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ABSTRACT 
 
YOUTH AND STATUS IN TAMIL NADU, INDIA 
Constantine V. Nakassis 
Asif Agha (supervisor) 
This sociocultural anthropological study looks at youth culture in Tamil Nadu, India, 
focusing on college-age youth in Madurai and Chennai. The dissertation first shows how 
youth experience their position in the larger Tamil society as “being outside of.” This 
exteriority is manifest in youth concepts of status and gender, the signs and activities 
which express such status and gender, and the social spaces in which such signs and 
activities are played out. In particular, the dissertation focuses on how the youth peer 
group is dually shaped as an exterior space of youth status negotiation—as exterior to 
adult norms of authority (and thus a space of status-raising qua transgression) and as 
exterior to norms of hierarchical ranking (and thus an egalitarian space of status-leveling, 
intimacy, and reciprocity). It is this tension between status-raising and -lowering which 
the dissertation shows to be crucially at play in how youth engage with and deploy 
various status-ful signs. In particular, the dissertation focuses on youth’s engagement 
with English and Tamil-English hybridized slang, commercial hero-centered Tamil films 
and their heroes, and (counterfeit) Western brands and fashion. In addition to focusing on 
youth engagement with such forms, the dissertation also looks at the production and 
circulation of youth-oriented Tamil film and (counterfeit) branded garments. The 
dissertation argues that we can only make sense of such cultural forms and their 
production and circulation by situating them with respect to youth concepts of status and 
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their negotiation in the peer group. Based on this discussion the dissertation offers critical 
commentary on academic literatures of globalization, film reception, and the semiotics of 
the brand.  
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I use the following abbreviations: adv. = adverbial suffix; +/-hon. = presence/absence 
of honorification; lit. = literally; n. = noun; nom. = nominalization (verbal noun); pers. = 
grammatical category of person; Vrb = verb; VrbAVP = adverbial form of the verb (Vrb + 
past tense marker + u); b. = born; dir. = director. 
 
Note on names 
All names are pseudonyms to protect the privacy of my informants, except for major 
places (e.g., Chennai, Madurai, Erode, Tiruppur, etc.), public figures (e.g., Rajinikanth, 
Vijay, etc.), or films. For such proper names I use the standardized transliterations rather 
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Thiruppuur, Madurai instead of Mathurai, Paruthiveeran instead of Paruththiviiran). 
Similarly I maintain the spellings of words commonly used in the English language 
literature rather than use the transliteration system of the dissertation (e.g., dharma 
instead of tharma). 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction: Youth and Status in Tamil Nadu, India 
 
1. Introduction  
When I arrived in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu to conduct my fieldwork, I 
originally thought I would be working on the dynamics of college students’ engagement 
with films about college students. Instead I found myself drawn to other questions, 
particularly related to issues of classification. Indeed, to make sense of the social world of 
the youth around me required me to delve into and understand how various classifications 
made the social realities at hand pragmatically intelligible for them. I found myself 
wondering “what do goatee beards, sunglasses, English, motorcycles, love, Western 
brands, earrings, smoking, drinking, long and dyed hair, riding the bus from the outside 
while hanging onto the window with one hand, casually combing one’s hair, whistling in 
the cinema hall, music television video jockeys (VJs), (college) rowdies (‘thugs’), and 
film heroes like Super Star Rajinikanth have in common? Why and how are these 
commodity signs, grooming habits, leisure activities, interpersonal emotions, and mass-
mediated personae seen as similar and talked about in similar ways? Why do they 
populate youth’s social reality and imagination? And what are the entailments to such 
classifications?” In small part, through its discussion of youth peer groups, concepts of 
gender and status, film representations and their re-animation in the peer group, and the 
production and consumption of (counterfeit) brands this dissertation speaks to my own 
fascination with the contingencies and necessities of classification and their imbrication 
in the (meta-)pragmatics of Tamil youth’s everyday lives. 
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One way to frame the materials dealt with in the dissertation is as consisting of a 
shifting terrain of register formations centered around ‘youth’ (as per Agha’s work on 
registers: 2003, 2005, 2007a, n.d.).1 When we speak of a register we speak of a repertoire 
of signs linked to a particular model of conduct and the performable figures of 
personhood characteristic of (or that emblematize) such conduct, relative to some social 
domain of individuals. The register, then, describes a regularity of meta-pragmatic 
construal (or stereotype) linked to some classification of signs.2 This classification is 
often multi-modal, including, for example, speech, dress, and bodily comportment. Under 
the register’s meta-pragmatic regimentation all such signs are seen as (by degrees) iconic 
with each other, belying a meta-semiotic leakage across sign forms, so that, for example, 
speech forms seem like (and similarly act as indexes like) dress forms. The register, 
however, is a model of conduct; that is, a regularity (or we might say, a genre following 
Bakthin [1986]) of meta-pragmatic activity regimenting instances of sign use vis-à-vis 
their socially normative construal (and thus, if felicitous, pragmatic efficaciousness) in 
context. This means that registers, as a normative principle (the norm of the register), are 
subject to, and in fact live through, their (re-)contextualization; that is to say, through 
tropic reformulations of the register. It is the dialectic between norm and trope (and their 
relative volatility) which accounts for both the maintenance of register formations socio-
historically and the emergence of new registers. If so meta-semiotically reanalyzed and 
construed, the normalization (or enregisterment) of such tropic textualities leads to new 
 
1 When talking about youth qua young people I don’t use single quotes. When talking about the age 
category ‘youth’ I use single quotes.  
2 Meta-pragmatic refers to that which is about the pragmatics of some other thing. A meta-pragmatic 
construal, then, is a construal of the pragmatics of some sign (e.g., that the pronunciation of a certain word 
sounds ‘dumb,’ ‘smart,’ ‘beautiful,’ etc.). Meta-pragmatic regimentation, then, is the ability/attempt to 
control (or regiment) the pragmatics of some set of other (object) signs.  
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register formations, which too may be troped upon (and re-normalized) ad infinitum. We 
can see, then, that the register is simply the most robust and salient case of a larger 
semiotic dynamic between the creativity of signs in context and their canalization into 
socially perdurable social facts (with respect to their intelligibility and construal) through 
reflexive semiotic acts.  
In short, the notion of the register is a way to understand difference—between types 
of signs, types of construals, types of users, and types of meta-semiosis—and thus a way 
to theorize classification as it is imbricated in contexts of reflexive semiosis. It is in its 
sensitivity to and theorization of the contextual embeddedness and socio-historical 
volatility that the register concept differs from accounts of classification that are familiar 
to us from the history of social thought: from Kant’s (1998[1789]) attempts to ground 
secure knowledge in transcendent cognitive classifications; Morgan’s (1970[1870]) work 
on kinship structures; Durkheim and Mauss’ (1963) and Levi-Strauss’ (1963[1962]) 
interest in totemism and kinship; Saussure’s (1986[1915]) exploration of the arbitrariness 
of the linguistic sign; Foucault’s (1984[1966]) “order of things”; Bakthin’s (1986) 
heteroglossia of speech genres and chronotopes; to classic linguistic anthropological 
discussions on the relationship between language and culture (Boas [1974(1889)] and 
Sapir [1949(1925)] on the phoneme; Whorf [1956] on grammatical classifications). All 
such authors treat classifications as pre-given objects for analysis. As the above 
discussion shows, however, the register concept is nothing without the specification of 
the semiotic principles upon which classifications come into being and change (trope, 
reanalysis, meta-pragmatic regimentation, etc.) and how the social life of registers is the 
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life of its classifications (rather than somehow exterior to it) as they act as conditions of 
possibility for semiosis in context. 
I have suggested, then, that we may see male youth culture in Tamil Nadu as 
organized by a terrain of register formations whereby the “college hero,” “college 
rowdy,” “matured youth,” “chinna paiyan” (‘small boy’), TV VJs, and film heroes like 
Rajinikanth are performable figures of personhood linked to semiotic repertoires (ripped 
jeans, Tamil-English hybridized slang, motorcycles, etc.) for a social domain (young 
men) that enable particular pragmatic effects in context, and thus serve as inputs for other 
sorts of social activities (e.g., status-raising in the peer group, impressing a girl, etc.).  
That said, however, I have not organized the dissertation according to named (or 
unnamed) registers of ‘youth.’ Instead I have posed the question as such: what is the logic 
which makes all of these semiotic forms enregisterable in similar ways, such that there is 
a meta-semiotic leakage between the sub-registers that fall under the (enregistered) age-
set ‘youth’ (i.e., that the college rowdy [‘thug’], the matured youth, Rajinikanth all 
fractionally function in the same way)? I treat ‘youth,’ then, as a kind of meta-register 
which organizes a number of sub-registers or “voices” (Agha 2005) that center around 
personae which themselves are variously indexed by the semiotic forms mentioned 
above. Rather than focusing on the differences between these semiotic repertoires, I have 
instead looked at the leakage of these forms into each other—that is, their commonality 
across sub-registers—and thus organized my discussion around the logic of these partial 
and overlapping register formations. What is the overall logic of this classification, its 
semiotic repertoires and their indexical values, and their enmeshment in the social 
contexts of youth interaction? 
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The short answer is that it is tropes of exteriority—themselves reanalyses off of the 
“objective” age structure/hierarchy in Tamil Nadu which youth are by degrees exterior 
to—which motivate the construal of different sign forms as indexically linked to different 
social types: that is, the semiotic repertoire of signs linked to ‘youth’ (and its various sub-
registers) are all seen as ‘exterior to’ ‘society’ (‘society’ being an equally enregistered set 
of alter [sub-]registers: the periya aaL [‘big man,’ ‘adult’], the actual rowdy, the white-
collar office worker). Further, as the dissertation shows, this logic of ‘youth,’ or 
‘exteriority,’ only has traction in the lives of youth insofar as it is able to speak to their 
concerns—which themselves are organized by the same logic of exteriority—as they play 
out in the peer group—itself constituted by such activity as an exterior space. The caveat, 
then, is that classifications live through their ability to be contextualized and 
recontextualized, regularized over multiple moments of semiosis and troped upon, by 
degrees, in various contexts and for various goals.  
Indeed, youth culture is, like all social terrain, a constantly shifting ground. The 
assumption of the dissertation, then, is not only that there is a particular kind of 
coherence to Tamil youth cultural forms, but to unpack this is to understand that social 
life is reflexively built upon signs in use (object-signs in context) and typifications of 
signs in use (meta-signs in context). We see this in chapters 2 and 3 through youth’s 
meta-semiotic troping upon signs from (adult) ‘society’ to achieve pragmatic aims in the 
peer group (status-raising and -leveling). In chapters 4 and 5 we look at how filmic 
representations are meta-pragmatically prefigured so as to be re-animated (and thus 
recontextualized) in the kinds of interactional work described in chapters 2 and 3. In 
chapters 6–8 we take up the consumption and production of branded forms, looking at 
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how particular semiotic objects like brands come to be meta-semiotically imbued with 
particular indexical valences so as to achieve the kinds of status work discussed 
throughout the dissertation.  
 
2. Liberalization in India 
This dissertation is not about liberalization or globalization in India per se, though 
economic liberalization and the changes wrought by it are a crucial backdrop to my 
discussion. Since independence, the official ideology of national development (a 
projection of the imagination of the [old] middle classes) was entrenched within the 
Nehruvian nationalist vision of a “gradual” or “passive” revolution (Frankel 1978). With 
time the linkage between the interests of the middle classes and this Nehruvian vision 
was loosened and governmental policy was increasingly reoriented toward this new, 
splintering middle-class imaginary (Kaviraj 1997; Khilnani 1999; Brass 2000; 
Deschpande 2003). This began at the policy level in the 1980s under Rajiv Gandhi with 
the mild liberalization of certain economic sectors (e.g., electronics, especially as linked 
to television). Such changes were expanded with the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 
early 1990s which began with the 1991 Union Budget. This was necessitated by the crisis 
of balance of payment and the increasing pressure, post–USSR breakup, from the United 
States, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank to liberalize the economy 
(Pendakur and Kapur 1997; Pathania 1998; Jenkins 1999; Rajagopal 2001). India’s debt 
had reached an all-time high and the NEP aimed at stabilizing the foreign exchange 
deficit. More than that, however, it also aimed at a fundamental break with the Nehruvian 
discourse of the “socialistic” pattern of society (Rajagopal 2001).  
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The NEP decreased the number of restrictions and controls on state monopolies, 
liberalized industrial licensing, lessened controls on manufacturing consumer goods and 
their prices, lowered taxes, reduced customs duty on electronics, increased foreign 
exchange allowance, and made remittances from non-resident Indians easier. In short, 
this meant opening up the Indian economy to global capital. Foreigners were allowed to 
raise their equity to 51 percent in Indian companies and increasing amounts of money 
were approved for foreign investment (Jenkins 1999: ch. 2). In effect, this reversed the 
Nehruvian economic policies of import substitution and emphasis on heavy industries 
toward export-oriented production, on the one hand, and a service-sector economy and 
consumerism on the other (Pendakur 1991; Rajagopal 1999; Jenkins 1999; Fernandes, 
2000a, b, 2001; Mazzarella 2003, 2005; Lukose 2009). 
 This change in economic focus was accompanied by a number of other changes 
which form the context for my study. First, there was an increased availability of 
consumer goods on the market, both from imports and from domestic production. The 
latter can be divided into two types: goods made for domestic consumption and goods 
made for export (which inevitably leak into the local market via export surplus and 
counterfeiting; chapter 7). The effect, in short, was the increased proliferation of 
consumables and Western branded forms. It is precisely these which have been taken up 
by youth in their own activities, as I discuss in chapters 3 and 6.  
This went along with the explosion of media—especially (satellite) television, home 
entertainment, and later the internet—and thus advertising as well (Mazzarella 2003). 
This was itself spurred by the presence of more players (global or otherwise), cheaper 
hardware and investment by the government in infrastructure. A number of authors have 
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linked this expansion of media to the increased presence in mass-media representations of 
the “new” middle classes as modern, global, urban, and conspicuously consuming (Ninan 
1995; Brosius and Butcher 1999; Mankekar 1999; Chaudhuri 2004[2000]; Fernandes, 
2000a, b; Butcher 2003; Mazzarella 2003, 2005). I would point out that such a changing 
media landscape, in addition to being class-specified, is marked by age as well, 
foregrounding ‘youth’ as a particularly vibrant, if vulnerable, part of this new aspirational 
atmosphere (Butcher 1999, 2003, 2004; Juluri 2002; Lukose, 2005a, 2009).3 
In addition to the expansion of television, internet, and print media, after 
liberalization film—the dominant medium in Tamil Nadu, then and today—became 
reoriented toward youth. The increase in television watching went along with a shift in 
film theater audiences. With the increased time available for broadcasting, there was a 
large increase in time for programming without an equal increase in original 
programming content, leading to films and film-related shows crowding the air (Agrawal 
1998; Pendakur 2003; Page and Crawley 2001; Butcher 2003). This has contributed to 
older people going to the theater less and less (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995; 
Nakassis and Dean 2007). Moreover, the increasing availability of relatively inexpensive 
VCD and DVD technology (itself made possible by liberalization), piracy, and the lack of 
renting have meant that profits must be recouped in theaters (or at least are so perceived 
by film producers). As the family as cinema-watching unit has receded, youth have 
become the main component of the audience (Derne 2000; Osella and Osella 2004; 
Nakassis and Dean 2007). And because moviegoing is problematic for young women 
 
3 This also played into the figurement of higher education as central to such projects of social mobility, and 
increasingly as a commodity itself to be consumed so as to further the nation and better the self (Lukose 
2009). See below for more discussion.  
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given norms of female modesty in public (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Lukose 2009) this 
has meant that movies, even more than before, are increasingly tailored to young men and 
their peer groups (chapters 4–5).  
Liberalization has also resulted in changes to colleges. In Tamil Nadu, the 
privatization of college education and the increase in engineering colleges (Fuller and 
Narasimha 2006), semi-private “autonomous” colleges and self-financing programs,4 and 
“parallel colleges” and private tutoring centers (of which spoken English learning centers 
are a huge part) (Lukose 2009) has catered to and created an increase in the demand for 
higher education across social community, sex, and region (urban, rural) (Chitnis 2003).5 
The linkage of higher education to social mobility (Beteille 1993[1991]; Osella and 
Osella 2000b; Jeffrey et al. 2008; Lukose 2009), both in terms of getting jobs (especially 
for men) and in terms of marrying up (especially for women) (Vatuk 1972, 1982, 1994; 
Sharma 1986; Dube 1988; Uberoi 1993; Jeffrey and Jeffrey 1994; Mukhopadhyay and 
Seymour 1994; Mukhopadhyay 1994; Seymour 1994, 2002; Ullrich 1994; Singh 1996; 
Ahmad 2003) is an important reason for the increase in the number of people going to 
college. This has expanded ‘youth’ both in terms of age and social domain, due to the 
 
4 An autonomous college is a college whose administration and funding structure is left relatively free from 
governmental direction. Such colleges have, thus, more scope for changing syllabi, creating departments, 
and disciplining students. Self-financing refers to courses where the costs of the instructors, classrooms, etc. 
are borne by students’ tuitions rather than government subsidies. Self-financing courses are linked to the 
privatization of higher education whereby the government decided not to provide funding for courses not 
already in the educational curriculum. In contrast to self-financing, aided means that the government 
subsidizes the college for such courses, both in terms of instructors’ salaries and students’ tuitions.  
5 The Government of India reports 9,954,000 students (40 percent women) in 16,885 colleges, a growth in 
number of students of thirty-three times since Independence (Government of India, Dept. of Education 
2006; Visaria, 1998: 37). In Tamil Nadu, there are twenty-two universities, over four hundred colleges and 
over three hundred technical institutes (Pillay 2004), with over 480,000 students (Government of India, 
Dept. of Education 2006), though the numbers were certainly larger when I did my fieldwork from 2007 to 
2009. 
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extended time spent in education as well as the increased pressures on young people to 
earn (and recuperate capital spent on education) before marriage (Jeffrey et al. 2008).  
The privatization of education has also had other effects on colleges (Sebastian n.d.). 
The growth of the Information Technologies (IT) sector (itself made possible by 
liberalization) has led to the demand for more engineering courses to funnel labor into 
such high-paying sectors (Fernandes 2000b; Fuller and Narasimha 2006). This has led to 
decreased interest among the “creamy layer” (those with the highest marks or the most 
money) in liberal arts colleges and the civil service employment that liberal arts colleges 
traditionally served as a means to; within liberal arts education, this has lead to increased 
interest in computer science, commerce, and science courses (that can lead to Masters 
degrees in IT) and English (that can lead to call center jobs) to the detriment of other 
disciplines.6 Privatization has also resulted in many colleges instituting self-financing 
courses to meet the demands for such new courses, which has lead to increased numbers 
of women on traditionally all-male campuses.7 There has emerged, then, a division 
between types of colleges (engineering versus liberal arts) and within liberal arts colleges 
between departments linked to speculative future income and thus (economic) status. 
Aided government colleges are the most affected by this, and their student bodies—like 
 
6 Departments have clear rankings within the colleges. These are mapped onto perceived status of 
profession, which itself is a speculative calque from the economic opportunities afforded by various jobs. 
Hence commerce positions (which allow the possibility of MBA positions) and computer science positions 
(which allow entrance to the IT sector) are more valued than physics and mathematics. Physics and 
mathematics allow a student to study a Masters of Computer Applications, and thus are more valued than 
English. English, however, allows increased access to call center jobs, and thus are more valuable the other 
sciences (chemistry, botany) which in turn are more valued than the humanities. The lowest departments in 
this hierarchy are economics, history, and Tamil. Such departments have, in recent years since the 
emergence of engineering colleges, suffered increasingly lower enrollments and decreased quality of 
students (as reckoned by administrators and teachers at least) (see chapter 3, section 3.3).  
7 This is because administrators want to have a maximum-sized applicant pool. By only having men apply 
that pool is cut in half. Further, self-financed courses are subject to the decisions of the administration more 
directly and less tied to (conservative) bureaucratic structures which control decisions for aided courses. 
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those of liberal arts colleges in general—increasingly come from more working-class 
(and thus presumably lower-caste) and rural backgrounds. This means that many college 
students have likely not gone to English-medium schooling. While colleges are supposed 
to be mainly conducted in English, this tension between English level and expectation 
produces a particular kind of dynamic surrounding English use involving the 
simultaneous desire and necessity to speak in English coupled with an anxiety about not 
speaking it well enough or speaking it too well (discussed in chapters 2 and 3).  
In short, liberalization has resulted in the availability to youth of new commodity 
signs, media programming, and institutions that increasingly appellate them. This has 
itself changed the contours of the category ‘youth’ and how it is engaged with, 
performed, and troped upon by young people. While my discussion in the dissertation 
does not specifically focus on liberalization per se it will be clear in the discussions of 
youth peer groups and social spaces (chapter 2), concepts of status (chapter 3) and their 
extensions in film (chapters 4 and 5) and branded forms (chapters 6–8) that liberalization 
is the most general context in which all such activities unfold.  
 
3. Where, what, and with whom I studied 
My fieldwork was situated in three areas of study in the south Indian state of Tamil 
Nadu (figure 1.1) from June 2007 to May 2009: (1) among (college-going) youth in 
Madurai and Chennai (section 3.1 below); (2) in youth-targeting media: primarily, music 
television channels (in Madurai and Chennai) and commercial film (in Chennai) (section 
3.2 below); and (3) the production and distribution of branded garments, authentic and 
counterfeit (in Madurai, Chennai, Erode, and Tiruppur) (section 3.3).  
 
Figure 1.1 Map of Tamil Nadu 
 
3.1. College students and other youth 
3.1.1 Madurai 
The first city I did my research in was Madurai, a (r)urban center (population of 
roughly one million people) in the largely rural south of Tamil Nadu, India. Madurai is 
often described as a ‘large village’ due to its reputation as a relatively conservative place 
where “Tamil culture” is still followed and ‘pure’ Tamil is still spoken; its close ties with 
agricultural production in the city peripheries; and the constant influx of migrants from 
rural areas. I picked Madurai because: (1) I had previously conducted research there; (2) 
it is presumably more conservative and less cosmopolitan than other cities in the state 
like Chennai or Coimbatur but is undergoing rapid change; and (3) it has a large number 
of colleges of repute and age which attract a highly mixed population (by location, class, 
caste/community, etc.). 
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In Madurai I worked in three colleges over the span of an academic year: a Christian 
liberal arts men’s college (though its graduate departments are coed and its self-financing 
undergraduate departments went coed in 2007); a Christian women’s liberal arts college; 
and a (Hindu) coed liberal arts college. The Christian colleges are of high repute in the 
city and cater to relatively higher-income families, though the recent changes described 
above have entailed a sizable rural and working-class population. Both Christian colleges 
are highly mixed by caste, religion, class, region and language. The Hindu college caters 
to a slightly more working-class and rural-commuting population, though it is also a 
college of repute in the city. All three colleges have both aided and self-financing 
programs.  
I lived in two undergraduate (UG) hostels in the Christian men’s college during my 
time in Madurai (a self-financing hostel for four months, an aided hostel for five months; 
the first hostel with two third-year roommates, the second with two first-year 
roommates). I attended classes in multiple departments, aided and self-financed, 
undergraduate and postgraduate (PG). I participated in youth activities inside and outside 
of the college: sitting on campus chatting and people-watching; going to restaurants, tea 
shops, bars, parks, and temples; shopping trips; roaming the city; cinema outings; 
watching television; going to concerts and other functions; playing sports, etc. I also 
conducted a series of film screenings and targeted television-watching sessions with the 
hostel students followed by group discussions. I did interviews with day scholars 
(‘commuting students’) and hostel students individually and in groups, both male and 
female, UG and PG. I also did interviews with college administrators and teachers.  
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In the Hindu men’s college I went to UG and PG classes in multiple departments 
(aided and self-financed); interviewed male and female UG (aided, self-financed) and PG 
students, administrators and teachers; went to college functions (including an overnight 
trip to an intercollegiate competition in Coimbatur); and generally hung out and 
participated in college social life.  
In the women’s college I conducted interviews with administrators, teachers, and UG 
and PG students; screened films for the hostel students followed by group discussion; and 
hung out with the students on campus as described above.  
In addition to my work with college youth, I also kept a residence in north Madurai 
where I interacted regularly with a group of local youth (in their mid to late twenties) 
some of whom had gone to college, but most of whom had not. This peer group was 
mixed by caste/community (Dalit, Thevar, Pillaimar, Brahmin, and Muslim) and class, 
but mainly lower(-middle) class. They were engaged in semi-permanent work. I also did 
some research (interviews and participant observation) with a branch of the Rajinikanth 
fan club in Madurai.  
 
3.1.2 Chennai 
I picked Chennai as a site because: (1) It is the state capital and the most 
cosmopolitan city in the state; and (2) it is the center of film production and much of 
television and print production.  
In Chennai I did research in two colleges: a Christian college of elite standing (though 
also undergoing the same processes detailed above) and a government college of historic 
repute but much affected by the changes in student body detailed above. Both colleges 
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have aided and self-financing programs. Both were all-male at the UG and coed at the PG 
level, though the Christian college had two coed departments at the UG level.  
At the elite college I stayed in one of the hostels for approximately four months with 
a single first-year UG roommate who was part of the coed department in which I spent 
most of my time. I attended classes in various departments (UG, aided and self-financed); 
interviewed hostel students and day scholars (male and female, aided and self-financed), 
administrators, and teachers; and generally hung out (as described above). I focused most 
of my time on one particular coed department, and attended college functions and 
culturals competitions with them, as well as went on a week-long college tour 
(‘excursion’; discussed in chapter 2, section 3.3.5).  
In the government college I attended UG (aided and self-financed) and PG classes in 
a number of departments; interviewed hostel students and day scholars, administrators, 
and teachers; and generally hung out on campus. I spent most of my time, however, 
among students of a particular bus route (students who ride the same bus route to 
college), hanging out with them both inside and outside of the college (e.g., at their bus 
stand, on the bus). I attended and participated in their annual bus day, which I discuss in 
more detail in chapter 3, section 2.3.1. While in the elite college I interviewed and hung 
out with both men and women, in the government college I mainly spent time with men.  
As I did in Madurai, in Chennai I kept a nearby residence. There I spent time with a 
group of middle-class bachelors working in low-level IT industries, as well as young 
working-class men who lived in the area. Both groups informed my research.  
In the dissertation I often simply speak of “youth.” I do this when my observations of 
college youth are consonant with the non-college-going youth that I spent time with. 
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Otherwise I explicitly specify college-going youth. Similarly, for observations that apply 
to both male and female youth, I do not qualify “youth” (see chapter 2, section 2.1 for 
discussion of this).  
 
3.2. Mass-media production 
3.2.1 Television 
While in Madurai I did participant observation at a local music television station for 
over two months. Here I was particularly interested in compering (‘television hosting,’ 
‘VJ-ing’), fashion, and the use of Tamil and English on air. I became interested in this 
because youth often cited music television comperes as exemplary users of Tamil-
English hybridized slang (“Tanglish”) and fashion, both of which they typified as status-
ful (“style”). To investigate this I spent time at the studio, interviewed comperes, 
technicians, and program directors. I even hosted a couple of shows myself, including a 
Valentine’s Day special where I fielded live calls in Tamil about love with my wife 
(fiancée at the time). (No other Madurai couple was willing to appear on camera to share 
their love experiences!) 
In Chennai I worked at Southern Spice (SS) Music, a music television station of 
regional (and national) repute. While founded as a south Indian multilingual station (it 
boasted VJs who spoke in the south Indian languages of Tamil, Kannada, Telugu, and 
Malayalam; as well as Hindi and English), it was mainly an English and Tamil-language 
station when I worked there (itself a recent change in the history of the channel). SS 
Music was something like the MTV of south India, and at one point was in talks with 
Viacom to become their face in south India. This station was very popular among urban 
youth and college-going Madurai youth. Here I interviewed producers, technicians 
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(editors, camera men, stylists), the VJs, program directors, and marketers. I did work for 
the station on shoots, writing scripts and web content, as well as hosting one show and 
being a reality-television participant in another. While in Chennai I also interviewed 
producers and comperes from a Tamil-language music television station popular among 
youth across the state.  
 
3.2.2 Film 
While in Chennai I did extensive work on the production of youth cinema. This 
included interviews with producers, directors, actors, cameramen, editors, music 
directors, fight choreographers, dance choreographers, costumers, and stylists. I also did 
participant observation on one particular movie (for a total of four months), doing script 
copyediting, location scouting, working on film and photo shoots, and attending editing 
sessions and meetings with producers. I also attended film industry functions (film 
puujas,8 audio releases, film releases, 100 day ceremonies) and industry social events 
(birthday parties, release parties). I also did library research in Chennai on film reviews 
of past youth-oriented films. 
 
3.2.3 Print and radio 
In Chennai I conducted interviews with those involved in the English- and Tamil-
language print press that focused on youth. I also did a set of interviews with youth-
oriented radio programmers and radio jockeys in Madurai.  
 
3.3 Textiles 
 
8 A puuja is a Hindu worship ceremony; in this case to ensure the successful undertaking of the film. 
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The third part of my research focused on the production of branded garments and 
accessories that were popular among the youth I worked with. This work took place in 
Madurai (where I interviewed retailers of export-surplus and counterfeit brands); Chennai 
(where I interviewed retailers, distributors/wholesalers, a sourcing agent for Western 
brands, and producers and designers of counterfeit brands and quasi-brands); and Erode 
and Tiruppur (where I interviewed distributors, wholesalers, and producers of authentic 
branded goods for export and counterfeit branded goods for the local market; as well as 
with factory owners and owners of retail outlets [for both authentic and counterfeit 
goods]). I spent time in the districts for wholesale counterfeit and export-surplus sales in 
Chennai, Tiruppur and Erode, as well as visited a number of factories and workshops in 
Tiruppur, Erode, and Chennai. 
 
4. Overview of the chapters 
I have divided the dissertation into three parts:  
Part I. Age, Status, and Gender (chapters 2–3), 
Part II. Style and Film (chapters 4–5), 
Part III. Style and the Brand (chapters 6–8). 
In chapter 2 I look at the age category ‘youth’ in Tamil Nadu as the intersection 
between (understandings of) the life cycle, institutions of schooling and marriage, and 
mediatized discourses such as fashion and film. I show how central to this age category is 
a trope of exteriority; that is, youth are figured as exterior to ‘society’ (i.e., kin and caste 
hierarchy), as liminally situated between and constantly distancing themselves from the 
age categories ‘child’ (chinna paiyan, lit. ‘small child/boy’) and ‘adult’ (periya aaL, lit. 
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‘big man’). I then look at how this trope organizes youth spaces, youth peer groups, youth 
activities and their associated semiotic registers.  
In particular, I show how youth peer groups—the main site of youth activity and 
status negotiation—are constructed through two inflections of exteriority: exteriority 
from norms of ‘society’ and its authority structures and exteriority from age and caste 
hierarchies. Thus, the peer group is simultaneously a space that motivates status-raising 
acts through transgression and a space marked by intimacy, egalitarianism (or at least the 
idea of it), and constant status-leveling and peer pressure. The main aim of chapter 2 is to 
show how the construction of ‘youth’ is diagrammatic, or indexically iconic, of (a) 
youth’s positionality vis-à-vis ‘society’ and (b) their concepts of status as they are played 
out in various contexts. In later chapters I explore how this diagrammaticity is mapped 
onto various semiotic registers such as youth film (part II) and branded apparel and 
accessories worn by youth (part III).  
In chapter 3 I examine youth concepts of status, in particular, style and geththu (akin 
to ‘cool’ and ‘badass,’ respectively, in the U.S.). I show how these are iconic with ‘youth’ 
in their logic (both diagram exteriority) while at the same time reinscribing the diacritics 
of ‘adult’ ‘society’ that they eschew through troping on them, whereby ‘child’ and ‘adult’ 
are re-signified as relative terms for deficient and valorized youth masculinity. I compare 
and contrast style and geththu with regards to the semiotic registers of which they are 
typifications, as well as to the meta-pragmatic stereotypes of (class-linked) personhood 
such terms invoke. I then situate these concepts in the dynamics of the peer group; in 
particular, I look at how status-raising typified as style or geththu is mediated in the peer 
group through genres of status-leveling (teasing, ragging, humor, gift giving, fighting). 
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This is an extension of the discussion in chapter 2 where I argue that the dialectically 
linked forces of the youth peer group—status-raising and -leveling—are the result of the 
construction of ‘youth’ and the zones of its deployment (youth peer groups) as 
simultaneously exterior (and thus status-transgressive) and highly intimate (and thus 
status-conservative). I show how these forces produce highly hybridized and negotiated 
youth cultural forms, thus revealing the ambivalence of youth status. I then return to the 
question of gender and why doing style is so problematic for women. I conclude with 
reflections on globalization and the idea that youth “negotiate” globalization in their 
activities.  
If in chapters 2 and 3 I am concerned with how particular signs are taken as iconic of 
‘youth’ and thus are capable of indexically entailing status in face-to-face activity, in 
chapters 4 and 5 I am concerned with the mass-mediation of ‘youth’ and how youth 
engage with such mass-mediated representations of youth status. In chapter 4 I analyze 
commercial Tamil hero-oriented cinema as the narrativization of youth status as played 
out in the peer group. I give particular attention to the popular actor Rajinikanth, looking 
at the representation of status and style in his oeuvre. I then turn to the villain and 
comedian as characters who are constructed as inverse images of the hero, and thus as 
deficient models of status (the villain as excessive status; the comedian as mismatched 
status). What I show is that the image of status portrayed in such films is completely 
intelligible within the logic of the youth peer group (both in terms of the semiotic 
repertoires involved, the meta-pragmatic typifications of such repertoires, and the 
dynamics of status negotiation), thus articulating a critique of approaches to Tamil 
cinema which discuss such films through notions of realism/fantasy and (in)coherence. I 
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conclude with comments on the effects of liberalization on such cinema, arguing that they 
have intensified the logic of ‘youth’ already present in such films, thus making youth 
status even more central to Tamil film and its social life.  
In chapter 5 I look at how youth engage with and re-animate the images of status 
presented in the kinds of film discussed in chapter 4. First I look at how film acts as a 
source register for youth’s own status work. Next I look at the commonsensical 
hypothesis that youth imitate their favorite film heroes as an explanation for the fit 
between film images and youth performances of status. I argue that this hypothesis is 
flawed in a number of ways. Instead I argue that youth use film images because they are 
pragmatically efficacious in their own status and identity work (as discussed in chapters 2 
and 3) and that this use is independent of ‘liking’ or identifying with a film or its hero. 
Moreover, I show that hero-oriented films are designed with such active use and 
recontextualization in mind; that is, filmic forms presuppose a particular model of 
spectatorship so as to increase their own circulation (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 
2009). I further go on to show that film heroes themselves must negotiate their own status 
on- and off- screen according to the same logic of the youth peer group, and that this is 
the case because youth engage with heroes’ status-raising performances as they would 
with their own peers’ status-raising. I then go on to show how the construction of a 
status-ful filmic persona is done in and outside of the filmic text. I conclude the chapter 
arguing that the paradigm of “reception” is a flawed way of understanding Tamil youth’s 
engagement with filmic representations, arguing for the analytic frame of “re-animation” 
instead.  
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In part III I look at the consumption (chapter 6) and the production and circulation 
(chapter 7) of branded forms on garments worn by Tamil young men. Chapter 6 looks at 
how and why youth use branded forms in their efforts at status-raising in the peer group. I 
focus on youth’s interest in branded forms in general without a concomitant interest in 
particular brands as brands. I investigate this willful ignorance of brands under what I call 
the “aesthetics of brandedness” and link this to the concept of style. Over and above the 
brand concept, I argue that youth’s aesthetics of brandedness explain how and why youth 
are both interested and ignorant of branded forms, whether they be authentic, duplicate, 
fictive, or only loosely linked to existing branded forms. I conclude my discussion of 
chapter 6 by arguing that what is at stake for youth are not brands at all, but rather an 
alternative ontology (that of style), and thus that concepts like glocalization, while correct 
in highlighting the complexities of semiotic forms in the era of globalization, ultimately 
misunderstand the issue through assuming that we are talking about the “same” thing (of 
such-and-such a type) circulating from one place to another.  
In chapter 7 I look at how such branded forms are produced and circulated in south 
India. First I look at the role of export surplus in circulating particular brands and in 
providing particular models to be copied by small-time garment producers. I argue that it 
is because export surplus is calibrated with respect to markets outside of India that it can 
serve as a source register for the production and circulation of branded garments within 
India, both through providing cheap materials and through providing designs that are 
assumed by producers to be inherently attractive (and thus viable commodities for their 
target market: youth). I then look at how duplicates and the various deviations from 
branded designs get produced. I show that, just as in youth’s use and consumption of 
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branded forms, the production of such branded forms operates according to a willful 
ignorance of brands under an aesthetic of brandedness. It is this logic that explains both 
the variability of branded forms and their formulaic-ness. I conclude by arguing that 
some of the main assumptions of work on counterfeit brands—that they induce 
“confusion”; that they “dilute” brand image; or that they leach off of the “demand” for 
authentic brands—are only intelligible under the ontology of the BRAND as understood in 
brand meta-discourses of advertising and marketing, as well as intellectual property law; 
an ontology that I demonstrate not to be in play among the Tamil consumers or producers 
of such branded forms.  
The discussion of chapters 6 and 7 returns us to the question of classification, though 
ultimately as I have shown, the issue of how different semiotic forms are classified (e.g., 
as authentic, fictive, or counterfeit) cannot be understood outside of, on the one hand, the 
meta-semiotic discourses which imbue them with intelligibility and indexical value and, 
on the other hand, their situatedness in actual contexts of use (i.e., status-raising in the 
peer group). I theorize this in chapter 8 by relating my discussion of Tamil youth’s use of 
branded forms to work on brands in the social science and marketing literatures. I argue 
that ultimately the brand is a meta-semiotically regimented relationship between a set of 
tokens with respect to a brand type; and that such a type–token regularity holds under the 
larger ontology BRAND. I argue that this meta-semiotic organization of the brand is 
crucial to understand how and why it is that the brand concept holds little traction among 
Tamil youth. As I show, this raises serious questions for how we are to understand the 
brand in the West, if only because all analysis to date has essentialized and naturalized 
this category.  
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Having theorized the brand from the perspective of its ontological reanalysis by 
Tamil youth, I go on to look at the brand from the perspective of the duplicate or 
counterfeit. I do this by discussing Baudrillard’s concepts of simulation and simulacrum. 
I show that such concepts ultimately are of the same sign–meta-sign organization that I 
explicate earlier in the chapter, though of a special type. I apply this to the concept of the 
brand showing how, while the counterfeit under the ontology of BRAND is a 
Baudrillardian simulacrum (and thus ultimately reinvests the BRAND ontology with its 
reality), the Tamil youth usage of branded forms counts as a simulation of the BRAND 
ontology. This, however, forces us to reevaluate the implications of simulation as it is 
understood by Baudrillard. I argue, in fact, that we can use the concepts of simulation and 
simulacra as semiotic configurations that can and must be empirically investigated and 
that have no necessary entailments about the liquidation of reality or history, and thus 
need not be accompanied by the burdensome and normative anxieties about the creeping 
shadow of capitalism.  
 
In addition to being a contribution to the literatures on youth culture, mass media, and 
brands, one of the goals of the dissertation is to understand how the construction of 
‘youth’ as an age category among others (and thus, in a sense, as a sociohistorically 
located fact of “social structure”) is diagrammatic of a particular tropic logic of 
‘exteriority’ from ‘society’ (a reanalysis of that “social structure”) that recruits a range of 
signs in multiple media to perform a range of social personae linked to ‘youth’ that have 
regularity in their indexical entailments (e.g., of status-raising) and meta-pragmatic 
typification (e.g., as style, geththu).  
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Methodologically this dissertation demonstrates the necessity of studying social 
processes (and the signs through which they live) by articulating how their contexts of 
production, circulation, and consumption (or re-animation and use) are coordinated (or 
not). This often requires us to link otherwise disparate social contexts. For example, to 
understand the brand or film representations I argue that we must have a firm grasp on 
the dynamics of the youth peer group, insofar as the logic of the latter is a condition of 
possibility on the social life of the former. Further, as I argue in parts II and III this often 
requires us to attend not only to discourses about youth, film, and brands, but also to how 
these metasemiotic discourses are taken up (or not) in everyday life. It is this movement 
between micro- and macro-, between object- and meta-sign that I show to be essential if 
we ever want to get a firm understanding of the social reality of Tamil youth. 
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Part I. Age, Status, and Gender 
Chapter 2 – Youth as Exteriority 
 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter I look at how age, status, and gender are articulated in the concept of 
‘youth’ in Tamil Nadu. In particular, I show how the construction of ‘youth’ vis-à-vis the 
life cycle and age hierarchy (i.e., “social structure”) as ‘in between’ and ‘outside of’ is 
reanalyzed by youth through a trope of exteriority from the reified agent ‘society.’ I show 
how this is the central logic of youth culture, a theme that I build on variously throughout 
the dissertation. I then go on to analyze the constitution of youth spaces and the youth 
peer group as ‘exterior’ spaces that make the performance and experimentation with 
‘youth’ and its forms possible. In particular I show how the youth peer group is 
constituted both as a space of status-raising and -leveling, a theme that I take up in 
chapter 3.  
 
2. Age, status, and gender in Tamil Nadu 
2.1 ‘Youth,’ diagrammaticity, and gender  
In this section I look at the conceptualization of age set in Tamil society, focusing on 
the category of ‘youth.’ The literature on youth in Tamil Nadu is scant (Cormack 1961; 
Rogers 2008, 2009, forthcoming are exceptions), though a number of authors have 
focused on youth in Kerala (Osella and Osella, 1998, 1999, 2000a, b: ch. 7, 2002, 2004; 
Lukose 2005a, b, 2009) and Karnataka (partly among Tamil youth; Nisbett 2006, 2007), 
both neighboring south Indian states. Work on age in other areas of India and South Asia 
is more common: for example, on youth (Liechty 1995, 2003; Derne 1995, 2000; 
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Saraswathi 1999; Parameswaran 2001, 2002; Juluri 2002; Verma and Saraswathi 2003; 
Verma and Sharma 2003; Abraham 2004; Butcher 2004; Chopra 2004; Mathur and 
Parameswaran 2004; Srivastava 2004a, b; Jeffrey et al. 2008), adulthood (Madan 1965, 
1981; cf. Osella and Osella 2000b, 2006: ch. 2–3), and old age (Lamb 2000, 2002; 
Dumont 1960; Madan 1965, 1981).  
This chapter contributes to this literature by looking at the construction of ‘youth’ in 
Tamil Nadu. My specific interest is how the construction of ‘youth’ diagrams concepts of 
status and gender as they extend into social space and interaction. By diagram I draw on 
Peirce’s (1992) notion of iconicity.1 The diagram is an internally complex icon whereby 
the internal relations of one semiotic object—in this case, the construction of ‘youth’ as 
an age set—is similar to, is projected onto, and acts as a condition of intelligibility for 
some other set of phenomena (e.g., concepts of status, social spaces, socially desirable 
figures of personhood, commodity forms) as socially meaningful and thus pragmatically 
efficacious. 
My interest in the diagrammaticity of youth culture resonates with early work in 
British Cultural Studies. What British Cultural Studies pointed out clearly and effectively 
is that youth cultural forms diagram the liminal positionality of youth; in their case, of 
post–World War II British youth subcultures’ positionality vis-à-vis the “parent culture” 
(as both oppositional to and reproductive of its parents’ class position), the mainstream 
culture (as selectively appropriating its forms and troping on them), and social class 
relations more generally (Willis 1981[1977]; P. Cohen 1993[1972]; Clarke et al. 
 
1 The icon is the semiotic configuration wherein two objects are similar to each other in some regard such 
that one of them (the representamen) can stand in for, or represent, the other (the object) to the extent that 
they are seen to fulfill such roles (i.e., produce an interpretant). 
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1997[1975]; Hebdige 1979). While their analysis of this diagrammaticity as necessarily 
instantiating the dualism of ideology and resistance (or individual and society [Williams 
2001]) is highly problematic,2 the more general idea that the conditions under which 
‘youth’ is constructed are recursively diagrammed in the cultural forms which make up 
that youth culture is analytically useful.  
In this dissertation I focus mainly on male youth and often use the elliptical, or 
unqualified, term youth. I do this because the concept of ‘youth’ as used by Tamils 
themselves implicitly assumes that ‘youth’ and youth culture are prototypically, or 
tendentiously, male (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 307). Engaging with youth culture 
and being a ‘youth’ for women is, as I discuss variously in the dissertation, problematic 
for a number of reasons. Young women—more specifically, their chastity (kaRpu)—are 
assumed to be metonyms for the honor of the family, kin group, caste group, and “Tamil 
culture” writ large (David 1980; Reynolds 1980; Ram 2000; Ramaswamy 1997; 
Niranjana 2001: 48–55; Anandhi 2005; Seizer 2005; Rogers 2008: 90; on other areas of 
South Asia see Vatuk 1972; Bennett 1983; Das 1988; Dube 1988; Tarlo 1996; A. Kumar 
2002; Ahmad 2003; Sodhi and Manish 2003: 124; Abraham 2004; Lukose 2009). As 
such, controls on young women tend to be more stringent, and thus their participation in 
youth culture—which, for both young men and women, is proportional to the extent that 
they are disengaged from the control of the older generations—is limited and often 
problematic (Liechty 1996, 2003: 233; Saraswathi 1999; Verma and Sharma 2003; 
 
2 One recurrent critique is the overfocusing on class, and hence the insistence on reading resistance into 
every act (McRobbie 1991; Straiger 2005; S. Cohen 2002[1972]). This is something that follows from the 
generally thin ethnography (see S. Cohen 2002[1980]; Murdock 1993[1989]; Griffiths 1996; Peterson 2003 
on this point). Nevertheless, even in Hebdige’s (1979: 88–89) discussion there are brief discussions of 
youth subcultures which are tangential to class, but instead, for example, take up issues of gender. 
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Abraham 2004; Chopra 2004; Lukose 2009). This isn’t to say that young women don’t 
have an experience of ‘youth’ that is comparable with that of young men. They do. What 
it is to say, however, is that youth culture in Tamil Nadu is masculinized by its very 
construction. My discussion, then, focuses on male youth, though I discuss women’s 
participation in, and experience of, youth cultural forms and practices where relevant.  
 
2.2. ‘Youth’ as exteriority 
‘Youth’—iLainjar, pasangka, valiban, teenager, youngster, or youth—as it is 
understood in Tamil Nadu today is a relatively new age category (see Liechty 1995, 
2003; Saraswathi 1999; Nandy 2004[1987] for discussion on the emergence of ‘youth’ in 
other areas of South Asia). ‘Youth’ is located at the intersection of (understandings of) 
the life cycle and age hierarchy; institutions of schooling and marriage; the home; and, 
since liberalization, particular kinds of mediatized discourses (e.g., youth-oriented 
marketing, mass media, commodity addressivity).3  
First I show how the organization of the life cycle into hierarchically graded age 
categories middles ‘youth.’ Then I argue that it is this liminality that youth reanalyze 
through tropes of exteriority, which form an organizing logic for a number of youth 
practices, concepts of status, and social spaces, most important of which is the peer 
group.  
 
2.2.1 ‘Youth’ as social category 
 
3 For a similar understanding of ‘youth’ in Kerala see Lukose 2009: 13 and Osella and Osella 1998: 191. 
On youth as an appellated addressee of mass-mediated discourse in South Asia see Liechty 2003; 
Mazzarella 2003; Osella and Osella 2000; Lukose 2005a, 2009 (cf. Frank 1997, Clarke, Hall, Jefferson, and 
Roberts 1997[1975] for discussion in the contemporary West). 
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Within the life cycle ‘youth’ is negatively defined as in between the age sets 
kuzhanthaikaL (‘children’) and periyavarkaL (‘adults’; lit. ‘big/important people’); for 
men the more colloquial terms are chinna paiyan (lit. ‘small boy’) and periya aaL (lit. 
‘big/important person/man’).  
While children are contained within the school and the home, adults head households 
and institutions (e.g., of schooling). Children are dependents and adults have dependents. 
Children and youth are (expected to be) unemployed or do part-time, non-permanent 
work (Jeffrey et al. 2008), while male adults as householders are expected to engage in 
permanent full-time work. In short, children’s and adults’ place is linked to the 
household. Children and adults are within the fold of what youth refer to as the reified 
agent ‘society’ (samuugam, samuthaayam, society). ‘Society’ in such Tamil youth usage 
refers to, proximally, the kin and caste group and more abstractly to those who set the 
rules for legitimate social interaction (i.e., status-ful male adults or their proxies).4  
Where does this leave ‘youth’ then? In this scheme, ‘youth’ is located in between the 
objective age categories ‘child’ and ‘adult,’ and thus outside of the kin and caste group 
(literally and figuratively).5 As non-adults, they are excluded from participating in 
particular kinds of social activities and decision making (e.g., kin group decisions, caste 
politics, financial decisions), as well as from economies of status negotiation involving 
mariyaathai (‘respect’) and gauravam (‘prestige’) and their associated indexes (e.g., 
 
4 In my discussion of ‘adult’ ‘society,’ neither ‘adult’ nor ‘society’ should be taken as descriptions of how 
such entities work in the world, but how they must be taken to work by youth so that youth’s own activities 
and experiences (which rely on such reifications) are intelligible to them and pragmatically efficacious. 
Indeed, I do little to unpack what one could possibly mean by ‘society’ as an analytical construct useful for 
describing social life. Instead I use it as a placeholder (as youth themselves use it) to explicate youth 
sociality. 
5 I mean “objective” here in the sense of being relatively perduring social facts that exist trans-subjectively 
such that they can be presupposed across many social contexts. I don’t mean “objective” in the sense of 
“natural” or “universal.” 
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having dependents [wife, children], patronage, owning land, sartorial codes [e.g., wearing 
a veeshdi]). (For discussion of the Tamil concept of mariyaathai see D. Mines 2005: ch. 
4). These are the concerns of adults, while young men don’t have, and aren’t entitled to, 
any of these things (cf. Osella and Osella 1998: 191; 2000b: ch. 7).6 Moreover, youth are 
explicitly ranked below adults hierarchically, as reflected in prescribed honorific address 
and related deference behavior. On the other hand, youth are exempt in large part from 
the responsibilities and duties linked to the maintenance of kin/caste honor and the 
household, and thus afforded a modicum of independence from ‘society.’ 
As non-children, young men, while dependents, are given an increased amount of 
freedom in terms of moving through public space; usage of their free time; and their 
access to small amounts of spending money. This independence is amplified by 
educational institutions—which create age-equal peer groups in a space (supposedly) 
relatively unmarked by caste and kin—and by assumptions by both parents and 
administrators that young men naturally will exert their independence at this age (and this 
isn’t necessarily a bad thing).  
Indeed, young men are assumed to flaunt and transgress ‘society’ and its norms of 
authority (e.g., they will love, drink, smoke, cut class, fight, ‘do’ fashion, etc.). And while 
such transgressive ‘youth’ activities are explicitly disapproved of, implicitly they are 
expected and condoned and thus encouraged for young men (but not women). The double 
standard of ‘youth’ and its ‘boys will be boys’ attitude is reflected in the following 
proverb that one youth’s grandmother used to justify his transgressions: 
 
6 Indeed, as per D. Mines (2005: ch. 4) discussion of mariyaathai (also see Dickey 2009a), being excluded 
from status economies that accrue mariyaathai places young men exterior to the reference group of adult 
men, i.e., ‘society,’ and thus without (or outside of) mariyaathai. 
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“pasangka viiddukkuLLee irunthaa kedduppooyiduvaangka.  
poNNungka viidde viddu veLiyee poonaa kedduppooyiduvaangka.” 
 
‘If boys are kept inside the house, they’ll get spoiled. 
If girls are allowed outside of the house, they’ll get spoiled.’  
In addition to mapping youth masculinity vis-à-vis notions of interior and exterior space, 
this proverb highlights why ‘youth’ culture problematically applies to young women. 
Young women are treated as extensions, and thus emblems, of a hierarchically nested set 
of social groupings: HOME < KIN GROUP < CASTE GROUP < “TAMIL CULTURE.” The home is 
a feminized space for youth. The imperative for young men, then, is to be in public space, 
outside of the gaze of the kin group, and thus by implication to roam around and do 
‘mischief’ (see Jeffrey et al. 2008: 94, 179 on youth in Uttar Pradesh; Osella and Osella 
1998, 2000b; Lukose 2009 on Kerala; Nisbett 2006: 132 on Tamil youth in Bangalore). 
Indeed, one friend’s older sister complained to me that her son wasn’t getting good marks 
at his technical college. I asked if he was cutting class and going to the movies instead (a 
stereotypical youth activity). No, she replied, at least if he were doing that there would be 
some “viiram” (‘heroism,’ ‘masculinity’) in it. He would be doing what other kids his age 
do (i.e., getting more mature through bucking authority). As it is, she worries because he 
stays inside the home instead.  
In short, transgressive youth forms are, while exterior and often anathema to adults, 
condoned by them as long as they are contained by the gendered age set. For young men, 
they are expected to transgress because that is what boys do. More importantly, such 
transgressions further maturation, they don’t spoil it. They don’t ruin the honor of the 
family because young men are always already expected to be exterior to it. Compare this 
to transgressions by women, considered interior to the family/kin group/caste 
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group/culture. Transgressions are likely, in many households, to warrant a beating (if 
minor) and even death (if major).  
As located in between, young men are assumed to be, by degrees, exterior from both 
the objective age categories ‘child’ and ‘adult.’ More than this, below I show that youth 
themselves understand their position in ‘society’ as exterior; that is, youth reanalyze the 
“social structure” in which they are imbricated via a trope of exteriority.  
 
2.2.2 ‘Youth’ as reanalysis 
If schooling (in particular, plus 2 exams7) and eventually college inaugurate the 
gradual withdrawal of youth from the spaces of the home and kin group (and thus the age 
category ‘child’), marriage is its upper limit. Thus, the (normal) age of ‘youth’ for a man 
goes all the way up to 35 years old, the normative upper boundary of marriageable age 
(cf. Jeffrey et al. 2008: 31; Osella and Osella 1998: 191; Verma and Saraswathi 2003). 
This marks the beginning of serious filial responsibility and duties (and more 
importantly, being held to such responsibilities by one’s family). For our purposes here, 
more important than the question of when youth are inducted into adult society is how 
youth themselves understand this social fact. Youth talked about their experience of this 
age before marriage as a time of freedom, before which ‘real’ responsibilities and duties 
begin. Before that, they are ‘outside’ of the strictures and censure of the kin and caste 
group. This was pithily explained to me by one friend, Vignesh, in a conversation we had 
about the observance of caste. Vignesh explained that in the college, and in the peer 
 
7 Plus 2 exams are taken in order to continue studying up to the 11th and 12th standards. Parents often push 
for their children to study very hard for these exams. As it takes months for the results to be posted, after 
the plus 2 exams youth are generally given a respite for pressures to study. Many youth told me that they 
picked up their stereotyped ‘youth’ practices (drinking, smoking, using affinal kin terms with friends, etc.) 
only after these exams.  
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group in particular, caste was bracketed. Without missing a beat and with an air of regret, 
he went on to say that he fully expected to have to increasingly orient himself to caste 
after marriage. There was no choice, he noted matter of factly, ‘because that is how 
society is here. It makes you observe caste.’ As he put it: ‘After marriage we (all) have to 
go inside society/caste’ (“kalyaaNaththukku appuRam samugaththukkuLLee 
poogaNum”).  
At the same time that youth figure themselves as ‘exterior’ to the hierarchies and 
logics that govern adult life and ‘society’, youth also figure themselves as exterior to 
childhood as an age category marked by dependence upon adults and containment within 
the home. They reject the idea that like children they are immature and without the 
faculty and ability to fend for themselves, as students would often complain about the 
excessive rules of the college.  
This double distancing from childhood and adulthood is expressed in youth’s own 
reflexive understanding of what being a ‘youth’ is all about. As they explained, ‘youth’ is 
about playing, being free, not being tied down, being without responsibility, and 
transgressing boundaries. Young men are assumed to be quick-tempered and 
unreflective; direct and crude in their speech; bold, careless, and callous to the demands 
of family and ‘society’ and thus self-centered (also see Jeffrey et al. 2008: 191). They 
indulge themselves: they go to the movies, smoke cigarettes, drink, roam the town, do 
style, love, fight, and do other ‘mischief’ (cheeddai). They are the inverse image of the 
periya aaL ‘adult/big man,’ the responsible adult who upholds and enforces ‘society’ and 
‘culture,’ who thinks before he speaks, who speaks indirectly and wisely with 
mariyaathai (‘respect’), who is responsible not just for himself but for his dependents, 
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and is thus fully entwined in ‘society’ (M. Mines 1994; M. Mines and Gourishankar 
1990; cf. Osella and Osella 1998, 2000b; D. Mines 2005; Lukose 2009). They are also 
the inverse image of the chinna paiyan ‘child’ who cowers before and aligns with the 
authority of adults and ‘society.’ 
As such, youth feel themselves to be placed in a double bind: to obey and be 
independent. As I show below through the example of facial-hair grooming, young men’s 
reflexive response to their exterior position in social structure is the refusal of the forms 
and diacritics of both childhood and adulthood.8  
 
2.2.3 Example: The mustache  
In Tamil Nadu the mustache is the sign of masculinity (see Hall 2009: 155–156 on 
the mustache in north India). As a commonly cited proverb states: ambiLLaikki miisai 
thaan azhaku, ‘it is a mustache that is beauty for a man.’ Asking young men about the 
social indexical values of the mustache, I would often get answers like aNmai 
(‘masculinity’), kalaachchaaram (‘culture’) or “Tamil culture”; and even 
panjchaayaththu thalaivar (‘headman of the village council’; often the leader of the 
dominant caste in the village).9 The mustache is traditionally linked to various kinds of 
masculinity—often iconic with social status and aggression (the bigger the better) and 
 
8 Note that this response is, as far as the youth that I spent my time with, a silent transgression behind the 
back of, or outside of, ‘society.’ It isn’t rebellion in the face of authority (Juluri 2002). Youth cultural forms 
aren’t about generational strife, then, but about exteriorized alterity (qua life stage). This is why the concept 
of ‘youth’ in Tamil Nadu largely isn’t that of liberation of a generation per se (which is how it is conceived 
of in the West, cf. Bucholtz 2002; Brown and Larson 2003), but of biding one’s time in a liminal life stage 
until one is authorized to join the next age set. 
9 This is, of course, related to the notion that the mustache is an index not only of individual status and 
masculinity, but that of the caste group in general. Thus, historically, only the dominant (and martial) castes 
of the village could sport large, beautiful mustaches. Within that, the leader of such castes would have the 
rights to the biggest and most beautiful mustache. Lower castes would be required to either be clean-shaven 
or to maintain smaller mustaches. Among Hindus, the exception would be religiously oriented castes—e.g., 
Brahmins—whose purchase on status does not hinge on displays of (hyper-)masculinity.  
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thus with particular martial castes and professions (police officers, army men, etc.)—and 
is identified by most youth as indexical of the periya aaL, the adult man of status, 
property, respect. In short, the mustache is an emblem of the male adult world, 
particularly of the rural man, the man who inhabits the space of ‘traditional’ “Tamil 
culture,” the space maximally interior to ‘society.’10 
My interest in mustaches was piqued by my viewing of the film Mustaches 
Unlimited, a documentary screened at the peNthirai festival (Women’s Film festival) in 
Madurai (August 3, 2007). While there, I asked a male college student sitting next to me 
why he had never shaved his valiant, but ultimately rather sad attempt at facial hair. His 
answer was that not having any facial hair would make him look like a chinna paiyan and 
by implication he would be teased by his peers as a deficient youth.  
Intrigued, in the following weeks I asked youth about their facial hair. Of those who 
could grow full mustaches, few did. In fact, having a(n adult-looking) mustache could 
equally draw teasing from one’s peers. Why? The mustache indexes a semi-stigmatized 
rural identity (to an urban youth sensibility at least), and to this extent was considered 
outdated and old-fashioned. But more importantly, such teasing worked off of the 
assumption that an adult-looking mustache on a young man is status-inappropriate and 
thus absurd. It associates the young man with an age set to which he does not belong, 
presupposing status to which he has no access because by definition youth are excluded 
from semiotic gestures that accrue mariyaathai (‘respect’). As another college student 
noted, ‘at this age one shouldn’t look like a periya aaL,’ like authority incarnate. ‘We are 
 
10 Note that the rural qua ‘interior’ is infused with a cluster of meanings: ‘traditional,’ following “Tamil 
culture,” hyper-masculine; but also backwards, ignorant/uneducated, superstitious, poor, caste-oriented, 
hierarchical, and patriarchal. 
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youth. What does a college kid need a mustache for? You can’t expect us to act like 
serious people (or take on such a persona).’ While facial hair of some kind may make you 
look older and mature (i.e., not like a child, which is a good thing), sporting a mustache 
makes you look too old which is both ‘ugly’ (asingkam) and embarrassing.11  
Not only is the mustache age inappropriate, it’s often seen as a direct challenge to 
adult authority. Indeed, having an impressive mustache would cause trouble with the 
school/college administration and parents. It would be an inappropriate sign of 
(traditional) authority, an arrogant and threatening gesture to adults who, within the age 
hierarchy, are superior to students (cf. Bastian 1996: 119–123 on Nigerian youth 
fashion). Such facial hair would also not be tolerated by the college administration 
because it indexes modes of masculinity (e.g., the rowdy ‘thug’;12 or rural caste-linked 
identities) antithetical to the socialization task of the college to produce middle-class, 
“decent” citizens (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Lukose 2009; cf. Dickey 2009a on “decency” in 
Tamil Nadu). Indeed, many students before they went on interviews for jobs or higher 
education admission would make sure to—among other things like putting on a tie, 
getting a short hair cut, and wearing cologne—shave their facial hair, conforming to their 
idea of what a young professional should look like.13 
‘To shave or not to shave?’ became the question for those with the option. A number 
of young men opted to shave. When I asked them about this, they indicated that being 
clean shaven was a “fashion” (‘trend’) among young men. But why? The answer was 
 
11 After marriage, though, almost all conceded that they would probably (have to) grow a mustache, 
something I observed in older friends after their marriages. 
12 See Dhareshwar and Srivatsan (1996) for discussion of the rowdy as a legal category in India. See Rogers 
(2008) on the college rowdy persona in the Chennai city college that he worked at; cf. Weiss (2002: 103ff.) 
on the persona of the wahuni (‘thug’) among Tanzanian youth.  
13 Compare this with Jeffrey et al.’s (2008: ch. 3) discussion of the stereotyped comportment of the 
‘educated’ in Uttar Pradesh. 
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invariably “style,” “banthaa,” or “geththu” (‘cool’ or ‘badass’ in the parlance of 
American youth status, see chapter 3 for discussion). Being clean shaven is “different” 
from adults, ‘society,’ ‘tradition,’ ‘culture,’ and the village. As one Madurai student from 
a village put it,  
‘In a village people ask you why you don’t have a mustache, thinking you look 
like a woman. In Madurai and other cities they’ll think it’s your style, or a 
“fashion.” They’ll think you look like a north Indian.’  
The lack of mustache indexes how ‘foreigners’ look, in this case either north Indians or, 
as students often commented with confusion and delight when I sported a healthy 
mustache, white foreigners.14  
If youth did grow facial hair, they preferred alternative kinds: the goatee (just the 
chin); the French beard (what Americans call the goatee); trim (a five o’clock shadow); a 
pencil-thin sculpted beard (inspired by urban American facial hair fashion);15 or just 
simply a beard.16 Such alternative kinds of facial hair were seen as style, as youthful and 
playful tropes on traditional norms of grooming.  
Note that facial grooming, then, is diagrammatic of the construction and experience 
of ‘youth’ vis-à-vis adult and child age sets as ‘different from’ and thus ‘exterior to’ via 
grooming styles that index exterior fashions and places. Facial hair diagrams the move 
 
14 My own mustache would often draw quizzical looks and laughs from students. Students got a kick out of 
it telling me my mustache was bayangkaram (‘frightening’), thooraNai (‘badass’), but not appropriate for 
the college or my age. Indeed, before one visit to a women’s college, my hostel-mates very seriously told 
me to push down the ends of my upwardly curling mustache. It would literally be too aggressive and rough 
for the college girls; it would intimidate them and thus impede my attempts at research. My shaving of the 
mustache, on the other hand, drew comments like: positively, ‘you look like us now, a “youth”’; ‘you now 
look like a “real” foreigner’; ‘you look like a “hero”’ (i.e., a film star); negatively, ‘you look ugly,’ or like a 
‘small child’ (chinna paiyan). 
15 The pencil-thin mustache can be added as a youth fashion from yesteryear, associated with the urban, 
“decent,” suave masculinity of older youth film icons like Gemini Ganesan, MGR, and Ravichandiran. 
16 Beards themselves are highly communicative; either of ‘love failure’ (kaathal thoolvi) (an association 
solidified by the representation of failed love in the film Devdas [1953]) or depression more generally; 
alternatively, the beard is seen as reflecting the rough masculinity of the rowdy (‘thug’). 
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away from ‘society,’ reconverting alternate and exterior norms of grooming as 
emblematic youth forms of status (cf. Weiss 2002 on urban Tanzanian youth’s hair 
grooming and tropes of exteriority; Bastian 1996: 111ff. on tropes of masculinity in urban 
Nigerian youth fashion).  
 
3. Youth spaces 
Youth spaces are those which are exterior to the family and the kin group, either 
spatially or virtually through speech chains (i.e., word getting back to your family). They 
are spaces where youth can congregate and operate without the censure of ‘society,’ 
where they can establish alternative norms and forms of status, where ‘youth’ is 
performed, played with, and negotiated. As such, ‘youth’ activity constitutes these spaces 
as youth social spaces through performances of exteriority (cf. Weiss 2002: 106; Nisbett 
2006, 2007). These spaces form a topography of youth activity for college students, often 
on route to or from the college campus. Below I give a brief discussion of some of these 
spaces, looking at them as spaces whose (literal) exteriority is iconic and generative of, as 
a condition of possibility, the enactment of ‘youth.’ I focus primarily on young men’s 
spaces. 
 
3.1 From tea stall to theater to college 
Youth’s movement across public space maps out youth space (cf. Lukose 2009: 69, 
81). One of the prototypical activities of young men is uur suRRathu ‘roaming about’: on 
motorcycles (for those lucky enough to afford access to them), on buses, or on foot. The 
rhythms of traversal and loitering define youth spaces, as a kind of destination-less 
pilgrimage with temporary respites: the tea stall (Cody 2009) or café (for the urban 
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elites); internet cafés (Nisbett 2006, 2007); the cinema hall; roadsides; parks (or in 
Chennai the beach); temples; the bus stop and the bus itself; shopping complexes and 
malls in large urban areas; and the college campus.  
Such youth spaces are where youth congregate in their peer groups and form their 
territories, their islands of authority. In Madurai such territorial hangout spots are known 
by the local youth slang top; in Chennai as addi. In such spaces youth feel empowered: 
they can tease and intimidate outsiders and each other; they can engage in jolly and horse 
around; they can chat, smoke, and time-pass (n. ‘hanging out’) by listening to film songs, 
smoking, and reading magazines. Such spaces are relatively anonymous spaces that 
maximize human traffic, and thus the ability to look at other individuals, especially to 
sight adi (‘ogle,’ ‘look at’) and comment adi (‘pass comments about’) girls. Such spaces 
also maximize youth’s own visibility, allowing them to be foregrounded against the 
background of the crowd.  
The irony, of course, is that such spaces are visible and yet tend to occlude exposure 
to those who are in, or who are connected to, one’s kin and caste network; that is, 
hierarchical structures of authority to which youth are answerable.17 Such spaces are 
doubly-inflected in that they allow one to evade (known) authority and transgress 
(unknown) authority via public acts of non-normativity. Thus, such spaces get co-opted 
and turned into zones of jolly and entertainment, of transgression and youth status (style), 
of the expression of autonomy and youth authority. 
 
17 In general, youth spaces are unmarked for age and caste hierarchy; for example, for hanging out youth 
tend not to go to small temples linked to particular caste deities, but large ones like the Meenakshi or 
Azhagar temples in Madurai. 
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The cinema hall is one such youth space par excellence, largely because film and film 
watching as ritual practice are largely linked with ‘youth’ and exteriority. The film 
theater is historically one of the first non-caste marked spaces in Tamil Nadu 
(Rajanayakam 2002: ch. 5). Youth easily turn the cinema hall, with their loud, attention-
grabbing chanting, clapping, dancing, and singing into a space of youth exteriority, where 
norms of society can be turned on their head in a carnivalesque inversion (cf. Osella and 
Osella 1998: 191, 2004: 290). In the dark anonymous cinema hall one can scream and 
yell, whistle, dance and shake, and lose oneself in the collective effervescence of youth.  
Cinema in Tamil Nadu is itself, like ‘youth,’ exterior to ‘society’ and ‘culture.’ In 
addition to the cinema hall (the physical space of consumption); the diegetic world (the 
representational object of consumption) with its transgressive representations of love, 
sexuality, and vigilant justice and the cinema industry, perceived as a morally corrupt 
world without muRai (‘proper conduct’) (Seizer 2005),18 are zones of transgression, of 
experimentation with alternative cultural forms and normativities, and—especially since 
the arrival of television and the receding of the family audience (Nakassis and Dean 
2007; Nakassis 2009; Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995)—zones of young men’s 
imaginative activity (Osella and Osella 1998: 191, 2004: 245; cf. Armsbrust 1998 on 
Egyptian cinema and youth). Indeed, going to the cinema in the peer group is one of the 
first (and most emblematic) behaviors young men do when they begin to disengage from 
 
18 Cinema in Tamil Nadu has always been seen as pornographic, obscene, debased, culture-less, mindless 
mass entertainment (Sivathamby 1981: 20; Dickey 1993b: 130–133, 2009b; Rajadhyaksha 1993; 
Vasudevan 1995: 2812; Srinivas 1999: 12–13; Derne 2000; Lukose 2009: 51; Mazzarella forthcoming). 
Indeed within traditional conceptions of status cinema actors aren’t afforded ‘respect’ (mariyaathai). Even 
great actors like Sivaji Ganesan were referred to with non-honorificating forms like cinemakkaaran or avan 
(“Film News” Anand 2008). As many Tamils explained to me, ‘we can watch and enjoy such actors, but 
nobody wants them in their family or wants people (especially women) in their family to be associated with 
them/cinema.’ While this is changing, it is still highly relevant.  
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the home. One of the first thrills of young men’s lives in establishing their maturity, their 
distance from childhood and exteriority from adult life, is skipping school and furtively 
going to the cinema show with one’s peer group. While children, women, and adults 
largely only see films with the family, young men see cinema with other young men 
(Osella and Osella 2004: 245; Lukose 2009: ch. 2). It’s no surprise, then, as I discuss in 
part II, that film is one of the central source registers for youth expressive culture. 
 
3.2 College as youth space 
Like cinema, college is a youth space par excellence. This isn’t because it’s more 
important as a youth space in terms of frequency or specificity of youth activities but 
rather because, like cinema, it holds a particular place in the Tamil imaginary of what 
‘youth’ is all about, as can be seen in the copious numbers of college-based films and 
television programming of recent years (Nakassis and Dean 2007; cf. Lukose 2009: 49–
51; Osella and Osella 1998: 191 on “college culture” cum “cinema culture”). Indeed, to 
the question ‘what did you expect college to be like before you came,’ most students 
answered ‘like it’s shown in films.’ College is a chronotopic space–time where 
prototypical ‘youth’ activities are supposed to take place: it’s a place for falling in love; 
skipping class to go to the movies; doing galaadda (‘fighting,’ ‘creating trouble’); 
drinking alcohol and smoking surreptitiously; doing fashion and style; and generally 
being jolly and carefree.  
College makes this experience of ‘youth’ maximally robust for a number of reasons. 
First, college is thought to be, and in many ways is, a place outside of kinship, caste, and 
thus ‘society.’ Its historical non-association with caste (as absolute criterion for 
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admission) and its association with merit and achieved status (even if strongly ideological 
notions) (Beteille 1993[1991]; Sharma 1986) make college a space where objective 
hierarchical differentiation based on caste and kin group are partially bracketed; at least, 
this was the case in the colleges where I worked (though see Jeffrey et al. 2008; Premi 
2004; Rogers 2008; Lukose 2009).  
Second, college is literally an exterior space.19 While parents may ultimately condone 
the transgression of its sons in anonymous exterior spaces, they certainly don’t allow 
such transgression to take place in the physical space of the home or neighborhood (cf. 
Osella and Osella 2000b: 230; Nisbett 2006, 2007). Like other exterior spaces, then, the 
college campus affords new possibilities of relatively anonymous and transgressive 
‘youth’ activities where society and its forms of hierarchy are deferred or bracketed.  
Third, college is a place where everyone arrives relatively anonymous, as opposed to 
the school where everyone knows you from a young age. It’s thus a space for the creation 
of, and experimentation with, new identities (Parameswaran 2001, 2002; Lukose 2009).  
Fourth, college is a space–time where new freedoms are allowed (e.g., of dress, of 
how and with whom to spend one’s free time, of how to spend pocket money), but that is 
still regulated by an adult-run administration. It thus provides a space for experimentation 
and transgression precisely because there is a loosening of restriction but still the 
presence of authority. Like the age category ‘youth’ itself, the college constructs youth 
experience as a dialectic of freedom from and transgression of rules (largely linked to 
administrators’ attempts to socialize students to a middle-class decent persona). 
 
19 The college itself is made up of social spaces of relatively more or less exteriority: for example, 
classrooms as interior spaces (populated largely by women) versus benches on walkways, the canteen, the 
sports ground, and the front gate as relatively visible and exterior spaces populated mainly by young men. 
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Finally, like schools, college brings together a large number of youth and organizes 
them in ways that encourages peer group socialization (e.g., in hostels, in class cohorts, in 
sports groups). Importantly, college organizes youth by department and year, thus 
creating cohorts where age difference is suspended. In college, with few exceptions, one 
does not take classes with students of other years or other departments. And because age 
is one of the primary modes of reckoning hierarchical difference in Tamil Nadu, such an 
organization creates (relatively) egalitarian groups (with respect to objective status 
differentiation by age).  
For these reasons college assembles youth outside of ‘society’ such that egalitarian 
peer groups can be formed, creating new sets of possibility for engaging in youth culture 
and establishing novel forms of status and authority. Below I discuss the different ways 
that college is constructed and used as a space of transgression and exteriority, as well as 
the attempts by the administration of the college to control that transgression and channel 
it into the socialization of students to “decency” and individual self-control. 
 
3.3. College and registers of exteriority 
3.3.1 College, dress, fashion, and body grooming 
College enables the experimentation with new forms of dress, fashion, and body 
grooming that aren’t possible at school. Youth engaged in such forms precisely because 
they were restricted at home and school.  
For example, while the school system has uniforms, the colleges I worked at give 
relatively more sartorial freedom. As one on my Madurai hostel roommates Stephen 
explained to me, ‘kids feel like they can do whatever in college. No restrictions, 
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especially with dress.’ When they get to college they often buy new clothing—
fashionable shirts, jeans, hats, rings, earrings, bracelets, etc.—and get new hair cuts, often 
re-animating mass-mediated images of youth personae (music television VJs and popular 
film stars). Many students who came in tailored slacks and checkered button-down shirts 
within their first year had undergone total transformations, donning (duplicate) branded 
shirts, ripped and embroidered jeans, sunglasses, earrings, bracelets, and hats.  
Many students in my Madurai hostel grew out their thumb or pinky nails for no other 
reason than the fact that in school you are required to keep your nails shortly clipped. 
Similarly, one female Chennai college student explained that girls in college often get 
new haircuts when getting to college. While potentially fashionable and aesthetically 
pleasing, the main motivation is simply to not look like a little schoolgirl or an adult 
woman with long plaited hair. (Compare this to the story of a school girl who was beaten 
by her teacher and had her ponytail cut off in front of the class for not coming to school 
with her hair plaited [Deccan Chronicle 2007].) In general, college students make every 
effort to avoid seeming like school children.  
At the same time, such college clothing, fashion, and body grooming couldn’t be 
done at home. This was especially true for students who come from rural areas. In our 
discussions of college life, youth often returned to the things that could be worn or done 
at college but not at home. At home youth are less able to transgress and distance 
themselves from adult ‘society’ and ‘culture.’ They are less able to express such 
exteriority to the extent that in their native place (or sontha uur) their ascribed identities 
of family background, caste and community are in play. The clothes that students would 
wear in college would attract different looks (viththiyaasamaa paappaangka), scolding, 
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and vicious teasing by adults and peers at home (cf. Tarlo 1996: ch. 6). When going 
home male students would often remove their jewelry (especially earrings), cut their hair, 
and change into more appropriate clothing. While fashionable in college, their college 
attire would be interpreted as arrogance or rowdyism in their hometowns. Similarly, it 
was not unheard of to see girls come to and leave college in one dress, but move within 
the college in another (Tarlo 1996: 201). 
 
3.3.2 College and language 
College is also a place where in addition to new commodity registers, new linguistic 
register competencies are learned and used. In addition to acquiring familiarity with 
English in classrooms (the exterior language par excellence), college also provides casual 
spaces for peer group interaction that facilitate adopting other forms of speech. For many 
students (especially from lower-class and rural backgrounds) college affords the 
opportunity to be exposed to and adopt new kinds of class-linked registers: decent 
(urban) standardized Tamil; English-hybridized Tamil; and youth slang (cf. Jeffrey et al. 
2008; Lukose 2009: ch. 5; Smith-Hefner 2007).  
In addition, while in the college (but outside of the classroom) students can deploy 
highly intimate and colloquial speech styles that are otherwise reserved for in-kin-group 
usage. In particular, the use of non-honorific forms, curse words, and fictive (status-
equal) affinal kin terms abound in peer groups in the college (and, more generally, 
outside of the home). Students explained that at home one has to be more in control of 
one’s speech. For example, addressing a close friend with tropic affinal kin terms while 
one’s family was around would invite scolding and embarrassment from elders.  
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Such censure of language at home, in contrast with the college, is especially true for 
young women. In public (and sometimes even at home) young women are expected to be 
calm and silent, while on campus they can selectively engage in teasing and boisterous 
joking that is impossible otherwise.20 Even within the college there are more or less 
problematic spaces: interior spaces like the women’s hostel, empty classrooms, and the 
library are freer, while public walkways and the college gate are more subject to censure 
(see Lukose 2009: 54, 57, 147 on gender and space among young women in Kerala). 
 
3.3.3 College and leisure: Love and other bad habits 
The case is similar with leisure activity. As one student told me, college is the time 
when a young man can learn ‘bad’ (but manly and thus valorized) habits. It’s a place 
where one smokes with his peers on tea breaks; drinks with his peers after college (or 
sometimes during college); skips class to go to the movies with friends; roams the 
campus (or outside of it) looking at girls; spends money with relative abandon; teases 
women and loves truly for the first time. At home, such social activity is likely to earn 
you a bad reputation and a beating from your family.  
Love is one of the most extreme ‘youth’ expressions of exteriority. Love is highly 
transgressive, with respect to parents (and to their authority to dictate marriage and 
control sexuality), to the kin and caste group (for it represents a break in the patriarchal 
 
20 The disjuncture between home and college is acutely experienced by young women. A number of young 
women complained to me that the things that colleges allow them to do are often inapplicable in their own 
homes. One particularly intelligent and bold, lower-caste and -class Madurai girl explained to me how at 
college they teach you to question, to be equal, and to speak freely with people of the opposite sex. But 
when she comes home she isn’t even allowed to sit down when a man of an older generation is present 
(e.g., her father, uncles, etc.). As she explained, to do so isn’t considered ‘respect(ful)’ (mariyaathai) to 
them. She voiced frustration with her inability to enact the non-hierarchical relationships and different 
gender roles that she learned in college. She explained that there is a “gap” because her parents can’t 
understand such non-hierarchical relationships and non-traditional gender roles. College (and sometimes 
the workplace) is one of the only places where such behavior is possible. 
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chain of authority, as well as the possibility for unions with members of other castes), and 
even the “culture” at large (which, in such discourses, is represented as one where 
children respect elders’ prerogative to choose marriage partners).  
And college is love’s chronotope. It’s a space–time where love is made possible, 
where members of the opposite sex are given opportunity to see each other and to get to 
know each other relatively freely. It’s no surprise, then, that college is the time and place 
when most youth expect to ‘do love’ (lav paNRathu), something that largely isn’t 
possible for ‘small boys’ (chinna pasangka) in school. To love, then, is to move out of 
childhood, to cease to think about the opposite sex as one’s parents do, as a ‘bad word’ 
(kedda vaarththai). Indeed, for this reason college is seen by parents as an inherently 
dangerous place because it’s a place where women’s honor and chastity is likely to be 
damaged, and where young men make ‘mistakes’ (thappukaL) (cf. Dube 1988; Karlekar 
1988: 159; Mukhophadhyay 1994; Derne 1994; Tarlo 1996: ch. 6; Parameswaran 2001; 
Seymour 2002; Jeffrey et al. 2008). 
 
In this section I have highlighted the ways that college is a space that allows youth 
culture to flourish. I have stressed that it is college’s status as an exterior space, as a 
space between the home and the school—and their associated signs and typification as 
‘childish’—that makes it able to function as such a space. Below I look at how the 
administrative and institutional organization of Tamil colleges also function to make 
college a particular robust site for the expression and performance of ‘youth’ vis-à-vis 
transgression.  
 
3.3.4 Channeling transgression 
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College functions as a youth space par excellence to the extent that it motivates 
transgression through imposing a set of rules and the expectation that such rules will be 
broken. Much of the ‘youth’ activity that college students engage in centers on breaking 
the rules, either of ‘society’ more generally, or of the college authority more proximately. 
Indeed, the colleges that I worked at had explicit rules which attempted to control youth 
qua ‘youth.’ For example, for men long hair, dyed hair, earrings, jeans, tee-shirts, loud 
colored clothing, ripped clothing, and too many pockets on pants were actively 
discouraged or banned on campuses. This regulation of youth fashion is even more 
extreme for women (especially in coed institutions) where wearing jeans, tee-shirts, 
blouses, sleeveless kurtas, and not using the dupatta are often banned (see Lukose 2009: 
86 for a similar case in Kerala). Cross-sex interaction is also often discouraged by 
faculty, outright banned by certain departments and in certain colleges. Language spoken 
in front of teachers is also highly regimented. Speech in Tamil should be devoid of bad 
words, colloquial phrases, and regionalisms, or it should be in English (the academic 
language of most colleges).  
Such rules are meant to socialize youth to an upper-middle-class, professional 
habitus: to be decent, modern subjects, and not local, lower-class, or rural (cf. Lukose 
2009: ch. 5). To this end many departments have “formals” day when students are 
required to dress the part of a white-collar professional. And indeed, many poorer and 
rural students answered the question ‘what have you learned in college’ by saying that, in 
addition to ‘youth’ habits like smoking, drinking, fashion, they had learned how to 
inhabit a particular kind of valorized persona—the middle-class professional—while 
shedding the local and crass habits from their (rural/low-class) background.  
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At the same time, however, more often than not youth activity and dress attempts to 
distance itself from such rules and from adult ‘society,’ either through pushing their 
boundaries or by their transgression. Youth expressive culture in college, in addition to 
troping on the indexes of childhood and adulthood in its negotiation between them, also 
tropes on the class-based vision of masculinity imposed by administrators and parents. 
Instead of dress slacks and button-down shirts with muted colors, youth prefer patterned 
bell-bottom slacks and printed button-down shirts in bright colors. Instead of ‘proper 
English’ or high-standard Tamil, youth prefer to pepper their colloquial Tamil with 
English loan words and slang re-animated from cinema dialogues (cf. Smith-Hefner 
2007).  
A common point of view of college administrators is that students need rules and 
discipline to be controlled. Without this surrogate patriarch students would go “berserk,” 
one hostel warden explained, smoking cigarettes until their lungs burst, drinking alcohol 
until they poisoned themselves, watching cinema until they went blind, and beating each 
other in fights until thoroughly black and blue. However, as the assumption is that it’s 
natural that students will break such rules (and thus expected), administrators often turn a 
blind eye to students’ transgressions.21  
Hostel wardens, teachers, and other administrators are constantly engaged in a tug of 
war with students, a cycle of rule enforcement and transgression. The rules produce the 
transgression, as many students cogently explained. The rules make the thrill of exerting 
 
21 There is variety by college, of course. In addition, as colleges have become increasingly privatized, the 
level of control and restriction of students has increased. This is ironical because as the image of college as 
space of total freedom was spread via the glut of commercial films about colleges in the 1990s the de-
politicization and privatization of colleges (both due to liberalization, see chapter 1) has resulted in the 
increased control by the administration over student unions and the student body more generally (cf. 
Lukose 2009: ch. 4 on colleges and politicization in Kerala). 
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one’s own agency and authority possible. Jumping over the walls after curfew; smoking, 
drinking, playing cards in one’s hostel room; cutting class to go to the movies or the local 
government bar; the collective ritual of making noise in the classroom or during silent 
study period in order to provoke disciplining by teachers are all quintessential ‘youth’ 
moments in the college.  
Ironically, this is precisely the reason why many students thought of school life as 
better or more fun than college life. While college had more freedom, the presence of 
freedom and the menacing implications of responsibility meant that rule breaking had 
less thrill attached to it. This, of course, is one of the principles for why youth forms 
become even more exaggerated in the college. Not only do increased freedoms allow for 
more frequent expression of the forms, the forms must be even more extreme so as to 
count as transgression.  
 
3.3.5 Outside the outside: Culturals and the college tour 
Among college students, youth cultural forms are expressed in their most extreme 
form in college activities where college authority itself is bracketed. For example, college 
functions like inter-college culturals competitions or hostel functions often afford youth 
the opportunity to go wild, dance with abandon, and put on their best fashion. The college 
rituals where this bracketing is the most robust are those take place outside of the college, 
physically and cognitively. Below I discuss one such example: the college-sponsored 
fieldtrip or tour. (In chapter 3 I discuss another such event from the working-class 
government college in Chennai that I worked in: bus day.) Note that “taking place outside 
of” does not mean the college is negated or erased. Rather it’s precisely because the 
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college is constantly in mind—one is outside the college but with one’s college peers on 
a college-sponsored trip—that it is necessary to continually transgress and eclipse the 
rules and authority structures of the college. Note that this relationship between the tour 
and the college is the same as between youth activity and ‘society’ more generally. The 
exteriority of youth does not in any way negate or erase ‘society,’ but rather keeps it 
constantly in play, reinscribing it through transgressing and troping on it. 
I went on a tour with the third-year class of a coed department from an autonomous 
Chennai college to the neighboring states of Kerala and Karnataka for roughly one week. 
As one student from the group explained, ‘the college tour is about doing all the things 
students do secretly (maraimugamaa) with respect to teachers: smoke, drink, roam, 
dance, sing, do fashion, tease, and ogle and romance girls.’ On tour one can do such 
things at a fever pitch in new and exterior places in the comfort of one’s peer group. This 
is because on tour one is outside of (the rules of) the college, the hometown, and even of 
the “culture.” The tour is a safe space for the quasi-ritualistic and orgiastic experience of 
‘youth.’ It’s a space for possibility, a space where authority is lenient/absent, but present 
(there were only four professors for roughly 120 students on the tour I went on) and one 
is left to one’s own devices in the peer group. 
This is most revealing for women. On tour young women are expected to, and do, 
dress qualitatively different. All the clothes they aren’t allowed to wear in the home and 
at college are worn on tour: jeans, tee-shirts, skirts, sneakers, and sunglasses. They let 
their hair down (literally) and wear makeup. While normally a woman’s dress is an index 
not just of her person, but of the family group, the kin/caste group, the culture, and the 
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nation, in the exteriority and anonymity provided by the tour such indexicality is 
neutralized.  
Even youth who typically avoided stereotypical ‘youth’ expressions (and 
transgressions) engaged with them while on the tour. This was most salient in youth’s 
obsessive self-spectacularization in their almost compulsive photo-taking. In such photos, 
students put on style-ish sunglasses, made muscles or crossed their arms, wrapped 
bandannas around their heads or hands, put on their baddest look, and struck a pose like a 
film star. Tour provides the opportunity—as does college more generally—to experiment 
with, embellish, and exaggerate youth identity.  
And as this was students’ own understanding of what the college tour was all about, 
they worked hard at making it happen. There was always the anxiety that the reality of 
the tour was not living up their expectations: “bore adikkuthu” ‘it’s boring’ was a 
common complaint on the tour during the lulls between hyper-kinetic dancing on the bus, 
singing film songs, ritualized teasing sessions among students, and drinking and smoking 
in the hotel rooms and in the back of the bus.  
 
In sum, youth spaces such as the college provide a literal and tropic exteriority that 
enables youth activity, a playing field or stage on which certain semiotic forms can 
embody and enact ‘youth’ through the transgression of norms of ‘society’ (or, as proxy, 
the college). Just as important as the exteriority that such youth cultural forms index, is 
the egalitarian peer group wherein such youth activity is put to use in the negotiation of 
status (Osella and Osella 1998: 191, 2004: 245; Nisbett 2006, 2007 on the role of the peer 
group as rite of youth passage; also see Kyratzis 2004: 626). Below I look at how peer 
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groups as exterior interactional zones are both spaces of status-raising and of intimacy 
and peer pressure. While I focus on the college because of its rich institutional 
elaboration of egalitarian peer groups, the dynamics I describe also apply to the non-
college going youth with whom I did research (see Osella and Osella 1998: 191; Nisbett 
2006, 2007).  
 
4. Peer groups 
4.1. Peer group as space of status-raising and -leveling 
If youth spaces are ‘exterior’ spaces that license the experimentation and performance 
of ‘youth,’ the peer group is the interactional unit that colonizes such spaces. And like 
‘youth’ and the spaces the peer group inhabits, the peer group is constructed as exterior to 
‘society’ and its perduring status hierarchies based on age. But what goes on in the peer 
group? As we have seen, one of the major aspects of youth activity is the reflexive 
distancing from childhood and adulthood. And importantly, such non-alignment to and 
transgression of ‘society’ constitute status-raising acts. That is, to transgress authority is 
to assert one’s own authority, and thereby constitute oneself as a status-ful individual, if 
only through presupposing the status necessary to make the rules. In short, by virtue of its 
exteriority to ‘society’ qua norms of adult authority the peer group is a space where youth 
are continually engaging in status-raising acts. I take up such status-raising in chapter 3. 
At the same time, by virtue of it being exterior to age hierarchy, the peer group is a 
space of relatively egalitarian and reciprocal interaction, and thus a space of peer pressure 
and intimacy. By egalitarian peer groups I mean peer groups where forms of status that 
are ascribed and hierarchical are (relatively) neutralized (see Flanagan 1989). I am 
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interested, here, mainly in same-sex peer groups. In mixed-sex peer groups gender is not 
neutralized in the same way, and still functions as an axis of hierarchical differentiation 
(though still less than it does outside of the peer group) (cf. Flanagan 1989: 213; Osella 
and Osella 2000b: ch. 7). Such peer groups are egalitarian not in the sense of being 
equalitarian—that is, where all individuals are necessarily equal—but in that (a) 
institutionally perduring and ascribed forms of hierarchical status are (temporarily) 
bracketed (cf. Osella and Osella 1998, 2000b: ch. 7; Nisbett 2007; see Flanagan 1989: 
261 on “egalitarian” as always elliptically modified by “relatively,” following Fried 
1967: 28) and (b) the group abides by an ideology of egalitarianism (see Flanagan 1989: 
248). Below I look at how the college, in particular, functions to construct the peer group 
as egalitarian.  
 
4.1.1 Age hierarchy and negation in the college  
One general feature of all colleges I have seen in Tamil Nadu is the senior–junior 
division, though the extent to which it is elaborated varies according to the institutional 
control over students (e.g., colleges where academics are stronger have more elaborate 
senior–junior divisions because of the focus on departmental unity) and the presence of 
competing modes of student organization (e.g., bus route or area). 
Senior–junior is a relative hierarchical relation (cf. ‘older than X’ or ‘younger than 
X’). Hence a third-year undergraduate (UG) student is a senior to a second year and a 
first year, and a second year is junior to third years and senior to first years. Postgraduate 
(PG) students and alumni are super seniors to UG students (or mighty seniors in some 
college slangs).  
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This hierarchy is indexed in a number of ways. In address terms, at the beginning of 
the year seniors demand asymmetrical honorification: through 2nd person pronouns, verb 
agreement (seniors receive 2nd pers. pl. and give 2nd pers. sing.) and verb-final markers 
(seniors give but do not receive daa [for men] and di [for women]),22 as well as in the 
usage of fictive consanguineal kinship terms like aNNan (‘older brother’) for seniors and, 
less frequently, thambi (‘younger brother’) for juniors.  
Within the college age is bracketed and thus less important than year. Hence a junior 
who is older than his senior is still required to treat him as a senior. For some students 
this created a cognitive dissonance and anxiety. Take, for example, Senthil who had 
discontinued his studies at one college and then came to another college a year later, 
making him one year older than his cohort members. Over the course of the two years of 
my fieldwork he increasingly began to withdraw from the social life of the hostel 
precisely because his self-image was hurt by the fact that his same-year cohort members 
addressed and referred to him in ways that were dissonant with their age-differential but 
consonant with their year equality. On top of that, his seniors, who were of the same age 
as he, addressed and referred to him as a junior (and by implication, one of lower status).  
Other respect forms, transplanted from “traditional” discourses of status, also apply 
between juniors and seniors: juniors shouldn’t talk too loudly around seniors; shouldn’t 
do too much fashion and style in front of seniors; shouldn’t smoke (or drink) in front of 
seniors unless given permission; and shouldn’t be allowed to get away with breaking the 
 
22 di is a less common usage, as it is considered more intimate/rude than daa which is used quite generally 
between intimates. daa is the (relatively) unmarked category, while di is marked for feminine gender of 
addressee. Youth in their peer groups use daa easily and commonly (to the extent of it being emblematized 
in the youth-oriented music channel, SS Music’s show “College da [sic]”). di is also occasionally used 
tropically between two men when one is putting the other down or teasing him, figuratively treating him as 
a woman.  
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college rules (e.g., using cell phones, wearing tee-shirts, etc.). Seniors are allowed to 
scold their juniors, but the opposite would be grounds for a physical confrontation, as I 
saw on multiple occasions. Seniors can question a junior and inquire about whatever 
information he pleases, though this can’t be reciprocated. The property of juniors is the 
public property of seniors, though juniors can’t use seniors’ property without permission. 
In the hostels, the control of the television remote—always a contentious form of public 
property—always rests in the hands of the seniors.  
When I asked why all of these restrictions exist, students answered that it’s the 
seniors way of showing their geththu (lit. ‘prestige,’ ‘power’), of figuratively showing 
that they are the periya aaL in the college or hostel. Changes to this inter-year hierarchy 
(e.g., democratizing access to the television remote), one third-year student explained to 
me, would result in a fight, both between seniors and juniors and between seniors and the 
administration. To cede their rights to juniors would create a gauravam (‘honor,’ 
‘prestige’) problem.  
At the same time, seniors have duties toward juniors. They are supposed to help them 
and give them advice in their college life, in their studies, and in their own intra-group 
problems. Like a higher-status adult (periya aaL) it is the seniors’ duty to resolve 
disputes among juniors and mete out judgment. There is also an element of affection (if 
developed over time) mixed with the sense of distance, fear (of juniors toward their 
seniors), and duty (cf. the aNNan–thambi ‘older–younger brother’ relationship).  
 
4.1.2 Ragging  
 58
                                                
As we noted above, juniors are made to be less free than their seniors. This is 
institutionalized in the ritual of ragging (something like hazing in U.S. fraternities).23 
While ragging in India in recent years has gotten much negative press (CURE 2007; 
Indiaedunews.net 2009; Jesudasan 2009; Oneindia.in 2009; Saqaf 2009; Sharma and 
Bodh 2009; Vijay Kumar 2009; The Hindu 2010) and has been deemed illegal due to the 
extreme cases of sadism licensed by it, ragging in a mild or light form was practiced as a 
ritualized expression of the senior–junior relationship during my fieldwork. Ragging is 
one of the processes by which seniors ‘control’ freshers (‘first-year students’). It usually 
lasts from the beginning of the year until the first department or hostel function (for intra-
departmental or intra-hostel ragging respectively), usually three months into the 
academic year.  
During this period freshers are forced by seniors to be figurative chinna pasangka to 
their periya aaL. Through ragging, juniors are forced to give respect to seniors in 
exaggerated rituals of status hierarchy. Ragging is a way to put freshers in their place, to 
socialize them to the year hierarchy (and by implication to within-year egalitarianism), 
and to the college rules. Indeed, it is really only during the ragging period that hostel and 
department rules are made to be followed to the letter by freshers.  
Ragging practices range from seniors, most often in a group (i.e., for an audience), 
‘calling’ (kuuppiduRathu) juniors to where they are sitting (thus already instituting 
 
23 Rogers (2008) wrongly glosses ragging as “bullying.” While ragging could be understood as a kind of 
bullying, this term does not capture the cultural meanings associated with ragging insofar as ragging is 
something particular to colleges (and only by extension to other organizational cultures); further, ragging 
acts not as literal dominance but as diagrammatic of larger social and symbolic configurations. Moreover, 
bullying imputes a particular kind of intentionality and outcome (dominance/submission) which isn’t what 
ragging is always about. As I argue in this section, it is as much about the formation of intra-year cohorts 
through the diagramming of social difference by year. Further, while one can bully someone of the same 
year (or higher), one can’t rag someone of the same year (or higher).  
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hierarchical difference) and asking them, roughly and directly, often invading the 
physical space of the fresher, their name, their hometown, etc. A typical question–answer 
turn-taking structure would be like this:  
Senior: eey, ingkee vaa daa.  
nee entha uur? 
Senior: ‘Hey, come (-hon.) here man (-hon.). 
Where are you (2nd pers. sing., -hon.) from?’ 
<direct eye gaze> 
Junior: chennai. Junior: ‘Chennai.’ <eyes downward> 
S: avan chennai NNu sonnaan! S: <To overhearers:> ‘He (-hon.) said (-hon.) 
he’s from Chennai!’ 
 
Through asymmetrical address and question initiation, as well as repetition via reported 
speech constructions a diagram of hierarchy between years is created. While third years 
have the right to question, to comment, and to speak about another’s words, juniors are 
expected to only talk when questioned (and only to the questioner), and to give concise 
answers with eye gaze downward and body comportment consonant with submission.  
Other kinds of ragging take the form of ritualized teasing, forcing a junior to do 
something embarrassing; for example, hugging and kissing a tree; standing in one place 
and repeating whatever the senior says while doing some other attention-requiring task; 
singing a song (e.g., a film song, the college song, or at one Chennai Hindu college, the 
college’s Sanskrit prayer) or, as in one Madurai college, doing the college salute (where 
the junior is forced to put his hands on his crotch, gyrate his hips erotically, stamp his 
right foot and then salute to his seniors); flirting with female strangers, professing their 
love, or singing them love songs (something highly embarrassing for young students). I 
have even seen a professor who, during class in an ice-breaking exercise, ragged a first-
year student by making him stand in front of the class and sing and dance. Then the 
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student was ordered to pretend he was directing the current sexy-girl of Tamil cinema, 
Namitha. In the name of ragging juniors are often forced to take seniors to the movies, to 
restaurants, to go on errands for them (e.g., getting them cigarettes, food, or other items), 
or to just straight-up give them money.  
But ragging at these colleges isn’t just about lowering the status of juniors, 
embarrassing and humiliating them (though it does this). Ragging is also about 
minimizing status-difference between juniors. Thus, anything that typically raises the 
status of the juniors is forbidden. For example, one of my Madurai hostel roommates at 
the beginning of his first year was forced to only wear lungis in the hostel and not the 
more style-ish tracks shorts that he was used to.24 Nathan, a friend studying in Coimbatur, 
told me over SMS that “one guy [a senior] physically forced me to remove my 
Livestrong [bracelet].”25 Nathan was also forced to stop wearing his hip-hop inspired 
clothing, and instead switch to more dowdy “formals” (slacks and button-down shirts). In 
a Chennai college that another friend studied at, first years are only allowed to wear 
formal clothes (no tee-shirts, jeans) but always had to look “shabby”: their shirt couldn’t 
be tucked in and they could only wear plastic bathroom slippers (i.e., no leather slippers, 
no sneakers). Students are also often not allowed to do other typical ‘youth’ activities like 
going to common hangout spots like the movies, the mall, or the beach. In short, freshers 
are banned from activity which status-raises or performs ‘youth.’  
 
24 A lungi is a stitched piece of patterned cloth worn by men that is wrapped around the body. In Tamil 
Nadu, it is considered an informal kind of clothing, worn by many at home, but only by the low-class in 
public.  
25 The Livestrong bracelet is a rubber bracelet that, through purchase, supports cancer treatment. It was 
started by Lance Armstrong, the famous cyclist. Such bracelets were considered ‘cool’ (“style”), and were 
popular among young hip guys at the time.  
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In effect, ragging attempts to make everyone in the age cohort equal. This gets 
reflected in who gets ragged. Indeed, it’s those who status-raise or are viewed as higher-
status (e.g., the English fluent, the fashionable, the rich); those who do not acquiesce to 
status-equalization and insist on their right to status(-raise) (cf. Lukose 2009: 190); and 
those who stand out or stand up for themselves who get ragged most intensely. The 
intensity of the ragging, thus, is proportional to the response to the ragging. One who 
does not play along—a sign of resistance to the year hierarchy—gets ragged more. (One 
can see how this can easily end up in runaway ragging that ends up hurting people, 
physically and emotionally.)  
In an interesting example that highlights how gender works into this, consider the 
example of a female, first-year student in an predominantly male college. Only her 
department and one other had female UG students. Because she speaks English fluently 
and confidently; is visibly well-off and wears stylish clothes; was often visible in the 
public spaces of the college campus; and speaks comfortably with members of the 
opposite sex in public (all of which are considered ‘bold’ for women and presuppose 
some level of status), the seniors of her department saw her as showing off, and thus in 
need of being ragged (cf. Rogers 2008: 90; Lukose 2009: 193–194). Calling her to them, 
they made her sing for them and then made her ask for their forgiveness. By contrast, her 
classmate who is quiet and demure received little to no attention from the seniors in the 
department, except for comments praising her ‘character.’ 
When ragging breaks down, that is, when a student will not participate to the point 
that it becomes a showdown between senior and junior, drastic measures are taken. A 
student who is defiant in the face of ragging risks physical beating. More interestingly, in 
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colleges where hostel or department identity is taken very seriously, resistance to ragging 
risks ostracization from the same-year group. Students who don’t share the experience of 
ragging, who opt out of it, are intentionally excluded from the peer group throughout 
their three years of college.  
The hostel or department function which signals the end of ragging—a welcome 
function for the first years—spectacularizes ragging in a public culturals event where 
freshers are expected to take the stage and perform irrespective of their talent (and often, 
in inverse relationship to it). Here public ragging in front of everyone, including 
professors, is performed. Students are forced to perform under non-ideal conditions: 
seniors will play the wrong song for them to sing; will force them to dance embarrassing 
steps to songs they weren’t planning on dancing to; and will boo and heckle them if they 
make mistakes (and sometimes even if they don’t). Here being on stage—where visibility 
and display of talent presupposes status—entails being ragged. For those who don’t take 
the stage, they are made to do funny things during other people’s performance (e.g., 
dance behind the performers on stage, walk in front of them and give the traditional 
greeting gesture vaNakkam to the crowd, or go and “hold up” the trees which are 
“falling”). 
Ragging has two effects. First, it fosters inter-year familiarity. Juniors and seniors 
learn each others names through the interactional ice being violently broken. Moreover, 
forms of affection through common rites of passage are developed. Second, and more 
importantly, it creates intra-year solidarity.26 Egalitarian peer groups within years are 
 
26 In one Chennai college I that worked in there was an attempt to stop ragging by having an orientation 
function at the beginning of the year. The point of the orientation was to replicate the function of ragging in 
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formed through the creation of hierarchical classes between years. Ragging is the time 
when strong bonds among first years are formed and where their in-peer-group 
nicknames are often generated (the embarrassing ragging event as baptismal event). Such 
egalitarian groups are—just as with youth’s relationship to ‘society’ more generally—
formed in distinction to, and ‘outside of,’ the hierarchical organization of social groups 
by year.  
Indeed, at the Madurai and Chennai colleges that I lived in, many students, juniors 
and seniors, lamented that not enough ragging was going on in their colleges. The 
evidence for this, they said, was that there were too many divisions within year cohorts 
because ragging had not forced solidarity among the students. This had resulted in 
unnecessary fights among first years (who didn’t know each other) which had gotten out 
of control (because seniors were not involved enough to regulate such “groupism”). 
Moreover, many students expected and looked forward to the thrill of being ragged. Light 
ragging was seen as jolly, as a necessary part of the college experience, by both students 
and administrators.27  
 
4.1.3 Intimacy and the peer group 
As an interactional space, as we have seen, the peer group is constructed as exterior to 
‘society’; in particular, to perduring modes of hierarchical status-differentiation by age 
(and within the college, year), and thus as a kind of egalitarian space. While on the one 
hand such ‘exteriority’ motivates status-raising vis-à-vis transgression as central to the 
 
another form (friendly, equalitarian socializing). Students were forced to meet each other, learn each 
others’ names, and speak. Ragging continued on anyway, though under the radar and in attenuated form. 
27 As one hostel warden noted, “I’m not supposed to say this, but ragging is necessary in the college.” 
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peer group, it also motivates intimacy, reciprocity, and peer pressure toward conformity, 
as I discuss below. 
The peer group is an extremely tightly knit space of intimacy. Within the peer group, 
everyone has rights over everyone else; property is common and youth share clothes, 
beds, cell phones, notes, and food. The peer group is also a space of reciprocity. For 
example, one mode of phatic communication among peers is the forward SMS. The 
forward SMS is a text message not authored by the sender and not addressed particularly 
to the addressee. It’s usually a poem, a joke, or a saying. Like the gift (Mauss 1954), 
youth sent such messages not because they had denotational content relevant to anything 
in particular, but because they established and maintained social relationships. Youth sent 
such messages compulsively. They also complained if you didn’t respond in the form of 
another forward SMS, as I found out when one student confronted me questioning my 
commitment to our friendship because I was not reciprocating by sending forward SMSs 
to him.  
The reciprocity and commonness of property and space of the peer group assumes 
and creates intense intimacy among youth, linguistically, emotionally, and physically. 
Linguistically, in the age-equal peer group youth do not use honorific forms (in the verb: 
-iingka, -aar, -aangka; pronominally: niingka, avar, avangka) in address or reference, 
except ironically. Instead they address and refer to each other using intimate/impolite 
pronouns (nee, avan, avaL), verb endings (-e, -aan, -aaL), address markers (daa, di), and 
insult/curse words. The most common address forms in the male peer group are fictive 
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kinship terms for affinal kin,28 either of the same generation—maappiLLai (variants: 
maapps, maappu), predominantly in Madurai; machchaan (variant: machchi), 
predominantly in Chennai—or of an older generation—maamaa (variant: maamu, 
maams).29  
Bracketing their literal kin meanings such address terms index equality, solidarity, 
and intimacy among youth in the peer group, something like ‘dude’ or ‘brother’ in the 
U.S. (Kiesling 2004; cf. Smith-Hefner 2007 on Indonesian youth slang). The tropic usage 
of such forms begins for most youth around the same time they begin to go to the movies, 
to smoke, to drink, and to love; that is, when they move outside of the home into their 
peer groups. Note, again, how youth cultural forms reinscribe larger social relations from 
 
28 Other fictive kin terms were also used—pangaaLi or pangu (lit., ‘men who share a stake in the property 
of the patriline’); baavaa (equivalent to maamaa in Telugu)—though with less frequency. The term 
pangaaLi is used primarily in Madurai and Theeni. Its fictive usage is slightly out-of-fashion in Madurai 
(but not in Theeni as I observed), dated to the mid-1990s (Bernard Bate, personal communication, 9.15.08). 
Women’s age-equal in-group usages didn’t, to my knowledge, use female affinal kin terms. Rather, English 
words (e.g., girl, loose-u ‘crazy person’) and insult words (e.g., panni ‘pig’) were used. Or, among the 
urban affluent (or in women’s colleges) men’s tropic affinal kin terms like machchaan or machchi were 
reappropriated and used between women (cf. the higher usage of daa among women than di). Note the 
masculinization here of women’s youth cultural forms.  
29 The first two are literally terms for one’s male cross-cousin or sister’s husband, both kin positions being 
the same under preferred cross-cousin arranged marriage in Tamil Nadu (Trautmann 1981). Maamaa 
literally refers to classificatory mother’s brother. In northern Tamil Nadu maamaa is also used to refer to 
mother’s brother’s son who is older than ego, while in southern Tamil Nadu machchaan is used for 
mother’s brother’s son who is older than ego. In northern Tamil Nadu machchaan refers to mother’s 
brother’s son who is younger than ego while in Madurai maappiLLai is used for this relation. In northern 
Tamil Nadu maappiLLai is only used for the ‘groom’ (as it also is in southern Tamil Nadu). Such fictive in-
group meanings are a projection from Tamil kinship structures where one is more emotionally close with 
one’s affines. Indeed, maamaa gives ego a daughter (Trautmann 1981; Kapadia 1995). Such cross-cousin 
terms, then, trope on this kin intimacy and generalize it to intimacy among equal peers. Interestingly, such 
terms are the most egalitarian in the kinship structure. While the relations of the patriline are fraught with 
hierarchy, distance, and respect, cross-kin relations are marked with informality, fun, and intimacy. Hence 
terms like (periya/chiththa-)appaa ‘(older/younger-)father’ (father or uncles) or aNNan/thambi 
‘older/younger brother’ are avoided within the peer group. (The only exceptions to this are: [a] the joking 
usage of chiththappu, a formation from chiththappaa [father’s younger brother], to refer to a member of the 
class who is either older than everyone else [and hence is like an uncle] or who acts too much like an adult, 
who is too responsible, etc.; and [b] pangkaaLi, though note that this is the only consanguineal kin-related 
term which is symmetrical and thus age-neutralized in its semantics.) Within the cross-cousin terms those 
used the most fictively among young men—maappiLLai in Madurai, machchaan in Chennai—in their kin-
literal usages specify ego as of the same age or younger than addressee; that is, the terms where age-linked 
status is neutralized in their literal semantic content are precisely the ones used tropically by young men in 
their peer groups. 
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‘society’ by tropically figuring themselves as exterior to, or transgressive of, those very 
social relations.  
Similarly, there is a high degree of physical intimacy among young men: for example, 
sleeping in the same bed, holding hands, and sharing food. At this stage in life the peer 
group, youth explained, is the substitute for the kin group, and the ‘attachment’ (paRRu) 
between kin members is transferred to one’s peers. Indeed, within the peer group young 
men actively distanced themselves from kin, tropically erasing kin relations by re-
signifying kin terms as in-peer-group usage. Moreover, amongst friends there was an 
active avoidance of discussing actual kin relations. 
Note that with the exception of youth peer groups, all such intimate acts are contained 
within the caste (e.g., sharing the same plate is reserved for caste-mates) and kin group 
(e.g., sharing property, using kin terms, feeding each other, sleeping in the same space). 
While the institutions of caste and kin attempt to regiment such intimacy and contain it 
within the group, youth peer group intimacy is highly transgressive of the hierarchical 
norms implicit in the regulation of intimacy. Adults often find such physical and 
linguistic intimacy disturbing precisely because they cross the lines of social grouping 
drawn by ‘society’ (Osella and Osella 1998: 191, 2000b: ch. 7; Nisbett 2007). Youth peer 
groups defer and bracket these lines and replicate them tropically within the youth peer 
group. 
Moreover, much of this intimate youth activity can’t be done outside of the peer 
group as it is insulting to the (adult) onlooker.30 Projecting the norms of the peer group 
 
30 As one of Rogers’ (2008: 91) informants puts it (though Rogers’ gloss as “rebellion” is misleading): 
“Explaining his [the informant’s] moral inconsistency toward female students, he noted that he had ‘two 
personalities, one for the home and another for college life.’ At home in front of his parents, he had to 
 67
                                                                                                                                                
outside of it is the quickest way to get taken down a peg (verbally or physically), and is 
thus avoided.  
 
4.1.4 Peer pressure and the peer group 
Because peer groups are so closely knit, because there is no pretence of maintaining a 
polite distance (to allow the other to maintain face), peers can be incredibly blunt and 
critical of each other. As I found out, my increased acceptance within the hostel was 
revealed when students began to stop holding back their criticisms of me. As I noted at 
the time:  
“One stage in the increase of intimacy here is the boldface statement of one’s 
dislike for something about the person with whom intimacy has increased. E.g., 2 
weeks have passed and now people I’ve become more comfortable with have no 
hesitation in saying what they think: your arms are flaccid, you’re glasses don’t 
look good, you looked better without a mustache, you don’t know anything about 
Tamil, your Tamil has gotten worse, you’d look better with a haircut, etc.” (Field 
notes, 7.26.07). 
Such intimacy opens the doors to constant status-leveling and peer pressure to act or be a 
particular way, thus creating status-sensitivity, an anxiety to keep up with and be 
constrained by the peer group. Students often commented that when they came to college, 
whether or not they looked forward to their ability to engage in youth fashion, they were 
obliged to. Students explained, if everyone around you is doing X and you are doing Y 
(where X is of equal or higher value than Y), you will naturally feel that you should do X. 
Students felt the compulsion to dress a particular way—for example, switch from 
wearing a lungi to wearing track pants; to get a nice cell phone, fashionable shirts, and 
 
appear meek and studious; however, if his college cohorts were to take him seriously, he had to be seen as 
being rebellious and nonchalant.” 
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jeans—and to speak a particular way—for example, to lose their regional dialects. Youth 
are constantly monitoring, borrowing and redeploying what others do. And they are 
explicit about this logic: ‘everyone else is doing it, so I figured so should I.’  
As the above discussion shows, then, there is an inherent tension in the youth peer 
group. On the one hand, the peer group licenses the performance of ‘youth’ and the 
transgression of adult authority as status-ful. The peer group, then, is a space of status-
raising. On the other hand, as constructed based on the trope of exteriority from ‘society’ 
qua hierarchy, the peer group is a space of intimacy, egalitarianism, and reciprocity. 
Thus, attempts to status-raise excessively (i.e., reintroduce hierarchical ranking within the 
peer group), to project oneself as better than the rest of the group are met with status-
leveling, as I discuss in chapter 3. There is, then, a tension between status-raising and 
peer pressure to conform (status-leveling) which is inherent in the peer group and 
resolved in interactions between youth in various sways (see chapter 3). 
 
4.2. Note: Axes of peer group formation 
Above I have discussed some features of peer groups in general. Peer groups, of 
course, also form based on various interests and sociological factors within which they 
are (relatively) egalitarian, as described above: for example, economic class and 
community (caste, religion, ethnicity/language); department or bus route/area; 
performance in academics; interests and leisure (e.g., music, film, sports, etc.); and youth 
status (i.e., the more transgressive youth tend to hang out more together, versus the more 
conventional; see chapter 3, section 2.1 for discussion). Below I describe caste and 
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community; ethnicity, language, and social class; department and bus route; and 
performance in academics.  
 
4.2.1 Caste and community 
Social grouping by caste and community is a touchy subject among (college-going) 
youth because of the politicization of these categories (cf. Lukose 2009: 177 on the 
unspeakability of caste in the college she worked in). While I was doing my field work, 
serious caste conflicts taking place in Tamil Nadu’s law colleges (Vannan 2008; 
Viswanathan 2008) and Christian-missionary targeting attacks in northern India 
(Frontline 2008) heightened this sensitivity.  
While in many government colleges in southern Tamil Nadu peer groups are 
explicitly defined by caste affiliation—more precisely, perhaps, on the binary axis 
“scheduled castes” (SC or Dalits) versus other castes (cf. Jeffrey et al. 2008; Rogers 
2008; Lukose 2009)—in the colleges I worked at neither caste nor religion were explicit 
ways that students organized themselves. Or at least, so they said. Indeed, some students 
did orient themselves, sometimes unintentionally, by community. On learning that an 
acquaintance was of the same caste, some individuals found themselves more at ease and 
more comfortable, as youth explained.31 Caste would emerge most saliently in the 
college if a conflict took on a caste element (e.g., if one person insulted another based on
caste; or in an ad hoc way when one conflict—e.g., departmental or personal—escalate
 
31 In Jeffrey et al.’s (2008: 93) discussion of caste among young men in Uttar Pradesh, one of their 
informants voiced an opinion that echoed how my own informants explained it to me: on meeting a caste-
mate one feels “a strange feeling of happiness welling up from inside,” and feels obliged to help that 
person. 
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re by mobilizing fellow caste-mates), or, as students alleged, during student elections whe
candidates would use caste as a word-of-mouth campaign mobilizer for support.  
However, explicit discussion of caste and religion, or even open recognition of an 
individual’s or peer group’s caste makeup, was looked down upon (see Lukose 2009: ch. 
5 on a similar situation in Kerala; Nisbett 2007 among Bangalorean youth). Students 
disavowed caste. Caste, they opined, was something that adults observed, either in the 
home (or hometown/village) or by the administration. (For a number of Christian 
students, coming to college was the first time they actually learned their caste because 
this was when they had to show their caste-affiliation document to the college 
administration in order to be admitted.) One’s peer group was not about caste or religion, 
or at least shouldn’t be, students proclaimed. Indeed, one third-year student in my hostel 
in Madurai told me that he was excluded by members of his hostel age cohort in his first 
year because when he came to the college he chose to spend his time with older members 
of his (SC) caste. This was offensive to the other students (including other first-year SC 
students) both because it distanced him from them by year, but also because it explicitly 
prioritized caste as the basis for social relations. That said, during my research time I did 
not observe any peer groups that were totally caste homogeneous. This was largely 
because there were more important identities within the college: ethnicity/language, 
social class, department, and area/bus route.  
While there are a number of reasons that might account for why my analysis diverges 
from other’s work regarding caste in colleges (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Rogers 2008; Lukose 
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2009),32 one important reason is that I am concerned to draw out a particular age-based 
logic that, at least according to my observations, was common across all peer groups, be 
they caste mixed or homogeneous. I discuss this further in section 5.2. 
 
4.2.2 Ethnicity, language, and social class 
Ethnicity and language were clear divisions in all the colleges I went to, and students 
often appealed to such divisions, either simply noting them or in disparaging members of 
other groups. Hindi speakers, Malayalam speakers, and students from northeast India 
were often self-contained groups. Such groups were relatively spatially separated (in 
terms of hangout spots in the campus; classroom seating; seating in the mess), 
interactionally distinct (they did not mingle as much with students of other groups and 
spoke different languages amongst themselves), and ragged internally.  
Social class was less often explicitly spoken of as a division between students, but 
could be observed as a principle of differentiated peer groups (cf. Nisbett 2007). This was 
compounded in two ways. First, many upper-class Indians are (semi-)fluent in English 
due to English-medium schooling. This prestige code choice forced a clear separation 
between those who could speak English and those who could not (and who could only 
speak Tamil) (cf. Rogers’ 2008 discussion and his telescoping of this difference into a 
difference of caste; Lukose 2009: ch. 5). Second, many richer students tended to be in 
self-financing courses held at a totally different time of the day. For such students there 
 
32 Some possible reasons are: four out of the five colleges I worked in were non-governmental, autonomous 
colleges; three of them had substantial middle-class student populations (or, at least, such a reputation, 
thereby providing a normative force for students of other backgrounds); three of the colleges were Christian 
institutions; area was largely coterminous with caste in the Chennai government college (and thus perhaps 
obfuscated by bus route/area); perhaps I simply was not looking for it in the right way; or perhaps it simply 
was not in play during my fieldwork. 
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was little overlap with their aided counterparts. This difference was often reanalyzed by 
poorer students not as class per se but as the difference between students who showed off 
(“scene pooduRathu”) with their style-ish clothes and English and those who did not. 
That is, in cases where the egalitarian peer group could not sustain itself due to perduring 
group-internal hierarchy rankings, students reorganized themselves into relatively status-
equal peer groups (see Nisbett 2007 on a nice discussion of this). Sometimes, but not 
always, this involved class. In chapter 3, section 2.4 I discuss differences between 
concepts of status and social class in more detail; in chapter 6, section 2.4 I discuss social 
class and use of branded forms qua status-ful objects.  
 
4.2.3 Department versus bus route 
In this section I compare the two colleges in Chennai where I worked. Both are 
longstanding institutions in Tamil Nadu with very different student populations. One is 
an elite college which draws heavily but not exclusively from an upper-middle-class 
student body from all over Tamil Nadu and the other is a very affordable government 
college whose student population is decidedly lower-middle-class from Chennai and its 
surrounding (rural) areas. These two colleges embody very different kinds of masculinity 
and peer group formation, as I discuss in chapter 3. While the elite college is typified by 
its students and those of the other college as “style” and “decent” (i.e., fashionable and 
[upper-]middle-class), the government college is a “geththaana” and “rowdy college” 
(i.e., tough and working-class) (cf. Rogers’ 2008 discussion of the Chennai city college 
that he worked at).  
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In the elite college, one of the main principles of group formation and identity is 
department. Students organize themselves based on their department and department 
rivalry is common. Ragging takes place within the department; functions are by 
department; tours are by department; and the spatial organization of peer groups on the 
college campus is based on department. This is because students’ classes are assigned by 
department and year (only language classes in the first year are cross-departmental). Thus 
students spend almost all of their time with people from their own department–year 
cohort with little chance to meet students from other departments or years. This is 
compounded because, as this college is “autonomous”—in effect meaning that there is no 
appealing administration decisions to discipline students—attendance regulation is 
rigorous. Moreover, area (‘neighborhood’) is not a primary axis for peer group formation 
because students come from all over the city, state, and country and thus neighborhood 
concentrations of students are low. Further, the wide range of social classes of students 
mean that transportation to the college is distributed: some come in car, some on bike, 
some by bus, some on foot. As such, besides department–year at this college there is no 
unified institutional principle to organize students’ peer groups. 
This was not the case at the Chennai government college where I researched. Here (1) 
many groups of students do come from the same area; (2) their socio-economic 
background is relatively homogeneous and thus they mainly come to the college by bus; 
(3) attendance is lax as administration control of students is weak and thus students spend 
a lot of their time outside of the classroom in their (area based) peer groups. In addition, 
(4) this college had been a training ground for political parties pre-1990s. As students’ 
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political identity was eroded in the 1990s by administrative and government action an 
identity vacuum was left in its wake.  
The result is that department is not a founding principle of peer group formation. 
Rather, it is the bus route; that is, the group of students who ride the same bus route to the 
college. The bus route is a named entity based on the name of the bus route, either as 
number or name: for example, Route 99, T. Nagar Route, or Velachery Route.  
In this college area and bus route are so dominant that the junior–senior divide is not 
rigorously maintained, instead being subsumed by the route. (Ragging a member of 
another route is a provocation for a confrontation between routes.) Ragging itself is 
highly attenuated and not institutionalized through department functions. Instead there 
exist powerful rituals and activities to socialize the students to route solidarity. The daily 
ritual of riding the route everyday (route pooduRathu)—including, for many students, 
when they were school children—is one such form of socialization.  
Route pooduRathu is not just being on the bus, but hanging out and socializing on the 
bus with one’s route-mates, even without the intention of going anywhere in particular 
(including the college; indeed, even when there was college leave students would route 
pooduRathu). Route pooduRathu also has its own expressive culture (see chapter 3, 
section 2.3.1). Route pooduRathu involves singing the route’s song—a song which extols 
that particular route as being the most status-ful and dominant—along with drum beats 
created by students banging on the bus frame, and dancing. A second ritual of route 
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solidarity is bus day, a day to celebrate the route where everyone on the route rides the 
bus to the college at the same time (see chapter 3, section 2.3.1).33 
 
4.2.4 Those who study and those who don’t 
Another division between students is their alignment to the goal of getting good 
marks (‘grades’) in their classes: that is, ‘kids who study’ padikkiRa pasangka (or nalla 
pasangka ‘good kids’) and those who fail in their studies or coolly shrug them off, kedda 
pasangka ‘bad kids.’ In the classroom such students self-segregate spatially to some 
extent. Stereotypically, the toppers—those with the top grades—sit in the front row while 
those whose studies lack, the maappiLLai bench, sit in the back; hence their other 
moniker, back bench boys.34  
What is interesting is that doing well in the college—which is seen as the institution 
par excellence for class mobility (cf. Jeffrey et al. 2008; Lukose 2009; Osella and Osella 
2000b)—is not associated with concepts of youth status per se (at least not as I have 
discussed it). Students who study well are neither idolized as a status-superior nor reviled 
as ‘uncool’ (see Jeffrey et al. 2008: 21 for a similar point). (Students told me this type of 
division was more salient in school.) I was surprised that students’ performance in 
college was not much of a strong predictor of the kind of company they kept or the status 
they were afforded by their peers. Rather, the issue was the degree to which they aligned 
 
33 Note that this isn’t to say that the elite college didn’t have peer groups that were made up of route-
buddies—for it did—or that department was not one reason why students of the government college were 
friends—for it was. Rather, these aren’t the dominant organization principles of these colleges. Further, it is 
possible, as in one of the Madurai colleges that I worked in, to have department and area/route mixed peer 
groups (e.g., “The Swarm,” a self-named peer group of students all in the Economics department and from 
the same neighborhood). 
34 Immediately after marriage the ‘bride groom,’ or maappiLLai, is treated with extra care by his wife and 
in-laws. He is expected to do nothing but rest, eat, sleep, and enjoy the attention of his new family. In this 
way, students who take their studies lightly are like the groom, relaxing and taking life easily, as nothing 
excessively important. 
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with adult authority. This was, however, linked to grades to the extent that back bench 
boys tended to be those who did other kinds of transgression in and outside of the 
classroom. However, it isn’t their academics per se that figures them in this way, but the 
notion that they don’t align with adult norms of authority.  
 
5. Conclusions 
5.1 Note on diagrammaticity 
In this chapter I have traced the lines of articulation between youth’s institutional, or 
objective, placement within the life cycle and their experience of that positionality to the 
semiotic forms and spaces which make possible and indexically instantiate ‘youth.’ I 
have argued that central to the logic of ‘youth’ in its various extensions is its 
diagrammatic quality of being exterior to and transgressive of what youth figure as 
‘society’ (the kin group, caste group). As I have shown, this diagrammaticity 
simultaneously distances itself from ‘society’ while at the same time reinscribing its 
social and cultural forms (often in tropic ways). What we see among youth, then, is an 
ironic oscillation between replicating more general (or “traditional”) cultural logics while 
at the same time motivating the use of non-traditional (or “modern”) cultural forms (e.g., 
sartorial fashion, linguistic forms). I explore this theme in chapters 3 and 6.  
 
5.2 Beyond the Venn diagram approach to Indian society 
In framing youth culture as reflexively constructed against age and caste hierarchies I 
have attempted to sidestep a particular way of viewing Indian society as a sociological 
Venn diagram, common in contemporary discourse about India.  
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In an older Orientalist view, India was only and ever about caste (Dumont’s [1970] 
Homo Hierarchicus being its anthropological apotheosis). As a redress, anthropologists 
and sociologists rightly pointed out that there were other rubrics through which to think 
about Indian society (Appadurai 1986b; Inden 2000[1990]: ch. 2): for example, class 
(Beteille 1993[1991]; Caplan 1987), personhood (Daniel 1984), psychology (Nandy 
1983), emotion and kinship (Trawick 1996[1990]), gender, urban–rural divisions 
(Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995), or individuality (M. Mines 1994; M. Mines and 
Gourishankar 1990). Appadurai’s (1986b: 75) formulation of the changing of the guard 
was a call “against holism.”  
At the same time, the causal link between the idea and reality of caste posited by 
Dumont was pointed out to be empirically problematic (Dirks 1987, 2001; Inden 
2000[1990]; Cohn 1996; Berreman 1972, 1979; Fuller 1977; Raheja 1988; Fuller and 
Spencer 1990) and was shown to be the essentialization of an otherwise more complex 
and volatile social history. Dumont had confused the (relatively new colonial) map for 
the (supposed timeless Indian) territory.  
In the contemporary moment, the dictum is still “against holism,” though the specter 
of caste has transformed itself in academic discourse from an ideational (or cognitive) 
category to a placeholder of identity, demography, and political mobilization. Today we 
formulate statements about India as the intersection of overlapping sociological 
categories, as in a Venn diagram: caste, class, gender, region, language, religion, age, etc. 
And rightly so, India is a diverse place and statements often require such qualification. 
The result, then, attempts to reconcile the political (i.e., secularized) existence of caste as 
basis for claims to the state (i.e., as a pure diacritic of difference) with the repudiation of 
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it having ‘positive’ and thus natural content (either at the normative or descriptive 
level).35 Caste largely becomes a demographic category (ironically reproducing the 
state’s own statistical understanding of caste), and its status as a reflexive category 
relegated only to those political interests vying for dispensation from the state or in inter-
caste conflict.  
Yet what I have tried to do in this chapter brackets this will to qualify and asks a 
different question: how does the construction of ‘youth’ as an age set itself reflexively 
figure caste and hierarchy as exterior to it in order to make itself intelligible? And what 
are the consequences of this? Rather than the question, how is ‘youth’ differentially 
experienced because of the existence of various hierarchies? (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Rogers 
2008; Lukose 2009), how can we understand ‘youth’ and hierarchy as mutually and 
reflexively constituted categories? As I have argued, the construction of ‘youth’ operates 
precisely through differentiating itself from the logic of age and caste hierarchy 
(‘society’) not in order to erase ‘society’ but to attempt to create a space exterior to it 
whereby new forms of status negotiation and pleasure are created (cf. Osella and Osella 
2000b: 242, 245). In order for ‘youth’ to be intelligible as exterior, representations of 
‘society,’ whether they be true or ideologically distorted, must be assumed to exist. This 
isn’t to say, then, that ‘youth’ and caste are non-overlapping categories (for clearly they 
aren’t), but rather to say that the experience of each is made possible by keeping them 
apart, like two magnetic poles create a field of attraction and repulsion. To do this, 
 
35 This takes place largely within the debate about “substantialisation” of caste (Dumont 1980[1966]; Fuller 
1996; Deliege 1996; Beteille 1996b; Dirks 1996a; cf. Sheth 1999: 2504 “classisation” of caste). In this 
understanding caste is largely decoupled from overt hierarchies (Kolena 2003), leading a muted existence 
in face-to-face public discourse, though being largely translated into euphemistic language of class and 
cultivation (Fuller 1996; Beteille 1996b) and living on in marriage practices (Beteille 1996b; Vatuk 1972), 
as well as becoming the grounds for caste-based political mobilization (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998; 
Sheth 1999). See Osella and Osella (2000b: ch. 7) for a discussion and critique.  
 79
however, we must be able to conceive of caste not only as a sociological dimension to be 
crossed in a matrix with other variables but also as a category available to youth’s 
reflexive awareness as part of their own identity and status work, in this case, through 
(temporary) exclusion or deferral. 
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Chapter 3 – Youth Status: Style, Geththu, and Other Status Concepts 
 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter I expand the discussion of chapter 2 by looking at particular models of 
status among young men and how these play out in their peer groups. I begin by looking 
at how youth concepts of status, while figured as exterior to the objective age categories 
periya aaL and chinna paiyan, reinscribed them as relative terms within the peer group. 
Having unpacked the terms style and geththu as class-linked models of youth status, I 
show how both concepts are diagrammatic of the construction of ‘youth’ more generally, 
as well as with young men’s experience of their positionality as exterior. I then go on to 
look at how such concepts work in the economy of status negotiation in the peer group. 
In the penultimate section, I come back to the question of style and gender, looking at 
how women engage with concepts of youth status. I conclude with some comment on 
globalization, arguing that the idea that youth “negotiate” globalization, “tradition,” or 
“modernity” is problematically formulated.  
 
2. Concepts of status and exteriority 
2.1 Reinscribing the periya aaL and chinna paiyan 
In chapter 2 I showed that the youth peer group is an exterior interactional zone that 
licenses status-raising. Among the youth that I worked with such status-raising was 
operationalized vis-à-vis the concept of being “mature.” To be status-fully independent, 
to transgress authority is to be a mature youth. Interestingly, in youth’s own explicit 
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discourse the “mature youth” figuratively approximates the periya aaL.1 His alter, then, 
is the “chinna paiyan.”2 To call someone a chinna paiyan, as one youth explained, is to 
not give that person value (mathippu). It’s to treat them as if they are an ‘ordinary perso
(saathaaraNamaana aaL), while the speaker is like a periya aaL or ‘big man.’3 Here, 
then, youth concepts of status and masculinity are rearticulated through the terms mature 
youth/periya aaL and chinna paiyan. 
Unlike their homophonic objective categories, chinna paiyan and periya aaL in peer 
group usages are relative terms: one is like a chinna paiyan to another, who is figured like 
a periya aaL. Recalling the mustache example in chapter 2, section 2.2.3, while having a 
mustache is avoided because it makes one look like a periya aaL and being unable to 
grow facial hair might elicit the teasing designation chinna paiyan, having no facial hair 
but being able to grow it is often described as an attempt to raise one’s relative status in 
the peer group, showing how one is like the periya aaL of the group, an important and 
‘cool’ person, thus inverting the default (i.e., adult) indexical value of the mustache while 
calquing objective age categories as relative designators of status-ful individuals.  
‘Maturity’ is most importantly mapped onto transgression of ‘society.’ The mature 
youth cuts class and goes to the cinema; he sight adi-s (‘ogles’) girls; he does (outlandish) 
fashion; he loves, and perhaps even has sex; he fights (and wins); he smokes, plays cards, 
and drinks alcohol (and when he drinks, he drinks the more powerful and mainly hot 
 
1 Note that “periya aaL” most often is used by youth in the peer group to refer to others doing status-raising 
(with a slightly negative connotation) while mature is used to refer to status-ful youth (including speaker) 
positively.  
2 While normative youth masculinity is at times defined negatively with respect to women or alternative 
masculinities (the “third gender” thirunangkai, or more derogatorily onbathu [lit. ‘nine’]; but interestingly 
not the homosexual) it was most commonly defined negatively as not the chinna paiyan (‘little boy’). 
3 It was also used to denigrate other social groups, as I learned when students from the government Chennai 
college referred to the elite college as a bunch of “school kids.” And vice versa, the elite college students 
described the rough masculinity of the government college as ‘childish’ (chinna puLLeththanam). 
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drinks [‘spirits’] rather than beer); and he uses bad words and talks to others without 
using ‘respect’ (mariyaathai) (cf. Rogers 2008: 86; Lukose 2005a: 925–926, 2009: 66–71 
on chethu). Instead of being inside (the home, the hostel) he moves through public space, 
loitering in cinema halls, tea stalls, and on the road. Here spatial, temporal, and normative 
distance acts as an icon of maturity: the further, the later, the more transgressively he 
wanders the more mature he is. In the Madurai hostels I stayed at, jumping over the 
college wall after curfew in the middle of the night and wandering the streets looking for 
cigarettes and mischief was, in some students’ eyes, the height of maturity and cool. The 
mature youth shows courage and ‘boldness’ (thairiyam) in breaking the rules, of which 
the college provides many opportunities.  
On the other hand, the chinna paiyan is afraid to do all of these things. He prefers, 
instead, to align with the norms of authority, content to be contained within ‘society,’ 
within the home and other spaces which make one childlike and dependent (cf. the 
concept of “mama’s boy” in the U.S.). Hostel students who went home at every possible 
chance, who never roamed outside of the campus, were teased by other students as 
chinna pasangka. Similarly, students who refused to drink, to smoke, to play cards, to 
love, to fight—in short, to break the rules—were labeled as chinna pasangka.4  
At the same time, the mature youth is, like the periya aaL, a leader, one who can 
make decisions, who can guide others, who dominates a conversation, and who bends 
others to his will (cf. M. Mines 1994: ch. 2; M. Mines and Gourishankar 1990). But, of 
 
4 Remember from chapter 2, section 4.2 that being seen as “mature” or like a “chinna paiyan” is also a 
principle of peer group formation. Thus, for example, one of the major divisions between the third-year 
hostel students at the Madurai hostel that I stayed at was typified based on this axis (in both directions). It 
was operationalized by pointing to different interests and leisure patterns (i.e., one group liked to play 
cards, smoke, drink, and ogle girls while the other group didn’t).  
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course, he isn’t a periya aaL literally and actively attempts to distance himself from this 
figure of personhood by bucking the rules and forming his own. This is unlike the chinna 
paiyan who is skittish, afraid, uncertain, indecisive, passive, and whom no one listens to. 
As one of my roommates in Madurai explained to me, the chinna paiyan requires 
guidance, is afraid of authority, and thus is dependent on others to tell him what to do. 
While this is appropriate for children in school, for college youth it isn’t. ‘Youth,’ he 
explained, ‘don’t like authority, don’t want to be told what to do, they can and should be 
able to make their own decisions.’  
While such designations are perspectival—those labeled chinna pasangka call the so-
called mature students undisciplined, without control, and morally questionable—the axis 
of differentiation—legitimate disengagement from ‘society’ and attempts to establish 
one’s own authority—is the same. Do you align with ‘society’ or to your own authority? 
More importantly, can you pull off staking off a space of authority? Will others ratify it 
as legitimate or not?  
As is clear, the fluidity and relativity of such designations, and by extension the 
concepts of status they presuppose, are subject to negotiation, revision, and change in the 
peer group. For example, while drinking, smoking, fighting, loving, and doing fashion are 
all associated with mature youth, doing them too much makes one like a chinna paiyan 
who is unable to make responsible decisions. Note that what counts as mature and status-
ful, then, is never fixed precisely because ‘youth’ itself is a shifter defined by its 
exteriority from the normative, perduring, and static, and thus is always capable of being 
reformulated and troped upon. In contrast to youth’s understandings and experiences of 
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adult authority structures, youth spaces of status negotiation are (made to be) emergent, 
relative, and fluid.  
What is most important to note here is that that even as youth distance themselves 
from the diacritics of ‘society’ and its objective age ranking through their transgression, 
the age statuses of ‘child’ (chinna paiyan) and ‘adult’ (periya aaL) are reinscribed within 
the peer group as relative designators through, on the one hand, typifying excessive 
obedience to (adult) authority as ‘childish’ and, on the other hand, valorizing norm-
flouting as status-ful. Here what would otherwise be typified as ‘childishness’ or 
irresponsibility by adults is inverted as status through transgression and irreverence 
among youth. Simultaneously, alignment with the adult world is denigrated as non-status, 
as indexing weak-mindedness and being afraid (of the Law). In this way, by the very 
logic of its exteriority the activity of the peer group is diagrammatic of social relations 
and concepts of status in Tamil society more generally and while differentiated from it, 
replicates it tropically in the peer group (see Kyratzis 2004: 626 on this point more 
generally; note the fractal organization of status, cf. Gal 2002).  
In short, youth status involves the creation of islands of authority among one’s peers. 
In such islands of authority traditional norms are bracketed while youth attempt to 
become a tropic periya aaL (of the group), to accrue enough interactional status to be 
able to be seen as status-ful, get other people’s attention, to be valued (mathippu). Table 
3.1 schematically charts this. 
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Table 3.1 Adult versus youth status5 
- Hierarchical 
- Institutional/ascribed (viz. objective 
periya aaL, chinna paiyan) 
- Interior  
- Alignment to norm 
- Egalitarian 
- Non-institutional/achieved (viz. the 
relative periya aaL, chinna paiyan)  
- Exterior 
- Non-alignment to norm (transgression) 
 
Examples of forms 
 
- veeshdi, saree, formals 
- (High) Tamil  
- (Tropic) patrline kin term usage 
(aNNan, thambi, appaa, ammaa) (+hon.) 
 
- Honorification (e.g., in 2nd pers. 
pronoun/verb forms niingka, -iingka) 
 
- Arranged marriage 
- Fashionable clothes, jeans, tee-shirts 
- English-hybridized Tamil 
- Tropic affinal kin term usage 
(maappiLLai, machchaan, maamaa); 
English address terms (dude, bro) (-hon.) 
- Non-honorification (e.g., in 2nd pers. 
pronoun/verb forms nee, -e; curse words as 
address terms) 
- Love 
 
Typified (by youth) as: 
 
- mariyaathai (‘respect’), saathaaraNam 
(‘normal,’ ‘ordinary’) 
- For ‘adults’ (periyavangka) 
- style, geththu, thooraNai (‘cool,’ 
‘badass’) 
- For ‘youth’ 
 
 
Below I discuss the concepts of youth status that instantiate such “maturity”: style, 
geththu, and thooraNai. These concepts are used by youth with overlapping meanings—
insofar as each embodies the relative notions of the periya aaL and status-raising—
though they have slightly different meanings by region and class.  
 
2.2. Style 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Among youth, the question ‘what is style?’ (style NNaa enna?) elicits two types of 
answers. One is the enumeration of the kinds of objects and actions which count as doing 
                                                 
5 Note that these distinctions aren’t absolute but overlapping and relative; they sketch particular tendencies 
between these two notions of status. Pace Gal (2002), we can see this as the logic of fractally re-embedding 
the shifters youth–adult. Moreover, this isn’t supposed to count as a description of how adult ‘society’ 
works, but how it’s taken to work by youth so as to make their own actions intelligible. 
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style. The second invokes personae that emblematize style; most commonly, film heroes, 
and in particular, Super Star Rajinikanth. In this chapter I look at the first answer. In 
chapters 4 and 5 I look at the second answer.  
When I got to Tamil Nadu for my fieldwork I was struck by youth’s flashy clothing, 
their branded apparel, their tee-shirts in bright colors with English words written on them, 
and other tokens of fashion. I often inquired why they wore such clothing and 
accessories, to which I almost always got a single word answer: “style.”6  
Why are your jeans ripped? Style.  
Why are you wearing a (fake) Nike wristband? Style.  
Why are you wearing sneakers today, it’s over 40 centigrade?! Style.  
Why do your shirts have wild colors and English writing on them? Style.  
What is with your giant 50 Cent belt buckle spins around? Style. 
Why the new cell phone with a million different functions? Style. 
I also found that style could also be used for body grooming:  
Why the long hair? Why no hair? Style. 
Why the hair coloring? Style.  
Why the goatee beard? Why no facial hair? Style.  
It could also be used to typify behavioral repertoires, leisure activities, and linguistic code 
choices: 
Why did you start smoking? Why did you start drinking? Style.  
Why is he riding the bus on the footboard/roof? Style. 
Why do you knock knuckles as a greeting instead of just shaking hands? Style. 
Why did you use that English word in your Tamil? Style.  
 
6 Cf. Lukose’s (2005a: 925–926, 2009: 66–71) discussion of the concept of chethu. She glosses this as 
“commodified masculinity” (p. 66). While I cannot speak for her materials, style can’t be reduced to just a 
commodity register. While it is the case that style includes commoditized signs (like brands, English, etc.), 
it also includes other things like whistling at the theater, loving girls, wearing the same shirt as your friends, 
or riding on the roof of the bus. These are all style because, as I show, they are exterior, they individuate 
and foreground the user, they are transgressive, etc. And while commodities can perform this function, they 
aren’t the only way that such interactional work can be done. 
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Why did he stop talking to us and go over to talk to those girls? Style.  
What is the logic that makes all such semiotic displays typifiable as style?  
 
2.2.2 Style and visuality  
Style is showing oneself to be different and unique, an individual foregrounded from 
the background of the peer group: “style NNaa thaniyaa theriyaNum” ‘to be/do style you 
have to be individuated/visible.’ Style is about getting attention from others. It is about 
‘attracting’ others (kavarkkiRathu). Anything style is an ego-focal index, ‘Look here!’ As 
youth explained, ‘when you walk by, people should turn their heads and look at you.’  
Note that being visible and individuated is a kind of status in Tamil Nadu more 
generally (M. Mines 1994; Dean n.d., 2009; Dickey 2009a), partially because to be 
visible is to subject oneself to the dangers of other’s envy and the power of vision. Only 
one who is strong enough to withstand the deleterious effects of kaN thrishdi (‘the evil 
eye’) would want to willingly attract such kinds of attention. To this extent, then, making 
oneself visible is understood as status-raising, as Melanie Dean (n.d., 2009) has shown in 
her work. As such, youth’s visibility practices implicitly transgress norms of avoiding 
envious attention and ostentation. 
‘Whistling and yelling’ (alappare pooduRathu, also a term for status-ful activity), 
group chants, dancing and singing, ‘teasing’ others (kalaaykkiRathu), sight adi-ing 
(‘ogling’) girls, graffiti, getting in fights, and doing fashion all appropriate space literally, 
aurally, and especially visually.7 Getting attention by its very definition attempts to 
control space, and to set the terms under which interaction unfolds. To be visible is to be 
 
7 Indeed, common slang terms for status-raising are explicitly visual (and filmic): scene 
pooduRathu/kaadduRathu (‘showing/putting on a scene’), film/padam kaamikkiRathu (‘showing a 
film/image’). 
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status-ful, and to be invisible, to be unseen and unnoticed by others is to be without status 
(Dickey 2009a). As one Madurai student noted regarding English as a style-ish form, ‘if 
you don’t know it, even a dog won’t turn to look at you’ (cf. Rogers 2008; Lukose 2009: 
ch. 5).  
 
2.2.3 Style and exterior space 
Forms which are style derive their value from alternative (i.e., non-“traditional”) and 
exterior frameworks of status and value: from the upper-class elites (figured by the 
working and middle classes as so rich that they are outside of ‘society’), from foreign and 
Tamil media (music television VJs, Hollywood films, Rajinikanth), and from the 
underground or marginalized (the criminal world, the rowdy). Fashions from north India, 
from America, from Singapore are style. English (spoken or written on clothing) is style. 
Western brands (real or duplicate) are style. Acting like a cinema hero (or a villain) is 
style.  
Youth status is also about projecting class and spatial mobility (also see Lukose 2009: 
ch. 5). Among lower- and middle-class youth, to do style through English and Western 
brands is to index social spaces outside the neighborhood, hometown, state, and thus 
figuratively invoke higher social strata and utopic exterior lands. This is revealed by the 
fact that one salient concept of non-status is the term local.8 The term local has multiple 
indexical values, contrasting both with decent—a middle-class notion (Dickey 2009a)—
and style—a youth notion. A shoddily made product, a product of no value is local. 
Language that is crass, ugly, and marked by colloquialisms is local. Behavior which is 
 
8 Cf. Tarlo (1996: ch. 7) on the similar indexical valence and use of the term deshi in rural Gujurat.  
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without any status is local. The local as non-status projects space in several ways. 
Objectively, it refers to the slums. Relatively, it refers to the peripheries of value. Thus 
things from Madurai are local with respect to things from Chennai; things from south 
India are local with respect to things from north India; and things from India are local 
with respect to things from abroad.  
In contrast to the local, style tropically figures exterior space. Thus, to not do style, to 
always stay within the ‘society’ and ‘culture’ of the region, is to be stuck without 
possibility of betterment. Youth sometimes understood this quite literally, particularly 
with regard to English and Tamil (cf. Jeffrey et al. 2008; Lukose 2009: 189). While one 
could easily elicit Tamil pride out of students, their spontaneous discourse about their 
mother tongue was often one of regret. As one student put it: “ippa yaarum thamizh like 
paNNamaaddaangka” ‘today no one likes Tamil.’ He continued to explain that with 
Tamil you can’t go anywhere; you can’t leave the state; you can’t get ahead.9 There was 
a kind of claustrophobia among youth: without transgressing ‘society’ and embracing
forms that index exteriority one can never escape. 
In this sense, style, even if a playful non-serious realm of youth fun, is linked with 
serious anxieties surrounding mobility and escape. As I noted in chapter 2, youth culture 
in urban Tamil Nadu, like the British subcultures of the 1960s (Willis 1981[1977]; P. 
Cohen 1993[1972]; Clarke et al. 1997[1975]; Hebdige 1979), projects the contradictory 
experience of youth and diagrams it in its expressive culture. While for post–World War 
 
9 One of Rogers’ (2008: 85) informants puts it thusly: “But if you know only Tamil, you can go nowhere. If 
you go out of Tamil Nadu, then you are empty; you are like a newly born baby. If I went to Andhra 
[Pradesh], I would be expected to speak in English; or at least in another Indian language like Hindi. Even 
here, if you go to a company, they will expect you to speak English. At RPG Cellular or SKYCELL [Indian 
mobile phone network providers] they will not speak Tamil. If you struggle to speak English, they will say: 
shut up and go away. They will not respect you.” 
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II British youth, status expressions and their aesthetics diagrammed age and class 
contradictions (among other things), for post-liberalization Tamil youth, style diagrams 
age relations (YOUTH : CHILDREN :: YOUTH: ADULT) and spatial (inside–outside) relations 
(VILLAGE : CITY :: CITY :: NATION :: NATION : GLOBAL). For many young men, the West 
was imagined to be a youth utopia: self-centered without kinship, abounding with money 
and job potential, egalitarian and equalitarian, everything style, everything modern,10 
sexualized but without marriage or children (cf. Yurchak 2006: ch. 5 regarding Soviet 
Russia).  
In addition to the figurative notion of space implicit in the concept of style is a literal 
one: style is something that is done in exterior (youth) spaces, but not something that can 
be done at home. When one goes out on the town (e.g., to the cinema, to the beach, to 
college) and when one goes out of town (e.g., on college tour) one performs style. 
 
2.2.4 Style and transgression 
In addition to being beyond the pale of ‘society’ and ‘culture,’ style is often seen as 
explicitly transgressing norms of ‘society’ and ‘culture.’ As one of my Madurai 
roommates Sebastian stated, he does not do style because he follows the ‘culture of 
adults’ (“periyavangkaLooda kalaachchaaram”). Moreover, he does not do style because 
 
10 As my Chennai roommate put it: ‘modern doesn’t mean style but this how “we use it.”’ The lexical item 
modern as used by Tamil youth means something akin to ‘newness’ (puthumuRai). In short, style is that 
which makes the user seem different and unique. Things that are modern, by contrast, are used by many 
people and don’t necessarily individuate the user. While things from the West are often considered style 
and modern, they aren’t synonymous. There can also be non-Western style and non-Western modern. 
Compare this with fashion as a Tamil lexical item. Something that is fashion is a fad, or a trend, while style 
is a status-raising behavior. Something can be a style without being a fashion, and vice versa. However, 
insofar as fashion is often valorized the two are linked. Similarly, there are examples of style which may 
draw on something old or timeless in order to differentiate the user: for example, talking loudly as a way to 
attract attention. That said, the emblematic kinds of style tend to be modern precisely because that which is 
modern often embodies exteriority, uniqueness, attention-getting, and transgression, themselves iconic with 
the construction of ‘youth’ qua status. 
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he is from a village and thus is “traditional.” Style, by implication, then, is neither of 
these. It is exterior to and deviant from “Tamil culture.” As such, style is seen as an 
explicit challenge by youth to established authority structures. Thus, style is harder to do 
in front of people of (traditional) status as it elicits disapproval and censure. 
More than simple transgression, style attempts to create new norms and authoritative 
anchorings. Thus, for example, ‘bad’ habits like whistling, smoking, drinking, fighting, 
ogling, teasing and loving girls are style because they transgress the norms of ‘society’ 
and because they attempt to stake out—for one’s peers at least—a space of authority in 
distinction to that of adults and other youth.  
Sartorially, style’s aesthetics are shocking and disturbing to the sensibility of others 
(especially adults). Gaudy colors, ripped fabric, and extra pockets are all style. In short, 
style-ish clothes are non-functional (except in their attention-getting quality) (cf. Blumer 
1969: 288). As one student explained to me using the example of pants:  
‘Pants usually have four pockets. Typically pants are tailored. That is “normal,” 
“ordinary.” So pants which have more pockets, pockets which are visible (even 
though, perhaps because, they are functionless) are “style.” Pants which are 
“ready-made” are “style.” At first there was the “six packet” [sic]—pants with six 
pockets. When that got ordinary, the fashion increased into twelve pockets, twelve 
pockets being more than six pockets, even more unnecessary. That was “style.” 
Then we came to know them as “cargoes.” The more pockets, the more “style.”’  
In fact, anything that cannot be understood through functionality or “tradition” is 
potentially style. I learned this on my first visit to India. I was wearing a tee-shirt inside 
out. A number of young men who were talking to me noticed and pointed out that my 
shirt was inside out. ‘Why?’ they inquired. When I shrugged and hesitated to come up 
with some sort of face-saving answer, one of them answered for me: ‘Oh, it’s style!’ The 
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anomaly explained, the conversation moved on (cf. Tarlo’s [1996: ch. 5] experience of 
her dress’s [un]intelligibility among her Gujarati informants).  
As a Madurai college professor bemoaned after scolding a student for entering his 
office with ripped jeans, long hair, and an earring, ‘everything and anything today is 
style: there is no rhyme or reason to it.’ Style verges on the absurd, on the comic. It is 
playful.11 Under the concept of style, deviation from norm is contained and made 
sensible. As function does not and cannot ground style, youth status and authority must. 
Style is about stretching norms as far as possible, going to the edge of reason, verging on 
madness (kiRukku), to attempt to make the non- and the extra-normative one’s own. To 
own transgression, to create one’s own authority, or co-opt the authority of something 
else, where only nonsense and unintelligibility existed before is style. As such style 
presents itself as all form, no substance; all surface, no meaning. Hence the irrelevance of 
the meanings of the English wordings on students’ clothing; on knowing who or what 
Eminem, 50 Cent, Diesel, Tommy Hilfiger actually are (‘are they rock bands or brands?’ 
my Madurai roommate Stephen asked me) (see chapter 6 for more discussion).  
 
2.2.5 Style for love, love as style 
But why do style? Besides its self-evidence as status-ful, students often justified style 
thusly: style was not just to impress one’s peers, but more importantly to impress the 
opposite sex. Suresh, a second-year college student in Madurai, explained to me that he 
likes brands like Nike because girls like Nike because it is style.  
 
11 Thanks to Susan Seizer for pushing me to emphasize style as a kind of play.  
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And indeed, young men do style in contexts when they are visible to women: for 
example, at the bus stop; when going outside for a stroll to sight adi (‘ogle’) girls; at the 
park, beach, or temple; at the movies or a college function; or when going to a girls 
college. When a girl would walk by, guys would adjust their clothing, push their hair 
back, lean against a motorcycle, put on sunglasses, etc. When a young man falls in (one-
sided) love, guys explained, he naturally starts to do style to “impress” her. One common 
question that peers ask to a youth performing new kinds of style is “enna daa, lav 
paNReyaa? ‘what’s the deal man, are you in love?’ 
However, young men don’t only do style for girls. Indeed, young men’s interactions 
with women are rare, and most of their status negotiation is same-sex. Even when the 
goal is attracting women through style, youth’s strategic displays of style are mediated by 
same-sex status negotiation: ‘among ten guys, I should be the one the girls notice,’ 
Suresh explained. In effect, over and above the question of impressing girls (or rather, 
precisely because of the inability to interact with girls except through the visual displays 
of style) style was part of the negotiation of young men’s relationships with each other 
(cf. Osella and Osella 1998: 193).  
At the same time, while style is for love, ‘doing love’ (lav paNRathu) is itself a kind 
of style to impress one’s same-sex peers (cf. Liechty 2003: 29 on ‘fashion’ and ‘doing 
love’ among Nepali youth). As my Chennai roommate pointed out (somewhat 
nostalgically for a time he never experienced), echoing a common discourse about the 
state of contemporary “Tamil culture” and love: ‘Today love is just a fashion, just for 
time-pass. Today, a college guy will have a bike, cool clothes, and a girlfriend <all 
emblems of style>. They will love for three years <the duration of college>, finish up 
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everything <i.e., have sexual relations> and then breakup and marry whom their parents 
tell them to.’ In short, being in a romantic relationship with a girl makes you stand out 
(visually through transgressive public displays of affection like sitting next to each other, 
speaking to each other, or holding hands; or virtually as a topic of gossip) and it hints at 
transgression of caste patriarchy’s and the kin group’s demand for arranged marriage (as 
an index of obedience to their authority) (cf. Osella and Osella 1998, 2000b: ch. 7). 
Ultimately, however, this is temporary, only for show, my roommate lamented. In short, 
the desire to love was a desire for style, for exteriority, for status. This is reflected in 
films that narrate the style-ish, darker-skinned, working-class youth hero loving the rich, 
north Indian college girl (e.g., the films of Dhanush or an early Rajinikanth; cf. 
Dhareshwar and Niranjana [1996] on Kaathalan [1994]). To love such a woman is to 
desire the exterior, to conquer it, hybridize it with the self, and to extend oneself as 
status-ful. It is to be ‘youth,’ to co-opt alternative cultural forms, to own them in efforts 
to create alternative models of status to the hierarchical kin-, caste-, and age-based 
‘society’ of adults. 
 
2.2.6 Style and individuality  
We might be tempted to think of style as a kind of self-expression, a proclamation of 
the unique individual against a society-oriented culture (cf. Williams 2001). And yet, it 
isn’t. Style is about being visible, getting attention, accruing status. It isn’t about 
interiority or the perduring authentic self, but about projecting a “public face” (M. Mines 
1994). It is a kind of garment.12 Youth make no bones about the fact that they do style not 
 
12 Thanks to Asif Agha for suggesting this trope.  
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because of their own personal tastes, but because they think that such forms can accrue 
them appreciation and status from their peers and the opposite sex.13 ‘It’s only about 
what others think,’ one youth noted. Thus, doing style isn’t linked to any discours
authenticity (e.g., of the subculture, of the brand, of understanding the English words 
printed on one’s clothing).14 In addition, style is something which need not be an 
individual quality; it can also be a property of the group. Hence, for example, youth 
would often all wear the same outfit when going out. They explained that when you see a 
bunch of people all wearing the same thing you’ll notice them, and thus this is style. 
 
2.3. Geth(thu), thooraNai, and other concepts of the figurative periya aaL 
Youth use a number of other words similar to style to typify that which is status-ful. 
In Madurai youth use the word thooraNai (lit. 1. ‘posture,’ ‘pose’; 2. ‘a kind of wedding 
decoration’). In Chennai (and Madurai to some extent), they use the word geththu (lit. 
‘prestige,’ ‘haughtiness,’ ‘influence/intimidation’). In other parts of Tamil Nadu (e.g., 
Paramagudi), one would hear simply (yaaru) periya aaL ‘(who is) the big man.’  
 
13 This isn’t to say that students don’t develop their own individual expressive forms over time. In talking 
to a third-year student at the elite Chennai college I did research in, he explained that there aren’t discrete 
identities for students vis-à-vis dress except that some dress more style-ishly and others more “ordinary” 
(which itself contains a number of other categories by proxy: rich/poor, urban/rural, local/formal, etc.). 
However, over the three years some students in his class had developed distinctive looks, though unnamed. 
For example, when they were out shopping on tour he suggested that his friend buy a particular kind of 
jewelry because it would “suit” his look. But even here this isn’t because it was seen as an expression of 
some inner self, but rather that it was consistent with a particular outer image. Such “looks” aren’t 
institutionalized, certainly not to the extent that they are in the West (vis-à-vis a rock style, a punk style, a 
metal style, a hip-hop style, a frat style, etc.), and thus can’t be invoked through particular emblematic 
sartorial forms. Rather, in this case they are only possible in the context of having gone to college with 
someone everyday for the past three years. 
14 What is interesting is that the pragmatic function of style as status-raising doesn’t exist at the level of 
explicit awareness when it’s internalized as an individual, authentic expression, as it is in the United States 
or among Indian elites. Indeed, the concept of personal style in U.S. disavows that one would ever imitate 
or copy someone else. This would invalidate such style. In the Western notion of style, then, individuals are 
atomic units that aren’t comparable per se and thus dressing in one way or the other doesn’t have status 
implication, but expresses the true self (at least that is the ideology). Yet this was certainly not how Tamil 
youth thought of style. 
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Like style, questions such as, ‘Why did he buy those new branded sneakers?,’ ‘Why 
did he get new, embroidered jeans with Suzuki written on the side?,’ ‘Why is he speaking 
in English?’ receive answers like “geththu maintain paNRathukku” ‘to maintain (his) 
geththu,’ “thooraNai kaamikkiRathukku” ‘to show (his) thooraNai,’ “periya aaL 
kaamikkirathukku” ‘to show that he is the periya aaL.’ However, such terms are slightly 
different in meaning/use and in the figures of personhood they invoke. While similar to 
style in that they refer to youth status, they invoke different modes of masculinity and 
project the periya aaL–chinna paiyan dynamic differently, depending on who is using 
them and in what contexts.  
As opposed to style which is mainly about getting attention through doing something 
different and thus figuratively projecting the periya aaL, geththu invokes a rougher kind 
of masculinity, something closer to ‘badass’ than ‘cool’ (cf. Rogers’ 2008 discussion of 
masculinity in the Chennai college he worked in). It is used more often to typify literal 
transgression (like smoking, drinking, fighting, rowdyism). Objects or behaviors which 
presuppose such a tough and status-ful persona, like rolled-up sleeves, a pulled back shirt 
collar, and flashy jewelry emblematize geththu.15  
 
15 Unlike style which is hardly ever used by youth to describe adults (it struck youth as un-felicitous), 
geththu and thooraNai can be used to describe status-ful adults and the signs which index them as such. For 
example, one close unmarried friend in Madurai explained to me that he didn’t like wearing veeshdis, 
because “veeshdi periya aaLooda thooraNai” ‘the veeshdi is the thooraNai of the big man.’ It’s the sign of 
his prestige/status as a man of age and repute (a status which he was excluded from). In usages to describe 
adults, however, both geththu and thooraNai generally describe status with respect to the individual and not 
with respect to his societal responsibilities (to the kin or caste group), as is the case with mariyaathai 
‘respect’ or gauravam ‘honor.’ One’s geththu or thooraNai can’t be impugned, though one’s mariyaathai 
or gauravam can be. Indeed, unlike mariyaathai or gauravam which are institutionally perduring, like style, 
thooraNai and geththu reflect the relative status relations between a group of peers in interaction. Between 
thooraNai and geththu, one difference is that thooraNai is explicitly linked to the notion of putting on a 
face, and in derisive contexts, as pretending. While geththu is a characteristic of a person (the outward 
expression of his being a periya aaL, literally or figuratively), thooraNai is a kind of pretence, it is 
something on the surface, an (over) action. It is exaggerated masculinity. 
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While thooraNai and style figuratively invoke the relative periya aaL through ego-
focal status-ful signs, geththu is, in addition to this usage, also used to more literally 
describe the dominance relationships between individuals. As youth explained to me, 
geththu is at core a description of the relative power relationship between two individuals 
(or groups). If you are ‘below’ me (kiizhee), if you have to do or listen to what I say, then 
when I exercise my power I am ‘showing geththu’ (geththu kaadduRathu). This resonates 
with the idea that a status-ful youth in a time of need should have his peers ‘standing 
behind’ him (pinnadi nikRathu), just as followers stand behind their leader. But this is 
recursive: those below the relative periya aaL have people below them, and so on. As one 
young man explained to me, the regress is that any man will have younger relatives with 
respect to which he has geththu. When he exercises his relative status over them, that is 
his geththu. Geththu, then, is a term of relative status, capturing the periya aaL–chinna 
paiyan dynamic in a literalistic and recursively embedded idiom. Indeed, this more 
closely approximates the “traditional” notion of status implicit in the concept of the 
periyar ‘big man’ of eminence as discussed by M. Mines (1994: ch. 2; M. Mines and 
Gourishankar 1990). It’s “naan thaan” (‘just me’), “top” (‘he who is at the top’), the 
notion that ‘there is no one above/beyond me’ (“enne minchi yaarum kedeyaathu”).  
In colleges, especially in Chennai, geththu (with this particular interpretation) is the 
reason that young men form cliques. As one student from the elite college in Chennai that 
I worked in explained, ‘college isn’t like in school where everyone is together, where 
everyone has studied since they were little kids. In college, you have to be part of a 
group. In college, you have to maintain some geththu, right?’ (“oru geththu maintain 
paNNaNum, le?”) He meant this both in terms of having a group of friends and in the 
 98
sense of having a gang of guys to support you in status-raising activities, including fights 
with rival groups. Indeed, while geththu was used to describe objects, behaviors, and 
individuals, it was also commonly used to describe groups of students.  
 
2.3.1 Geththu and the bus route 
This usage is most clearly seen in the organization of students in the government 
college in Chennai in which I did research. As a whole, this college is renowned in 
Chennai as a “geththaana college” ‘a badass, tough college.’ Students from this college 
often boast about this: their college is the toughest college, the “top” college, and thus 
they are the “Kings of Chennai.”  
 This college’s peer groups are based around the bus route (see chapter 2, section 
4.2.3). I first came across these bus routes through their graffiti, written all over the 
insides of the buses they rode and the college walls. Such routes boasted with epithets 
invoking the most ‘biggest’ of the ‘big men,’ the king: “Route ##: Kings of the City,” 
“Route ##: Kings of the [College name],” “City King ## Route: King of the King 
Maker’s [sic]” (photo 3.1).  
 
Photo 3.1 Bus route graffiti: “King of the King Maker’s [sic]” 
 
These routes imagine themselves as gangs involved in bloody warfare with other gangs 
to establish dominance relations. Being the top route means having the most geththu, 
winning the most number of fights. Thus other routes are their adimaikaL ‘slaves.’ Next 
to one of the epithets on the college wall (“## ROUTE SINGKANGKAL” ‘## route lions’) was 
a picture of a bloody machete and the caption “raththa buumi engkaL [name of the 
college], ‘Bloody earth, our [name of the college]’ (photo 3.2). Students would boast 
about their scars, their police cases, the battles of the route with other routes, and the fact 
that instead of security guards the college had a permanent detail of police on campus.  
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Photo 3.2 Bus route graffiti: “raththa buumi engkaL [college name]” 
 
Such fights were, though real, mainly symbolic. The aims were not to annihilate the 
other routes, but were about “ego,” establishing dominance relationships: who was the 
periya aaL, which route had the most geththu in the college and in the city (they had 
rivalries with routes of other colleges). Indeed, when routes were not jockeying for 
dominance, they were friendly. Students openly admitted that such rowdyism was just for 
jolly, viLaiyaaddu, ‘play/a game.’ While violent, showing geththu in this idiom is like 
doing style. It is a form of status negotiation within the peer group, variously extended in 
social and spatial scale, in order to project the relative periya aaL. 
The route is also organized internally by the concept of geththu. The route has as its 
leader the head or thala (short for thalaivar, ‘chief’; lit. ‘headman’). The thala of the 
route is the student who is the fiercest (the terror of the route), who is able to dominate 
all. One becomes head through beating all others who would vie for leadership, through 
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either fighting or through support from one’s peers. The head, like the top route, is 
looked up to and inspires fear. The thala is the figurative periya aaL of the route. 
The tropes surrounding the route and the thala explicitly draw from traditional 
conceptions of status. In particular, they are drawn from tropes of royalty. (Students were 
even able to give me lineages of their routes, quasi-origin myths tracing the emergence of 
the route into positions of dominance in the college through political intrigue, alliances, 
and battles.) The head should be silent in the sense of not singing, dancing, teasing, 
whistling, yelling, standing on top of the bus (all things that characterize the activity of 
route pooduRathu, ‘riding the bus route’; see chapter 2, section 4.2.3) (cf. Irvine 1974). 
Unlike other students who must be visible in order to accrue status, like the ‘headman’ or 
king, the route leader need not, as presumably everyone knows who he is. To do so 
would be beneath his status. Such is his geththu. Indeed, it took me a while to actually 
meet the route heads. They were always present in our group conversations, but didn’t 
speak or make themselves visible to me.  
This is the only instance within peer groups where I found status being 
institutionalized in a relatively hierarchical and static manner akin to adult ‘society’ while 
still outside of its authority structures (cf. student government, hostel government, 
department organization).16 This is partly because the route is an inter-year peer group 
and thus age hierarchy is relatively less neutralized than in the department–year based 
peer groups of other colleges where everyone is the same age.17  
 
16 The film fan club might be another possible exception (Dickey 2001; Rogers 2009).  
17 Indeed, there is a category difference between the route and the peer group as such. The route is a super-
peer group akin to the department. Within the route youth do organize themselves into age-equal peer 
groups, though this sub-division is less pronounced than in colleges where the department (with its year 
cohort division) is the main criterion of peer group formation, as is the senior–junior divide. Departments, 
however, don’t usually have student heads per se.  
The route is highly organized. It perdures over years (though the route head usually 
changes every year); it has its own songs (modified gaanaappaaddu [Chennai 
fisherman’s folk songs] which are passed on and modified year by year), epithets, and its 
own rituals. For example, every year each route picks a day to celebrate the route in what 
is called “bus day.”  
Bus day is organized by the heads each year. The route head collects dues from route 
members, route alumni, sympathetic citizens, and local politicians (photo 3.3).  
 
 
Photo 3.3 Bus day donations receipt 
 
With the money the route head buys alcohol (for route members), decorations for the bus 
(minimally a garland), posters (to advertise the day), and rental charges/bribes for 
transportation officials and bus drivers to get government buses. With these buses the 
route members and their friends and only them (which may easily total into the hundreds) 
slowly ride from the beginning of the route to the college. En route the students engage in 
extreme route pooduRathu: singing the route’s song to the rhythms played by route 
members by hitting the bus with their hands; dancing to frenetic kuuththu beats provided 
by a rented band or by students’ songs; riding on the side of the bus (hanging on by the 
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side windows) or on the top of the bus (photos 3.4, 3.5); whistling; yelling insults at 
students from other colleges; teasing (kalaaykkiRathu) onlookers (especially girls); 
getting dressed up in style-ish clothes; and drinking alcohol. Like the college tour 
(chapter 2, section 3.3.5), bus day is a particular ritual of youth exteriority where ‘youth’ 
is performed to its maximum.  
 
 
Photo 3.4 Bus day celebrations 1 
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Photo 3.5 Bus day celebrations 2 
Having a big bus day with lots of people, making the most amount of noise and being 
the most visible all express the route’s geththu, as does having the first bus day of the 
season. Bus day is a celebration of, and demonstration of, a route’s geththu; hence the 
exaggerated displays of youth status, youth transgression, and youth exteriority. It also 
traces out the route’s territory via the buses’ traversal of space, co-opting such space as 
the space of the route, if only temporarily. 
Geththu in the route means more than fighting and domination, as the discussion 
above shows. It’s about status-raising more generally. Geththu is also about 
entertainment (jolly), but through creating temporary islands of alternative authority. 
Expressions of geththu, by either the route or an individual youth, attempt to bend the 
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rules of existing authority and get away with it. The amount of someone’s or some 
route’s geththu is reflected by the degree that existing rules can be bent and alternative 
authority can be established by their extra-normative acts.  
In sum, geththu is linked to a particular kind of rough, rowdy masculinity that projects 
the periya aaL–chinna paiyan dynamic quite literally, often operationalizing status as 
physical dominance or tropes of it. Below I compare geththu and style, looking in 
particular at the issue of social class and status.  
 
2.4 Status and social class: Geththu versus style 
While both geththu and style are about getting attention, raising status, projecting 
exteriority, and transgressing, they tend to do so differently. Relative to geththu, style 
expresses status through figuratively indexing elite social class—for example, via English 
and (duplicate) branded clothes—while geththu does so through hyper-masculine 
displays—for example, fighting, riding the footboard of the bus, teasing (kalaaykkiRathu) 
and intimidating other.18  
In addition to the forms involved, the meta-pragmatic stereotypes invoked by such 
forms differ. For example, when I asked students in the elite Chennai college about 
geththu, the name of the government college that I worked at came up. If I asked students 
at the government college about style, the name of the elite college would come up. 
Students at the government college would explain, ‘if you really want to see style go over 
to that royal (‘rich’) college. There the students are really style-ish. They can afford to do 
 
18 For similar concepts of youth masculinity, see Lukose (2005a: 925–926, 2009: 66–71) on chethu among 
Malayali youth; Schoss (1996) on “shine” among male Kenyan youth involved in tourism (especially the 
contrast between the “smart” professionalized tour guides and the flamboyant “beachboys”); and Bastian 
(1996) on young Nigerian men.  
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a lot of style through clothing, jewelry, cell phones, bikes. They have access to modern 
fashions. Here, we are all relatively poor guys, and hence it isn’t so much style as geththu 
that concerns us.’ Students, of course, do do style at the government college. However, 
their identity-linked typifications diverge as per their reflexive awareness of their class 
position. Like youth’s relationship to adult status they can’t access, students at the 
government college figure themselves as more-or-less exterior to style, which for them is 
a class-linked register that they are partially excluded from.19  
Besides the forms and the class-linked persona invoked through them, different 
groups use these terms slightly differently. Students from the elite college (who tend to 
be more affluent) use geththu and style with more overlap (thus eliding class from their 
conceptions of status) than the government college students (who tend to be from 
working-class backgrounds), who differentiate style and geththu to a greater extent. As 
one government college student put it, middle- and upper-class youth don’t worry that 
much about geththu because of their kudumba gauravam (‘family honor/prestige’). 
Because of such gauravam their families exert more control over them. Thus, they (are 
made to) exert more self-control because there is more objective status at risk. That is, 
because they are closer to ‘society’ (they have more invested in the status economy of 
adult society) they are less transgressive (they are more controlled), and thus they have 
less geththu and are like chinna pasangka. Naturally they value it less, he reasoned. 
Inversely, the discourse from the elite college’s students about the government 
college’s students’ mode of masculinity is that it is not decent, it is local. They typify the 
 
19 The difference between these two colleges isn’t only social class, but also the stereotyped identities of the 
two colleges. The elite college has long been linked with producing civil servants and white-collar 
professionals, while the government college has historically been linked to political agitations, student 
politics (which is hyper-masculinized in Tamil Nadu), and producing police men and politicians.  
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hyper-masculinity embodied in this government college as ‘childishness’ (chinna 
puLLeththanam): they fight too much, they fight for silly reasons, they drink too much, 
and they aren’t serious enough. As such, the elite college students projected the students 
of the government college as chinna pasangka (i.e., deficient youth) to their more 
“mature” status. 
As for (super-)elite youth, those who speak fluent English at home, wear authentic 
brands, who travel and study abroad, forms which perform style for the lower- and 
middle-classes are so presupposed as part of their peer groups that style is erased from 
their discourse altogether. Such students are above the status concerns of the more 
economically challenged. As such, style is replaced with a notion of “taste” or inner-
expression similar to concepts of self-expression qua individual “style” in the U.S. 
(Bourdieu 1984). To such youth, the lower- and middle-class notions of doing style and 
geththu are crude; they betray an inability to think independently and thus show the 
childishness of the lower- and middle-classes with their herd mentality. For them, the 
word “style” is used to describe a way of expressing one’s inner self through unique 
affectations. For them the issue is individuality, not individuation.  
Moreover, even when the core meaning of style is the same, its extensions and its 
source registers differ by social class. For example, for the upper-middle classes style is 
embodied in authentic branded items but not duplicates; for working- and middle- class 
youth the distinction is irrelevant. They don’t have enough money for authentic brands 
(see chapter 6). For the upper-middle classes, words like “dude” and “brother” were 
style-ish speech, while working-class students may not even be familiar with such terms.  
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One important difference to note is that forms typified and used as style by upper-
middle class youth, like authentic brands and English, are themselves a mode of 
socialization to individual mobility within the global economy. Indeed, most of the jobs 
available to the students of elite colleges (where style is presumably done maximally) are 
call center positions and multi-national jobs in metropolitan cities, or jobs abroad. On the 
other hand, geththu in the government college I worked in typifies forms and activities 
which have no cultural capital in the white-collar job market, and thus provide no 
foothold from which to enter the globalizing economy.  
In my discussion I have exaggerated the differences between the uses of the terms 
geththu and style so as to highlight two different kinds of transgression and exteriority 
from ‘society’ that are differentially associated to social class: an aesthetic of exteriority 
via tropes of wealth and mobility and an aesthetic of exteriority via tropes of rough 
masculinity. Both are exterior, but only one facilitates economic mobility.  
 
2.5 Youth status as life stage 
Doing style, maintaining geththu, showing thooraNai are considered, by both youth 
and parents, as part of the youth life stage. As one gets older one ‘naturally’ does less 
style and transgresses less. The responsibilities of life begin to weigh heavier, one’s 
attention and energies are steadied, and one’s duties multiply. Youth eventually ‘have to 
slow down’ (veekam kuRaikkaNum), become less self-centered, and start thinking about 
the family, its gauravam (‘honor’), and one’s mariyaathai (‘respect’): one has to ‘move 
inside society/caste’ (“samuugaththukkuLLee poogaNum”) and grow up (cf. Osella and 
Osella 1998: 201, 2000b: 245).  
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An exchange with a UG student Shankar from the Chennai government college that I 
worked in illustrates this. He sent me a forward SMS that had the name of his college 
with a machete dripping with blood from it. I jokingly asked him, what’s with all the 
“muradduththanam” (‘rowdy-ness,’ ‘intimidation,’ ‘aggression’)?  
 
S: Chumma! Rody colg la tats y 
 
S: Just cause! (Ours is a) rowdy college, 
right? That’s why. 
C: enna, ithellaam college-ukku 
maddumthaanaa? 
C: What, so all this is just for college? 
S : S. Costes silent ta job ku poganum! S: Yes Costas, (after this) I have to go to 
work silently! 
C: Haha. Appa rowdy thanam 
mudnchirukkum! 
C: Haha. After that your rowdyness will 
be finished! 
S: YeS. Mams Silentu irukanum 
college. pogura varaikum than Rowdy 
thanam ellam. 
S: Yes maams <variant on maamaa, cf. 
‘bro’>, (then) I have to be silent. All this 
rowdyness is just while I am going to 
college. 
 
As we can see, college offers a particular zone for youth to transgress, to indulge their 
exterior liminality; in this case as a college rowdy (cf. Rogers 2008). And this is figured 
not as a perduring generational difference, but as a transient phase, as an age set.  
As one recently married friend explained: ‘Before marriage you spend most of your 
free time with your friends. There is a freedom there. At that age, one doesn’t care as 
much about listening to family. After marriage, the only people you spend your time with 
are family. Life becomes family. One moves into family.’ He continued by explaining 
that when he was younger he would only see his kin relations at special occasions once a 
year. But now that is all he sees. And with family, you can’t be however you want. There 
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is no freedom. You have to be like this or that, how they want or expect you to be. There 
is a pressure to be a certain way, to start thinking about your future and your kin/caste 
responsibilities. 
For the girls with whom I spoke with in Madurai and Chennai, the experience was 
similar. All the egalitarian relations, all the modern, style-ish clothes, all the 
independence afforded by college (or the workplace) are a phase. They last as long as 
they are in college (or working). After that comes marriage, and all the adult 
responsibilities that entails, from changes in dress, speech, leisure activities, to the 
company they kept.20  
 
3. Status-raising and -leveling in the peer group 
In this section I look at how concepts of youth status play out in peer groups through 
status-raising and -leveling activities and rituals which act to reconstitute the peer group 
as an egalitarian and exterior youth space. 
 
3.1 Over style 
 
20 This, of course, begs the question, what is generation and what is age set? Of course, the two are 
dialectically related to each other. And this is one of the problems with work on youth culture (e.g., Liechty 
2003: 37): there is a projection from age set to generational change, which itself is simply the naturalization 
of our own belief in the history of society as successive waves of generations. Yet it’s precisely through age 
set that generational changes become possible. To take a simple example, more and more students were 
wearing track pants instead of lungis. While the reason given was style and style itself is a transient life 
stage, through the socialization to a particular middle-class, urban habitus (itself motivated by concepts of 
decency in the college) such changes in dress were likely to perdure beyond the age set if only because such 
changes were unrelated to (i.e., had no implications regarding) adult concepts of mariyaathai. Similarly 
while the avoidance of high Tamil among youth speakers and the valorization of English isn’t leading to 
language shift in Tamil Nadu per se, it does seem to be leading to register shift. Many students were not 
particularly well socialized to higher registers of Tamil, though they were perfectly fluent in spoken Tamil 
(though perhaps not literate) and (less than) proficient in English. While they expected that when they 
would become periya aaLungka they would acquire and perhaps have occasion to use higher registers of 
Tamil (cf. Meek 2008), it’s unknown to whether they will be able to speak such registers when they get 
older. Ultimately, of course, to tease apart generation and age set requires multi-generational study. It’s 
enough to note, however, that Tamil youth understand their predicament as both age set and generation, and 
that the importance of age set with respect to status behavior must be noted. 
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If style is status-raising, it is constantly haunted by its own excess. As I argued earlier, 
this is inherent in the construction of the peer group, youth’s own understandings of their 
place in ‘society,’ and their concepts of status. 
What are the boundaries of style? If style and the peer group are about transgression, 
does such transgression itself have limits? One of my first fieldwork experiences went 
straight to this question. I asked Ajith, a third-year student in Madurai, ‘what is style?’ ‘It 
depends,’ he explained, because style is relative. ‘What is style for one person will be 
“over” (‘excessive’) for another.’ That is, the boundary is negotiable. And indeed, much 
of students’ casual conversation, gossip, and teasing is about whose style is acceptable 
and whose is excessive or kiRukku (‘crazy’); who is status-ful and who is showing off or 
trying too hard.  
Style is defined as much by its deviation from norms of propriety as it is by its own 
tendencies toward excessiveness and (unwarranted) deviation from the norms of the peer 
group. Style is always troubled by the possibility of it being too much, and thus is 
constantly being negotiated in the peer group through status-leveling. This is reflected in 
the elaboration of the concept of style in terms of its excess, as reflected in terms like: 
over style, over acting/action, banthaa (‘excessive showing off,’ ‘prestige’), scene 
pooduRathu (lit. ‘putting on a scene [from a film]’), film kaadduRathu (lit., ‘showing a 
film’), padam pooduRathu (lit., ‘putting on a film/picture’), build up paNRathu (‘building 
[oneself] up’; a reference to the ‘build up’ sequences preceding the hero’s appearance in a 
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film), bigu paNRathu (‘to condescend,’ ‘act better than [s.o. else]), thalai ganam (lit., 
‘head weight’), head weight (‘arrogance’).21  
Ajith illuminated over style with the following example. Leaning over, he said, ‘look 
at my watch. It’s nice, right? It’s shiny, it’s steel, it has the name of a brand on it. But 
look closer: it isn’t running! It’s broken. It’s a fake. The watch is style, but it is “over” 
because it’s broken.’ This disjunct reveals that he in fact does not have the status (in this 
case, access to authentic, working branded commodities) to back up his status-raising 
move in wearing the watch. While the watch implies a kind of middle-class commodity 
consumption, this status-ful presupposition is infelicitous because the watch is broken: 
his wearing it is “over action” and is vulnerable to the claim that he is trying too hard to 
impress. (Hence his quick move toward self-status-leveling by laughingly revealing his 
watch as broken.) And indeed, as I observed many times over, attempts at excessive 
status-raising always elicit status-leveling from one’s peers. As one female Madurai 
student told me using a youth proverb: “over banthaa udambukku aagathu” (‘too much 
showing off/status-raising is bad for the body’); that is, excessive style results in 
“fetching some nice slaps,” as she glossed it, from one’s peers. 
Because status expressions are always relative to the uptake of the peer group, over 
style is always defined relative to the style of one’s peers. If everyone is wearing ‘normal’ 
clothes and one comes with ripped jeans and a branded tee-shirt, one will inevitably be 
labeled as showing off. Such status expressions, however, won’t be considered excessive 
 
21 Note how the figuration of excessive style is linked to the notion of re-animating filmic images and thus 
to tropes of visuality. This is because filmic representations of style are inevitably exaggerated as film 
heroes are figured as higher status individuals than fans. They are also linked because the imitation of film 
is often associated with the madness of film fanaticism and the childishness of the fan (see chapter 5 for 
more discussion).  
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within a group of peers who dress similarly. Over style is also relative to the 
activity/location at hand. While an outing to the girls’ college, a college function, or the 
cinema may call for one level of style, the same level of style for going to the hostel mess 
or one’s home village will invite teasing and scolding. In short, style and over style are 
context dependent. They are also dependent on particular ideologies about personhood 
and appropriateness. 
 
3.2 Ideologies of personhood and style 
Particular ideologies of personhood are often invoked to legitimate who can do style 
and who can’t. When I asked a group of students why they were teasing one particular 
student for doing style but not others who were engaging in similar status practices they 
would note that the style-ish displays in question ‘suited’ (suit-aa, match-aa) the one guy, 
but not the other. That is, some people are more equipped to do style than others. This 
might be justified aesthetically: for example, a student with a rough looking face might 
be able to pull off certain kinds of style (e.g., an earring), while on someone with a baby 
face it might seem inappropriate (e.g., ‘he looks too much like a chinna paiyan to have an 
earring’). At the same time, too much style for a tough looking guy (e.g., long hair, a 
beard) might make him look too much like a periya aaL or a rowdy and thus be 
excessive.  
Similarly, youth often assume that particular people can(not) do style based where 
they come from, their “culture” or ‘native place’ (cf. Daniel 1984: ch. 2); that is, based on 
some notion of appropriateness (Tarlo 1996: 246; Dean 2009; Dickey 2009a). My 
roommate Stephen in Madurai came from Kodaikkanal, a place associated with Christian 
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missionaries, colonial vacationers, and a famous American private school. Students often 
explained Stephen’s forays into sartorial style, which they appreciated and ratified, as due 
to the fact that he is from Kodaikkanal. Similarly, students from north India were seen as 
more likely to do style. Style was okay for such youth, it didn’t “disturb” others because it 
was part of their “culture.” Similarly, my deviations from the norms of Tamil society 
(sartorial or other) were always rendered intelligible by the idea that in my “culture” we 
did style naturally. Most confusing for youth, in fact, was why I didn’t do more style: 
why didn’t I have more style-ish clothes, why was my cell phone so ordinary, why didn’t 
I always wear sneakers, why was my bag so ‘normal’? Their assumption was that I could 
do whatever style to whatever level of absurdity I wanted to. So why didn’t I (cf. Lukose 
2009: 77)? 
Note, of course, that what grounds style is, again, a trope of exteriority. Places which 
are exterior, and thus status-ful, license style: WESTERN > OTHER-FOREIGN (e.g., African, 
Southeast Asian) > NORTH INDIAN > MALAYALEE (and other Southern states) > TAMIL 
URBAN > TAMIL RURAL. Those who come from interior places most closely aligned to 
‘society’ and ‘culture’ (i.e., caste and “tradition,” the ‘real’ Tamil “culture”) are least 
likely to be given the benefit of the doubt vis-à-vis style (cf. Tarlo 1996).  
Similarly, students from certain departments are assumed to be more style-ish and 
thus are not questioned as much if they performed style. This too has a hierarchy (see 
chapter 1, section 2): VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS, COMMERCE > COMPUTER SCIENCE, 
ENGLISH, PHYSICS > CHEMISTRY, BOTANY, MATHEMATICS > HISTORY, ECONOMICS, TAMIL. 
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The style departments are, of course, those where the rich study with more frequency.22 
The person from Kodaikkanal, from America, from Commerce, from Visual 
Communications is used to dressing with style because that is their norm, their culture. It 
is the (mis-)match between projected status and status-licensing background which makes 
one person style and another over style. 
While ideologies of personhood certainly set particular defaults for the evaluation of 
performances of style, such ideologies are more often than not after-the-fact 
rationalizations. Such ideologies can be defeased, and poor guys from the village can just 
as well be ratified as style pasangka (‘stylish guys’) and rich urban students as un-style-
ish. Such work takes place in the centrifugal and centripetal forces of the peer group, 
pushing youth toward difference and pulling them toward sameness, as I discuss below. 
What is interesting is that for those whose status is secured—that is, they are accepted by 
their peers as status-ful—style is a property of their person and thus their status-raising 
moves are performative of style. For those who are not necessarily seen as status-ful, who 
occupied the grey area, style is a tenuous performance, an external surface or show. For 
such individuals such semiotic displays aren’t seen as a property of the person, but a 
function of the form: he got that haircut for style, he used that English word for style, etc. 
Such performances of style are only sometimes entailing of status, depending on the 
attending co-text and uptake by one’s peers.  
 
3.3. Strategies of status-leveling 
 
22 This is due to how, on the one hand, fees and corruption involved in buying seats makes placement in 
such departments function as an index of economic status, and, on the other, the association of schooling 
and money. (The rich can study at better English-medium schools, etc., and thus get into better departments 
on merit.) 
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Below I discuss a more general set of interactional practices and genres that function 
to status-level and maintain the egalitarian space of the peer group qua intimate space of 
peer pressure and coercion: gossip, teasing and status-linked humor, rituals of status-
inversion, the treat, and fighting (cf. Osella and Osella 1998: 195ff.; Nisbett 2007; see 
Kyratzis 2004: 631–635 for a review). Such practices speak to the ambivalence of youth 
status and the appreciation and envy it potentially engenders. As we see, it is also a 
principle of the hybridization and negotiation of status-ful youth cultural forms. 
 
3.3.1 Gossip 
Gossip is a common mechanism for social control in many societies (Briggs 1998; 
Besnier 2009; on youth peer groups see Kyratzis 2004: 632). Among youth, talking about 
others whose behavior transgresses the bounds of reasonable status-raising; or whose 
status-raising can’t be licensed by their status is one way that: a) those who gossip reset 
the status level of the peer group, and b) those who are seen as showoffs are encouraged 
to tone down their status-raising. As a Chennai student put it while describing his 
departmental peers, guys who scene pooduRathu (‘put on a scene,’ i.e., act like they are 
on screen, like film heroes), who show off too much with their branded clothes, who are 
always trying to show what a periya aaL they are, inevitably get torn down by their peers 
behind their backs and interactionally kept at a distance. A female student who moved 
from Chennai to Madurai told me that when she got to college, her overly style-ish 
clothing (jeans, sleeveless kurtas) and English speech kept the rumor mill about her 
going. Only when she started speaking in Tamil and dressing more modestly would other 
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girls even interact with her. In her case, gossip about her made her socially peripheral 
until she changed her behavior to be more in line with the group.  
The fear of gossip and the fear of being seen as showing off are potent forces among 
youth. Strong enough, for example, to cause students to hide status-ful aspects about 
themselves that others might not ratify: for example, covering up a romantic relationship; 
or lying about their high marks.  
 
3.3.2 Teasing and English 
Much of the face-to-face status regulation in the peer group is done through teasing. 
Students often experience teasing as entertainment. It’s taken lightly most of the time and 
everyone is usually a good sport (see section 3.3.3 below). You have to be a good sport, 
in fact, because teasing is highly ritualized and institutionalized in forms like ragging 
(chapter 2, section 4.1.2) and culturals. But teasing is also serious business and functions 
as a force demanding conformity to the peer group. In general, youth only get teased 
about things that are considered status-ful.23 
The most common kind of teasing among college students regards English use. 
English use is considered style, indexing the speaker as one who has command over a 
language that affords job opportunity, global mobility, and the impression of education 
and upper-class background. English use also projects exteriority and contrasts with high 
register Tamil—which commands mariyaathai (‘respect’) among ‘big men’ (periya 
aaLungka), emblematized in the Dravidian politician speaking about protecting “Tamil 
 
23 Rarely in peer groups did I find examples where youth teased someone about their low status. Such 
teasing quickly turns into insults and results in fights or breaking off of social relations. The kinds of 
teasing I am interested in here are forms of status-leveling (not status-lowering/ranking) which function to 
maintain social relations in the peer group and not sever them. 
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culture”—and colloquial local (or regional) Tamil—which is seen as ‘normal’ or crude 
(cf. Smith-Hefner 2007). Students’ use of high Tamil is almost nil, only invoked as 
parodic humor, and colloquial Tamil is unmarked for status. 
But using English to index exteriority and ego’s status is precarious. Youth often 
deride individuals who use a “foreign” accent (American or British) when speaking in 
English or in Tamil (cf. Lo and Kim 2009). Such individuals act like they were ‘born in 
London,’ or had ‘just gotten off the plane from America.’ Such a student is a “peter.” 
Here the Christian name Peter is a metonym for the absurd English persona invoked 
through such speech. Such a youth “peter (v)uduraan,” meaning that they ‘show off’ 
(banthaa kaamikkiRathu) through English. In fact, English usage is such a pervasive 
mode of status-raising that youth often used peter (v)udurathu to simply mean ‘showing 
off’ in any semiotic register. 
In addition to accent, using English words in one’s speech is grounds for teasing. 
Thus, in a peer group where no one speaks English fluently, code-switching or code-
mixing is immediately greeted with teasing; and if such English usage is seen as 
excessive (that is, more than the others in the group can [under]stand) it is met with 
explicit meta-pragmatic discourse. For example, at functions where a (youth) speaker is 
speaking in ‘too much’ English audience members will invariably yell out “thamizhle 
peesu!” (‘Speak in Tamil!’) (cf. Lukose 2009: 187).  
My English-fluent roommate in Madurai, Stephen almost never spoke English in the 
hostel except to me. This was precisely for the reason that speaking in English, even 
when comprehensible to his peers, would lead to him getting teased (and certainly to their 
annoyance), and eventually to exclusion from the group. One common rejoinder to a 
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student who uses too much English is: “A, B, C, D, E, F, G…engkaLukkum theriyum” 
‘We also know our A, B, Cs (so no need to show off).’ Inversely, in a group where 
everyone speaks English at a particular level, someone who speaks English but at a lower 
competency will also be teased, not only as ignorant, but also as trying to project a level 
of status that he can’t sustain.  
What one finds, then, is a desire, in fact an obsession, with speaking English 
accompanied by a paralyzing insecurity, a shyness/fear that one’s English will either be 
too good or not good enough (also see Rogers 2008: 85; Lukose 2009: ch. 5). To not 
know any English is a sign of ignorance. But even more than this, to be exposed as 
ignorant or deficient in English in moments of status-raising through English (of which 
every token utterance of English is a possibility) is humiliating for students and thus 
studiously avoided. 
This dialectic has a number of effects on how English is used. First, because everyone 
wants to speak in English but can’t, within peer group interaction there is a motivating 
force to use English words when speaking Tamil (code-mixing) and the avoidance of 
clause and sentence level constructions (code-switching).24 Students pepper their Tamil 
with English words, and much of youth slang is derived from English. As one student 
explained after trying to initiate in English with me in vain as everyone else told him to 
stop: 
‘There isn’t anything wrong with the sentence “Scissors-e kodu. Paper cut 
paNNaNum.” It conveys some knowledge of English and is thus status-raising. 
 
24 Moreover, full English speech is associated, for most students, with their encounters with adults in the 
college: classroom lectures, the speeches of college officials, job interviews in the placement cell, etc. (cf. 
Lukose 2009: 186). Thus, while English is usable as status-ful behavior at the word/phrase level, its full-
blown use is indexical of formal contexts associated with adult authority. 
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Further, its use won’t exclude one’s peers. But saying “Give the scissors, I want 
to cut paper” will elicit teasing because it’s banthaa, because it’s trying to show 
that you are the periya aaL.’  
Second, as using English words that are unknown by most of the populace runs the 
risk of teasing, there is a push is toward using English words that have a social domain 
that is neither nil nor all of the peer group. Words known by all cease to have status-
raising potential while words known by none will invite censure. 
Third, there is an incessant glossing activity or cross-code semantic redundancy in 
youth’s Tamil whereby English words will be accompanied by their Tamil glosses. This 
is a longstanding pattern in Tamil Nadu and one can find a large number of such cross-
code reduplications where a Tamil word and English word of same denotation are 
combined into a single lexical item that has the same denotation as its components (e.g., 
but-anaal, so-athanaale, varisai-queue, gate-vaasal). Such cross-code reduplication and 
glossing diagram the dialectic between status-raising and -leveling in a manner that 
parallels the pragmatics of use–mention (Fleming n.d.). In effect, one ‘mentions’ the 
English word, hesitantly status-raising, while at the same time ‘using’ the Tamil gloss of 
the English, thus preemptively countering any possibility of teasing. By doing this one 
can status-raise without leaving anyone out.  
Fourth, words that contribute minimally to the denotational text and maximally to the 
interactional text are favored: greetings and departures (“Hi,” “What’s up?,” “Good 
morning,” “Bye,” “We’ll meet tomorrow”); ritualized interactional moves and phatic 
communications (“How are you?,” “Did you eat?,” “Ok[-vaa?],” “Isn’t it?,” “Yeah, I 
know”); and discourse linkage words (“but,” “suppose,” “so”). Such words are status-
raising (i.e., are ego-focal) but don’t exclude anyone from the conversation (i.e., aren’t 
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addressee-focal). This is because their denotational content is minimal but their 
interactional content is maximal and easily recoverable from context without knowledge 
of English. Such usage manages the double bind to status-raise by speaking English but 
not status-raise too much by not speaking too much English.  
 
3.3.3 Teasing as humor 
Above we saw how excessive status-raising—where attributed status differs from 
perceived/desired status—can produce jealousy, gossip, and teasing. In addition to being 
a form of control, teasing is also a genre of humor and entertainment (cf. Lukose 2009: 
82–84 on chammal in Kerala; Nisbett 2007 among Bangalore Tamil youth).  
Among youth teasing as humor takes a number of recurrent formulae, all of which 
inversely diagram youth status. In such genres of teasing a person is attributed a level of 
status (explicitly, or implicitly via presupposition) that is incommensurate with the 
perceived status of that person. Such teasing figures the status-raising behavior as 
something to be questioned because it can’t be backed up by the status of that person. 
Thus, for example, in my Madurai hostel two roommates Vignesh and Danavel sparred 
back and forth, trading teases. Vignesh initiated saying that Danavel was loving a girl, 
causing everyone in the room to laugh. Danavel shot back that Vignesh looked like the 
popular and handsome film star Ajith. Here the tease that Danavel is loving a girl—
something which is good and which guys want to be doing—is met with another 
otherwise status-raising statement that Vignesh looks like the light-skinned film hero 
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Ajith. Of course, he doesn’t, nor was Danavel loving, thus creating a tropic dissonance 
whose construal is status-leveling qua teasing.25  
I often encountered this kind of humor when a new person was introduced to me. The 
form of the joke is the following: ‘This is my friend X. He is Y’ where X is the person’s 
name and Y is filled by some status-raising or status-presupposing predicate: for 
example, ‘loving a girl,’ ‘the top of the class,’ the “college hero,” ‘the best chess player in 
the college,’ ‘the biggest rowdy in the college,’ the “college terror,” the “#1 accused,” 
etc.  
Such explicit linguistic boasts for another, negatively valorized through irony, are 
largely embarrassing for the person being introduced and always get good laughs from all 
around. Ventriloquating attributed status playfully pokes fun through ironically creating a 
status mismatch: the target of the teasing is attributed some kind of status which is either 
perceived to be excessive or impossible/untrue. Through third-person attributions, such 
humor navigates sarcastic insult (2nd pers.) and boasting (1st pers.).26 
As age is a salient axis of status-differentiation in Tamil society, much status-humor 
revolves around age. For example, a common joke among youth is to say that someone is 
older than he really is; for example, ‘Vivek is 31 years old!’27 Relatedly, mismatch of 
 
25 Young men almost always denied being in love except as a kind of confession, saying that such 
information if mismanaged would eventually lead to gossip about both the guy and the girl, and thus spoil 
their reputations (especially the girl’s). Indeed, one of the common sources of envy among college guys is 
that another guy has a girlfriend while they don’t. Such a situation causes the girlfriend-less person’s 
‘stomach to burn’ (vayiRu eriyuthu). 
26 Similarly, during culturals performances clapping, while usually a form of praise, is often used by youth 
to ironically tease someone on stage who they want to take down a peg. They do this by excessive and 
premature clapping. Here the ordinary form is troped upon in order to attribute a level of status-raising to 
another that all recognize as excessive. 
27 Cf. the term chiththappu (see chapter 2, section 4.1.3). 
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cross-generational fictive consanguineal kinship was often perceived as humorous.28 For 
example, male students would often playfully joke with their female classmates by 
calling them akkaa ‘older sister.’29 For example, in a light ragging session in the elite 
Chennai college that I worked in, a group of style-ish third-year students were 
questioning a first-year girl, asking her name, where she is from, and what classes she is 
taking. The girl was, appropriate to the genre, part embarrassed, part demure, part 
submissive as expressed in her body language, tone of voice, eye gaze, and terse answers. 
When the girl, presumably by accident due to being so nervous, answered one of the 
third-year’s questions “Yes, uncle” everyone broke out laughing. This was compounded 
when the other third years seized on this status-mismatch and reversed it, saying that no, 
actually his birthday is in 1992, making him younger than the girls. They shouldn’t call 
him “uncle,” he should be calling them akkaa! This got a wide round of laughs from all 
the students (and a blush from the target of the teasing).  
Similarly, parodic uses of status-raising behaviors often functioned as humor in the 
peer group. For example, trying to speak English but failing at it was always good for a 
laugh (cf. the famous Rajnikanth comedy dialogue in the film Veelaikkaaran [1987] 
discussed in chapter 4). Youth often speak in humorous, exaggerated broken English as a 
joke, demonstrating familiarity with English and thus status-raising, even while 
distancing themselves from the enregistered figure of status-ful personhood associated 
with it, and thus self-status-leveling. 
 
 
28 Kin terms from the patrline tend to be humorously used precisely because (age-)status and hierarchy is 
more salient for one’s consanguineal kin than for one’s affinal kin.   
29 Note that the participial noun for a woman who shows off with English (peter vudravaL) is peter akkaa, 
thus compounding the tease by ironic attribution of foreign background and older age. 
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3.3.4 The treat 
Another youth cultural ritual that reflects and redistributes status is the treat. When 
something good happens to an individual (s)he is expected, and often times forced, to 
give a “treat” to the peer group; for example, take them out to the movies, buy them 
dinner (or sweets), or for men, buy them alcoholic drinks (also see Nisbett 2007). Here 
“something good” means something which raises one’s status in the peer group. Having a 
birthday (in Tamil Nadu, on your birthday you have to bring the cake), getting a job, 
winning a game, securing someone’s love, getting married, or passing an exam, for 
instance, all require giving a treat to one’s peers. Not giving a treat is seen as selfish, as 
arrogant, and is grounds for breaking social relations.  
While youth will often state that one treats because one wants to share the happiness 
due to the status-raising event, this isn’t its only function.30 Indeed, as with the other 
youth cultural forms describe above, the treat is a mechanism of advertising status-
raising (one treats because one has had his status raised) coupled with status-leveling 
through redistribution of status, thus recreating egalitarian relations out of status-
differentiation. This tropically replicates the model of patronage that one finds in adult 
society (M. Mines 1994; M. Mines and Gourishankar 1990) through youth rituals of 
transgression (smoking, drinking, cinema). Through the circulating treat (Mauss 1954) 
the peer group is reconstituted as status-level. 
 
3.3.5 Fighting 
 
30 This necessity to treat is so strong that one of my close friends upon getting engaged studiously avoided 
walking in his neighborhood, instead taking auto-rickshaws or bikes in circuitous routes. He was afraid of 
being stopped and asked for a treat (in this case, sixty rupees for a quarter of spirits) from any and 
everyone. I myself was unknowingly stuck with the rather large bill at my own going away party. 
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Most of the time peer group activity works smoothly and status-leveling of the kinds I 
described above regulate youth affairs. However, physical fighting is always a resort that 
exists among youth to negotiate status.  
One night in the first Madurai hostel that I lived in, during an interview with two 
second-year students we heard a commotion in an adjacent room. Going over there we 
learned that a fight had broken out between two first years. The first years had been told 
by the third years to put away the cricket equipment, a legitimate expression of 
hierarchical difference. One upper-middle class, urban first-year, Bradley, told 
Venkatesh, a working-class rural first-year, to put it away. Venkatesh, in turn, told 
Bradley he could do it if he wanted to, but he wouldn’t. Both turns were un-ratified 
expressions of hierarchical difference. Because there was no principle to determine who 
had the right to tell the other what to do, a verbal fight broke out. The moment, however, 
when it escalated into physical confrontation involving a mirror used as a weapon is 
when Bradley, proficient in English, code-switched into English. Venkatesh, insecurely 
ignorant of English took this as a direct insult that he was an ignorant bumpkin, unable to 
speak in or understand English, and thus attacked Bradley. As this example shows, once 
status negotiation through ego-focal tropic displays of style breaks down, the negotiation 
of status takes on a more literal semiotic mode of status-leveling: physical blows.  
In general, if status-raising becomes too much for the peer group to handle, if it 
implicates one’s peers as lower status, thereby hierarchically ranking them and 
impugning their self-image, a physical fight to literally establish dominance is always a 
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possibility; as is the dissolution of the peer group and the severing of social relations (see 
Nisbett 2007 for a nice description of this).31  
 
Status-raising objects/behaviors are dangerous cultural forms: while they have the 
power to elevate the user, they risk making the user the object of derision. Hence the 
multiform hybrid and partial strategies at play in the peer group. As we saw, youth’s 
activities in the youth peer group are highly ambivalent about status, and thus almost 
always offer a kind of deniability prefigured in their use. This is itself a reaction to the 
anxieties and insecurities of being a youth, of being in the double bind to obey (the peer 
group) and transgress (through status-raising). With respect to English use we saw how 
youth’s own practices hybridize status-ful signs so as to negotiate the problematics of the 
peer group (also see chapter 6, section 3.3 on how the consumption of brands works 
through a similar dialectic). I take this up in the conclusion of the chapter. 
Status-raising also enables particular kinds of pleasure. We saw how genres of humor 
status-level through ironical status-raising, lowering status through attributing status. 
While such practices are otherwise aggressive gestures (teasing outside of the peer group 
can lead to fighting) in the peer group they are converted into signs of intimacy/solidarity 
through their double-voicedness. Thus, at the same time that youth status invokes the 
specter of its excess, it also makes particular forms of humor and play possible through 
status-mismatch, status-inversion, and performance of other’s styles (e.g., film stars) by 
 
31 While I didn’t observed incidents of the kind described by Rogers (2008), we might also add “eve 
teasing” (‘sexually harassing’) women of an adversarial group as a way to status-lower other men. I did 
observe cases of this on an individual level, though the groups in the colleges I worked at didn’t explicit 
organize around caste and thus such events didn’t become caste-mobilizing conflicts as Rogers describes. 
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parodic distance (see chapter 4 on the film comedian) that ultimately reconstitute the peer 
group as a space of intimacy and egalitarian reciprocity.  
 
3.4 Status licenses transgression, transgression begets status, status begets status 
As we have seen, there is a thin and shifting line between acceptable and excessive 
status-raising. There is no clear and fixed line precisely because youth status is largely 
defined by its exteriority from perduring modes of institutionalized status. Rather than 
being anchored in unambiguous and perduring forms of status, youth status is a shifter 
(Silverstein 1995[1976]), interactionally grounded, ephemeral, and in constant need of 
renewal. And as I have argued, this is inherent in the tension of the peer group as a space 
of status-raising/transgression and -leveling/peer pressure.  
Youth status exists in the circular logic of transgression and grounding of 
transgression. Status presupposes and entails the ability to deviate from norms of 
authority (‘society’). And yet to have such transgression ratified by your peers, one must 
have established an alternative authority which grounds such transgression. The irony 
here, then, is that those with status can have their style be easily ratified by the group, 
while those who don’t can’t. And this is a bootstrapping project. One can’t out of the blue 
start doing style. It will certainly draw teasing from one’s peers. One has to piecemeal 
engage in status-raising negotiation in the peer group.  
Not only can youth who are viewed as status-ful pull off status-ful displays, but they 
can also set norms of status-ful transgression. To this extent, mature youth become the 
islands of the authority they desire. While a youth considered as a chinna paiyan with a 
mohawk hairstyle might come off as absurd, a status-ful youth with the same haircut 
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would be style. And having gotten such an outlandish haircut (and having it ratified by 
the peer group), such a status-ful youth becomes the baptismal event from which other 
less status-ful youth can replicate such style with less chance of being made fun of. I 
return to this issue in chapter 5 in considering how film can function as source register for 
youth’s status work.  
 
4. Women and status: Why doing style is so difficult for women 
4.1 Introduction 
So far we have been looking at youth status from the perspective of men. I justified 
this because the construction of ‘youth’ as exteriority makes being a female youth 
problematic insofar as women are: (a) figured as interior to home, family, kin, caste, and 
culture, because (b) their behaviors, clothing, and status work are taken as indexes of the 
status of the groups to which they belong. The emblem of this is the woman’s kaRpu 
‘chastity.’ The woman’s chastity is the honor of her kin group, her caste group, “Tamil 
culture,” the Indian nation (Chatterji 1993; Mankekar 1999), and even divinity itself 
(Ramaswamy 1997). Because of this, after puberty young women’s behaviors are much 
more regulated than during their childhood (Vatuk 1972, 1982b; Kakar 1978; Daniels 
1980; David 1980; Reynolds 1980; Bennett 1983; Das 1988; Dube 1988; Tarlo 1996; 
Ram 2000; A. Kumar 2002). Whereas young boys are given more freedoms as ‘youth,’ 
women are given less. They are expected and made to be more mature, more controlled 
(kadduppaadu), more like adults.  
Nevertheless, there are, as we have had occasion to point out, zones where such 
expectations and controls are partially lifted for young women. College is one such place, 
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and women’s colleges are exceptional social spaces for the social processes I have been 
discussing in this chapter (cf. Tarlo 1996: ch. 6). While geththu and thooraNai are hardly 
ever used to describe women, their behaviors, or their possessions (except perhaps in 
teasing them through tropes of masculinization), they can and do do style. Style is, 
however, highly problematic for women. But what exactly is so unladylike about ‘youth’ 
and style? 
 
4.2 Visibility  
First, as we noted, style is about being seen, about being visible. Even more than this, 
it is about wanting to be seen, as desiring attention. In Tamil Nadu, however, the woman 
as agent of her own desire is in most contexts stigmatized (Nakassis and Dean 2007). To 
have desire is to invoke the awful power of the sexually voracious woman, the out-of-
control female sakthi (‘power’) that can destroy social relations and even physical matter 
(cf. the Kannagi myth32) (Wadley 1980a, b; Daniel 1984). Female style is often described 
simultaneously as showing off, as seductive, and as (demonically) threatening (cf. Lukose 
2005a: 925 on gema in Kerala; Tarlo’s [1996: ch. 6] discussion of the cardigan). One 
college girl in Madurai whose chudithar hem revealed the top half of her back was 
described by onlooking young men as ‘doing style,’ as “scene pooduRathu” (‘showing 
off’), and as “puuchchaaNdi kaamikkiRathu” (‘showing puuchchaaNdi,’ the demonic 
boogeyman). To take another example, going out in public with free hair (i.e., not in a 
braid, the emblem of the control of female power) is thought to make a woman look like 
 
32 The Kannagi myth is the story of Kannagi, the wife of a wealthy merchant. Having lost their fortune, 
they travelled to Madurai where her husband pawned her jewelry so as to raise money and start afresh. 
Unfortunately the jewelry is mistaken for the Queen’s recently stolen jewelry and her husband is falsely 
accused, convicted, and executed. Kannagi’s anger at the injustice was enough to set all of Madurai on fire. 
Her anger had this power because of her purity of character and chastity.  
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a demon or ghost, but also makes people think that the woman has an abaasamaana 
guNam, ‘a bad (i.e., loose) character.’  
Second, to have desire is to (potentially) compromise one’s kaRpu, and thus to 
threaten the honor of the patriarchal kin and caste group. Recalling the proverb from 
chapter 2, section 2.2.1, while letting a man out of the house makes him a man, letting a 
woman out of the house spoils her. The quite real fear here is that to be seen in public 
will lead to the assumption by others of agentive desire, and this to the assumption of 
immodesty, and thus to the destruction of reputation and the possibility of (upward 
mobility in) marriage.  
Style threatens a woman’s reputation precisely because style inevitably invokes over 
style and thus teasing. Teasing by boys, or by the reified agent ‘society,’ is the first step 
to gossip, and gossip to a spoilt identity (Goffman 1963). Young women, indeed, fear 
teasing and gossip, and this largely shapes how they act and dress in public (Lukose 
2009; Tarlo 1996). For a man, however, there is no such threat. In fact, not doing style is 
likely to ruin one’s reputation. (It certainly won’t aid it.) Style for a man is status, it 
attracts; for a woman it attracts too much, it is glamour. For a man, over style is at most 
absurd; for a woman it is immoral. By this logic, knowing all this, what kind of girl 
would do style but a bad one? 
This was made clear to me in discussions with male youth about why jeans and tee-
shirts are considered so transgressive for women while track pants and short sleeve 
jerseys of the same cut and fit worn by female athletes are not. But why? Young men 
explained that it is because sports dress is a uniform. It is required. Thus, the 
interpretation that the girl is trying to get attention is neutralized. On the other hand, one 
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wears jeans/top to get noticed. Thus, as one student reasoned, one can infer that the girl 
who wears jeans is easier to talk to, and by implication, easier to sleep with. And while 
young men enjoyed looking at women dressed as such, it was highly disturbing for them 
as well, as too attractive, too seductive. But wearing track pants/jersey is for sports, not 
for looks. It is obligatory, not a choice. Hence it is not style, not agentive, not sexualized, 
not problematic.  
While transgression from adult gender norms for men are expected, for women they 
are dangerous. For all these reasons, to do style, to be visible, to try to get attention is a 
sexualizing act and thus to be avoided.33  
 
4.3 Status-raising  
Style is about status-raising. It’s a kind of boast. While for men this is fine, for most 
women boasting is highly problematic. This is because the general assumption in Tamil 
Nadu is that between a man and a woman of the same age or younger the man should 
always be higher status.34 And yet a status-raising woman puts this into question, and 
thus presents a challenge to men.35  
 
33 Incidentally, this is a major reason why many Tamil women aren’t allowed to act in television or film. To 
be on screen is to be visible, and this is in and of itself enough to question a woman’s modesty and the 
honor of her kin group (caste, culture, nation). While in rural Theeni on the set of Goa (2010), getting the 
husbands of interested local woman to be extras was difficult for precisely this reason.  
34 This is the explicit logic why in a relationship between a man and a woman the man should be older and 
taller. Otherwise, the woman will see him as a chinna paiyan, and thus will never respect him. The man 
will lose control (cf. Lukose 2009: 193–194). 
35 We might cite examples of powerful women in Tamil politics. I would argue, however, that such women 
are the exceptions that prove the rule. Moreover, in such cases the relationship between the dominant 
woman and subordinate men are often reframed within socially sanctioned kin relationships of mother to 
children.  
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The woman who does style makes men uncomfortable because she questions the 
masculinity of those around her by participating in their economy of status work.36 While 
men have geththu, women are ‘caught’ by ‘arrogance,’ “thimiru pidichcha poNNu.”37 In 
the college a girl who talks ‘too much’ (i.e., jokes around with the guys and isn’t shy and 
reserved), who projects status, who does style, or who speaks in English is arrogant, is a 
rowdy poNNu (‘rowdy girl’) who has head weight (chapter 2, section 4.1.2).38 Such a 
young woman is derided, isolated, teased.  
Among young men there is a palpable anxiety about today’s “modern” women. The 
common refrain from young men about such women is that they “scene pooduRathu” 
(‘show off’), they act like they are better than men, and this is why young men avoid 
socializing with them. Male insecurity often gets played out in avoidance behavior which 
only exacerbates the problem because channels of communication and understanding are 
severed (cf. Osella and Osella 2004: 243; Nisbett 2006: 139; Weiss 2002: 110–113 on 
masculinity as predicated on female exclusion).39  
 
4.4 Patriarchy  
 
36 Similarly, being teased by a woman is doubly status-lowering, and guys often noted that when girls were 
around they were extra careful not to try to show off and fail (e.g., make a mistake while speaking English). 
College professors explained that this was one of the drawbacks of coed education: boys are more hesitant 
to answer questions in class for fear of being wrong in front of their female classmates, and thus teased by 
them (or their male peers).  
37 We can note the obvious parallels with the double standards in the U.S. vis-à-vis derogatory terms like 
“bitch” applied to women whose actions would receive laudation if done by men. 
38 For example, the idea that women would use men’s language (e.g., terms like machchaan) in their own 
peer groups is seen as a kind of arrogance (thimiru), as strange and incongruous, as gutsy (thuNichchal), 
and unfeminine. 
39 Such insecurity also abounds in youth film (thanks to Dr. Uma Vangal, personal communication 9.30.08, 
for pointing this out regarding Dhanush’s oeuvre). See, for example, the film Manmathan (2004) which 
centers on the condoning of the hero killing English-speaking, rich, style-ish women who sleep around. 
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A woman doing style is a challenge not just to the concept of masculinity but to 
patriarchy itself.40 Style is about the transgression of ‘society’ (i.e., patriarchy); about 
being bold and challenging authority. While for young men transgressing patriarchy isn’t 
itself a challenge to patriarchy as such (it’s a challenge to specific authorities, or an 
attempt to figuratively insert oneself into the larger political organization of ‘society’), 
for a woman to transgress through style is to undermine the patriarchal order in general. If 
to do style is to be exterior to the authority of patriarchy, and if patriarchy is predicated 
on the control of its women as chaste, a woman doing style threatens ‘society’ itself. For 
a woman, then, style is doubly transgressive. It puts the honor of the patriarchal group 
(the caste, patriline) at risk, and questions the ability of ‘society’ to carry any authority at 
all. 
Style is also about status work which is ego-focal, about being self-centered. Young 
men can do fashion because they don’t have to care what others think (chapter 2, section 
2.2.2). As we saw, this isn’t true for women. Thus, while self-centeredness is 
neutral/good for men, it’s a dangerous quality in a woman (M. Mines 1994). This is 
because a woman’s actions are never simply ego-focal but radiate in all directions from 
her. Self-centered-ness for a woman is unacceptable because to be self-centered is to 
forsake the home, the family, ‘society,’ ‘culture,’ the nation. Women who do style, youth 
explained, are “very bold,” “independent,” and most importantly ‘don’t care about 
others.’ And under the belief that women are the baakkiyam (‘auspicious gift’) of the 
patriarchal group to which they belong, and thus literally cause the success or ruin of the 
 
40 See Tarlo’s (1996: ch. 6) discussion of the modern, stylish cardigan as a medium of resistance to 
patriarchy in the Gujarati village in which she did her fieldwork. Also compare with Bastian’s (1996: 100–
111) discussion of the kinds of tropes of masculinity in Nigerian women’s fashion circa the 1980s and 
men’s reactions to it. 
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family, a woman who does style can literally cause the ruin of the family and the 
patriarchal social order more generally.  
To be a young woman, then, is to be caught between ego-focal youth status and 
concern for others. This mediates young women’s relationship to youth culture more 
generally, making style highly problematic. This is precisely why women’s fashion often 
provokes violent reaction: women’s behavior and dress are never simply ego-focal but 
always alter-focal, indexical of the kin group, the ‘society,’ the ‘culture.’ When they 
transgress, then, they transgress for everyone, all onlookers, all addressees. (See Lukose 
[2009: intro., ch. 2] on the complexities of women’s fashion among Indian youth; also 
Tarlo 1996.) As some young women of a Madurai college explained, ‘young women [i.e., 
we] may like jeans, but insofar as they offend the sentiments of others, they are taboo. 
When the principal burned a pair of jeans on the campus as part of the symbolic banning 
of jeans on the campus, few protested. We came in chudithars’ (cf. Lukose 2009: 86).  
 
4.5 Women do style  
Yet, as I noted earlier, women do do style, though often in a more muted fashion than 
men. Women’s style in fashion tends to be less conspicuous. In general, women’s fashion 
eschews the marks of exteriority. For example, while the male body is covered in brands, 
women’s clothing remains largely unbranded. Women’s clothing also downplays 
exteriority through negotiated forms: for example, the north Indian chudithar instead of 
Western jeans; or hair clipped but not braided (see Lukose 2009: ch. 2 on what she calls 
the “demure modern”; Tarlo 1996). Instead, status in clothing is expressed through 
materials, fabric quality, color matching, and embellishments (metal work, embroidery, 
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etc.). In fact, it is often not even called style, but fashion, meaning a current trend, thereby 
negating the problematic associations of style.41 
While style in women’s fashion is more controlled, its full expression in speech is 
possible. Indeed, the stereotype among youth is that it is young middle-class women who 
peter (v)uduRathu (‘show off with English’) the most. Young men stated that such girls 
speak as if they are from a foreign land, often code-switching just at the moment when 
their speech becomes audible to others. As such style is relatively unrelated to women’s 
sexuality per se, it is less controlled and easier for women to engage with. 
Finally, for many young women style is something one appreciates from a distance, 
but not something that one does. While they may not be able to re-animate those who do 
style—TV VJs, film actresses, rich-urban women—they can enjoy the fashion from a 
distance: unrequited style.  
 
4.6 Who, where, and when female youth do style  
As it is for boys, women’s engagement with style in fashion is licensed in 
circumstances where the chance of such actions getting back to anyone who knows the 
girl is minimized. Thus, for example, in all-girls colleges, girls might come to the college 
in one outfit, but then change into another more style-ish outfit once inside (cf. Tarlo 
1996: 201). And as discussed in chapter 2, the tour (especially outside of Tamil Nadu) is 
always a good time to break out style-ish forms. 
For women the concept of style is even more class-linked than it is for men precisely 
for the reasons stated above. Because style is linked to public space and visuality, young 
 
41 Thanks to Melanie Dean for pointing this out to me. 
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working- and middle-class women almost always link style to the rich, as something that 
only rich girls did. This is because only rich girls can afford access to the kinds of 
exterior spaces where it is possible to do style and avoid teasing and harassment from 
men. Rich girls go to college and hang out in spaces of wealth (malls, restaurants, foreign 
countries) where they won’t get bothered for doing style. Further, they get to such 
exterior spaces by taking their motorbikes or cars, and not by walking or riding on the 
bus.  
Given the luxury of exteriority, the rich are seen to literally inhabit a different world. 
In this sense young rich/elite women are doubly outside of ‘society,’ and thus are able to 
do style without threat to their reputation. Hence the stereotype about rich women is that 
they don’t care what others think, of what ‘society’ says about their behavior. They live 
in a different ‘society’ and thus they are free. Their status is so high, as it were, that it’s 
un-impugnable. They can afford, literally and figuratively, to do style. And while this is 
clearly a lower-/middle-class linked perspective, unlike boys’ fashion where forms and 
designs are continuous across a class spectrum, women fashions and style are 
discontinuous across social classes. In general, rich urban women dress qualitatively 
differently than middle-class and poor women: they wear pants, jeans, tee-shirts, and 
blouses, rather than thavanis, chudithars, and sarees (cf. Tarlo 1996: ch. 5–8).   
 
5. Conclusions 
5.1 Summary 
In this chapter and the last I have laid out a particular logic that organizes youth 
cultural activity in Tamil Nadu. In chapter 2 I showed how the construction of ‘youth’ as 
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an age set in an otherwise age hierarchical ‘society’ motivates youth’s experience of their 
own positionality in that ‘society’ as exterior. I examined how this exteriority is taken up 
in youth’s own activities and forms the central trope that organizes the peer group and its 
social spaces and the activities and semiotic registers that unfold in them. In particular, I 
showed how much of the activity in the peer group is about status, and that meta-
pragmatic typifications like style and geththu are themselves diagrammatic of ‘youth’ (as 
exteriority to hierarchy) while at the same time reinscribing the categories of ‘society’ 
that youth attempt to distance themselves from. One entailment of the peer group 
constructed as exterior space is its highly intimate and coercive nature, creating a 
contradiction between the peer group as a space for status-raising and transgression and 
the peer group as space of constant status-leveling and peer pressure. In this chapter I 
explored how the forces of status-raising and -leveling inherent in the youth peer group 
shape the negotiation of status-ful signs via their hybridization and double-voiced 
structure (e.g., in humor, jokes, English use). 
While I mainly looked at young men’s experience, I noted how gender and class 
crucially mediate these dynamics. Indeed, we can think of style and geththu as two 
concepts of class- and gender- linked genres of meta-pragmatic typification that are 
enregistered with respect to different models of ‘youth.’ In the coming chapters I explore 
the mediation of these genres of status vis-à-vis film (chapters 4–5) and branded forms 
(chapters 6–8).  
 
5.2 Globalization, “tradition,” age, and style 
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Ritty Lukose (2009: 62; cf. Brown and Larson 2003: 12–13) writes in her 
ethnography of college-going youth in post-liberalization Kerala that political discourses 
about youth  
“have a theory of globalization and youth embedded within them: youth is a 
consuming social group, the first to bend to what is understood to be the 
homogenizing pressures of globalization, a globalization fundamentally tied to 
Americanization. Youth consumption practices index the presence and reach of 
globalization.”  
I have said little explicitly about globalization or the presence of American cultural forms 
among Tamil youth, though we have had occasion to note them. This is perhaps because 
of the implicit and seemingly unresolvable tension that Lukose identifies in debates about 
globalization, a tension between globalization/homogenization and resistance to 
it/heterogenization (Robertson 1995, 2001; Appadurai 1990; Tomlinson 1997; Bauman 
1998).  
This tension, what Mazzarella (2004: 348ff.) has dubbed “the Formula,” is 
presumably resolved through the notion of “negotiation,” following British Cultural 
Studies’ attempt to understand hegemony and move beyond the staid dualism of 
power/ideology and agency/resistance (cf. Mosse 2003). Hybridized cultural forms are 
the supposed evidence for such negotiation of globalization. For example, Jeffrey et al. 
(2008: 16) note that young men’s masculinities in many societies are played out through 
the hybridization, or partial engagement and appropriation, of signs that indexically 
invoke “tradition,” “modernity,” and “globalization.” Thus, such youth practices can be 
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read as either negotiated acceptance or resistance to hegemonic masculinities/ 
ideologies.42  
What I would like to suggest is that the issue shouldn’t be formulated in terms of 
alignment of youth toward preexisting ideologies or not (i.e., as a model of “reception” of 
discourses handed down to local “targets” from global “sources”). Rather, we should ask 
how do youth use particular signs, taken from a variety of source registers, to do their 
interactional work? As we have seen, Tamil youth’s concerns with status in the peer 
group recruit semiotic forms from various source registers: from Western branded forms 
and English, the accoutrement of the rowdy, and tropes on the objective periya aaL. 
While we might see this as a mix of the “traditional” and “modern” and thus the 
negotiation of “globalization” what I pointed out in this chapter is that all such semiotic 
forms, irrespective of their traditional-ness or modernity, are functionally the same vis-à-
vis the logic of ‘youth.’ Youth use such forms not because they are “modern,” “global,” 
or “traditional” per se but because such forms can be made to do interactional work in the 
peer group (i.e., status-raising and -leveling).43 From this point of view, youth are not 
negotiating “globalization,” “modernity,” or “tradition” but are negotiating the 
 
42 Tarlo (1996: ch. 2) gives a similar argument in her discussion of male fashion in colonial Indian. For her, 
the problem of what to wear, and the kinds of hybrid compromises it created, was caught in the double bind 
of desires for civilization/status (“modernity”) and cultural loyalty (“tradition”). Interestingly, even in the 
examples she discusses (e.g., on pp. 53, 57) we see precisely the status dynamics discussed in this chapter. 
Further, her argument regarding how Gujarati villagers engage such national debates (pp.  332–335) 
resonates with the argument that I present in this section. Bastian (1996) provides a rich set of examples 
showing a similar dynamic in young Nigerian men and women’s fashion practices. Here we see how 
concerns about local status negotiations within and across generations motivates into use both “traditional” 
and “modern” sartorial signs, thereby creating hybrid fashion forms. Similarly Schoss (1996) provides a 
number of examples of how young Kenyan men involved in the tourism trade draw on exterior source 
registers of value in their dress in order to negotiate their places in larger kin networks, even if she 
ultimately argues that what is being done through such dress is consuming “cosmopolitanism” itself (pp. 
184). 
43 Cf. Tobin (1992: 4) and Stanlaw (1992) on a similar argument regarding the “domestication of the West” 
through Japanese consumption activities and English use, respectively.  
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contradictions of the youth peer group: the injunction toward exteriority and status-
raising and the peer pressure and anxieties of conformity inherent to the peer group. 
Because of the contradictions of the peer group, itself a result of youth’s own reanalysis 
of their position in the life cycle, youth cultural forms are hybridized so as to 
simultaneously status-raise and -level at the same time, to raise one’s esteem but avoid 
censure from the peer group.  
To read such youth peer group activity as a negotiation of “tradition,” “modernity,” or 
“globalization” is to, I would argue, read youth culture allegorically against anxieties that 
analysts often feel acutely (for various reasons). I do not deny that in some instances 
youth themselves may reanalyze their own experience in this way. Certainly some do 
some of the time. But this is an empirical question and must be posed as such rather than 
as a pregiven from which analysis follows (cf. Mosse 2003). In my observations, most of 
the time most male youth were unconcerned with globalization, tradition, or modernity as 
such. When they were, it was in moments of reflection (or secondary rationalization) on 
what they were already doing (which abides by a different logic than the question of 
negotiating globalization per se, as I argued above).44  
 
44 The approaches to globalization that I have discussed, then, observe that: (a) youth use “modern” forms, 
“traditional” forms, and “global” forms; (b) youth are involved in “negotiation” projects via (a); and (c) 
youth cultural forms hybridize (a) while doing (b). I showed how this view mistakenly attributes this as the 
“negotiation” of “globalization” because it doesn’t take into account the on-the-ground logic of the youth 
peer group. What is interesting is that there is a systematic motivation of (a), (b), and (c) from the logic of 
the construction of the age category ‘youth’ and how it plays out vis-à-vis tropes of exteriority. As I have 
discussed in this chapter and the last the middling of ‘youth’ in the life cycle is reanalyzed by youth via 
trope of exteriority; this trope constructs youth spaces, concepts of status, and the peer group as a space of 
status-raising and -leveling and thus produces the observables (a), (b), and (c). I would argue, then, that this 
process of reanalysis and status negotiation systematically motivates the globalization story as an 
ideological misunderstanding. It is a classic Whorfian projection/Boasian secondary 
rationalization/Marxian fetish where the logic of some social process motivates a partial awareness of that 
process, and thus through reanalysis, a distorted ideological formulation of it. It would seem to do this for 
both globalization theorists and for Tamil youth who, on occasion (re)analyze the experience of Tamil 
youth as the negotiation of “globalization.” 
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Seen from this light, the question of “negotiation” is a false solution to the problem 
posed by ambivalences of youth culture; false not because it is necessarily untrue, but 
because it doesn’t allow us to pose certain kinds of questions given its assumptions. 
Given its assumption—there exist discourses or ideologies, what are the possible ways of 
engaging with them?—the conclusion—one can either accept, reject, or negotiate them—
seems self-evident. But rather than framing the issue in terms of how individuals 
“receive” or engage with preexisting and static entities (denoted by abstract nouns like 
“ideology,” “culture,” “power,” “globalization”) I have asked how youth variously use 
and re-animate signs which have various indexical values (like “modernity,” “the West,” 
“tradition”) to do some (often mundane) interactional work (e.g., status-raising in the 
peer group, impressing a girl). Just as a carpenter doesn’t negotiate with a hammer 
(except under the most strained readings) but uses it to do his work, youth use signs of 
modernity, tradition, and globalization to do their own work. 
This is not to say that globalization, modernity, and tradition are irrelevant to youth’s 
social reality, for clearly they are, as source registers for youth’s status work. Indeed, one 
of the ironies of Tamil youth culture is the motivation and recruitment of particular youth 
cultural forms from the global exterior in order to play out particular understandings of 
status which are distinctly Tamil (e.g., the status differential of periya aaL–chinna 
paiyan) while bracketing the larger institutional meta-pragmatic discourses (caste, kin 
group) which attempt to locate ‘youth’ with respect to those discourses (as hierarchically 
ranked below adults). The issue, then, isn’t just the mutual constitution of the 
modern/traditional or global/local, but that this mutuality is asymmetrical precisely 
because of its multi-tiered semiotic structure of sign–metasign: [‘youth’ is a trope [on 
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“traditional” concepts of status via [modern forms and traditional forms]]].45 That is, it 
isn’t only a question of the kinds of cultural signs recruited by youth in their activity (i.e., 
are they “traditional,” are they “modern”?) but also an issue of their diagrammaticity, or 
higher order logic (and tropic possibilities) (cf. Gal 2002 on fractal recursivity). In short, 
then, rather than seeing youth engagement with “tradition” and “modernity” as 
semiotically flat, or one dimensional (that is, taking place only at the level of cultural 
forms with such-and-such indexical values), we must also be able to understand how such 
youth engagements are always already figured within a more complex semiotic 
configuration of a two-tiered structure (minimally of the sign–metasign order), 
imbricated in particular on-the-ground interactional work (cf. Mosse 2003). 
 
45 Cf. Mazzarella (2003: 263ff.) on a similar but inverted situation among India advertising elites: 
[‘consumerism’ is a trope [on globalization via [“Indian-ness” and signs of elite status]]] whereby the 
simulacrum of indigeneity is reproduced through a globally-aware sensibility, thereby producing a 
consumerist structure and (reified) “tradition” in an asymmetric relation of tradition mobilized for 
consumerism. 
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Part II. Style and Film 
Chapter 4 – Film as Style, Style in Film: Hero, Villain, Comedian 
 
1. Introduction 
In chapters 2 and 3 I showed how the construction of the age category ‘youth’ and 
concepts of youth status diagram youth’s relationship to their reified notions of ‘society.’ 
The focus was on status at the level of face-to-face interaction in the peer group. As was 
clear, however, youth status is informed by and re-animates mass-mediated images of 
youth masculinity and status; in particular, film (Rogers 2009, forthcoming; see Osella 
and Osella 2004; Derne 2000; Lukose 2009). In this chapter I look at style in hero-
oriented, Tamil commercial action films, with particular attention given to the style of 
Rajinikanth. In chapters 2 and 3 I bracketed the importance of film precisely because, as I 
argue in chapter 5, while film is an important source register for youth status (a) it is 
more general notions of status and age (as discussed in chapters 2 and 3) that inform both 
youth peer group activity and film representations of masculinity; and (b) it is the 
dynamics of the peer group that directly inform how youth engage with and re-animate 
filmic representations.  
 
 2. Filmic representations of status: Style, geththu, and status inversion 
In this chapter I argue that the best way to understand commercial cinema is as the 
negotiation of status in the peer group put in narrated form. I discuss this with respect to 
the hero (as positive representation of status), the villain or rowdy (as excessive 
representation of status), and the comedian (as inverted representation of status). I make 
this strategic move for two reasons: first, to recenter the analysis of such film from being 
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text to audience focal (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009); second, to move from 
the notion of reception to the notion of re-animation or use, and thus from a focus on 
media to mediation, or how meaningful social activity is enabled and coordinated with 
respect to mass-mediated representations (see Agha 2007b; Mazzarella 2004).  
Reading commercial film through the lens of youth status is justifiable, I argue, for 
the following reasons: (1) the main audience of Tamil films, especially of the hero-
oriented films discussed in this chapter, is (male) youth (Nakassis and Dean 2007; 
Rajanayakam 2002); (2) such films are about youth in terms of their protagonists, social 
worlds, and concerns; and (3) cinema as an institution is figured as exterior and 
transgressive to ‘society’ and ‘culture’ and thus is, by degrees, iconic with the 
construction of ‘youth’ and its forms of status (chapter 2, section 3.1).  
While Indian film has been read through the lens of religion and mythology (as a 
projection from, or as drawing on) (Mishra et. al 1989; Dwyer and Patel 2002; Osella and 
Osella 2004: 224; Lutgendorff 2006); political image and (quasi-)propaganda (Hardgrave 
1971, 1973, 1979; Hardgrave and Neidhart 1975; Sivathambi 1981; Pandian 1992; 
Dickey 1993b; Rajanayakam 2002); political economy and ideology (Prasad 1998; 
Lukose 2009: 49–51); caste politics (Dhareshwar and Niranjana 1996); fan devotion 
(Srinivas 1996; Dickey 2001; Osella and Osella 2004; Rogers 2009, forthcoming); or the 
moral frameworks, fantasies, and desires of the makers or audience (Thomas 1985, 1995; 
Mishra et al. 1989; Kakar 1990: ch. 3; Dickey 1993b, 1995; Derne 2000; Osella and 
Osella 2004: 224–225; Dickey 2009b), it has not been read from the perspective of 
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concepts of youth status, and certainly not of style.1 And yet, as we will see, Tamil film is 
rife with representations of status, both in and out of the film text.  
Why has film not been so investigated with respect to status? I argue that this is 
because most work on Indian cinema operates with a highly partial view of film as 
communicative process. In such work, the audience is passive (as the semantics of term 
reception implies; Asif Agha personal communication, February 9, 2010). They are the 
communicative end point, the telos of the text. The film is consumed by the act of 
viewing, used up, completed (cf. the notion of commodity “consumption,” Marx 1976: 
ch. 1).  
In this chapter and the next I take another line of inquiry: how can we see film as 
imbricated in the pragmatic goings-on of everyday life, as a resource for pragmatic 
interactional work by viewers (versus simply iconic with the viewer, producer, myth, 
“culture,” ideology, or psyche, etc.). I argue that this iconic indexicality—the re-
animation of film by youth (iconism) to achieve pragmatic ends in peer groups 
(indexicality)—explains (a) what aspects of film youth engage with; (b) the 
reproducibility and hence recirculatability of hero-centered films outside of film (peer 
groups, TV, other films, political campaigns, etc.); (c) how youth talk about film stars 
and their selective deployment of filmic images of status (chapter 5); and (d) why the 
hero-centered film can produce what I call “hero-stars”2 through their inter-discursivity 
(chapter 5).  
 
1 Rajanayakam’s (2002: 97, 231) dissertation, while it deals extensively with the image of Rajinikanth, 
relegates style as a mere “gimmick” which youth like but which is of ultimately no real consequence 
besides endearing Rajinikanth to his fans. 
2 What I mean by “hero-star,” as discussion will make clear, is a popular and status-ful actor whose on-
screen and off-screen personae overlap to such a degree that there is a trans-textual coherence to his heroic 
characters such it that transfers to his extra-textual persona qua “star.” Examples from Tamil cinema 
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3. Style: Super Star Rajinikanth and the hero 
3.1 Rajinikanth as style 
As noted in chapter 3, if you ask youth in Tamil Nadu ‘What is style?’ you will often 
get a one word answer: Rajinikanth. Indeed, style as a lexical item is something 
historically particular to Rajinikanth (b. 1950). While M. G. Ramachandran (MGR) 
(1917–1987)—the most popular Tamil actor-politician of all time, active from the 1950s 
to the 1970s—certainly did something akin to style (e.g., his fashionable clothes; his 
oratorical dialogues; his signature crossing of his index and middle finger, placing them 
on the tip of his nose and then untwisting them in a motion that left his index finger 
pointing up in the air), this was not called style, but paddaiya kiLappaRathu (lit. ‘strip off 
wood/bark/skin’; roughly, ‘doing something in an impressive manner’; cf. English ‘rip it 
up’). The word style, as far as I know (and my informants knew), was first used to talk 
about Rajinikanth (who rose to prominence as MGR was retiring to full-time politics) and 
is fused with him. Rajini is style. Style is Rajini. This isn’t to say that style isn’t used or 
usable with reference to other individuals (new stars, older stars in retrospect, non-film-
related individuals), but that to invoke style is to invoke, at some level, Rajinikanth.  
Rajinikanth is, and has been since the seventies, the biggest hero-star in the Tamil 
industry.3 He began as a character actor in 1970s, often playing the villain or negative 
 
include MGR, Rajinikanth, Vijay, and Ajith. The hero-star is associated with a particular type of film, the 
commercial hero-oriented action film.  
3 He is certainly the best paid. Apparently in all of Asia Rajinikanth, even in his late fifties, is the second 
highest-paid actor today only after Jackie Chan (Eapan 2009). This is telling as the Tamil-speaking 
audience is at least seven times smaller than the size of the Hindi-understanding audience, not to mention 
the pan-Asian audience of Jackie Chan’s films. Further, the economics of the Tamil film industry, unlike 
the Hindi film industry, relies mainly on the theatergoing audience, instead of on ancillary markets and 
diaspora audiences, as the Hindi cinema does, making his per film salary all the more impressive. 
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hero in K. Balachandar’s family-oriented melodramas. Even in his early films—for 
example, Bharathiraja’s realist film Pathinaaru Vayathilee (1977) where he plays the 
village villain—his speedy delivery and oft-repeated dialogues (“ithu eppadi irukku?” 
‘how is it?’) made him popular among viewers. This villainy paid off and he made the 
transition into being a(n anti)hero in his own right in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
through the craft of director S. P. Muthuraman. From the 1980s on he played the “angry 
young man” (often remaking Amitabh Bachchan films from Hindi) (Kazmi 1998), an 
antihero who works on the peripheries of society as a vigilante meting out his own 
justice. It is in this period that (a) his image as the “Super Star” of Tamil cinema 
congealed and that he became the biggest action hero in Tamil Nadu; and (b) style 
became his signature trademark.  
His image reached its apotheosis in the 1990s with super-blockbusters like Thalapathi 
(1991), Annamalai (1992), Muthu (1995), Baadshaa (1995), Arunaachalam (1997), and 
Padaiyappa (1999). The new century has seen as a slowdown in Rajini’s films both in 
number of films and box-office revenue; indeed Baba (2002) and the more recent 
Kuseelan (2008) were flops. Nevertheless, Chandiramukhi (2005) and Sivaji: The Boss 
(2007) were big successes. Currently in production, his Enthiran (dir. Shankar) promises 
to be even bigger (if its budget is any indication).  
 
3.2 Why Rajinikanth?  
If the supposition of this chapter is that youth’s concepts of status are central to film, 
why take the hero of yesteryear when there are contenders for the throne from today’s 
generation: Vijay, Ajith, Dhanush, or Simbu?  
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First, youth in Madurai and Chennai cite Rajinikanth as what style means. Second, 
many are still Rajinikanth fans, either informally or in fan clubs. Third, all are well 
versed with, and enjoy, his films. Fourth, they see other film stars like Vijay as simply 
newer versions of Rajinikanth. One Madurai student put it thusly: ‘If you want to 
understand style there is no one better than Rajini. No one does style like Rajini.’ When I 
then asked, ‘If you like Vijay for his style but Rajini’s is better, why do you say you are a 
Vijay fan?,’ he answered ‘because Vijay is for today’s youth only, while everyone loves 
Rajini, from a little child to an old man. Vijay is the new generation.’ Fifth, 
Chandrimukhi (2005) and Sivaji (2007) were hits and were re-animated by many youth 
while I was in the field. Their dialogues, styles, and comedy sequences were taken up in 
youth’s own peer groups. Finally, from my own viewings of Vijay, Ajith, Dhanush, and 
Simbu films, the conclusions from my analysis of Rajini’s films are applicable (certainly 
enough for the purposes of my argument) to these heroes.  
 
3.3 Note on heroism and style 
There is a slight difference in what Tamil youth mean by style when they are talking 
about the style of Rajinikanth versus the performance of style in the peer group, though 
ultimately the two are the same. When one asks what is style vis-à-vis Rajinikanth, youth 
will inevitably point out a set of stereotyped mannerisms or actions performed by Rajini 
in the course of the film: for example, the way he twirls his finger; the way he throws a 
cigarette into his mouth from a distance; his gait; or his so-called “punch dialogues” (akin 
to the one-liner in Western action films). These are the most localizable, most detachable, 
and most framed as style by the film text itself (through slow motion shots, double takes, 
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sound effects explicitly typified as style), and the most repeated elements of style (both 
within the film and across films).  
These elements are considered different from, though are obviously related to, the 
more general notion of heroism (‘the quality of being a hero’). Stereotypically, heroism 
includes things like fighting off bad guys, jumping across buildings, and saving the 
damsel in distress. 
By contrast, style is used by youth in their peer groups more often than not as the 
explanation for some behavior, mannerism, or status-ful object (e.g., apparel, 
motorcycle). It explains the function of some form, its reason for use: it singles out the 
user and his attempts to raise his status. As such, style gets applied to much more 
mundane forms (e.g., a tee-shirt) and for more diffuse phenomenon (one’s total image 
can be queried: ‘what’s the deal with all the style daa’?). Indeed, even acting like a film 
hero, heroism, is reanalyzed as style in the peer group.  
In my analysis of Rajini’s style I treat both notions of style as part of the same 
phenomenon. The first (Rajini’s formulaic repertoire) is a subset of the second (the logic 
of differential status-raising that ‘builds up’ the persona of the status-ful individual). 
Ultimately it’s the second more general category which youth end up drawing upon more 
heavily. This is because it’s broader in scope and thus affords more opportunity for re-
animation in the peer group. 
 
Below I analyze style in one emblematic Rajini film, Baadshaa (1995), which I 
watched with a group of Madurai students in the second college hostel that I stayed in. 
After the film I did several group interviews with them about the film which I use to 
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ground my analysis and discussion. This method allowed me to highlight which moments 
resonated with students (by their comments, their talking back to the screen, their 
whistles, claps, boos, laughs, and dancing), as well as which moments they considered to 
be emblematic of Rajini’s style.  
 
3.4. Baadshaa as a story of youth status 
Baadshaa (lit. [Urdu/Hindu] ‘king,’ ‘leader’) (1995; dir. Suresh Krishnan) is the 
Rajinikanth action film par excellence. The Tamil youth with whom I spent my time 
cited this film as their favorite Rajinikanth film (and one of their favorite films in 
general), as the film which encapsulates Rajini’s style and performs it to maximum effect 
and pleasure. As I show below, Baadshaa is a story about style.  
 
3.4.1 Individuating the hero-star 
Like his other films (e.g., Annamalai [1992], Padaiyappa [1999], Sivaji [2007]), 
Baadshaa (1995) begins by announcing itself to be a Rajinikanth film. The first images 
are tiny lights appearing one by one, accompanied by what we could perhaps call Rajini’s 
“theme music” (it’s the same in many films). Cumulatively the lights spell “Super Star.” 
Then, in succession the letters R-A-J-N-I fly toward the audience. Having spelt “RAJNI” 
[sic], his name comes to rest in between between the words “Super” and “Star,” first in 
English, then in Tamil (photo 4.1). This tells us what we already know: this film is, first 
and foremost, a Rajinikanth film. 
  
Photo 4.1 “Super Star Rajni” [sic] intro 
 
3.4.2 Deferring darshan 
The diegesis opens with a number of scenes where the hero’s (comic) sidekick is 
giving money to the needy (someone who needs dowry, someone who needs hospital 
bills paid) on behalf of Manikkam (an auto-rickshaw driver played by Rajinikanth).4 
Manikkam is praised by others—as a great man, a good guy, as our aNNan (‘older 
brother’)—but our experience of seeing him on-screen is deferred. We only hear about 
him from others.5 Note that in commercial Tamil cinema the hero’s entrance is one of the 
major events of the film-viewing experience. It’s the moment when the fans throw the 
confetti into the air; the whistling and dancing begins; when the film is officially on its 
way. All this deferral, then, functions to increase the anticipation of the audience. 
We learn that today is ayutha puuja (the worship ritual for the tools/machines through 
which one earns), so Manikkam is at the auto-stand ‘tearing it up’ (“paddaiya 
kiLambikkiddiruppaaru”). This is an inter-discursive allusion to MGR. (His auto-stand is 
also called “MGR auto-stand.”) 
                                                 
4 Note that the auto-rickshaw driver is a stereotypical working-class profession in urban areas. A populist 
image, but also a figure of low status.  
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5 See Rajanayakam (2002: 88–92) on the trope of speaking for the hero more generally. 
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Cut to the first song. A large crowd of auto-drivers and neighborhood people have 
gathered at the auto-stand for the puuja. The camera focuses on a pumpkin thrown into 
the air to commence the ritual. Cut to the pumpkin flying in the air, then cut to white 
sneakers running toward the camera. Cut to Manikkam jumping in the air and smashing 
the pumpkin with his head. (It’s crucial in the ritual that the pumpkin be smashed [Dean 
2009] so as to release the negative energy, or thrishdi, that is absorbed by the pumpkin. 
That Manikkam breaks it with his head is, presumably, an index that he is so powerful 
that nothing will happen to him. Indeed, touching such a pumpkin after it’s broken is 
believed to cause bodily harm [Melanie Dean, personal communication, February 1, 
2010], which it certainly doesn’t do to Manikkam.) The next shot is of Manikkam landing 
on the ground and smiling at the camera in a fully frontal bust shot. He is looking directly 
at the camera and in slow motion he gives the vaNakkam gesture (the traditional greeting 
of folding the hands in front of the chest) to the audience/camera.  
Cut back to his fellow auto-drivers dancing in front of a cinema hall (showing 
Jurassic Park [1993], a huge hit in Tamil Nadu). In the dance sequence he is 
differentiated, made visible, and centered: while all the other auto-drivers have colored 
shirts and shoes (in addition to the auto-driver’s olive-brown jacket/pant uniform), 
Manikkam wears a bright white shirt and sneakers; he is always in the middle of the shot; 
he is in the front (foreground) of the group (background); he is the only man dancing with 
the women; and he is the only one singing the song.  
Lyrically, he is portrayed as a man of status—for example, he sings that he will come 
to name your child (a role reserved for the high status)—but decidedly part of the (peer) 
group. As the lyrics state, everyone trusts him. This status-raising is ratified by the 
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onlookers. For example, his female family members come to see him dance, expressing 
approval and appreciation in their faces. The final shot is a trick shot where two 
Manikkams face the camera with an open hand extended. This trope of status is akin to 
the linguistic trope of honorification through pluralization, while also invoking the image 
of the Hindu deity whose iconic representation is as that of multiple body parts (heads, 
arms, legs) (Havell 1980[1928]: 44–45; Stutley 1985: x; Dehejia 1997: 140, 242).  
 
3.4.3 Introducing the egalitarian, progressive, down-to-earth hero 
As the song finishes, the diegesis begins with sketches of Manikkam as an older 
brother, not a success in career or studies (in this he like most people), but as the enabler 
of his siblings’ successes: in education (his sister has the marks to get into a medical 
college, a very difficult and prestigious achievement) and in work (his brother has 
become a police officer). As it turns out, Manikkam is fulfilling the dying wish of his 
father to give his siblings a better life. He is a consummate progressive, pushing for his 
sister to study, and thus eschews “bad” tradition (as indexed by their mother’s desire for 
her daughter to stay with traditional gender roles and not study). With his younger 
brother he refuses to allow him to get the traditional blessings from him (a status diagram 
where the receiver of blessings falls to the feet of the giver). Instead he hugs him, a sign 
of equality. In short, he isn’t only against the old habits of ‘society’ and “tradition,” he 
also values egalitarianism over hierarchy.  
 
3.4.4 Maximizing status by status-lowering 
A common trope in many Rajinikanth films is to show him as someone who is 
uninterested in status-raising. In general, at first his characters are simple people that 
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embody a submissive and hyper-polite demeanor. They avoid fights, symbolic displays of 
domination, and showing off.  
The opening scenes of Baadshaa show just this through a series of episodes where 
Manikkam actively avoids conflicts. For example, a fellow auto-driver warns him about 
an area where there is unrest: ‘I thought I would tell you,’ he says, ‘since I know you 
don’t like fights.’ Manikkam agrees, ‘I definitely don’t.’ This has a comic feel, for the 
audience knows that he—that is, all of Rajini’s characters, past, present, and future—is a 
consummate fighter.  
This is a rhetorical strategy to maximize Manikkam’s status-raising, however, 
because ultimately through the instigation of others (most often the villains who 
challenge him or hurt his women) he rises to the occasion to show his true self/potential, 
that of the indestructible hero, the man of power, action, and style. Such a strategy also 
functions to create anticipation (When will he reveal his true self?) and light comedy. To 
take another example, in a later scene while driving the heroine in his auto-rickshaw they 
come across a fight. He immediately turns around and drives off. She asks if he is afraid. 
‘Yes, very much so,’ he says.6 She then asks him if he has ever loved anyone and been 
loved by them, to which he replies in hyper-polite speech that there are no girls who have 
pursued him. He even goes so far as to say a boy shouldn’t even pursue girls. Note that 
this diagrams an image of anti-status which is, given that we know Rajinikanth to be the 
Super Star and desired by many women, a status-inversion/mismatch. To this extent it 
functions as comedy or irony. (This scene evinced laughs from the students that I 
 
6 Note that the participant framework—poor youth–beautiful young rich girl—would typically evince 
hyper-masculine displays of style. Knowing this, Manikkam admitting his fear is unexpected, and thus is 
humorous. Additionally, it projects Manikkam as an innocent and good person.  
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watched the film with.) Even more than diagramming anti-status, it diagrams anti-youth: 
he disavows romance, he avoids fights, his speech is hyper-polite, and he is considerate 
and respectful of others. He acts the chinna paiyan, recognizing the authority of others, as 
well as ‘society’ and ‘culture.’ 
Even as the plot develops this artifice of Manikkam the ordinary auto-driver, the 
chinna paiyan, starts to unravel. When his younger brother goes for his police interview, 
the police inspector notices his older brother’s name is Manikkam, son of Rangasaami, 
born in Bombay. Suspecting that perhaps he is Manik Baadshaa—the infamous Robin 
Hood smuggler and gangster from Bombay who supposedly died four years ago in a 
fire—he calls Manikkam to the office.  
In this scene, Manikkam walks into the room, full frontal bust shot. Mutual 
recognition seems to pass over the faces of the police inspector and Manikkam. The 
police inspector rises, a sign of respect and surprise. Close up pan of Manikkam’s face. 
He walks into the room with a scowl, his upper lip cocked to one side, his head slightly 
down, eyes looking up (photo 4.2, left). As we will have occasion to see, this is his 
preferred posture (and that of the next in line for Super Star status Vijay as well) when 
revealing himself as a status-ful individual. There is a flash cut to (Manikkam as) 
Baadshaa, the gangster in Bombay walking with sunglasses and a beard. This is indexed 
as a flashback film through a film-negative effect (photo 4.2, right). There are then a 
series of cuts of Baadshaa’s henchmen shooting off guns with the film-negative effect; 
Baadshaa doing his style walk (also with film-negative effect); and newspaper articles 
about how Baadshaa, the famed smuggler, died in a bomb blast. Here we have the first 
instance of style bleeding into the diegesis.  
  
Photo 4.2 Manikkam–Baadshaa, positive–negative, ‘small boy’–‘big man’ 
 
We come back to the present (presumably this flashback is the mental interpretant of 
the police officer who thinks he recognizes Baadshaa in Manikkam) and are returned to 
the ordinary Manikkam. In contrast to this literally inverse image of style (Baadshaa), 
Manikkam is humbleness incarnate. He refuses to sit; he greets the police officer first 
with the vaNakkam gesture; his arms are folded and his body is comported as a man of 
lower status. He strives to convince the police officer that he is just a simple auto-driver, 
Manikkam. As he leaves and walks out, the music kicks in, a hint that perhaps the police 
officer’s hallucinatory, in-the-present flashback is the truth after all.  
When the police officer asks his subordinates for Baadshaa’s file, they get scared just 
hearing the name, “Bombay Baadshaa.” Again, speaking for the hero begins the process 
of the hero’s status-raising, while allowing him to maintain his humble demeanor, 
thereby negotiating the dictates of status-raising and -lowering in the peer group, as 
discussed in chapter 3.  
 
3.4.5 Style as attracting women 
A major part of the construction of the status-ful hero is his ratification as status-ful 
by others. One of the primary functions of the heroine in Rajinikanth’s films is, I argue, 
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to ratify the status of the hero. This is either through providing a reason for the hero to 
fight and struggle against patriarchy (as in the love story) or villainy (in the action film); 
or, more directly, through her approving gaze and dialogue about him.  
As in his other films, it is the heroine’s romantic attraction to the hero which first 
ratifies his style in the film. In Baadshaa, the song sequences for “Azhagu” (‘Beauty’) 
and “Style Style” function to this effect. In “Azhagu,” a love song for Manikkam from the 
perspective of the heroine, Baadshaa’s style begins to be revealed. As the students with 
whom I watched the film noted, ‘in this song everything Rajini does is style, plus 
comedy.’  
The song is a daydream of the heroine Priya who sees Manikkam wherever she goes, 
in every man she sees. She sees (who she thinks is) Manikkam doing style, but it’s then 
revealed not be Manikkam, but some non-status-ful individual (usually whom she has 
ended up in an amorous position with). The style inversion/mismatch creates the comic 
effect. In this song Manikkam comes in a number of avatars: as a man in a tuxedo serving 
her a drink; as a man in a track suit exercising next to her in a state-of-the-art gym; as a 
business man in a suit surrounded by beautiful women working for him; as the doorman 
for a five-star hotel in regal clothing; as a Nagaswaram player; as a traffic cop; as a 
Vaishnavite Brahmin on a motorcycle; as a driver of a car (a sign of status); as a 
deboinaire man in a purple blazer and pink cumberbun; as a gangster in all white with a 
big mustache; as a bus conductor in a bus that passes her by;7 as a man in a luxurious 
bathrobe who watches her bathe; and finally as the ordinary Manikkam sitting on her 
porch in his auto-driver outfit.  
 
7 In Rajini’s ‘real life’ parallel text he is extolled as coming from the modest background of a bus 
conductor. This, then, is an extra-textual reference to his past career. 
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Each avatar performs some style. As the man with the car, he puts on his sunglasses 
by twirling them and rotating them around his hands first. As the bus conductor he style-
ishly descends and ascends from the bus while it’s moving. As the Brahmin, he sits on 
top of his motorbike decked out in Puma brand sneakers and round fashionable 
sunglasses. Lyrically the song revolves around his beauty and his style; as it’s put in the 
lyrics: ‘his beautiful smile, his physical beauty, his beautiful speech.’ (These three are 
recurrent features of praise in many Rajini films.) The lyrics voice her desire for him, and 
the cause of this desire is his style. 
The style portrayed in this fantastical song sequence eventually begins to bleed into 
the diegetic reality. In a later romance scene, Manikkam drops Priya off at her house. 
Getting out of the auto, he pushes back his jacket and puts his hands on his hips in a 
single deft motion, leaving him standing with his body maximally enlarged. (His arms 
and chest are extended by the posture of having the hands on the hips, and his legs 
slightly spread. This is a common style in many Rajini films.) She clicks seductively with 
her mouth, looking up at him, rocking back and forth on her heels, “nee seyRathule 
ellaam style-aa irukkiyaa?” ‘Are you style-ish in whatever you do?’ Embarrassed, he 
switches his posture. The implication here is that he can’t help but be style; he does it 
without knowing it. Not knowing where to put his hands, he points in her face (another 
diagram of status-difference) and mildly scolds her saying that he isn’t in love with her. 
She smiles, “oh ho, nee peesuRa thamizh kuuda style-aa irukkiyaa?! ‘Oh ho, you’re style-
ish even in the Tamil you speak (it seems)?!’ When he tries to leave, she grabs him, turns 
him, and kisses him on the mouth: ‘whatever you say, “I love you. I love you.” See you 
later dear.’  
 159
                                                
After this scene comes the song “Style Style” where the love proposition is 
transformed into a platform for Rajini to perform his style and to be praised by the 
heroine. He enters as James Bond, twirling a pistol around his finger in silhouette against 
a black and white target. He jumps through the target to a female chorus yelling “Super 
Star!” In this song his sartorial style is emphasized. In his first getup he wears a bright, 
shiny silver blazer with matching cowboy boots, leather black pants, a huge belt, and 
sunglasses. The sleeves of his blazer are pushed back, with the cuffs of his shirt revealed. 
(This is a common style across many of his Rajini’s films.) He puts on his sunglasses in 
his signature style while smiling at the camera and singing. In this song he is surrounded 
by cars and airplanes (signs of status and mobility). His costume changes: now he is the 
captain of the airplane and she the head stewardess. It changes again: he is in all leather 
with metal studs across his pants and vest (an outfit reminiscent of Mad Max); pieces of 
leather hang off in strips from his clothes; he has on a large metal belt, a bright red 
bunyan, and lots of jewelry.  
Lyrically, the song constructs the character Manikkam as Rajini the actor that inter-
discursively blends the hero with the star. It opens by appelating him by his epithet “Hey! 
Super Star! Style style super style, ithu style style thaan super style-thaan” ‘Hey Super 
Star! Style, this is your style, this is (your) super style!’ The heroine sings, “karuppum oru 
azhaku enRu kaNdukoNdeen unnaalee” ‘Because of you I have found that black is also 
beautiful’ in reference to Rajini’s dark complexion.8 In the final verse she praises his 
‘beautiful, milky smile’ and ‘the beautiful hair that falls on his forehead.’ (Another 
characteristic style of Rajini’s is longish hair where the bangs fall on his forehead, thus 
 
8 Rajini’s dark complexion is one of his distinctive traits, especially given that he took over the mantle of 
hero-star from the famously light-skinned MGR (Rajanayakam 2002).  
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requiring him to flip his head back to move the bangs, or to run his hands through his hair 
to push back the bangs.) She finishes by saying “unnai paarkkum pozhuthil pootha 
peNgaLil naan oru thinusu” ‘I am one of the girls who admired you when they saw 
you.’9  
 
3.4.6 Revealing style 
So far in the film, Manikkam’s true identity as Baadshaa, a man of status and style, 
has only been hinted at in flashbacks, non-diegetically grounded song sequences, and 
obliquely in his interactions with the heroine. It fully erupts into the diegesis when the 
chastity of his sister is questioned by a corrupt medical college principal attempting to 
force her into sexual favors. He approaches the principal as Manikkam, attempting to be 
polite and deferential. The principal says, ‘Have you come to threaten me? Because I am 
a big rowdy. Only after being a criminal did I come to be a principal!’ Manikkam then 
asks his sister to leave the room. From a posture of submission he then puts his hands on 
the principal’s desk (invading his private space), leaning in with a big smile and says, ‘I 
have another name.’ Cut to the negative flashback shot of Baadshaa walking. Cue 
Baadshaa’s theme music with a crowd chanting “Baadshaa! Baadshaa!” Cut to a shot 
from outside the room (the point of view of his sister). We see the principal scared, acting 
submissively, and then standing up in deference. We see Manikkam/Baadshaa talking 
animatedly (versus his submissive comportment earlier), touching his uniform (as if 
 
9 We can find similar scenes in films like Padaiyappa (1999) where the villain-cum-heroine praises his 
boldness (thairiyam), his anger (koobam), his valour (viiram), his speech (peechchu), and ‘more than 
anything else his style’ (“ellaatheyum vida, un style-u”). Similarly, in Sivaji (2007) the heroine says to him, 
‘What I like about you is your style and your thunderous action.’ See Rajanayakam (2002: ch. 4) for 
discussion of this in other films.  
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saying that all this is just a disguise). Cut to inside the room, Baadshaa saying ‘Don’t say 
anything to anyone outside.’  
Next comes what viewers take as the introduction of the emblematic style of the film: 
smiling, Manikkam/Baadshaa flips his hand in the air and twirls it with the index finger 
pointing up. This is accompanied by a swoosh sound effect. His smile fades, his eyes 
intense as he intones: “naan oru thadave sonnaa nuuRu thadave sonna maathiri” ‘If I say 
it one time, it’s as if I said it one hundred times.’ (Again note the trope of plurality as 
status.) The smile returns and he claps his hands twice. The principal raises his hands in a 
vaNakkam gesture. When leaving, his sister asks what he said to the principal to change 
his mind. He laughs and says, ‘the truth’! That is, that he is a status-ful individual; that all 
his humbleness is a veneer of this real style-ish self, Baadshaa.  
So far Rajini’s status as super-hero has been revealed slowly and sporadically, as has 
his style as index of that status. It’s explicitly revealed by way of the final status-lowering 
event of the film: his ruthless beating and the subsequent abduction of his sister. In an 
encounter with a local rowdy, Manikkam tries to defuse a showdown between his brother 
and the rowdy. Rather than let his brother suffer at the hands of the rowdy, Manikkam 
allows himself to be taken for punishment. His fellow auto-drivers try to stop him. He 
style-ishly points his finger in the air with a swoosh sound to silence them. In this scene, 
tied to a lamp post, he takes a vicious beating.10 The mood is dramatic, intense. With 
every blow he takes, there is a cut to lightning striking and shots of his smiling face. A 
mini-song praises his patience and tolerance, comparing him to Jesus, but indicating at 
core he is the super-hero we know him to be: ‘Look at his innocent face, his calm face, 
 
10 The students with whom I watched said that when they saw this scene as children they would cry on 
seeing Rajini receive such a thrashing. 
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his infant smile while bleeding, his patience like Lord Jesus as he is beat. He is a candle 
giving light while his body burns. What sinner switched his horoscope, who put a wet 
cloth on this volcano?’ (my emphasis) As they take him down from the lamppost, 
Manikkam simply walks away. His brother angered, he reports the rowdy to the police. In 
retaliation the rowdy abducts their sister and brings her back bloodied (and possibly raped 
as well). On seeing this challenge to his status, Manikkam becomes Baadshaa, the super-
hero.  
The next scene is a fight scene. There are close ups of Manikkam/Baadshaa’s eyes 
staring in anger. Cut to a shot of his hand closing into a fist. A henchman of the rowdy 
charges him. He unleashes a single punch which sends the henchman flying all the way 
across the road, hitting a lamp post. Cut to shots of the shocked onlookers. Slow motion 
shot of Manikkam/Baadshaa looking up with a scowl, his head tilted down, eyes looking 
forward. He pushes back the unbuttoned shirt that is on top of his tee-shirt, putting his 
hands on his hips (accompanied by a swoosh sound). Edited together by jump cuts, there 
are increasingly closer shots of his face in anger, looking up and scowling. His theme 
music/chant “Baadshaa! Baadshaa!” kicks in, along with the flute motif from the Western 
film The Good, the Bad and the Ugly. He single handedly beats all the henchman. In the 
middle of the fight, he tells his brother to go inside. His brother, shocked, doesn’t move. 
In an uncharacteristic (as far as his brother is concerned) display of authority and power, 
he turns around and repeats it yelling with intensity and deliberation: uLLe poo! ‘Go 
inside! (-hon.).’ He then rips out a water pump out of the ground with his bare hands. 
Turning in slow motion, his hair flying back and the water behind him spouting up in the 
air, in a single spectacular blow he knocks down all the henchmen who are surrounding 
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him. He then throws the pump across the battlefield to knock the main rowdy’s gun out of 
his hand.  
Finally, he ties the head rowdy to the lamppost. The light of the post is flickering on 
and off as he beats the rowdy with the same wood log that he was beaten with. All you 
can hear are the blows and the wind howling. As more reinforcements of the rowdy 
come, it’s revealed that Manikkam/Baadshaa’s neighborhood friends and fellow auto-
drivers are members of Baadshaa’s old Mumbai gang. They intercept and beat the 
reinforcements. The fight is over. Manikkam/Baadshaa is victorious. Cut to a shot of 
Baadshaa with his hair flowing behind him, blown by the wind. Baadshaa’s men come up 
to him one by one, kneel, kiss his hand in obeisance, and walk behind him. He is the don 
(‘head gangster’) and they are his henchmen.  
The scene finishes with the film’s signature punch dialogue. His voice has a heavy 
reverb effect, the pitch of his voice is low. He warns the rowdy: “innoru thadave intha 
pakkam naan unne paaththaa, paaththa idathileyee kuzhi thoNdi puthaichchuduveen” ‘If 
I see you around here another time, I’ll bury you right there and then.’ He throws the log 
into the air and it knocks out the light. All goes to black. Cut and fade in to Baadshaa 
standing before the camera, lit from behind, glowing. His hand style-ishly twirls and flips 
around until his index finger is pointing up. His voice reverberates with a heavy echo 
effect: “oru thadave sonnaa nuuRu thadave sonna maathiri” ‘If I say it once, it’s as if I 
said it a hundred times.’ We hear the lightning crack, and in slow motion he puts his 
hands on his hips flinging back his unbuttoned shirt along with a swoosh sound effect. 
Baadshaa is fully revealed: style has gone public.  
His brother confronts him: ‘Who are you? What happened in Bombay?’ Interval. 
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3.4.7 From style to periya aaL 
In the first half of the film Rajini’s style/status has been covered, revealed, confirmed, 
and proven. The second half of the film goes into his backstory to explain how the 
ordinary youth Manik became the terrifying gangster Baadshaa, and then how Baadshaa 
became Manikkam the auto-driver. In doing so we are introduced to the principal villain, 
the (almost) equally style-ish Marc Anthony.11 The rest of the story revolves around their 
conflict, and how Baadshaa becomes the periya aaL to the subordinated villain. Here 
style becomes the symbolic battlefield for the status negotiation between the hero and the 
villain.  
The flashback begins with Baadshaa’s chant accompanied by his walking down a 
hallway, then down the stairs of a huge mansion (in multiple shots). He is in a style-ish 
suit (no tie); his blazer is a colorful blend of fabrics with the sleeves rolled up; he is 
wearing sunglasses that have no arms; and he is sporting a beard.12 Walking behind him 
are his men. For the students this moment, his revelation as Baadshaa, is the 
consummation of his style. This scene provoked the loudest reaction among the students. 
They yelled, stood up, clapped, and turned the volume of the TV to the maximum, the 
praising music blaring distortedly through the speakers:  
 
eey! Baadshaa paaru Baadshaa paaru! Eey! Look at Baadshaa! Look at Baadshaa! 
paddaaLathu nadaiya paaru!  Look at the gait of the army man!  
pagai nadungkum padayai paaru!  Look at the army that makes the enemy 
 
11 Marc Anthony is played by Raghuvaran, one of the recurrent villain’s in Rajini’s films. 
12 Here the beard has multiple indexicalities: one, as a diacritic of difference with respect to Manikkam; 
two, as an index of him being a rowdy; three, as an index of style; four, as am ambiguous marker of 
community affiliation. (This is because the beard is associated with Islam, and as we see below, it is the 
murder of his Muslim friend Anwar which transforms the simple Manik to Baadshaa.)  
 165
                                                
tremble!  
coat-u suit-u reNdum eduththu pooddu 
nadakkum puliya paaru!  
Look at the tiger walking who has put on 
both coat and suit!  
paRReriyum neruppu poola sudderikkum 
vizhiya paaru! 
Look at the eyes that scorch like a fire that 
burns with heavy flames!  
raththam veervai reNdum koNda 
raajaangkaLin mannan thaanadaa!  
He’s the emperor among kings, made up of 
sweat and blood!  
ivan peerukuLLe kaantham uNdu uNmai 
thaanadaa! 
 
It’s true, there is a magent in his name!13 
The backstory of Baadshaa revolves around a tale of revenge and lost innocence in 
Bombay. As young men, Manik and his childhood friend Anwar are the only ones who 
stand up to the villain Marc Anthony when he attempts to illegally evacuate their slum. 
The death of these young men is called for, but because Manik’s father works for 
Anthony, Manik’s life is spared. Anwar, however, isn’t. Anwar’s death radicalizes 
Manik, and he becomes a rowdy (Manik Baadshaa) to destroy rowdyism (Anthony).  
A montage of explosions and news articles inform us that Baadshaa has become a big 
rowdy criminal, only rivaled by Marc Anthony, the target of his revenge and a rival 
emblem of style and status. The rest of the flashback centers on the rivalry between 
Baadshaa and Anthony which culminates in Anthony’s imprisonment, Baadshaa’s 
father’s death, and Baadshaa’s promise to give up the life of crime and become 
Manikkam. This takes place through a series of confrontations where the relative status of 
the two rowdies, Baadshaa and Anthony, are negotiated. The negotiation proceeds 
through two intertwined idioms: one is style, or the symbolic diagramming of relative 
status; the other is through physical fights and the literal determination of status. 
 
13 One of the common refrain’s about Rajinikanth among his fans is that he is a ‘magnet’ (kaantham), a 
(super)natural attractive force. This is also a trope on the ending of his name -kanth. 
 3.4.8 Building up the periya aaL: Speaking and style 
Anthony receives news that Baadshaa was able to foil his plan to bomb a religious 
function. After shooting the messenger of the “bad news,” as Anthony puts it in his style-
ish low drawl, he gets a phone call. He answers, slowly, deliberately, with style: 
“Anthony, Marc Anthony. <pause> solReen. Hmmm. Good news” (‘Antony, Marc 
Anthony. <pause> I’ll let you know. Hmmm. Good news’). Baadshaa has called to set up 
a meet. The next scene’s showdown gives a first approximation of the battle of status 
between these two powerhouses (photo 4.3): 
 
 
Photo 4.3 Baadshaa and Marc Anthony showdown 
 
Anthony: enna Manik? nalla irukkeyaa? 
 
Baadshaa: Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa. 
A: Ah, yes, Manik Baadshaa. enna 
vishayam thambi? enkidde ethoo peesaNum 
NNu sonneyaame. ethoo uthavi theevaiyaa? 
sollu. enna veeNaalum seyveen. nee engka 
 
Anthony: What Manik? Are you (-hon. 
throughout) doing well?  
Baadshaa: Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa. 
A: Ah, yes. Manik Baadshaa. What is the 
problem little brother? They said you 
wanted to speak to me about something. 
Do you need some help? Tell me. 
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Raangkasaami puLLe, ache. sollu. 
 
B: Che, eh, eh, eh. ithu paaru. enakkum 
unakkum thaan saNdai. intha 
Baadshavukkum Anthonykkum saNdai. nee 
saagaNum. ille naan saagaNum. unooda 
aLungka saagaNum. ille enooda aLungka 
saagaNum. pothu makkaL ille. appaavi 
makkaL ille. ippa therinjchu poochchu. nee 
oru koozhe. oru koozhe saNdai 
pooduRathu. ithe pudikkaathu. intha 
Baadshaa, intha Manik Baadshaa 
pudikkaathu. mudichchiduReen. 
mudichchiduReen.  
 
ini, ini eezhu naaLukkuLLe un kathai 
muduchchidureen. 
Raangasaami: Hey! yaarkidde peesuRe 
NNu unakku theriyumaa? 
B: theriyum paa. oru ayoogiyakkidde 
peesuReen.  
R: Eey!  
 
A: Ah, ah ah ah. chinna puLLe. aamaa 
Manik Baadshaa, nee thozhilukku puthusu. 
kuzhanthe. enna sonne? eezhu naaLle enne 
mudikkiReyaa? unne eezhu secondkkuLLe 
naan mudikkiReen.  
 
illaiya? konjcham paaru.  
Whatever you want I’ll do. You are our 
Raangasaami’s son (after all). Tell me.  
B: Che, eh, eh, eh. Look here (-hon. 
throughout). The fight is between you and 
me. A fight between this Baadshaa and 
Anthony. You have to die or I have to die. 
Your men have die or my my men have to 
die. But not common people. Not innocent 
people. Now I finally know. You are a 
coward, fighting a coward’s battle. I don’t 
like this. This Baadhsa, this Manik 
Baadshaa doesn’t like it. I’ll finish you. 
Finish you.  
 
<B. snaps.> 
I’ll finish you in seven days from now. 
 
Raangasaami: Hey! Do you know who 
you’re talking to? 
B: I know, father. I’m talking to a fraud. 
 
R: Eey!  
<A. gestures for R. to cool down.> 
A: Ah, ah ah ah. Small boy. That’s right 
Manik Baadshaa, you’re new to the field 
(of crime). A child. What do you say? In 
seven days you’ll finish me? In seven 
seconds I’ll finish you.  
<takes off his sunglasses>  
No? Take a look.  
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B: angkee konjcham paaru kaNNaa.  
 
Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa.  
 
 
Eh hey hey. onnu solReen. nalla 
therinjchukoo. nallavan aaNdavan 
soothippaan. kai udamaaddaan. 
keddavanukku niraiya koduppaan. aanaa 
kai vidduduvaan. Ah!  
 
<Glances to his right at some sharpshooters 
with Baadshaa in their sites. Baadshaa 
removes his sunglasses. He looks to his 
right.> 
B: Look over there dear.  
<laughs>  
Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa.  
<Begins to leave. Turns back around 
suddenly.>  
Eh hey hey. I’ll tell you one thing. Learn it 
well. God tests good people. But he won’t 
abandon them. He gives a lot to bad 
people. But he’ll abandon them. Ah!  
<Puts on his sunglasses and walks off; 
music kicks in. Cut to scenes of him in his 
luxurious car alone, sitting with his legs 
crossed.14> 
 
This last dialogue is given by Baadshaa with Rajini’s characteristic rhetorical flourish, 
the rhyme scheme (underlined in the Tamil above) embellished through his delivery and 
punctuated by his behavioral style, putting on his sunglasses, pointing his finger, and 
getting the last word and walking off to music.  
In this dialogue both Baadshaa and Anthony vie to determine who is the periya aaL 
through their use of address and reference terms: Anthony diminutizes Baadshaa and 
treats him as a chinna paiyan; Baadshaa instead status-raises through third-person 
reference—DEMONSTRATIVE + PROPER NAME (this is a common strategy in Rajini 
                                                 
14 Note that sitting with one’s legs crossed in repose in a trope of status in Tamil Nadu.  
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films15)—and aggressive tropes of intimacy (e.g., “kaNNaa” ‘dear’). They also vie in 
their oratory (mostly cool, though Baadshaa flares at the right times to reveal his superior 
status) through tropes of intimidation and philosophical position statements. In these, 
Baadshaa is more coherent and, ultimately, successful.  
Their fashion also diagrams this as a battle of style. Both come with their fashionable 
haircuts (Baadshaa with his slight shag; Anthony with his rowdy-ish funk [‘mullet’]), 
their sunglasses (both use the sunglasses to punctuate their status moves by taking them 
off and putting them on at key moments), and their clothes (Anthony is in a swank 
business suit, Baadshaa in a blue velour track suit). 
After a similar second encounter the film then moves through a series of montages 
(accompanied by Baadshaa’s theme song) of Baadshaa as the periya aaL of the Bombay 
underworld. All other gangsters come to kneel at his feet and kiss his hand while he sits 
in his throne with a huge dog at his side. (This image is one of the more memorable and 
circulated images from the film.) He is shown beating people, surrounded by money, 
screaming orders on the phone, and handing out money to married couples (i.e., 
redistributive wealth cum social service cum patronage).  
The next episode that demonstrates Baadshaa’s dominance and style is the trap set by 
Kesavan (the father of Priya, the heroine, and a minion of Anthony) at Baadshaa’s 
birthday party. Again, Baadshaa is style embodied. At the party he enters at the top of the 
staircase with the crowd below him. He is in a white suit with a red cumberbum, 
matching scarf, and his armless sunglasses. He pushes back his jacket and puts his hands 
 
15 Cf. Pandian (1992) where Rajini’s punch dialogue is as follows: "intha paaNdiyan, eppoovum, 
engkeeyum, ethilum right” ‘This Pandian is always right everywhere in all things’ (with hand pointing 
toward his chest/the check on his shirt). 
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in his pockets. He walks down the stairs as flowers are thrown on him, greeted by a giant 
group of singers and dancers. He takes over the drum beat and starts into a faster song 
(“Raa Raa Ramayah”), playing various instruments and dancing. The song is an outline 
of what youth life is about and, of course, about praising Baadshaa as status-ful: ‘just as 
there is only one moon for the night, and one sun for the day, there is only one Baadshaa 
for the world.’ His henchmen are shown stopping someone from taking his photo (as a 
diagram of his importance: he is an object of visual desire, and thus he has to police his 
own image).  
At the end of the song Baadshaa goes back up the stairs to sit in his throne above all. 
At that point Kesavan springs his trap and gunfire opens on Baadshaa. It seems that 
Baadshaa is shot, but no sooner than we fear his death does the chair spin around 180 
degrees, revealing that it was not Baadshaa sitting in the chair at all but a dummy (how 
did he make the switch?!). He is alive and well sitting in an identical chair on the 
opposite side. He then deliberately crosses his legs, a repeated gesture of status in Tamil 
films. This shot is repeated three times in rapid succession, a trope of status and itself a 
cinematic style. Baadshaa opens fire and kills all the bad guys with the exception of 
Kesavan. To the begging Kesavan who has fallen at his feet, he points his finger (with a 
swoosh sound effect):  
 
Baadshaa: eppa nee enakku jalra adikka 
arambichcheyoo, appavee 
purinjchupoochchu daa nee muthale kuththa 
pooRe NNu. intha Baadshaa adi paadi 
eppoovaavathu paaththirikkeyaa daa? 
appavee purinjchukka veeNdaam un 
Baadshaa: When you (-hon. throughout) 
started to kiss my ass (lit. hitting the 
“jalra” drum) I first realized that you were 
going to backstab me. Have you ever seen 
this Baadshaa playing and singing? You 
didn’t need to know that I knew your plan 
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thiddam therinjchupoochchu NNu.  
 
poo. Anthonykidde ethaavathu neermaiye 
iru.  
 
Keesavan: Sir, enne, enne onnum 
senjchirukkamaaddiingka, le? 
B: poo!  
K: saththiyaamaa . . .  
 
 
B: intha Baadshaa oru thadave sonnaa 
nuuRu thadave sonna maathiri.  
K: theriyum sir. theriyum. sariingka sir. 
Sariingka.  
then.  
<B.’s left hand flashes up and rotates.> 
Get out of here. At least be true to 
Anthony.  
<Keesavan with folded hands> 
Keesavan: Sir, so you won’t do anything 
to me, will you (+ hon.)? 
B: Get out! 
K: I promise . . .  
<B.’s right hand flips up with a swoosh, 
index finger pointing up, interrupting K.> 
B: If this Baadshaa says it once, it’s as if 
he says it a hundred times. 
K: I know sir. I know. Okay (+hon.) sir. 
Ok (+ hon.). 
 
Rajini’s style is performed not only through high-status fancy clothing, his punch 
dialogue with its related body language (the pointing index finger, crossing legs, sitting 
in his throne above all others), and his differentiation from other characters (dress wise, 
placement in the screen, editing tropes of status), but also through his reality-defying 
acts: how can he switch bodies without anyone seeing, only to spin around when all the 
villains’ bullets are spent, not mention his amazing accuracy with a gun? His style is also 
indexed in his access to speech. In contrast to the dialogues with Anthony which are 
relatively equal in turn-taking (though Baadshaa ultimately gets the last word), here we 
see Kesavan, a man of little status, silenced into simply begging for his life. 
 
3.4.9 Besting the villain, part I 
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The final push by Anthony takes place. He bombs everything Baadshaa owns. 
Baadshaa takes it all very coolly, playing the piano as his empire seems to be crumbling. 
Cut to Baadhsaa calling Anthony. Anthony answers with his characteristic style: 
“Anthony” <in low drawl>. Baadshaa simply says, with equal style, “Baadshaa.” 
Baadshaa reveals that he gathered evidence against Anthony for the bombings. Anthony 
breaks from his cool register of style and screams “Baadshaa!” Baadshaa begins to laugh 
and says in his characteristic quickfire delivery “Yeah, yeah, yeah.” (Note here how 
linguistic style and Anthony’s loss of cool, as a kind of register break, diagrams 
Baadshaa’s superior status and victory.) He then flips his jacket backwards with a 
flourish, puts his hands on his hips, first on the left, then the right in a slow motion frontal 
shot accompanied by a swoosh sound effect: “Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa.” His name 
rings with a heavy echo effect. He continues: 
 
enna sonne? kuuddam seeththu ellam 
jeeykkamudiyaathu NNu sonne, le? uNmai 
thaan.  
 
 
aanaa enkidda irukkiRa kuuddam naan 
seeththa kuuddam ille. anbaale seeththa 
kuuddam. entha thani saamraajiyam. 
anbaa saamraajiyam. yaaraalee 
azhikkamudiyaathu.  
 
What did you (-hon. throughout) say? You 
said that I couldn’t gather a group and win 
everything, right? It’s true.  
<He walks forward, his steps echoing. He 
takes off his sunglasses; full frontal view> 
But the group that surrounds me isn’t a 
group I gathered. It’s a group that joined 
together (on their own) because of love. A 
unique/separate empire. An empire of love. 
No one can destroy it.  
<He puts his sunglasses back on and 
laughs.> 
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Cut to the police deciding to arrest Anthony. Cut to a later conversation between 
Baadshaa and Anthony. Baadshaa is talking into a clear-plastic futurist looking speaker 
phone (something unique at the time). Anthony, on the other hand, has his own style-ish 
cordless phone. ‘This is the greatest day in Manik Baadshaa’s life,’ Baadshaa declares. 
Anthony laughs, conceding that he indeed is a periya aaL, but also revealing that he still 
has a trick up his sleeve: ‘You made a mistake in leaving your father with me.’ When 
Baadshaa rushes to the house to save his father, his father gets between him and the bullet 
meant for Baadshaa. His father dies to save him. Cut to a shot of Baadshaa.  His glasses 
fly off as he turns his head in slow motion, his hair flying across his face. He literally 
dodges the bullets fired at him, climbs the wall in an impossibly fast movement and beats 
Anthony. Anthony is saved at Baadshaa’s father’s request, but arrested by the police. The 
flashback ends. 
 
3.4.10 Besting the villain, part II 
Flashing forward to the original timeline, Kesavan learns that Baadshaa is still alive 
when Baadshaa comes to save Priya from her arranged marriage. Baadshaa takes Priya 
away as his own. The next song has Rajini in getups from all kinds of status-ful 
masculinities including a sheik, a king, and a rowdy. He co-opts every form of masculine 
status, putting his stamp of style on it, recombining it in a bizarre pastiche celebrating his 
attainment of the heroine.  
Learning that Baadshaa is still alive, Anthony escapes to exact his revenge on 
Baadshaa. He kidnaps the female members of his family. Baadshaa infiltrates Anthony’s 
camp and starts killing his henchmen one by one, each in an amazing display of valor and 
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power. When Baadshaa finally makes it to Anthony’s room, Anthony claps in mock 
applause. He circles around Baadshaa and greets him: “asalam alakkam.” Anthony tries 
to blow the bombs that he has rigged, but none go off. Baadshaa’s men have disabled 
them. Baadshaa leans in and says ‘I got rid of all the bombs’ <smiling>, “valaikkum 
salam!” Unfortunately, Anthony has a backup: he has the family tied up with bombs 
ready to go off. With the remote control (and the upper hand) Anthony begins to beat 
Baadshaa. They exchange blows. Unable to set of the bomb, Anthony lights the floor on 
fire to burn Baadshaa’s family and makes an escape. Baadshaa rolls over the flames with 
his body to put them out. Freeing his family he chases after Anthony by jumping down 
two stories. He then hits Anthony’s moving car with a log which causes it to wreck and 
explode! Anthony is cornered by the auto-drivers on one side, the community on the 
other, and Baadshaa emerging from the flames of the car. He begins to walk toward the 
camera in a frontal shot, his head tilted slightly down with his eyes looking up/straight 
ahead (i.e., his style walk). As he walks through the flames the camera cuts between 
Manikkam the auto-driver and Baadshaa the don (i.e., as Anthony remembers him).  
Anthony does a double take and wipes his eyes. Baadshaa/Manikkam’s 
demonstration of physical dominance and style have literally superimposed the images 
and sutured the two identities. Both time and perception have been reversed through the 
status-ful actions of Baadshaa/Manikkam. The theme music with its “Baadshaa 
Baadshaa” chant begins as he walks toward Anthony. When he gets there The Good, Bad, 
and the Ugly flute motif punctuates his arrival. Cut to a close up shot of Baadshaa’s face, 
looking up with one lip cocked, head slight turned down. Flashback to Anwar getting 
stabbed (past), cut to Baadshaa punching Anthony (present). Cut to Anthony shooting his 
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father (past), cut to Baadshaa hitting Anthony (present). This second hit is doubled: one 
hit as auto-driver Manikkam, one as the don of Bombay Baadshaa, a tropic fusing of 
identity and statuses. Repeat. Finally Baadshaa picks Anthony up over his shoulder and 
walks while the crowd cheers him on to dump him into the flames of the car, his own 
funeral pyre. The inspector comes on the scene (too late of course to actually enforce the 
law) and tries to stop Baadshaa from exacting his own alternative justice based on his 
own norms of authority. He appeals to him as Manikkam, the auto-driver, the man of 
compassion and ‘society.’ Manikkam lets Anthony fall onto the ground and walks away. 
However, Anthony has grabbed the gun from the cop and pulls it out. Before Anthony 
can shoot he gets shot in the head by Manikkam’s younger police officer brother. Family, 
Priya, and Manikkam are reunited and the song that begins the film (“Autokkaaran”) 
finishes it. Baadshaa has again become the ordinary style-less Manikkam. 
 
3.5. Summary of analysis of style 
Above I have told the story of Baadshaa (1995) as the story of status. In particular, as 
the narrativization of how style as iconic index of status is acquired, hidden, negated, 
inverted, deployed, revealed, and (of particular interest to fans) developed and changed in 
comparison to other films. I have shown that style, in addition to punctuating all moments 
of the hero-oriented film, is the agent moving it forward: who has style, who is licensed 
to use it, and whose style wins out (hero’s or villain’s)? In the following sections, I 
synthesize and abstract the elements of style that characterize the hero-star.  
 
3.5.1 Individuation of the hero-star: Style and visuality 
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The emblematization of style in the image of Rajinikanth is all about visuality and 
standing out. The hero-centric text is thusly constructed. Rajini is always differentiated 
and foregrounded from his surroundings. In the opening song of Annamalai (1992), while 
Rajini plays a simple milkman, he is always presented as different from his peers. While 
all other milkmen are in clothes colored by powder from the celebration of maaddu 
pongaL (a harvest holiday celebrating cows), he is sparkling white. He is the only one 
with brand new, white Diadora branded sneakers (itself totally anomalous with his image 
as a milkman).16 In Padaiyappa (1999), during a festival the village youth are dressed in 
red pants and yellow shirts and the elders in white shirts and veeshdis. Only Rajini is 
dressed in modern costume (pants, button-down shirt unbuttoned, tee-shirt underneath, 
shoes). In general, throughout Rajinikanth’s films, the hero-star’s clothing tends to be 
shiny, colorful, and fashionable (see more below), foregrounding him against the 
background of other more drab and less status-ful characters.  
The hero takes up most of the objective time on the screen. He is in the most number 
of scenes. The hero also takes up most of the objective space of the screen. The shot 
structure of such films continually individuates and foregrounds the hero: hence the 
ubiquity of fully frontal shots; closeups of the face and the eyes; and well lit shots where 
the hero is centrally positioned in sharp focus.  
More than this the camera is itself used style-ishly to meta-communicate the hero’s 
style. Hence the visual tropes that status-raise the hero: for example, shooting the same 
image multiple times and using jump cuts to move between them; the trick shot of 
multiplying the image of the hero-star on the screen; rewinding an action and playing it 
 
16 To query this inconsistency with viewers is to elicit the self-evident response: ‘it’s his style.’ 
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again (e.g., in Vijay’s Pookkiri [2006]). Such tropes of multiplicity function like 
linguistic tropes of plurality for honorification through a visual medium. It’s as if Rajini 
is more than a single man, it’s as if his style-ish actions exceed their own diegetic status 
as singular events. If he does it once, their impact is as if, as Rajini puts it in Baadshaa 
(1995), “nuuRu thadave maathiri” ‘he has done it a hundred times.’17  
 
3.5.2 Style as set of idiosyncratic mannerisms 
Rajini’s style is most usually emblematized for viewers in the aspects of the film text 
which are most visually salient, most localizable, most repeated, most differentiated from 
their surrounding co-text, and most recontextualizable (across and outside of films). 
These are also the aspects that are most transparently presented to viewers’ awareness as 
style. Most notable are Rajini’s unique mannerisms and punch dialogues. The two 
reinforce each other, as well, because they are often part of the same performance. In 
general, his punch dialogues and his signature mannerisms function in the narrative to 
punctuate his attempts and successes at status-raising. And since this happens repeatedly 
throughout the narrative (as the narrative is about such status-raising), this kind of style is 
the most transparent qua style.  
As we saw in Baadshaa (1995) he twirls and contorts his fingers in elaborate pointing 
gestures before delivering punch dialogues (‘If this Baadshaa says it once, it’s as if he 
said it a hundred times!’). Similarly, in Baadshaa (1995), Annamalai (1992), Padaiyappa 
(1999), and Sivaji (2007) he flips back his shirt while putting his hands on his hips during 
moments of status-assertion. The signature move of Padaiyappa (1999) is the physically 
 
17 We can also note the use of echo and reverb effects to similarly tropically augment the status-ful-ness of 
his voice and words. 
 178
                                                
impossible twirling of a cigar around his finger and then throwing it into his mouth from 
his hip. This goes along with his low voiced, reverbed out punch dialogue ‘my way is a 
unique way’ (“en vazhi thani vazhi”). With the last line of the dialogue he snaps his 
fingers to produce a flame for his cigar, one of his signature styles. (He does a similar 
style in Annamalai [1992].)  
As of late, as cigarette smoking in films has come under fire from the government, 
Rajini’s style in more recent films like Sivaji (2007) has replaced cigar(rette)s with 
chewing gum. Thus, instead of flipping a cigar(rette) into his mouth and smoking, in 
Sivaji he throws a piece of gum from one hand, bounces it off of his palm (and later in the 
film off of the villain’s forehead) into his mouth. He punctuates this with his style-ish 
dialogues: “cool” or “summa athirthu, le?” (‘it makes you tremble, doesn’t it?’).18  
Another signature style is how Rajini puts on his sunglasses. While in older films he 
did so by rotating and flipping the glasses around his hands while putting them on, in 
Sivaji, in his incarnation as MGR the glasses are flipped around to the back of his head 
without the use of his hands! 
As we have had occasion to note, such various styles are also accompanied by other 
repeated moves: the head tilt (head tilted down, eyes looking slightly up with a smirk on 
his face, photo 4.2), the brushing of his hair, and the crossing of his legs. All such style-
ish mannerisms inevitably are accompanied with other meta-signs of difference: 
 
18 In other (comedy) scenes, this style is troped upon by using notionally hot things instead of gum: in one 
scene he throws chilies into his mouth, in another he flips a firecracker in his mouth and lights it, 
punctuating it with one of his older style-ish dialogue—“ithu eppadi irukku?” (‘How is it?’)—from the 
1977 breakout film PathinaaRu Vayathilee. Other styles from Sivaji (2007) include: flipping a coin (and 
later car keys) from one hand to another (his hands are stretched at full length across his body), then back to 
the original hand, and then flicking it up into the air, catching it in his pocket; later as M. G. Ravichandiran 
his style is to tap his bald head with all his fingers (as if playing a miridangam drum). 
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fashionable clothes, shots of onlooker’s amazement, the swoosh sound effect (connoting 
the rapidity of his motion), as well as punch dialogues (see below). 
In all such cases, such actions are style because: (a) they draw attention to themselves 
as actions that exceed their functionality (one can simply put one’s sunglasses on, or put 
gum in one’s mouth); and (b) they are presumably difficult to do, if not impossible 
without the aid of camera tricks. In this sense through the performance of some skill they 
both draw attention to themselves and the user as “different” and thus status-raising.  
 
3.5.3 Style and dialogue 
Rajini’s dialogues, as we have seen, are delivered in a way that marks them off from 
everyday speech. They are poetic (rhyme, alliteration, meter); they are monologic; they 
are delivered with either blazing speed or very deliberately; they are often heavily 
affected with echo or reverb; they are delivered in a lower pitch than his normal speaking 
voice (especially when the delivery is deliberate); they are framed by style-ish 
mannerisms (as discussed above).  
Take, for example, the following example from Padaiyappa (1999). On the left-hand 
column I have put the dialogue (with gloss below it) and in the right-hand column the use 
of kinesics and sound effects. Note the syllabic parallelism and its iconicity with the 
paralinguistic use of his fingers. 
 
“en vazhi  
(‘My way . . . ) 
<swoosh sound effect as he moves his left hand 
across his body from right hip to left; thumb 
and middle finger touching, his index finger 
pointing up> 
thani vazhi  <With the words “thani–vazhi” his index 
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(. . . is a unique way. . . . ) finger/hand moves up–down.> 
thadukkaathee/ kuRukkidaathee/ 
siiNdaathee / Better don’t come in my 
way.”  
(. . . ‘don’t try to interfere/cross it.’) 
<While saying the last phrase his index 
finger/hand moves from left to right.> 
 
In terms of their denotational content, such dialogues status-raise Rajini by projecting 
him as more than a normal man. They also often encapsulate his philosophy, figuring him 
as a kind of leader, politically and spiritually. Take, for example, another variant of the 
punch dialogue from Padaiyappa (1999): 
 
arasan anRu kolluvaan. theevam inRu 
kollum. athu antha kaalam. arasan inRu 
kolluvaan. theevam anRee kollum. athu 
intha kaalam. intha jenmaththil senjcha 
paavam intha jenmaththile 
anupavikkaNum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
niingka anupavippiingka. naan 
yaareyum kuRukkidamaaddeen. en vazhi 
yaaravathu kuRukkiddaa . . .  
 
 
 
 
The king kills on that day (then), while God 
kills on this day (today). That was at that 
time. The king kills on this day (today) while 
God kills on that day (then). That is this time. 
(Today) we experience the sins of this 
lifetime in our lifetime.  
<Up to now his hands are only punctuating 
the deictics (‘that/this day’). He is looking at 
the villain, head tilted, eyes looking straight 
ahead/up. After the last word of the line his 
index finger pops up to point at the face of the 
villain with a swoosh sound.>  
You will experience (your sins). I don’t cross 
anyone. If anyone crosses my path . . .  
 
<He then raises his hand and spinning on his 
finger is a cigarette, accompanied by a fast, 
twirling sound effect. He then throws the 
cigarette into his mouth, lighting a match off 
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purinjchathu, le?  
 
 
 
en vazhi thani vazhi. 
maRakkaathiingka !  
 
of the villain’s shoulder.>  
You understand, right? 
<He starts to walk away, and then turns back 
accompanied by a swoosh sound effect. Cut 
to a low angle shot looking up at him>  
My way is a unique way. Don’t forget it! 
<His voice is low, reverb and chorus effected. 
Wide shot of him walking away twirling a 
chain, accompanied by the swooshing sound 
of the chain. As he gets near the camera he 
wraps the chain around his waist and walks 
off camera.> 
 
Through his cosmological philosophy of sin he here locates the wrongdoers and by 
implication figures himself as just. He then threatens anyone who gets in his ‘way’ 
(vazhi). Vazhi (‘path,’ ‘way’) here stands in as his statement of difference: he walks a 
unique path; he is outside of convention, normalcy, the ordinary, and authority as he is, in 
fact, his own authority.  
Consider another example from the film Annamalai (1992). In this scene Rajini 
(whose character’s name is Annamalai) has goaded the villain—a rich man corrupted by 
greed—into spending an exorbitant amount of money at an auction. Annamalai has done 
this in order to bankrupt him, to turn his own avarice against him.  
 
 
muuNu koodi mathippu soththu panneNdu 
koodi koduththu vaangkina buththisaali 
paaththirukkeyaa nee? naan innikki thaan 
<with a normal, conversational pace> 
Have you ever seen a smart person spend 
twelve crores19 for property only worth 
three crores? Today I saw just that. They 
 
19 The Indian counting system proceeds from thousands to lakhs (100,000) to crores (10,000,000). 
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paaththeen. ethoo peesa kaNakku kaNakku 
NNu peesuraangka. intha Annamalai 
kaNakku konjcham keedkaddum:  
 
 
ambillai pooduthu inRu kaNakku,  
pomble pooduthu naaLaiya kaNakku.  
paiyanunga pooduthu mana kaNakku, 
poNNunga pooduthu thirumaNa kaNakku.  
ezhai pooduthu naaLai kaNakku,  
paNakkaaran pooduthu paNa kaNakku.  
arasiyalvaathi pooduthu ooddu kaNakku,  
janangka pooduthu nambikkai kaNakku.  
manushan poodda thappu kaNakku,  
aaNdavan pooduthu paava kaNakku.  
intha Annamalai pooduthu eppoomee  
   niyaayamaana kaNakku.  
 
kuudi kalichchu kaNakku sariyaa irukkum. 
enkidde kaNakku peesuRaangka?!  
 
[the villain and his son] are always talking 
about some calculation or another. Let’s 
hear the accounting/calculations of this 
Annamalai: 
<with a brisk metered delivery> 
Men put the calculations of today, 
Women put the calculations of tomorrow. 
Boys put the calculations of the heart, 
Girls put the calculations of marriage. 
The poor put the calculations of tomorrow, 
The rich put the calculations of money.  
The politicians put the calculation of votes, 
The people put calculations of trust. 
Man puts the calculation of mistakes, 
God puts the calculations of sins. 
This Annamalai always puts the calculation   
   of justice.  
<From here on his speech is super fast>  
Add it, subtract it, the calculation will come 
correctly. What are they talking to me about 
calculations?! 
 
In this dialogue Annamalai co-opts the villain’s own oft-repeated style-ish dialogue 
(“kuudi kalichchu kaNakku sariyaa irukkum”). He elaborates and improves it, making it 
more poetic than the villain ever did (note the phonological, semantic, and grammatic 
parallelisms). But Annamalai also makes fun of the dialogue and by extension the villain 
as he demonstrates his mastery over the villain’s style by bending it to his own ideology 
of justice, framing it in a his reported speech construction ‘what are they talking to me 
about calculations?!’  
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Just like his mannerisms, then, Rajini’s dialogues both individuate and status-raise 
him. Moreover, they articulate Rajini’s extra-societal justice philosophy. Such dialogues 
articulate a discourse of exteriority—from the rich in Annamalai (1992), the political 
system in Padaiyappa (1999), and India itself in Sivaji (2007)—and figure Rajini as a 
man who is extra-ordinary, who stands apart from the crowd. He says in Sivaji (2007) to 
a group of rowdies who laugh at him for coming alone without any help: “kaNNaa, panni 
thaan kuuddamaa varum” ‘Dear, only pigs come in groups.’ Knocking them back with a 
single blow, the sound of a lion growling in the background reverberates as the theme 
music starts up. He style-ishly flips his collar back and finishes the dialogue with his 
index finger pointing up: “singkam single-aa varum!” (‘The lion comes alone!).  
 
3.5.4 Style and fights 
Such style in dialogues and mannerisms are often the prelude to fights where the 
symbolic diagramming of status as style is literalized in actual physical domination. Here 
style becomes geththu as the hero beats the rowdies to a pulp. In the filmic idiom, 
however, geththu and style are fused in heavily style-ized fight sequences, often in a kung 
fu idiom (and more recently, e.g. in Sivaji [2007], in the idiom of Hollwyood action films 
like the Matrix [1999] and video games like Mortal Kombat [1992]). Common tropes 
include the slowing down or speeding up of a blow and the use of fans to blow back the 
hair of the hero, the dust on the ground (the step of the hero makes the ground itself 
tremble), or ripple the skin of a foe who has been struck (a trope of strength).  
For example, in Padaiyappa (1999), after beating a number of rowdies, Rajini 
literally knocks one rowdy down by simply blowing in his face. In Sivaji (2007) he plays 
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the piano facing away from the keys as he beats off the rowdies with his legs. In a song 
qua sex qua fight scene in Sivaji he enters riding a motorcycle lying down with his feet 
on the handlebars and a hat over his face. The bike flies forward propelling him into the 
air. He hovers in the air in slow motion. Electricity buzzes and a lion’s roar echoes as he 
flies through the air demolishing legions of enemies. At one point in the fight he dodges a 
bullet, and then throws his gun so that it flies around a fountain (like a boomerang), 
shoots a villain in the face, and then returns to him. Later he literally stares down a bullet 
until it stops and drops into his drink.  
 
3.5.5 Style as the impossible, as the ridiculous 
One of the aspects of style is that it tends towardness excess. As we have seen, this is 
both true in its diagramming of social relations—to do style is to transgress ‘society’—
and in its diagramming of the hero’s relationship to physical laws of the universe—his 
style can bend the laws of reality as we know it. As such, style borders on the implausible 
and impossible. For example, in Sivaji (2007), Rajini’s first character Sivaji Arumugam 
actually cheats fate by being reincarnated as M. G. Ravichandiran, thus defying his 
astrology that if he marries the heroine he will die. This fulfills his own prophesizing, as 
he tells the heroine: ‘The love that I have for you is more powerful than any horoscope.’ 
And while ostensibly it’s the cliché of love that defies death, in fact it’s style, for he 
comes back not to love her (the love story is a mere tangent) but to vanquish the status-
ful villain through his reincarnation in an even more style-ish avatar. He is too status-ful 
to die. Note only would his fans not allow it, but neither would his own image (cf. 
Pandian 1992). 
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This aspect of style as defying of reality itself takes two tones in the hero-centered 
film, as it also does in youth peer groups: (1) as ridiculous, and thus as a form of ironic 
comedy; and (2) as serious: the hero really is that powerful. The two often blend: style is 
taken seriously and yet it’s also absurd. Indeed, Rajini’s whole image, as Rajanayakam 
(2002) has pointed out, is based on both style and comedy. I would alter this by saying 
style as appropriate status-raising and style as excessive/absurd status-raising (see section 
3.5.5 below).  
For example, in Sivaji (2007) there is a scene where Rajini’s character is rapidly 
signing two documents with two different hands at the same time, style-ishly flipping and 
twirling the pens backwards and forwards each time he finishes a set of documents. The 
scenes are both serious and comic, because such acts do perform style, but do so in a 
playful self-reflexively parodic way.20  
 
3.5.6 Style as fashion 
In addition to the signature styles of Rajinikanth, style also inheres in his 
appropriation of signs from alternative frameworks of value; in particular, those 
associated with social class (versus caste) and exteriority (versus the autochthonous). 
Below I discuss his use of status-ful commodities of exterior origin: fashion and English 
(section 3.5.7).  
Rajini’s dress ranges the gamut: from (simulacra of the) “traditional” to hyper-
modern. However, in all his hero-centric films, in moments where his status is in 
 
20 We can also mention more mundane discrepancies in Rajini’s films which abide by the same logic. For 
example, why is Annamalai, a simple milkman always wearing expensive branded sneakers with his 
otherwise rustic, traditional outfits? Because Rajini’s status is so high and established that such style qua 
deviation from norm is licensed: he can bend social convention to his own will, just as he can bend the laws 
of the universe. (See chapter 5 for more discussion.) 
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question, his dress is always style-ishly modern. Thus, in Baadshaa (1995), while as 
Manikkam he is dressed relatively ordinarily, as Baadshaa his fashion is hyper-style. In 
Annamalai (1992) he starts off as a relatively normal milkman, but ends up a successful 
business man who embodies a formal style (e.g., suits, tuxedoes). In Sivaji (2007), as 
MGR, the reincarnation of Sivaji, he is even more stylish with his large diamond earrings 
and leather jacket. In short, Rajini’s dress in his films diagrams the narrative as a tale of 
status: from the hiding of status to its revealing to its deployment in the aims of 
domination.  
The most stereotypical elements of Rajini’s style in fashion are: his sunglasses, his 
pierced ears, his wearing of a button-down shirt over a tee-shirt, his jeans or cargo pants, 
his sneakers, his long-ish hair feathered and hanging over his face, and his use of branded 
apparel in his dress (e.g., Diadora, Nike, Diesel, Puma). In addition to dress, in such 
status-elevated states Rajini is always surrounded by fashionable status symbols: cars, 
motorcycles, huge mansions. Here style is an appropriation of wealth by the sub-altern 
youth. He takes that which is reserved for the rich, for men of traditional status, and 
makes it his own via tropes of youth status.  
Rajinikanth’s own relationship to fashion and body modification qua style is 
diagrammed most clearly in the song “Style” from the recent film Sivaji (2007). Before 
the song, the heroine tells Sivaji (Rajini’s first incarnation) that she can’t marry him 
because of he is too dark for her. (It’s a false reason: she doesn’t want to marry him 
because the astrology predicts his death if they marry.) In response, Sivaji declares that 
he will become white for her. After a number of comical therapies to become white, he 
returns to her successfully. The first shot shows him pulling up in his Mercedes Benz. In 
a deferment of the moment of visual pleasure, we only see his white leg (revealed 
because of his style-ish three-fourth length cargo pants). He walks into her store and 
throws her a rose. We get our first look at this new, white Rajini. The song begins.  
Hero and heroine are dancing in front of Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim museum in 
Bilbao, Spain. In this song, Rajini comes, one by one, in eight different “getups” which 
span a range of hip fashion including a variety of wigs (blond, light brown, dark brown, 
but notably not black, the stereotyped hair color of Tamils), jeans, blazers and jackets, 
button-down shirts in bold colors, scarves, sunglasses, and leather shoes (photo 4.4).21 
The dancers and the heroine (played by Shreya) are in hip-hop inspired clothing.  
 
Photo 4.4 Seven of the eight Rajinikanths in “Style” (Sivaji: The Boss [2007]) 
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21 Below is a description of the various Rajini getups in this song sequence (though note that some of the 
items are swapped in and out across shots). In his first getup Rajini is in jeans, a black button-down shirt 
with white trim, a pink leather blazer, aviator sunglasses, and a blond wig with straight hair. The second 
getup has Rajini in black shoes, dark blue jeans, black tee-shirt with print design, a black blazer with red 
scarf, black sunglasses, and a brown straight-haired wig with blond streaks. The next getup has Rajini in 
black shoes, an all white suit, black sunglasses, and straight-haired blond wig (with brown roots). The 
fourth costume is brown shoes, brown cargo pants with wallet chain, light pink shirt and matching scarf, 
brown camoflage jacket with patches, and dark brown, curly wig. Next comes light brown shoes, turquoise 
pants, white button-down shirt with orange sweater on top, sky blue leather jacket, light purple scarf, silver 
sunglasses, and a blond wig. Sixth is blue jeans, pink belt, green tee-shirt with print design, navy blue 
jacket with patches on it, pink scarf, and wavy brown wig and strip of facial hair running from his lower lip 
to his chin. Seventh, we have Rajini in light brown shoes, khaki pants, red shirt, orange cowboy style 
jacket, red-pinkish scarf, sunglasses, and a brown hair wig. The eight Rajini is in black shoes, dark 
bluejeans, white synthetic tee-shirt with star print, Formula 1 style racing jacket, blond wig, and sunglasses.  
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The hero and heroine dance in front of two groups of dancers: Caucasian dancers and 
dancers of African descent. Notably there are no Indians in either dance troupe. While the 
symbolism of black to white transition represented through black and white dancers is 
clearly, if not crudely, represented there is a more important point: the iconism of the 
transition operates outside of India. Both black and white represent exteriorities that 
Rajini dually has the status to appropriate. Indeed, it isn’t a dark south Indian that 
represents blackness (a ripe reservoir for cultural meaning in Tamil cinema), but an 
African. And it isn’t a light-skinned Indian (remember, the light-skinned heroine cited a 
lack of matching of skin color as the problem) but hyper–light skinned blond dancers that 
symbolizes the white. It isn’t that he has moved from being darker to lighter, but that in 
the process he has appropriated the exterior, he has become an object of desire through 
co-opting that which is beyond India.  
Indeed, the whole song’s visuality operates on this principle. All the outfits are 
Western, modern style outfits (which also index the West through the brands displayed on 
the clothing: e.g., brand logos on the Formula 1 racecar style jacket) that have no 
indexical trace of India. The hyper-modern, almost surreal, architecture of the 
background is downright alien. It is a stark, empty, cold landscape of inorganic geometry, 
devoid of any signs of sociality: no people, no nature, only technology. (This 
technoaesthetic is itself reflected in one pair of sunglasses Rajini wears which have 
windshield wipers on them moving back and forth!)  
This is compounded musically and lyrically. The song is a sluggish hip-hop beat of 
the down-South U.S. variety popular in the U.S. at the time of the film’s release. Its 
angular samples of horn stabs, synthesized bass, programmed drums, and a call and 
response introduction echoes contemporary rap music. The lyrics construct Rajini as the 
embodiment of style, and thus as an object of attraction: ‘your gait’s style, your smile is 
style, your speech is style’; ‘your style stirs it up, it attracts, it’s victorious’; ‘your style is 
hot to the touch, it’s thunderous action, it’s (your) often disheveled hair’; ‘everything you 
do is style’; ‘your style is for the children, for the youth, for the old.’ 
The song ends with an English rap: “Am I black or white? Does it really matter if I 
am black or white? This is me. This is you. This is what I’m telling you.” As the rap 
begins—questioning whether it matters if he is black or white (indeed, it doesn’t, it only 
matters if he is style and if this can justify his changing skin colors)—the different getups 
assemble together in the same frame in a frontal shot. Seven of his eight getups (minus 
the racing jacket Rajini) are lined up left to right facing the camera. The heroine is on the 
far right of the screen (photo 4.5). All of a sudden, all seven collapse from left to ride and 
implode into the Rajini closest to the heroine. This trope of multiplicity-in-singularity 
diagrams not only status (as ‘more than’) but also Rajini’s ability to tie together so many 
diverse styles together coherently.  
 
 
Photo 4.5 Seven Rajinikanths becoming one (“Style,” Sivaji: The Boss [2007]) 
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At the end of the song, a ninth avatar approaches the hero and heroine. It is 
Rajinikanth in blackface, in all black clothing with long dreadlocks and sunglasses. It is a 
style-ized image of anti-status, of ugliness (photo 4.6).  
 
 
Photo 4.6 Rajinikanth as style-ish anti-style (“Style,” Sivaji: The Boss [2007]) 
 
He has come to (comically) ogle the heroine and challenges Rajini, this white Tamilian in 
English, “Who do you think you are (doing such status-ful style)?” He is summarily sent 
off by the white Rajini in a style-ishly delivered and non-honorificating “poo daa” (‘get 
lost’). The white Rajini has successfully embodied the image of style. He has 
appropriated the image of the status-ful Other, he has sent off the image of the status-less 
Other, and has secured the attraction/love of the heroine. Note that this is appropriation 
and not an attempt to pass (hence his use of Tamil to send off the English-using 
impostor). It isn’t that he is a white person; but rather, as the lyrics state, that he is a 
‘white Tamilian’ (veLLai thamizhan). No matter what his color is, he is ‘always 
completely Tamil’ (eppoothum pachchai thamizhan).22  
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22 He sings: “appa thaan vechcha karuppee. ippoo thaan sekka sevappee. eppoothum pachchai thamizhan. 
ippoo naan veLLai thamizhan” ‘I was black then. Now I am bright white. I am always completely Tamil. 
Now I am (just) a white Tamilian.’ 
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Rajini is style insofar as he is the agent who co-opts and instantiates this alternative 
scheme of value through fashion. This formulation is precisely how Rajini’s Madurai 
fans interpreted the song: ‘Rajinikanth can do all such styles because of his status and 
popularity (remember, the young and old alike love his style). Everything he does is 
style,’ no matter its source, its extravagance, its absurdity, its authenticity. As his fans 
explained, ‘he can do foreign style even better than foreigners. He is conversant in 
English, Tamil, Spanish, any language. Rajini can perform any kind of style because 
Rajini is (performatively) style. If he does it, it’s style.’ And yet he is still authentically a 
Tamil. He exists in both worlds. And again, this is possible because his style is 
underwritten by a more fundamental status such that any particular style can be done and 
then discarded after use without threatening his true being, his true identity as a Tamil, as 
a modest man of the people/peer group.23  
 
3.5.7 Style as English 
Rajini’s co-optation of the exterior and the status-ful extends beyond the body into his 
speech as well. Taking again the song “Style” from Sivaji (2007), we can easily see how 
the lyrics diagram Rajini’s appropriation of exteriority through code-mixing between 
English and Tamil, and code-switching between Tamil and English. For example, 
consider the introduction to the song:24  
Give me one time style yeah . . .  
Give me two time style yeah . . .  
Give me one time style yeah . . . 
Give me two time style yeah . . . 
 
23 Of course, that Rajinikanth is neither ethnically Tamil nor from Tamil Nadu isn’t a problem for 
audiences who have come to accept him as a Tamil (see Rajanayakam 2002: 241 for discussion). 
24 I have italicized the Tamil words in the quotation and left the English words unitalicized; in the gloss I 
have underlined the Tamil words that are glossed and the glosses of those words. 
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Give me three time somethin’ . . .  
 
oru koodai sunlight  
oru koodai moonlight  
onRaaga seeththa color thaanee en white. 
Give me three time somethin’ . . . 
<Music kicks in.> 
A pot of sunlight  
A pot of moonlight 
My white is the color of them combined.  
 
Here we see code-switching—from English to Tamil—followed by code-mixing English 
noun phrases into Tamil sentence structures.  
Rajini’s relationship to English, however, is ambivalent. As far as English is 
concerned, he plays both sides: style for status-ful effect and over style for comic effect. 
Indeed, broken English is sometimes termed “Rajini English” by youth due to Rajini’s 
successful comedic use of English disfluency in depicting (failed) status-raising. Such 
comedy is perhaps best captured by the following scene from Veelaikkaaran (1987). In 
this famous scene Rajini is a recent arrival from the countryside to the big city. At a job 
interview he is asked if he can managed in English. His comic sidekick jumps in (in 
Tamil): ‘how can you expect him to speak in English when he just arrived from the 
village?’ At this point Rajini begins his memorable dialogue (the first line was often 
quoted to me by students, or deployed by students to tease each other):  
<to the sidekick:> “Shut up! I can talk English, I can walk English, I can laugh 
English you bloody fellow! <to the interviewer:> Waya puri in Tamil becomes 
vaay puri in English and bhel puri in Hindi. Sir, English is a very funny 
<pronounced “punny”> language sir. But fine and the Tamil language as well, 
you know how? English is the passion of the nation. It’s a consideration, a 
conjunction become injunction and injunction become irritations. Frustration and 
temptations come up for all nations. Because conditions become corporations 
become premonitions. That’s why fiction deserves in collusion, diffusion, 
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destruction, demonstration, declaration, desolation, depression, deliberation, and 
decoction.” 
  
What is interesting about this clip is that while it pokes fun at the (rural) upwardly 
mobile and parodies Rajini as a status impostor through his schizophrenic word salad, it 
still demonstrates him as a successful candidate as he gets the job. English here is a kind 
of mystic tongue (the audience would understand only a fraction of what he is saying; 
indeed, it took me many attempts to understand his super fast delivery). But it is wielded 
successfully by Rajini nonetheless. 
Rajini’s style dialogues also deploy English as a serious marker of status. Such usages 
tend to be, just as they are with young men’s use of English as style in their peer groups, 
at the beginning or ends of his dialogues, in greetings or departures, as glosses of 
something said immediately before or after in Tamil, or in single lexical items deployed 
without any denotational content (e.g., “cool” from Sivaji [2007]).  
For example, in Baadshaa (1995) Baadshaa confronts the police for their inability 
and unwillingness, due to their fear, to confront Anthony. When he arrives the police ask 
him to sit. He replies in English, “No no no, thank you very much . . . .” He then switches 
into Tamil to explain how bad Anthony is, how the police have done nothing, and how 
he, Baadshaa, has only tried to do good. He switches gears into a punch dialogue in 
Tamil. Before leaving he again switches to English: <with an echo effect to the English> 
“Okay? Bye <waves>. Bye!” Here we see the use of English for the interactional moves 
at the beginning and the end of the dialogue.  
In Padaiyappa (1999) Rajini goes into a long lecture in Tamil, scolding the female 
villain for her arrogance and quick temper. Having given his philosophy on gender 
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relations, he tilts head and menancingly smiles with raised eyebrows. He then switches 
into a rapidfire delivery English, demonstrating his mastery over the language of status 
and exteriority: “You know one thing? Anger is the cause of all miseries. One should 
know how to control it. Otherwise, life will become miserable. Try to understand that.” 
He starts to walk off, but then comes back and roughly glosses his philosophy in Tamil: 
“Last but not least: athika aasai paNRa ambilleyum athika koobappadRa pombleyum 
nalla vaazhnthathaa sariththanam kedeyaathu.” (‘There is no instance of a man who 
desires too much and a woman who gets too angry living happily’). Having glossed his 
philosophy, he raises his hand and gives a style salute along with the swoosh sound 
effect. He says “Bye” and walks off to horn fanfare, in slow motion walking toward the 
camera, head down in his style gait.  
 
3.5.8 Status-raising and -leveling 
In this section, I show how the construction of Rajini’s style also iconically reflects 
the peer group dynamics of status-raising and -leveling. We noted in the discussion of 
Baadshaa (1995) that Rajini’s films often increase the tension and excitement in seeing 
him initially perform his style through prior moments of status-lowering. His characters 
are often constructed at first as humble, respectful, even afraid. It’s only through others 
that his inherent status is made to come out. This, of course, is an indication of his 
modesty: he takes no pleasure in status-raising, but it must be done. It isn’t under his own 
agency, and thus he can’t be accused of boasting.  
This is compounded in that before Rajini’s characters begin their performances of 
style (in particular, self-status-raising punch dialogues) they have already been 
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constructed as men of status and style by those around them. To take an example from 
Sivaji (2007), the heroine’s neighbor extols him as a humble man: ‘Look at his eyes, 
man!’ (“avanooda kaNNu paaru ayyaa”). Cut to Sivaji looking at the camera smiling. 
The neighbor says: ‘Look at his skin color, man’ (“avanooda color-a paaru ayya”). Cut 
to Sivaji flipping a piece of gum into his mouth, cut to onlookers looking amazed. The 
neighbor says: ‘Look at his style, man! . . . Who in Tamil Nadu would say that they don’t 
like him having seen him?’ (“avanooda style-e paaru ayyaa. . . . avane paaththu thamizh 
naaddile pidikkale NNu evanoo soluvaar ayya?”). At this moment Sivaji protests that he 
is lauding him too much. The neighbor replies: ‘Look at that, man, he’s a person who 
doesn’t even like being praised!’ (“paaru ayya, pukazhchchi pudikkaathavan ayya!”) 
There are at least three functions at play here: the first is to maximize Rajini’s status-
raising through leveling it. The trope of humble origins, as well as comedy segments 
which poke fun at Rajini’s status, act to lower his status, only to raise it later with greater 
effect. Second, such a construction—in particular, the exteriorization of his own status-
raising through testimonials and the reactions of others to him—acts to preemptively 
ratify his style as authentic, as legitimate, as acceptable and not to be derided as over or 
absurd.25 It paves the way, as it were, for accepting Rajini as someone who has enough 
status to perform such style and (pre-)ratifies such performance once it’s done. Through 
these mechanisms Rajini’s status becomes an undisputed fact within the diegesis. Third, 
this construction reaches outside of the text to construct Rajini himself as a humble 
person, as a man of the people, as an ordinary person. Indeed, Rajini’s popularity 
partially hinges on the fact that in terms of ascribed status markers he is deficient: he isn’t 
 
25 Rajanayakam’s (2002: ch. 4) discussion of this provides many more examples of this more general point: 
Rajini’s status is raised before he even raises it himself. 
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white skinned, proportionally built, or conventionally beautiful (like MGR) (see 
Rajanayakam 2002 for a thorough discussion of this). Moreover, he comes from the 
modest background of being a former bus conductor. (I return to this point later in 
chapter 5.)  
In short, Rajini’s characters are always presented as both ordinary and extra-ordinary, 
as part of the community of peers, but somehow apart from it (see Rajanayakam 2002: 
144–173). However, his being superior to his peers is never presented in a way that is 
excessive to his status, never more than necessary, never showing off, never arrogant. 
One interesting phenomenon that Rajanayakam (2002) points out in his notion of “liminal 
spurts” is that Rajini’s status-raising (what he calls “elitising”26) is often coterminous 
with his status-leveling (what he calls “sub-alternising”). For example, Rajini often does 
his style with a beedi (a cheaper cigarette smoked by the working class) or a cigar 
(associated with rural areas) rather than the relatively more costly cigarette; or, while 
dressed as an ordinary milkman in Annamalai (1992), he wears a pair of sneakers (a sign 
of status). That is, there is a compulsive performance of difference through sameness 
(and vice versa) through co-occuring signs of status-raising and -leveling. This is, as we 
saw in our discussion of peer groups, precisely the double motion of the peer group 
toward individuation and inclusion, of status-raising and status-leveling.  
 
 
26 One issue with Rajanayakam’s (2002) account is that he wants to exclusively associate style with the 
elites. Thus, doing style isn’t only status-raising, but “elitising.” There are a number of limitations to this. 
First, Rajanayakam has no clear account of style precisely because he explains it away as “gimmicks” 
which somehow attract viewers (presumably due to its inherent attractiveness). Second, it isn’t clear that 
style is necessarily something only linked to elites, though it certainly often is. This exposes a more general 
telescoping in Rajanayakam’s discussion: he is only interested in MGR and Rajini’s image construction as 
emblems of class-relations as they play out in the political realm, and takes no consideration of age as a 
relevant factor (cf. the critique of Prasad 1998 in Nakassis and Dean 2007, fn. 21).  
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3.5.9 Style as a life stage, as temporary 
In Rajini’s films, while reality has itself been altered by his style (the villains 
vanquished, dharma restored), at the end of the film he either returns to his previous state 
of non-style or becomes a literal periya aaL (e.g., he finishes Padaiyappa [1999] and 
Annamalai [1992] as an old man; in the latter he returns to his lowly milkman status at 
the end of the film; he gets married at the end of Baadshaa [1995] as the ordinary 
Manikkam; he finishes Muththu [1995], where he plays a double role, just as he started: 
as a lowly servant and an elderly renouncer). While the hero-star is exterior and 
transgressive, he ultimately moves beyond, renounces, or suspends his youth status.  
That is, Rajini’s characters’ construction as antihero vis-à-vis his bad habits (e.g., he 
smokes, he drinks, he filanders, he loves), vigilantism (i.e., he works against and above 
the law), occupation (e.g., as a rowdy), and his social background (e.g., as poor, as an 
immigrant; Rajanayakam 2002: 241) places him outside of ‘society.’ However, Rajini 
doesn’t only inhabit the periphery. His characters move back into ‘society’ at the ends of 
his films. What is important to note, however, is that such moves back into ‘society’ are 
from a position of exteriority where Rajini’s return is to a ‘society’ changed because of 
his intervention. In effect, ‘society’ and its authority have been reappropriated as his 
island of authority. Further, whenever he moves back into ‘society’ his expressions of 
style are diminished and muted.  
One reason for the suspension of style at the end of Rajini’s films—especially his 
older films—is that the Rajini audience is mixed and includes adults. A second reason is 
that it constructs Rajini as humble, modest, and one of the people. Style is inside him 
always, but need not be expressed unless there is a foe to be vanquished. Otherwise he is 
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a man of the people, a commoner just like you and me. The third issue evoked by this 
renouncement of style is the idea that style is a kind of disguise, something ephemeral, a 
temporary artifice to raise status for someone who is liminal. The hero-star is a vehicle to 
change the world through efficacious status-raising. At the end of this, however, style is 
used up and made unnecessary. It can be stored away until the next film. Thus, for 
example, at the end of Annamalai (1992) Rajini sings the first song from the film about 
being a milkman and tells everyone that being a millionaire (which he only became to get 
revenge on the rich villains) was a ‘disguise.’ At the core he was always the same guy, a 
milkman: “ithu thaan permanent. maththellaam temporary” ‘This [being a milkman] is 
what is permanent. Everything else is temporary.’ Similarly, recall the song “Style” from 
Sivaji (2007) where Rajini becomes a white man as the ultimate expression of his style. 
When he finds out, however, that the heroine doesn’t want him to be white at all, he 
immediately washes off his “veesham” (‘disguise’).  
Note, then, that the filmic concept of style is just like youth’s own understandings of 
their age as temporally transitional and in between. For both Rajini and youth more 
generally, style is a surface to be played with, a tool of temporary appropriation, and itself 
must be negated at the correct time. With age one moves on from relative youth status to 
objective adult status: going ‘into’ ‘society’ and becoming a periya aaL with adult 
responsibilities, duties, and signs of status. And indeed, in Rajini’s films the characters 
never really overthrow the social system. Rather, they co-opt authority, move up the 
social ladder, and displace evil (Rajanayakam 2002: 180). This parallels, in fact, youth’s 
own experience of youth not as rebellion but as transgression; not as overthrowing social 
relations, but as creating spaces exterior to them.  
 199
 
3.5.10 Summary 
I have argued that Rajinikanth’s filmic image qua hero-star and the narratives that 
construct that image are, at core, stories about youth status negotiation, and need not be 
read as only political vehicles (pace Pandian 1992; Dickey 1993a, b; Rajanayakam 2002). 
In particular, they are about style as the outward expression of status. I showed that while, 
on the one hand, style is something particular to Rajinikanth (as a set of mannerisms, 
dialogues, stereotyped signs associated with him alone), style is also iconic with the more 
general notion of status among youth which is itself an icon of ‘youth’ itself, and thus not 
particular to Rajinikanth at all. I argued this by showing how Rajini’s style is constructed 
as: (a) visual and individuating; (b) exterior to ‘society’ and ‘culture’; (c) transgressive of 
established norms in content (Rajini’s characters break the rules), in form (the 
conventions of the Rajini film themselves are a deviation from those established by MGR 
[see Rajanayakam 2002: 124–125]), and in ‘real’ life (Rajini’s early “parallel text” was of 
a deviant youth); (d) co-opting signs of wealth and status; (e) diagramming the relative 
relationship of periya aaL–chinna paiyan figuratively through style and literally through 
fights (geththu); (f) caught up in the youth peer group dialectic of status-raising and -
leveling; and (g) replicating the transitory status of ‘youth’ in the narrative’s construction. 
In short, Rajini’s style presents us with a hyperbolic image of ‘youth’ and its concepts of 
status. As we see below, this status construction contrasts with both the villain (as 
excessive status) and the comedian (as inappropriate status).  
 
4. The villain and the comedian: Excessive and deficient status 
4.1 Introduction 
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As I have argued, the hero-centered film moves through representations of status and 
its negotiation. But while the hero is the main emblem of status, he isn’t the only one. 
The status negotiation and the build up of the hero’s status require that other characters 
engage in status work as well. As I show in this section and the next, other main 
characters in the film—villains and comedians—are also emblems of status, though of a 
deformed sort.  
In the case of the villain, this is because he is defined by and defines the hero through 
conflict. The narratological function of such conflict is to determine who is the periya 
aaL among them. For the comedian, there are two reasons why status and style are central 
to his character: (a) the comedian is often the sidekick, and thus his status work (status-
mismatching or -lowering) serves to highlight and foreground the hero’s status-raising; 
and (b) status-inversion and -mismatch in Tamil Nadu is itself a form of comedy 
entertainment (chapter 3, section 3.3.3). 
 
4.2. The villain 
4.2.1 The villain as (not) status-ful (enough) 
In the hero-centric film the villain is a mirror image, if distorted, of the hero. Indeed, 
the construction of the villain is the same as that of the hero in all the films discussed so 
far, though not as elaborated. The villain dresses fashionably style-ish, grooms himself 
style-ishly, and is surrounded by style-ish objects.  
For example, Marc Anthony in Baadshaa (1995) wears sunglasses, an earring, 
dresses in chic business suits, and has a hip mullet hair cut (funk). The female villain of 
Padaiyappa (1999), Neelambari, is often shown in modern dress: jeans, miniskirts, 
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leather boots, and sunglasses. One of the villains from Annamalai (1992) has a sculpted 
beard, bejeweled jacket (with matching pants), sunglasses, and cut-off leather gloves. 
More recently, the villain of Vijay’s hit film Pookkiri (2006), Ali Bhai, is shown in fancy, 
shiny black suits, sunglasses, and leather jackets. Similarly, the remake of Rajini’s Billa 
(2007) is all about the style of the villains (think the Sivaji [2007] song “Style” taken as a 
whole film): gangsters dressed in expensive, shimmering suits and reflective sunglasses 
living in the hyper-modern Kuala Lumpur with its sleek steel and glass aesthetics, shot in 
a cool blue color scheme.27  
The villain is also transgressive of established norms and authority structures. He 
commits crimes and does evil malicious things as we saw with the scheming Marc 
Anthony of Baadshaa (1995). He also partakes in youth status-raising rituals: he smokes, 
he drinks, and he loves (although illicitly, kaLLaa kaathal). The introduction of the 
villain of Pookkiri (2006) Ali Bhai shows him smoking a cigar and taking shots of tequila 
in a discothèque surrounded by beautiful and scantily clad women. The villain occupies 
exterior spaces: industrial hideouts, huge modern mansions, bars, and clubs. 
In general, then, the villain’s style rivals that of the hero in its exteriority, its 
transgressiveness, its visuality, its attractiveness to women, and its diagramming of 
difference. Indeed, his style verges on the extreme and excessive: over style. Remember 
that the most common reaction to youths who do too much style, especially by adults, is 
that they look like, or act like, rowdies (i.e., villains).  
 
27 This was an intentional move by the filmmakers in order to create a hyper-modern style-ish backdrop that 
Tamil viewers never had seen before (Shah 2009). The filmmakers wanted the film itself to be style (it was 
a Rajini remake afterall), but in a contemporary idiom.  
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The villains in hero-oriented Tamil cinema also have their own style-ish dialogues 
accompanied by individuating status-raising mannerisms (finger pointing, 
removing/putting on sunglasses, crossing the legs). Above we saw some of the dialogues 
of Marc Anthony from Baadshaa (1995) and his characteristic styles: his low voice, his 
third-person introductions (“Anthony, Marc Anthony”), and his taunts. Similarly as we 
saw above, the villain of Annamalai (1992) has his own punch dialogue that he deploys: 
“kuuddi kalichchu kaNakku sariyaa irukkum/varum” ‘If you add and subtract (it), the 
calculations will be right/correct.’ Pragmatically, the villain’s dialogues are used in the 
same ways and places as the hero’s: before some status-raising activity (e.g., fighting or 
embarking on some status-raising project) or after it succeeds. 
Similar tropes of status-raising are also deployed. Swearing revenge, the female 
villain of Padaiyappa (1992) status-raises through the same DEMONSTRATIVE + PROPER 
NAME construction as the hero: “intha Neelambari nenechchaa, nichchiyamaa mudiyum” 
(‘If this Neelambari thinks it, it’s definitely possible’). She snaps her fingers, swearing 
not to take off her anklets until she gets her revenge. She says ‘This is definite, man’ 
(“ithu saththiyam daa”), and then slams her hand into a glass table and breaks it. Her 
hand bleeding, she repeats: “ithu saththiyam,” closing her fist on the glass. Villains also 
speak English in their dialogues. For example, in Annamalai (1992), one of sub-villain’s 
only dialogues is the English sentence “I am a bad man.”  
Like the hero’s style, the villain’s style moves between the serious and the ridiculous. 
Marc Anthony’s character straddles this line. His unique mannerisms evinced laughs 
from students, but also were part of the serious construction of him as a foe to be 
reckoned with. Fighting is also central to the villain’s style, and the villain’s fighting skill 
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rivals the hero’s. He can vanquish his foes with a single blow, causing them to fly off into 
the distance, at times even the gaining the upper hand on the hero. He is a strong, 
dangerous, masculine man, ruthless and fierce in his fighting abilities.  
In terms of the camera treatment of the villain and sound effects, it is the same as the 
hero: swoosh sound effects emphasize the villain’s style; multiple camera shots of the 
same action act as tropes of status; slow motion and sped up shots act as tropes of 
strength and speed; and frontal bust shots and closeups of the eyes and face individuate 
and make the villain visible. Like the hero, the villain is style. 
 
4.2.2 Excessive status: Villain is never humble, only humbled 
As we have seen, the hero and the villain’s status is similarly constructed and 
represented. So what is the difference, then, between the hero and the villain?  
First, in an earlier filmic idiom which still carries weight today (though less and less; 
see section 4.4 for more discussion), the hero occupies a higher moral ground than the 
villain. The villain is ruthless and sadistic, while the hero is righteous and just.  
Second, the villain is never humble until humbled. He is arrogant. He engages in none 
of the status-leveling which the hero does. While status-ful, he inspires no hope in those 
around him, he isn’t liked or admired because he is arrogant. For example, while 
speaking-for-the villain is a common trope of status-raising, such speech never valorizes 
the villain except to highlight his power and strength. Indeed, it often casts the villain as 
unjust or arrogant. For example, in Padaiyappa (1999), the hero’s friends comment on 
the female villain. Saying that she studied abroad, they categorize her thusly: “enna 
thimiru, enna banthaa, enna style-u” ‘what arrogance, what showing off, what style.’ 
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They continue to say, ‘Didn’t you see her come in car? She came from studying abroad in 
a plane, and the car came in a boat.’ Here speaking-for-the-villain status-raises, but 
figures such status not as appropriate but excessive and arrogant. She has style (and its 
commodity trappings), but it’s too much. She is arrogant, her style is over. 
Third, the villain is an obstacle to the hero. By definition, then, the villain’s status and 
style must be made subservient to the hero’s. While the villain is the hero’s double, (s)he 
must be outdone in style, his/her status must be appropriated, and finally (s)he must be 
vanquished physically (or made to reform and repent). Ultimately the issue of the villain 
and the hero comes down the question of style and geththu: who is the periya aaL, 
symbolically and literally? It’s the play between dominance through style and dominance 
through fighting that characterizes the narrativization of status in such films. Indeed, it’s 
the bombastic villain which gives the hero an occasion to rise to, and thus brings out his 
status. It’s only the status-ful villain that can reveal the true strength and style of the hero. 
Moreover, without such provocation, the hero’s displays of status would smack of 
arrogance. It is, in fact, the figurement of the hero as modest and reluctant to status-raise 
coupled with the excessively status-raising villain who elicits the hero’s extreme status-
ful acts that makes the hero an appropriate emblem for youth status.  
 
4.2.3 Example: Symbolic status negotiation in Padaiyappa (1999) 
Take the hero–villain encounters in the film Padaiyappa (1999). In Padaiyappa, the 
main villain, Neelambari, is an arrogant, Western educated woman who initially wants 
Padaiyappa (played by Rajinikanth) romantically. (She is also his cross-cousin and thus a 
potential/preferred marriage candidate.) When she can’t have him and he marries her 
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servant (a doubly humiliating situation for her), she swears revenge. This quest is 
expressed in the film through negotiations of status between Padaiyappa and Neelambari, 
through a back and forth to determine who the periya aaL is.  
In one famous scene Padaiyappa goes to her wealthy home. She has taken out all of 
the furniture from the house. Padaiyappa enters. Cut to a low shot of her coming down 
the stairs (a common trope of status difference, as we saw in Baadshaa [1995]). She 
snaps her finger and a servant brings her a chair. She sits in front of Rajini, another 
diagram of status difference, forcing him to stand in front of her. She crosses her legs 
slowly, the sole of her foot passing right in front of the camera, taking up most of the 
screen.28 She then gives him a style salute with a flourish of the hand (accompanied by a 
swoosh sound effect). Her head is cocked to one side, slightly pointed down, her eye gaze 
slightly looking up in a similar posture of style assumed by Rajini in many films. Her first 
moves of style have diagrammed her symbolic domination of Padaiyappa through co-
opting his style. 
Padaiyappa replies by pulling off his scarf and flipping it up into the air with a 
swoosh sound effect (throwing the scarf onto the shoulder is a recurrent style of the film), 
then grabbing a swing as if out of nowhere (it’s out of the frame, presumably tied up to 
the ceiling) and pulls it down in a slow motion shot. The scarf lands on his shoulder and 
he takes a seat across from her. His theme music kicks in. He crosses his legs slowly, 
deliberately. He puts his hand on his knee, assuming the most circulated image from this 
film, sitting majestically like a king. He then gives his style salute. She ratifies his style, 
 
28 Note that not only is sitting down while others stand indicative of higher status, but the foot, and the sole 
of the foot in particular, is extremely status-lowering to others: thus, for example, one throws one’s shoe to 
humiliate another and one worships God by falling at his feet. 
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saying ‘my electric dear, you know why everyone likes you? Even though you have aged, 
your style and beauty haven’t left you’ (“minsara kaNNaa. ellaarukkum een pidichchu 
irukku NNu unakku theriyumaa? vayasu aanaalum un styleyum azhakum innum unne 
viddu poogale”). He replies: ‘“Thank you, thank you.” It was with me when I was born. It 
will never leave me’ (“Thank you, thank you. kuudavee poRanthathu. ennikkum 
poogathee”). Padaiyappa 1, Neelambari 0. 
And yet, it does leave him, as well see in a later encounter. The villain has pulled off 
her first victory: she reveals that she has gotten his daughter to fall in love with her 
nephew, only to force her nephew to stand her up at the alter, breaking her heart. She rubs 
it in Padaiyappa’s face through the co-opting of his punch dialogue and his style. She 
says to him: ‘You often say, my way is a unique way (“en vazhi thani vazhi”). 
Neelambari’s way is also unique. From now on your activities won’t cross me.’ While 
repeating his words back to him, Neelambari holds out her hand in a fist, with the thumb 
pointing up moving from left to right in Rajini’s characteristic style. When Padaiyappa 
tries to style-ishly throw his scarf onto his shoulder he misses. She says, ‘this is the first 
time in your life it’s slipped off, huh’? Here the failure of style diagrams her victory, her 
superior status, her (temporarily) being the periya aaL. He is unable to do style in front of 
her. Padaiyappa 1, Neelambari 1.  
In the final showdown, however, Padaiyappa’s style comes out on top. Padaiyappa 
has determined that her nephew was only pretending not to love his daughter. He didn’t 
say anything out of fear of his aunt and politician father. Padaiyappa shows up at the 
nephew’s wedding day (the aunt has arranged for him to marry someone else) with 
literally thousands of people as support. Padaiyappa and his army and Neelambari and the 
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wedding party stand opposite each other. The nephew reveals that he does love 
Padaiyappa’s daughter. Padaiyappa walks across the divide to take him to marry his 
daughter and starts to leave. Then, he dramatically turns around (with swoosh sound 
effect). Standing next to the villain, Rajini looks at her with head tilted down and eyes up, 
while she stares forward. He has won, and his eye gaze is direct, while hers is defeated, in 
avoidance. He gives a dialogue: ‘I think that now you are remembering the drama that 
you conducted when you cheated my daughter right at the moment that that the thaali29 
was supposed to be tied. You won once. It’s a good thing it happened. I woke up. Now I 
think you understand’ (“thaali kaddi veeNdiya neeraththile en magaLe eemaaththi nee 
nadaththina naadagam ippoo unakku njaabagam varum NNu nenekkiReen. oru thadave 
nee jeeychchidde. nalla thaan poochchu. naan muzhichchiddeen. ippaavathu unakku 
purinjchi irukkum NNu nenekkiReen”). That is, she understands that he is superior to her, 
he is the periya aaL. She understands this not only because he was able to conduct the 
marriage as he had planned, but because his style is back. Grave sounding strings enter. 
The camera cuts to a low shot of just the villain and Padaiyappa. Her arms are crossed, 
her eyes finally looking at him, ratifying what she knows will now happen, he will 
symbolically diagram his return to dominance through his style. His hand flashes up, 
cocked and ready to deliver his punch dialogue: ‘My way is a unique way’ <his index 
finger moves up and down>. Better don’t come in my way’ <his finger moves from left 
and right> (“en vazhi, thani vazhi. Better don’t come in my way”). He gives a style salute, 
smiles at the applauding crowd behind him and walks off toward the camera. Padaiyappa 
is back, and so is his style. 
 
29 Tamil marriage ceremonies center on the tying of the thali (a string) around the bride’s neck.  
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4.2.4 Summary 
The filmic image of the villain, and the rowdy more generally, is as that of excessive 
style plus geththu (itself expressed in acts of style). The villain’s style, however, is not 
commensurate with his/her status, and this is revealed when the hero puts the villain in 
his/her place. This reflects, again, the status-economy of the youth peer group: those who 
transgress too much, who boast too much, who attempt to dominate too much, must be 
taken down a peg. There is a pleasure, then, in seeing the hero (who, remember, always 
partakes as a member of the peer group as well as apart from it) put the villain (the 
individual who pays no heed to the peer group and purely attempts to status-raise) in 
his/her place.30  
In short, style is the raison d’être of the villain insofar as the hero is defined by the 
economy of style. A villain who does no style gives no pleasure to the audience. (S)he 
isn’t a villain at all. As it became clear from talking with youth about film, they expect 
that the villain will project his/her status via style to the maximum, because only then can 
the expression of pure style sans society’s norms of morality be relished as an object of 
pleasure in its own right. Moreover, only then can it provoke the hero into even more 
over-the-top expressions of style. The villain’s excessive style makes it necessary for the 
hero to engage in even more extreme expressions of style while allowing the hero to 
maintain his status as justified and not arrogant. 
 
30 This is also why the other alternate fate of the villain is to reform and recognize the authority of the hero 
(i.e., self-figure him/herself as a chinna paiyan). It is not enough for the hero to achieve his goal and 
resolve the film’s conflict. The villain must be explicitly ranked as subservient to the hero and his norms of 
authority. 
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While the hero diagrams the experience of youth status as a push and pull of status-
raising and -leveling, the villain diagrams the individual who only attempts to status-
raise. This is why the villain is simultaneously an object of pleasure for audiences and an 
object of derision.  
 
4.3. The comedian 
4.3.1 The comedian as mismatched status 
If the hero is the emblem of reasonable style (style backed up by status and acceptable 
to others) and the villain is the emblem of excessive style (too much style for his/her 
status and unacceptable to others), then the comedian in hero-centered films presents us 
with an emblem of inverted or mismatched status. Like the villain, when the comedian 
does style it’s too much for his status. But unlike the villain whose status inevitably does 
not quite get to the level of the hero (in fact, it is post hoc, in contrast to the hero that the 
villain’s status is ratified as excessive), the comedian’s status-raising attempts don’t even 
pass muster as status-ful in the first instance. Thus, often the comedian’s status-raising 
attempts reflexively meta-communicate their deficiency in the acts themselves. As such, 
the comedian’s performances of status do not entail status. Rather, they diagram anti-
status, often by merely ‘reporting’ or tropically re-presenting emblems of status.  
The comedian—more precisely, the buffoon (cf. Seizer 2005)—has little to no style, 
he has no masculinity, he has no geththu. In this he differs from the villain who does have 
status and geththu, just not as much as the hero. Thus, when the comedian performs style, 
when he projects masculinity and status, it is ridiculous and absurd. For example, the 
popular comedian Vadiveelu’s ridiculous mustache in films like Maruthamalai (2007) 
and Imsai Aran 23-am Pulikeesi (2006) are a clear diagram of this absurd masculinity as 
comedy (photo 4.7). In the photo from Maruthamalai (2007, right) compare the 
mustaches of the hero, which is appropriately masculine, to Vadiveelu’s hyperbolic and 
comic mustache (not to mention fake looking, thereby meta-communicating that this is 
comedy). 
 
  
Photo 4.7 Vadiveelu’s humorous mustaches: Pulikeesi (2006, left) and Maruthamalai (2007, right) 
 
The comedian’s status-raising is comic because it is a status-mismatch. We know that 
the comedian doesn’t have the status to back up his status-raising moves. And when he 
gets put in his place, often by those of low status (women, children, average working-
class people on the street), the comic effect is produced. The comedian, then, offers us an 
image of deficient status. This isn’t to say that the comedian has no other comic appeal. 
Physical comedy, double entendre and word play, satire, and situational comedy are all 
aspects of comedy in Tamil films. What is most interesting from the point of view of this 
chapter, however, is that comedy in hero-centered Tamil films largely does its work 
through status-mismatches in failed performances of style.  
As we see below, the comedian is largely defined through his relationship with the 
hero. This happens in two ways: through situations where the comedian acts like a hero, a 
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man of style but is revealed not to be; or through parodying the image of the hero. In the 
latter case there is a double voicing: there is the mismatch of status—we know that the 
comedian is no hero and to see him act like one is ridiculous—and layered on top of that 
the voice of parody—his status-mismatch is a reflexive and inter-discursive performance 
(and thus there is a knowing wink involved). In such comedy it is the image of the hero, 
and status itself, that is being made fun of as ridiculous even as such comedy more often 
than not acts to build up the status of the hero.31  
 
4.3.2 Revealing the buffoon 
In Annamalai (1992) much of the comedy is created through the character Panju’s use 
of English. We know it to be anomalous given his status within the narrative—he isn’t 
the hero Annamalai and he is the owner of the local tea shop (a low-status job)—and 
outside the narrative—Janagaraj is a well-known comedian in many films. Panju’s 
recurrent comedy is his insistence on using English even though he isn’t fluent and even 
though it is interactionally unnecessary. In an early scene in the film Panju is sitting at the 
tea stall reading the English newspaper and explaining it, wrongly, to the guys hanging 
out. He sits in the middle of the group, and his manner (e.g., his pedantic hand gestures 
and his use of rhetorical questions ‘do you know what X means?’) indexes him as a kind 
of vaaththiyaar ‘teacher,’ a position of high status in rural Tamil Nadu. His tone of voice 
is patronizing and exaggerated and slow in delivery, ambiguous between his inability to 
read and his perception of his interlocutors’ inability to parse English.  
 
31 It is, of course, debatable whether these two categories are different in kind. Indeed, the first case only 
works through the implicit image of the hero as status-ful and the construction of the comedian as not (cf. 
the villain). The second case, then, is the case where the image of the hero is more explicitly inter-
discursive and thus viewers have more grounds to impute a level of reflexive awareness to the comedian as 
part of their interpretation. 
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Panju: Today’s News. Minister files 
complain(t). 
  
 
Minister files complain(t) NNaa enna 
arththam theriyumaa? Minister-ukku 
muule viyaathi NNu arththam. muule 
viyaathiye vechchukkiddu ivanungka 
veelaikki een poogaNum NNu keekReen. 
aduthathu padikkiReen. 
 
Following of the railway concession. 
 
Concessions NNaa, church-le father 
irukkaan. udkaarnthu mannippu 
koduppaangkoo.  
 
vaa Annamalai! Good morning Brother 
Mountain!  
 
Annamalai: vaNakkam. 
 
 
P: It’s okay.  
 
Cricket news padikkiReen. keeLu. 
Gavaskar clean bowl. Clean bowled 
NNaa vanthu appadiyee panthu paaru. 
gup NNu pudikkiRaan. athu thaan 
<reading the headline:> 
Panju: Today’s News. Minister files 
complain(t). 
<He doesn’t pronounce the final “t” sound.> 
<to the overhearers:> 
Do you know what “minister files 
complain(t)” means? It means the minister has 
piles. What I’m asking is, why should these 
guys go to work if they have got piles? I’ll 
read the next one.  
 
<reading the headline:> 
Following of the railway concession. 
<to the overhearers:> 
Concessions means in the church there is the 
father. You sit down and they give 
forgiveness.  
<Annamalai comes and sits. To Annamalai:> 
Come Annamalai! Good morning Brother 
Mountain! 
<Annamalai stands up.> 
Annamalai: Greetings. 
<Hands folded at chest in vaNakkam 
gesture.> 
P: It’s okay. <laughs>  
<Annamalai sits back down.>  
I’m gonna read the cricket news. Listen. 
Gavaskar clean bowl. Clean bowled means, 
he comes and catches the ball just like that. 
That is why it’s called clean bowled. 
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cleaned bowled NNu peeru.  
 
While the comedian is ostensibly status-raising through his style-ish language use, which 
also figures him as the teacher to his listeners (thus figured as students and chinna 
pasangka), there are clear signs that he doesn’t know English well. His reading is slow 
and verging on stuttering. Second, his translations and pronunciation are wrong. He 
confuses “files” with “piles” (Tamil doesn’t distinguish /f/ and /p/.) He confuses 
“confessions” with “concessions.” And he gets “bowled clean” backwards (it has to do 
with pitching the ball, not catching it.) Moreover, his translation of the proper name 
Annamalai into its literal gloss ‘Brother Mountain’ is ridiculous.  
There are other ways that he is (comically) status-raised. When Annamalai first 
comes he sits down. When Panju greets him, Annamalai rises from his seated position 
and comports his body to deferentially greet Panju. Panju ratifies this diagram of status 
with his “It’s okay,” that is, ‘you do not have to stand for me,’ exercising his right as the 
presumed higher status person to dispense with the formalities. This diagramming of 
unequal status is comic because it’s a status-mismatch; the audience recognizes 
Annamalai (and Rajini) as a higher status character (and person in real life) than Panju.  
The comedy continues when a white tourist (as indexed by the camera around his 
neck) comes and sits.  
 
Panju: Hiii!  
Tea worker: veLLaikkaara saami, enna 
saapiduReyee? 
 
P.: Eey! unakku avankidde peesuRathukku 
Panju: Hiii! <in singsong prosody; waves> 
Tea worker: White ‘guy’ (saami, lit. ‘god’; 
address term for priest), what are you (-
hon.) eating? 
P: <to the tea worker:>Hey! You don’t 
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thaguthiyee kedeyaathu.  
naayee! nee poo uLLoo! 
 
 
Eey! nee enna udkaarnthukkiRe?  
naaLaikki sappida vaa. pooyyaa! 
Disgruntled customer: aamaa uurleyee tea 
vechchirukkaan.  
P: Hi. Hello. My name is Mr. Panj.  
White guy: Nice to meet you. I’m Mr. Pim. 
P: Hi Mr. Pim. And now I am going to 
explain you what are all the foods we are 
having. Rice cake. And spicy vada. 
 
And big sauce. In these what you like to 
have? 
White guy: oru masaala vada, oru chaiya, 
suudaana chaiya. 
 
 
 
Annamalai: uh, uh, Good morning. 
P: uh, vaNakkam.  
have the status/qualifications to even speak 
to him. You (-hon.) dog! Go inside! 
<to the customer sitting next to the white 
guy:>  
eey! And what are you (-hon.) doing sitting 
here? Come back tomorrow to eat. Get lost! 
Disgruntled customer: <muttering> Right, 
only he has tea in the whole town.  
P: Hi. Hello. My name is Mr. Panj. 
White guy: Nice to meet you. I’m Mr. Pim. 
Panju: Hi Mr. Pim. And now I am going to 
explain you what are all the foods we are 
having. Rice cake. And spicy vada. 
<cut to Annamalai looking dubious> 
And big sauce. In these what you like to 
have? 
White guy: <in Tamil to the tea worker:> 
One masala vada, one tea, a hot tea. 
<Comedy sound effect. Cut to Panju 
looking annoyed/angry. Annamalai comes 
over and sits next to him.> 
Annamalai: uh, uh, Good morning. 
P: uh, vaNakkam. <P.’s deportment is 
smaller. Rajini grabs him by the neck and 
shakes him.> 
 
Panju, as the (supposed) periya aaL of the group, attempts to monopolize 
conversation with this high-status individual (indexed by his race and his dress [a full 
suit]). When his midget tea worker asks the white tourist in non-honorificating, colloquial 
Tamil what he wants, Panju insults the worker. He doesn’t have enough status to speak 
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with him. Moreover, the customer sitting next to the white tourist doesn’t have enough 
status to sit next to him. This status differential is diagrammed by the code-switching 
from English (with the white man) to informal Tamil (with the worker and the customer). 
Panju begins to show off his English, only to be shocked that Mr. Pim speaks in fluid, 
colloquial Tamil. Moreover, Mr. Pim bypasses address to Panju and directly addresses 
the tea worker. That this is the punchline is indexed by the sound effect (a detuned 
harmonica) alongside a shot of Panju’s annoyed/angry/shamed face. Here the comic 
effect is dual: first our expectations are broken, a white person speaking Tamil! (This 
mismatch provides no end of comic effect or wonderment to Tamils, as I found in my 
fieldwork.) Second, as someone who knows English and Tamil well, his Tamil shames 
Panju for his excessive use of English: it was unnecessary, exposing his vain attempts to 
status-raise. That his attempts to status-raise were never taken seriously by anyone is 
already indicated by the grumblings of the disgruntled customer and Annamalai’s 
dubious looks. This is confirmed when Annamalai comes to sit next to Panju. Making fun 
of him, he says “Good morning” in English, reversing the earlier status differential with 
Rajini paying deference to Panju in Tamil, thereby lampooning his use of English. Panju 
ratifies being put in his place by his response in Tamil “vaNakkam,” preceded by a 
tentative “uh” spoken with a shrunken body comportment indicating low status. 
Annamalai grabs him around the neck in a playful show of teasing dominance.  
 
4.3.3 Parodying geththu 
Much of the comedy of Vadiveelu—one of the most popular comedians today—
hinges on acting the buffoon through unwarranted status-raising (plus physical comedy). 
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In the film Pookkiri (2006) Vadiveelu has the ridiculous costume of a martial arts fight 
master, complete with hair knot on the top of his head. In his introductory scene 
Vadiveelu is conducting a martial arts class for the neighborhood children. From the get-
go we know that Vadiveelu will project some style or geththu which he can’t back up, as 
he does so in almost all his films. This is ratified by one of the kids who comments 
regarding Vadiveelu preparing to break a set of flaming wood blocks with his hands, 
‘He’s been giving us a build up for the past three years’ (“muuNu varushamaa build up 
kodukkiRaaru”) ‘but he still hasn’t done anything.’ Indeed, instead of breaking the 
blocks, he changes his mind and calls the heroine Shruthi to come, so that he may flirt 
with her and impress her with his status-raising masculinity. Shruthi’s doesn’t want to go, 
but also doesn’t want him to come to her. This tells us that, indeed, he is somewhat of a 
pest, not the cool guy he thinks he is. ‘I’ll teach you martial arts,’ he proclaims to the 
class. He calls for his assistant to bring him logs of wood, and gives one to Shruthi and 
one each to two young students. Cut to the mother of the family complaining about how 
annoying he is. (Note speaking-for-another as status-lowering the comedian.) He says to 
Shruthi and the students: ‘immediately after I say “ready” attack me in any direction you 
want. Watch how I block the blows’ (“naan ready NNu sonna udanee entha direction 
veeNaalum attack paNNungka. athu eppadi thadukkiReen NNu watch paNNungka”). He 
says “ready?” (i.e., are you ready for me to say “ready”?) and they all hit him in the head 
at the same time. He blocks nothing. Comic music kicks in as the camera cuts to a head 
shot of him in pain alongside bird and cuckoo sound effects. He says, ‘This is what 
happens when you do something without a plan. You have to plan. OK <sounds like 
“Hookay”> (“entha oru vishayaththeyum plan paNNaame paNNinaa ippadi thaan. plan 
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paNNi paNNaNum. OK”). As if it was not bad enough, upon his exit a bucket falls on his 
head. Here his attempts to show his geththu fail. His status-raising is ridiculed, and this 
no less by low-status women and children.  
 
4.3.4 Building up the hero through mismatched status 
What is interesting is how the comedian’s failed attempts to act the periya aaL 
diagram a form of anti-status, or anti-style. And the more ridiculous and absurd the 
mismatch between actual and projected status the more the comic effect is. While this 
kind of comedy provides its own pleasure, more often than not it functions to build up the 
hero (or the villain).  
Take a comedy sequence out of Padaiyappa (1999) for example. In this sequence the 
fat, dark-skinned comedian is going along with his friends to meet his future wife. For 
this important day, he is supposed to be the center of attention, and thus he makes 
everyone walk behind him (including the hero Padaiyappa). The other guys say that it’s 
embarrassing to have to walk behind him, thus status-leveling him as he attempts to 
project his status-differential. Padaiyappa defends him (thus status-leveling himself in 
ratifying the comedian’s status-raising): ‘today he is going to see his fiancée (for the 
marriage fixing). It’s his day to be the “hero,” so leave him be.’ Dressed in all-white 
traditional clothing, the comic says, ‘If Padaiyappa is the man of power, then Azhegesan 
[the comic] is the man of beauty’ (“Padaiyappa man of the power NNaa, Azhegesan man 
of the beauty”).32 Using the same third-person trope of status, as well as English (the only 
 
32 The name Padaiyappa has as its root padai ‘army,’ and Azhagesan azhagu ‘beauty.’ 
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Tamil lexical item, besides the proper names is the conditional marker NNaa), the comic 
again status-raises.  
Immediately after this status-raising, the comic trips and falls into the mud, status-
leveling him. His clothes sullied, everyone starts laughing at him. Though Padaiyappa 
doesn’t want to, he is guilted into switching dress with the comic. Now the friend is 
dressed in very style-ish clothes and Padaiyappa in traditionally status-ful clothing. The 
punchline of the comedy is how villagers repeatedly come up to them and treat 
Padaiyappa as if he is the groom (remember, now he is wearing the traditional garb). In 
each instance, Padaiyappa retorts, ‘No, he is the groom, but he is wearing my clothes.’ 
Each villager in turn says, ‘oh, that’s why he looks good.’ The comedy revolves around: 
(a) the fact that the comedian’s attempts to status-raise are thwarted; and (b) the fact that 
everyone—even old, uneducated country women—find the style-ish dress more 
appropriate for Padaiyappa but anomalous for the comedian. In both interpretations 
Padaiyappa is figured as a high-status individual (as the groom, as a person befitting 
style). In the end it’s the hero’s style which is ratified as authentic and appropriate and the 
comedian’s attempts to status-raise through style which are repeatedly questioned and 
then explained away. Here the comedy functions to ratify the hero’s status and to provide 
entertainment.  
 
4.3.5 Parodying the hero 
Another comic usage of style by the comedian is the self-conscious parody of the 
hero. This is done through inter-discursive re-animation of the hero. This usage can be 
found in an increasing number of youth-oriented films (e.g., Chennai-600028 [2007]; 
 219
                                                
Saroja [2008]; Padikkaathavan [2009]; Goa [2010], Thamizh Padam [2010]). Here the 
comedy stems from: (a) the performance of hero-esque style by someone who isn’t a 
hero; and more importantly (b) through the parody of particular heroes (by replicating 
their distinctive styles) and thus by making light of hero-oriented cinema more generally.  
In the non-hero oriented cinema of director Venkat Prabhu we can find such spoofing 
in its most sophisticated (and popular) form.33 In his films, his younger brother, the 
comedian Premji’s comedy is based almost entirely on the re-animation of the hero 
through parody. Such parody works in two ways. First, through the reappropriation of 
dialogues from Rajini and Vijay films; for example, the popular “enna kodumai 
Saravannan sir?!” (‘What cruelty is this, Saravannan sir?!’) from Rajini’s 
Chandiramukhi (2005), used in Chennai-600028 (2007), Saroja (2008), and Goa (2010); 
the repetition of the address term “sir” between the characters in Saroja (2008) as a 
lampoon of such such usage in Sivaji (2007) (and in the film industry more generally; 
Venkat Prabhu 2008); the dialogue “evvaLavoo paNRoom, ithe paNNamaaddoomaa?” 
(‘we’ve done this much, we won’t do that as well?’) from Vijay’s Azhakiya Thamizh 
Magan (2007) used in Saroja (2008) and Goa (2010); or “oru vaaththi mudivu eduththaa 
naanee en peechchu keedkamaaddeen” (‘If I make a decision once, even I won’t listen to 
what I say’) from Pookkiri (2006) in Goa (2010). Second, through the reappropriation of 
mannerisms and tropes of heroism/style; for example, Rajini’s hand gesture in 
Padaiyappa (1999) with the hand held to the face, palm facing inwards, bottom fingers 
slightly curled inwards, the index finger pointing up is used by Premji in Chennai-600028 
 
33 While all of Venkat Prabhu’s films “take the piss” (as he puts it) out of the Tamil hero-stars (Venkat 
Prabhu 2008), his latest film Goa’s (2010) first half is totally based on the premise of making fun of Tamil 
films from the 1980s and 1990s.  
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(2007), Saroja (2008), and Goa (2010); or the extended fight scene in the second half of 
Goa (2010) parodying Rajini’s fight scenes in general (and in particular, of Baadshaa 
[1995] and Sivaji [2007]). Interestingly, Premji’s form of comedy parallels how young 
men—as well as Premji and his brother, director Venkat Prabhu, interact with each other 
and in their peer group—also re-animate film dialogues in order to create comic effects in 
the peer group, a kind of playful acting as if one were the hero. Indeed, the phrase “enna 
kodumai Saravannan sir?!” was a common phrase used by youth in their own peer 
groups during my time in the field.  
This parodying also happens within hero-oriented cinema itself. Rajini’s Sivaji (2007) 
moves deftly between projecting actual style and comic style. In the prelude to a comic 
fight scene from Sivaji (2007), after a minor rowdy finishes a status-raising dialogue 
Sivaji’s index finger flips up along with a swoosh sound effect. But before he can begin 
his punch dialogue, his comic sidekick (played by Vivek) stops him, saying that ‘these 
days all sorts of unimportant guys are giving punch dialogues and twirling their fingers. 
It’s not worth it.’ (Here he is simultaneously making fun of the rowdy, other hero-stars 
who are vying for Rajini’s position as “style king,” and also presumably Rajini himself.) 
Sivaji concedes: ‘So you give the dialogue then.’ Vivek says: 
 
Eey! Chittor thaaNdinnaa Katpadi.  
Sivaji siiNdinaa dead body.  
 
 
Chinna pasangka paakkiRathu PoGo.  
 
 
Eey! After you cross Chittor comes Katpadi. 
If you mess with Sivaji (you’re a) dead 
body.  
<finger points up to punctuate each line> 
Little kids watch PoGo [a children’s TV 
station].  
<slides over to the other side of the rowdy 
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Sivajikidde veendam, go go.  
 
Six-ukku appuram, seven.  
Sivajikku appuram, evan?  
 
ithu eppadi irukku? 
 
and points at him>  
(If) Sivaji doesn’t want it, go go. 
<slides back toward Sivaji>  
After six comes seven. 
After Sivaji, who (comes)? <with ‘who’ his 
finger is pointing up toward the heavens> 
How is it? <looking at the camera>  
 
Here Vivek re-animates Rajini in two ways. First he speaks for Rajini in a hyberbolic, 
exaggeratedly comic style, performing a Rajini-esque dialogue (note the rhyme scheme). 
Second, he uses one of Rajini’s first one-liners from Pathinaaru Vayathilee (1977) “ithu 
eppadi irukku?” ‘how is it?,’ gently poking fun at Rajini’s own image. In a later faux 
punch dialogue, Vivek both parodies the punch dialogue genre and his deficient status to 
give one by providing his own echo effect at the end of the dialogue by repeating the last 
syllable.34  
 
4.4 Blurry moral lines, hybrid characterization 
If one looks at the changes in Tamil cinema post-liberalization—with the entrance of 
cheap electronics to duplicate and view VCDs and DVDs (and thus piracy) and with the 
arrival of satellite television and the internet (Pendakur 1991; Pendakur and Kapur 1997; 
Shields 1998; Agrawal 1998; Page and Crawley 2001)—one sees that the audience for 
Tamil film has largely shifted from the family as unit of film watching to the youth peer 
                                                 
34 The whole film Sivaji (2007) can be, in fact, seen as one hypertrophy of style to the point of comic 
absurdity. Later in the film, when trying to break the audio-password that Rajini has set up for his laptop, 
the police bring in a series of mimicry experts. Tellingly, the comedy here revolves around each mimicry 
artist attempting to break into Sivaji’s computer by delivering lines from past Rajini films: “oru thadave 
sonna, nuuRu thadave maathiri” from Baadhsaa (1995), “Lakalakalakalakalaka” from Chandiramukhi 
(2005), “cool” from Sivaji (2007). As in all of these cases, style in the wrong hands evinces comedy. Also 
not the inter-discursivity and auto-referentially as part of the pleasure of the scene (chapter 5).  
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group (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995; Kathir 2005; Ratnam 2005; Nakassis and 
Dean 2007). Concerns of morality, sentiment, and kin relations as they have been 
traditionally treated in Tamil cinema have increasingly been bracketed in contemporary 
films and relegated to specific genres (in partirular, the ‘family film’ kudumba padam). 
Since liberalization, in hero-oriented cinema, the heroes are more like villains, there are 
fewer scenes of family-oriented sentiment (but more scenes of related to youth love and 
‘love failure’), and kin relations are often unremarked upon or themselves deficient.35  
Yet what has filled the vacuum? I would argue that status, violence (fights), comedy, 
and love have filled the vacuum. Action films are less and less about establishing a 
particular moral order (Thomas 1995) and are more centered on the relative status-
relationships between the characters: of the hero to the villain, of the hero to the 
comedian, of the villain to the comedian. It’s in this light that we can begin to understand 
the displacement of the hero as a morally-centered character, and the blurring of the lines 
between the hero, the villain, and the comedian (as noted by Rajanayakam [2002: 370] 
without explanation).36  
This isn’t to say that current hero-centered films don’t retain a fixed moral compass, 
or that older films didn’t at times blur the hero, the villain, and the comedian. Rather, it’s 
that such blurring is more possible (and thus more common) given the changing structure 
 
35 This is the case unless the film is explicitly about the youth’s engagement with family as in, for example, 
Kaathal (2005) and 7G Rainbow Colony (2004). Such films are, notably, not hero-centric films (see 
Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009). 
36 The flipside to this is the emergence of more specific genres post-liberalization carved out of elements of 
the older commercial-action film: sentiment hypertrophied in the ‘family film’ (kudumba padam), comedy 
track hypertrophied in the parody/comedy film, and plot-coherence and romance hypertrophied in realist 
youth-oriented (love) films (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009). Note that the last three types of 
films mentioned are explicitly oriented to youth (and young men in particular).  
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of the audience and the economics of film from the producer’s point of view (Ratnam 
2005; Nakassis and Dean 2007).  
This trend, in fact, begins with Rajinikanth’s “angry young man” where the do-
gooder image of MGR was denaturalized by the grittier antihero, a hero who can be 
ruthless and who feels no guilt (Rajanayakam 2002: ch. 4). If in the earlier films of MGR, 
the villain stands in for pure evil to the hero’s pure goodness (Rajanayakam 2002: ch. 4–
5), since Rajinikanth’s inauguration of the rowdy antihero the villain has increasingly 
stood apart from the hero not by ‘morality,’ or at least not primarily by occupying a 
separate moral space, but because he is simply an obstacle to be overcome through style 
and geththu. This trend has continued with heroes such as Vijay in films like Pookkiri 
(2006).37 We may also cite films like Puthuppeeddai (2006), Paruthiveeran (2007), 
Subramaniyapuram (2008), and Naan KadavuL (2009) which, while not hero-centered 
films, figure the protagonists as attractive precisely because of their violent, anti-social 
nature. We can also note films where the hero is the villain. In Manmathan (2004), Simbu 
plays two twins, one who is cheated by love and the other who kills women who cheat 
men (cf. Bharathiraja’s Sivappu RoojakkaL [1978]). The film’s ambiguous moral 
compass ends with the villain-hero admitting, ‘I don’t know if what I do is right or 
wrong, but I won’t stop doing it. Only God can judge me.’ Here the hero is so far exterior 
 
37 Take for example, how in Pookkiri (2006) the hero’s ruthlessness and cruelty equals, and even exceeds, 
that of the villain. While there is ultimately an attempt to put the hero back into the moral order through a 
late-in-the-game flashback/twist, the construction of the hero as a pookkiri (‘rogue’) makes him no different 
from the villains he fights. Indeed, he works with them to kill politicians and other rowdies! It’s only when 
their egos clash (ostensibly it’s because the hero doesn’t believe in killing children and women), that the 
villain becomes an obstacle. This prompts the hero to rise to the challenge. What is interesting is that one 
gets the impression that this display of humanity from the hero functions simply to provide a ground for 
opposition, rather than the articulation of a particular moral position. Vijay doesn’t show moral outrage. He 
explains it coolly, as a matter of fact. Indeed, the whole film revolves around the fact that he has no 
conscience, no mercy, that he is a pookkiri. In any case, it’s on this point that the hero–villain ego clash 
begins, which then blossoms into all-out war where the status-differential negotiated through style is 
resolved in style-ized fighting independent of the moral order. 
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to ‘society’ that morality becomes a moot subject until the afterlife. Similarly, comedy 
blurs with the villain in the Vijay film Ghilli (2004) where the villain enacts both an 
image of excessively arrogant status and a comic image of the insane rowdy. And with 
Rajini, as we have already noted, comedy blends with heroism and style.  
In short, status in general, and style in particular, forms the core of hero-centered 
action film. In contrast to older films where style was, at least narratively, subordinate to 
the reestablishment of the moral universe through the abolishment of evil, in newer films 
morality takes a less important role and, as a result, the villain–hero dynamic revolves 
increasingly around their relative ranking: who is the periya aaL? In such status 
negotiation the lines between hero and villain blur and become unimportant. Increasingly, 
the hero becomes defined as he who is left standing, the villain as he who is vanquished. 
Note here that discourses which link increased violence in film as the degredation of 
morality in general miss that what has changed in Tamil film and society is not morality 
per se, but the economics of film and its related foregrounding and elaborating of already 
existing filmic motifs and features (i.e., the narrativization of status). 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have: (1) argued that commercial hero-oriented film can be usefully 
seen through the lens of youth status, both in terms of characterization and narration; (2) 
further, that representations of masculinity and status in the film abide by the same logic 
of status of the youth peer group, albeit hypertrophied; and finally (3) that such 
representations of status are distributed variously among characters, creating a set of 
figures of (non-)status-ful personhood: the ratified status-ful hero, the excessively status-
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ful villain or rowdy, and the deficiently status-ful comedian. Film presents, in this sense, 
mediatized versions of youth concepts of status and masculinity, themselves an inflection 
of common cultural discourses on status. 
Implicit in my discussion is that Tamil film can’t be understood outside of ‘youth’ 
and youth notions of status. As I show in the next chapter this is because youth engage 
film based on the same logic of status negotation in the peer group that in this chapter I 
argued makes Tamil film intelligible in the first place. 
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Chapter 5 – Using Filmic Style to Status-Raise:  
The Parallel Cases of Youth and Hero-Stars  
 
1. Introduction  
In chapter 4 I looked at how hero-oriented Tamil commercial film can be read via the 
lens of concepts of youth status and status negotiation, as outlined in chapters 2 and 3. In 
this chapter I extend this analysis, arguing that the felicity of this interpretation is a result 
of (a) how youth audiences engage with Tamil film and their hero-stars and (b) how hero-
stars contruct their own images. I argue that audiences evaluate heroes/actors based upon 
the same logic of youth status in the peer group and thus heroes’ image construction 
abides by the same principles.  
First I look at how film serves as a source register for young men’s status work. I then 
ask why this should be the case. In doing so I argue against the idea that young men 
imitate their favorite film stars. Instead I argue that young men’s engagement with filmic 
images is tied up in their non-filmic concerns with status negotiation in the peer group 
and not about liking or identifying with a hero per se. I show how such status dynamics 
also apply to aspiring and established stars. I look at how the image construction of hero-
stars abides by the logic of the youth peer group, analyzing the various ways that hero-
stars status-raise and -level. I then conclude with a more general discussion of the 
concept of reception and its problematic assumptions about communicative practice.  
 
2. Film as source register for style  
2.1 Introduction 
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Mass media like film, television, the internet, radio, and print are all source registers 
for youth’s status work.1 I focus on film, however, because film is the most salient 
medium for youth, both in terms of their engagement with it (they consume more film 
than other media) and their re-animation of it (their status work draws more heavily on 
film than other media).  
 
2.2 The two protagonists of youth film: Hero and non-hero 
For the purposes of this chapter it is useful to schematize the protagonists of Tamil 
youth cinema into two kinds: what I call the hero and non-hero protagonist (or simply, 
 
1 In Tamil-language television youth slang terms are circulated and standardized through youth-oriented 
serials like KaNaa KaNum KaalangkaL—for example, the group address term makkaa, gaaNdu aaku ‘to 
get angry’—as well as through popular dance shows. In the English-language, but Tamil-oriented television 
station SS MUSIC and to an extent Tamil channels like SUN MUSIC, English slang terms are circulated to 
(middle-class) youth through their VJs (cf. Smith-Hefner 2007). Youth characterized such speech as style 
because of its English fluency—which they found attractive—and over style because of its (perceived) 
performance of Tamil disfluency. English slang like “What’s up?,” “No probs,” “dude,” “brother,” and 
“okies” were taken up by youth through such stations. “Tanglish” constructions such as kalaaychi-fy 
(‘making fun of’), adich-ify (‘beating’)—[VrbAVP + -ify], a verb when used in English, a noun when used in 
Tamil—are circulated through VJ speech (cf. Lukose 2009: 88 on “chethu-fying”). In addition, new 
fashions were circulated through TV, especially through VJs’ style-ish dress. More important, however, is 
how television, especially English-language television is able to make youth familiar with, and thus 
popularize to an extent, certain musical genres whose distinctive dress youth sometimes borrow from in 
performing style. Hip-hop style, for example, both in terms of fashion (low-rise baggy pants, 50 Cent and 
Eminem tee-shirts), language (“what’s up,” “bro”), and dance steps are made available to many students 
through channels like SS MUSIC, VH1, and MTV. Tamil-English rap and its related style also have been 
popularized through such stations (and the recent cross-over efforts in Tamil film) via artists such as 
Malaysian rapper Yogi B. and the group Natchatirangkal. Such channels, however, are more important for 
upper-class, urban audiences’ engagement with fashion, though not exclusively. Another interesting source 
of style, particularly in the form of body management is American wrestling programs which are very 
popular among youth. The styles of wrestlers, the dialogues, the fights, the grand entrances, the 
melodrama—all reminiscent of the hero-oriented action film—are thoroughly enjoyed by youth and form 
another image of embodied style. The internet and its extension into cell phones are increasingly a source 
register for youth’s performances of style, in terms of the display of knowledge (e.g., knowing about the 
most recent films, pop artists, world news, general knowledge, slang terms); as a place to learn about and 
reenact certain styles; and as an activity unto itself that is style (e.g., using social networking sites like 
Orkut, going “browsing,” having a computer with an internet connection as style). Indeed, the internet is a 
ripe space for youth enactments of style insofar as it emblematizes ‘youth’ virtually: it is an exterior space, 
a foreign space, a space outside of ‘society’ and the norms of the everyday (via its anonymity), a space 
where image can be manipulated and changed according to one’s own desires. American pop and hip-hop 
styles and music are made available to many youth through their internet browsing and downloads, and file 
sharing through cell phones. Youth’s cell phones abound with pictures of what they consider style: brand 
logos, the weed symbol, photos of Che Guevara, pictures of actors, pop stars, and popular Western and 
Tamil songs.  
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non-hero).2 This isn’t only an analytical distinction but one that youth viewers also make 
in distinguishing films that are for ‘pure entertainment’ and time-pass and those which 
attempt to do something different, and by implication ‘serious,’ in their cinema (see 
Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009). The non-hero is a protagonist who is supposed 
to be a character out of ‘real life,’ either as the ‘typical young man’ (e.g., in films like 
Oru Thalai Raagam [1980], Kaathal Theesam [1996], Kaathalar Thinam [1999], 
ThuLLavathoo Ilamai [2002], Boys [2003], Kaathal Kondeen [2003], 4 Students [2004], 
7G Rainbow Colony [2004], Autograph [2004], Kaathal [2004], Chennai-600028 [2007], 
Kalloori [2007], Vennila Kabadi Kuzhu [2009]) or as some ‘real’ type of person from a 
different walk of life (Seethu [1999], Pithamagan [2003], Puthuppeedddai [2006], 
KaRRathu Thamizh [2007], Ooram Poo [2007], Paruthiveeran [2007], 
Subramaniyapuram [2008], Naan KadavuL [2009]). He is made in the image of actual 
individuals. He is of this world or of some possible world.  
The hero, on the other hand, can be seen as a kind of ideal type. In many ways he 
isn’t of this world, or perhaps of any possible real world. He is larger than life. Akin to 
the epic hero, he projects and embodies particular qualities present in the world, but in an 
exaggerated and hyperbolic way, bleached of the gritty specificity of the non-hero. The 
hero is the protagonist of the commercial films discussed in chapter 4. Such films are 
often typified by both audiences and academic critics as unrealistic, fantastical, and 
 
2 This division of hero/non-hero is roughly related to the star division of labor in Tamil cinema, from actors 
who play the hero—Thyagaraja Bhagavathar, M. G. Ramachandiran, Rajinikanth, Vijay—to those who 
play characters—P. U. Chinnappa, Sivaji Ganesan, Kamal Hassan, Ajith. My distinction is slightly 
different however. For even for those actors who play characters, they do so because this is part of their 
perduring image, their style if you will. Such actors are seen as different and talented because they do not 
always play the same type of character (the “hero”) in the same type of movie (the “commercial film”). 
They are character-stars, but not hero-stars. The distinction of hero/non-hero, then, is broader and includes 
actors who may never become stars through the characters they play.  
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escapist (Dickey 1993b; Prasad 1998; Thomas 1985; Nandy 1987–1988; Kakar 1990: ch. 
3; Derne 2000; Osella and Osella 2004; Srinivas 2010; see Dickey 2009b for a review), 
though we will have occasion to problematize this later in the chapter. The hero is a super 
man: he can fight a hundred men and win; time and space are no limitation for him, and 
thus are of no import to the plot (hence, presumably, the suspension of criteria of 
coherence and rationality in such films). The hero doesn’t just speak dialogues qua 
conversations, but also delivers punch dialogues qua oratory. As many have pointed out, 
while the non-hero lives to serve the film and its story, in commercial action cinema the 
film and its story live to serve the hero (Pandian 1992; Rajanayakam 2002); more 
precisely, the hero-star. Much of the literature on Tamil film has focused on such films as 
vehicles for the creation of fan worship, and thus of political mobilization, as in the cases 
of MGR and Vijaykanth in Tamil Nadu (Hardgrave 1971, 1973, 1979; Hardgrave and 
Neidhart 1975; Sivathambi 1981; Pandian 1992; Dickey 1993b; Rajanayakam 2002; cf. 
Rogers 2009).  
What is interesting is that such hero-stars in Tamil cinema are never what are referred 
to in Tamil Nadu as “new faces.” They are always established names in the industry who 
have been around for a long time. When such current hero-stars entered the field, 
however, they entered like all other actors: playing the non-hero character. And vice 
versa, the non-hero protagonist is often played by the new face. If successful in such 
films, such young actors get the chance to accrue status over time in the eyes of 
audiences and film industry insiders through being cast in hero-driven commercial films. 
With a string of such successes in such hero-oriented films, they may become hero-stars.  
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2.3 The (non-)hero and style 
There are two points to note. First, the non-hero isn’t a status-ful actor. The hero-star 
is. Second, the non-hero is rarely a source register for youth status work and style. While 
non-hero films may be source registers for slang or comedy dialogues, they aren’t 
generally for style qua fashion or behavioral repertoires. Hero-oriented films, however, 
are. Indeed, as we will see, the whole spectatorship of hero-star driven commercial film is 
organized around the replication of fractions of the hero-star through repeat viewing, 
other media (TV, radio, print), fashion trends, re-animated film dialogue, and fan activity 
more generally (e.g., putting putting up sign boards, social service in the name of the 
hero-star). In contrast, so-called realist, “experimental” commercial film’s spectatorship 
grounds itself in a different ontology: that of the ‘real’ world, of the coherent and 
plausible story (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009). Such films attempt to reflect 
‘reality’ and in this fetish there is little in the way of performable status to be mined by 
viewers. One identifies or empathizes with the non-hero protagonist as an equal (or even 
someone of lower status) from a (fractionally) common social world. By contrast, the 
hero-centered film exists to be re-animated, in the theater (through whistling, dancing, 
and singing to the songs; by speaking the dialogues; and conversing with the hero on-
screen) and outside of it. As such, the hero presents, by degrees, a usable figure of status-
ful personhood. To watch the hero on-screen is to watch status, to watch style; to ratify 
that status and style is to make such style doable in everyday life. Through such 
spectatorship, the style of the hero-star becomes usable for viewers.  
This is revealed by how youth use the terms hero and heroism in their peer groups. 
Such terms are used by youth to describe both the hero and his heroic actions on the 
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screen and to describe the youth who does style; in particular, who status-raises in an 
idiom resonant with that of the hero-star.3 To successfully perform such style in the 
college peer group is to be the college hero. The over style of heroism (and style in 
general) is captured in phrases like scene pooduRathu (‘to put on a scene’ [from a film]), 
film kaadduRathu (‘to show a film’), padam pooduRathu (‘to put on a film’), over acting 
(‘excessive acting’), and build up paNRathu (‘to build up excessively’ [cf. the building 
up of the hero’s character on-screen]). These phrases are used to describe (s)he who 
shows off too much, who acts absurdly like a film hero(ine). As we saw in chapter 3, 
teasing often invokes actors’ names, ‘who does he think he is, Vijay?’ or ‘look at her 
acting like some kind of Jyothika/Simran!’  
 
2.4. Using film for style 
Youth’s re-animation of film ranged from the direct and literal to the more vague and 
impressionistic (i.e., as noted above, acting ‘like’ the hero). An exhaustive list of 
borrowings and inter-discursive moments between film and peer group activity would be 
near impossible both because of the sheer numbers of borrowings and 
recontextualizations, and because with each new movie new borrowings emerge. The 
cycling of fashion among youth is incredibly fast and the styles, teases, and jokes 
discussed herein will likely be out of circulation before long (cf. Eble 1996 on American 
college slang). Below I give an idea of how film is used by youth through discussion of 
some examples.  
 
 
3 While heroism is inclusive of style, the reverse isn’t necessarily the case. Heroism includes things not 
narrowly understood as style (but can be reanalyzed as ‘doing style’): for example, fighting or being a good 
Samaritan. (See chapter 4, section 3.3 for discussion.) 
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2.4.1 Speech  
Youth speech, both male and female, borrows heavily from film. Film circulates 
particular lexical items: for example, “jilfonse” ‘illicit romance’ from the film Ithayam 
(1991); “pedde rowdy” ‘local rowdy’ from the film Kaathalan (1996); “omlete poodu” 
‘to vomit’ from the film Boys (2003); “meedi” ‘playboy’ from Manmathan (2004); “free-
udu” ‘let it go’ from the film AaRu (2005); the English word “cool” in Sivaji: The Boss 
(2007). 
Film also circulates phrases and larger swatches of dialogue. For example, the phrase 
“Thirunelveeli halwa daa!” comes from the chorus of a popular song from the film Saami 
(2003) and is used to index speaker’s knowledge of some task (contrary to interlocutor's 
expectations).4 The Vadiveel dialogue, “appadi shock aayiddeen” (‘I got shocked like 
that’) is used humorously to feign surprise or shock. Similarly “oh poodu!” (‘put an 
“oh!”’) is a phrase from the eponymous song in Vikram’s hit film ThuuL (2003). By 
commanding one’s friends to shout “oh!,” this phrase is used draw attention to a youth 
who is engaged in something he doesn’t want attention for, thereby teasing him. 
 Even whole speech registers are circulated through film: for example, Chennai slum 
speech is familiar to, and used by, Madurai youth from films as early on as Maharaasan 
(1993), a Kamal Hassan film where he plays a slum youth; while I was in the field, rural 
Madurai speech styles were made more familiar to and deployed by Chennai youth 
through films like Paruthiveeran (2007) and Subramaniyappuram (2008). 
 
4 The logic is that just as the dessert halwa is a metonym for Tirunelveli, the speaker is an exemplar of the 
activity at hand. For example, person B is on the computer opening a program. Person A says, ‘You have to 
do it like this.’ B responds with Thirunelveeli halwa daa! ‘I know that quite well man!’ 
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Such linguistic forms, especially film dialogues, are often used by youth as inside 
jokes or like proverbs. Rajinikanth’s punch dialogues (see chapter 4) are often 
recontextualized by students to punctuate some point they might be making, often with a 
touch of humor. For example, dialogues like “oru thadave sonnaa nuuRu thadave 
maathiri” (‘if I say it once it’s like I said it a hundred times’) from Baadshaa (1995) are 
used to jokingly drive home the speaker’s point. Or just as commonly, phrases like 
“summa athirthuvu, le?” (‘it makes you tremble, doesn’t it?’ from Sivaji [2007]) are used 
to jokingly justify one’s excursions into style by invoking Rajini’s image as a style-ish 
actor.  
In addition to heroes, the comedian is a common source register for youth speech; for 
example, Vivek’s neologism, “S.I.” short for “summa irukkeen” (‘just hanging out,’ or 
euphemistically, ‘I’m unemployed’); the address term goyyaale, the exclamation gokka 
makkaa from Vadiveel;5 or puNam thiNi from the film Paruthiveeran’s (2007) comedian 
Kanja Karuppu. Comedy dialogues form a core set of inside jokes common among youth 
all over Tamil Nadu. Vivek’s comedy, “pick up, drop, escape!” is used by youth to 
humorously describe their entries and exits from romantic interactions. Shouting out 
“thoppi!” (lit., ‘hat’) from Rajinikanth’s Chandiramukhi (2005)—a reference to the 
character Senthilnathan (played by Prabhu) which youth found so funny—at someone 
who had failed at something, or had gotten caught doing something wrong, is enough to 
tease that person. Similarly, “enna kodumai, (Saravanan) sir!” from the same film (and 
 
5 Some of Vadiveel’s comic phrases that were often used by youth include: “vanthuddayyaa 
vanthuddayyaaaaaa” (‘they’ve come man, [I cannot believe that] they’ve come maaaaaaan’); “entha oru 
vishayaththe plan paNNaame paNNinaa ippadi thaan. plan paNNi paNNaNum. Hookay" (from Pookkiri 
[2006]), "enne vechchu comedy kimidy ethuvum paNNaleye?” ‘You’re aren’t doing any comedy 
schmomedy at my expense, are you?’; this is used when one feels that people are ironically praising them; 
biffa bipa biplack, an allusion to the earlier onomatopoeic slang jing jing jack to refer to the three grades of 
women: beautiful, average, ugly. 
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replicated in Rajinikanth’s’s next film Sivaji [2007], and by the comedian Premji in 
Venkat Prabhu’s films Chennai-600028 [2007], Saroja [2008], and Goa [2010]) is used 
by youth to humorously exclaim about something they found unjust or absurd. Such 
dialogues are often used to punctuate teasing sessions. In teasing peers for using too 
much English, youth might invoke the classic Rajinikanth comedy dialogue from 
Veelaikkaaran (1987): “I can talk English, I can walk English, I can laugh English . . . .” 
(see chapter 4, section 3.5.7, cf. chapter 4, section 4.3.2)  
Youth also use names of characters from films, often the comic characters, to tease 
their peers; for example Taaklas from Paruthiveeran (2007), a name used to refer to 
someone who has a childish face but cheats others (as per the character in the film); or 
SorNakkaa from ThuuL (2003) for a bold woman (based on the female rowdy character 
in the film). Such names most often referred to characters of anti-status (a childish 
looking cheat) or status-mismatches (a female rowdy) precisely because they humorously 
diagram failed status-raising attempts.  
Such reenactments have multiple uses. First, they provide a pleasure in simply 
repeating the form. Second, as inside jokes such reenactments provide solidarity among 
peers. Third, such forms take on their own lives in their reenactments, becoming objects 
of pleasure unto themselves through acquiring new meanings and indexical values. 
Fourth, such dialogues can be used rhetorically to bring home a point, to (ironically) 
point to oneself as status-ful through status provided by the actor, or to status-lower 
another through teasing.  
 
2.4.2 Behavioral repertoires, the body, and style 
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Youth also derived behavioral repertoires for style from films. For example, pushing 
the hair back, smoking cigarettes, throwing the cigarette into the mouth, spinning around 
one’s sunglasses before putting them on, punctuating speech with a twirling of the index 
finger and then pointing it into the air, are all forms of style introduced by Rajinikanth 
and which youth explicitly point to as the source register. Similarly, greeting a peer by 
bumping the knuckles of the fist was introduced in the S. J. Surya film New (2004).  
Enacting the hero or style are the common typifications of such behaviors. Such 
behavior, unsurprisingly, is exaggerated when visibility itself is salient: for example, in 
performance settings (e.g., culturals competitions), in highly public places (classrooms, 
buses, parks), and when cameras are present. Indeed, when a camera comes out, 
especially when students are on their college tour (see chapter 2, section 3.3.5), male 
students inevitably end up posing like various hero-stars: expanding their bodies to look 
bigger by making muscles, putting on cool sunglasses, and crossing their arms in hip-hop 
inspired, but film circulated poses. Such reenactment was jolly, a fun expression of youth 
subjectivity as well as part of youth’s own aesthetics of style. 
We can also briefly note changing norms of beauty regarding men’s body type. The 
spectacularization of the male physique has increased as of late, from the fetish of the big 
bicep to, most recently, the six-pack. Shortly after Dhanush’s six-pack in Pollaathavan 
(2007), Vishal’s in Satyam (2008), Suriya’s in Vaarinam Aaiyram (2008) (see chapter 6, 
photo 6.5), and most recently Aravind Akash’s in Goa (2010), many students (like other 
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film stars [Buzz18.com 2008]6) became keen on having a six-pack. To have such a body 
was style or geththu. 
 
2.4.3 Film as source register for college rituals 
Like performances of self in the peer group, when students have to do any kind of 
stage performance they utilize film as a source register. Students sing film songs, perform 
film songs in their live bands, dance to film songs, do mimicry of actors, and perform 
skits which utilize the characters and dialogues of films. Film is also often the common 
touchstone from which ragging happens at various college functions. Students might 
have to act like a film character, sing or dance to a film song, or propose to an imagined 
film actress. During one function, for example, the emcee ragged the students performing 
by playing film comedy dialogues that he had saved on his cell phone into the 
microphone. For example, to punctuate the onstage teasing one student, he played 
Vadiveelu’s “enne vechchu comedy kimidy ethuvum paNNaleye?” (‘You’re aren’t doing 
any comedy schmomedy at my expense, are you?’). Here some swatch of the film is 
reproduced in a larger text segment as a typifying meta-commentary on the performance. 
The voice of the comedian is made to stand in for that of the emcee in a complex 
ventriloquation, thereby recontextualizing both the film text-segment and the current 
event (ragging the student, getting some laughs).  
The bus route songs of the government college in Chennai that I discussed in chapters 
2 and 3 also borrow heavily from film. The melodies of such songs are often film 
 
6 Indeed, while in pre-production for Goa (2010) Aravind Akash was on a special regimen to prepare his 
six-pack. It provided endless conversation among the assistant directors and other crew about who had a 
six-pack, how cool it looked, and how to get one.  
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melodies with the lyrics of the song playfully reappropriated and changed to exhort the 
geththu of the bus route and the college.  
 
2.4.4 Fashion 
Fashion is the most visible and important arena where youth utilize film as a mine for 
new styles. Paralleling our discussion in chapters 2 and 3, many examples of style in 
fashion find their way to youth via film representations.  
For example, from slum barbershops to high-end fashion salons, customers use film 
star haircuts as their frame of reference, either through film name or photos. ‘Cut my hair 
like Suriya in Veel (2007)’ or ‘perm and color my hair like Vikram in Anniyan (2005)’ 
could be heard in barbershops and salons in the late 2000s, as would have cuts from films 
of yesteryear be heard in their heyday (e.g., the attack hair style from the film Thil 
[2001]). ‘Shave your mustache like Ajith’ or ‘grow a beard like Suriya’ were common 
advice given among students. “Virumandhi” (the name of a 2004 Kamal Hassan film) 
was a common teasing epithet for me when I had a mustache. This usage is interesting 
because such a mustache has many more salient resonances: associations with rural 
masculinity, martial caste groups, protection deities, police offers, (low-level) politicians, 
or just simply the periya aaL. Students bypassed those and went directly for the film as 
reference point, even though my mustache looked very different from Kamal’s actual 
Virumandi mustache (photo 5.1).7 This was because making such connections was itself 
a pleasurable activity, re-remembering the film to mildly tease me for my
age/status/culturally-inappropriate mustache. 
 
7 Note that this comparison was based on the mustache alone, for I never received any comparisons to 
looking like Kamal Hassan except when I sported such a mustache.  
   
Photo 5.1 The real Virumandhi (Kamal Hassan) and the tropic Virumandhi (Constantine Nakassis) 
  
Similarly, clothing fashions are often first introduced by a particular film hero, and 
then taken up among youth until their cache are used up. The history of fashionable pant 
styles reads as the history of popular actors—from the bell bottoms (1970s) and then later 
the tapered pants of Rajinikanth and Kamal Hassan (1980s); the MC Hammer inspired 
pants of Prabhu Deva (1990s); the “6 pocket” pants of Rajini to its new avatar “cargoes” 
and jeans (2000s) as popularized by Vijay.  
When I arrived in Madurai in 2007 Vijay’s film Sachin (2007) had introduced the tee-
shirt sewed onto the button-down shirt as a fashion. The handkerchief wrapped around 
the hand across the palm and in front of the thumb, a popular style among youth, had 
come from Vijay’s Pookkiri (2006) (photo 5.2). Vikram’s Bheema (2008) made popular 
the short-sleeve button-down shirt with sleeves which could be folded up and buttoned. 8  
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8 Fashion styles are not only about the hero-star of Tamil cinema. Fashions just as easily came from 
Hollywood cinema. For example, more than a few youth in 2007 still sported hair styles like the hero of the 
1997 super hit Titanic, Jack. 
 
Photo 5.2 Vijay-style handkerchief wrap 
 
Interestingly, while dressing like the hero is acceptable to most all students, shirts 
with the hero’s face or most recent film on it (see, e.g., chapter 6, photo 6.16), are 
considered local, or low class, as something associated with slum dwellers, villagers, and 
the uneducated. Such shirts, as one college student explained, are “chillaRai thanam” 
‘childish.’ One looks like a “chinna paiyan.” He meant this literally, because school 
children tend to be the most enthusiastic film fans; and figuratively, as one of low status. 
In his (lower-)middle-class social circle, wearing such shirts will make your friends laugh 
at you and tease you. Here a class-linked discourse is deployed to rank status by 
alignment to film, redeploying common discourses (from adult ‘society’) about the 
childishness of cinema and the childishness of cinema fans as pathologically devoted to 
the hero-stars. To look like a film star is style (qua tropic periya aaL) while to signal fan 
devotion is childish insofar as it marks one explicitly as subordinate. 
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Western brands, too, circulate through Tamil cinema (though this was not the only 
way, see chapters 6–8). Below I discuss one particularly interesting example of a brand in 
cinema qua style: the Nike “swoosh.” (I return to this example again in chapter 6, section 
3.2 as well.) 
The Nike swoosh can be seen all over Tamil Nadu. On tee-shirts, earrings, shoes, 
shorts, wristbands, hats, jackets, cell phone wallpapers, and the sides and backs of cars, 
motorcycles, buses, and auto-rickshaws (cf. Bick and Chiper 2007). What is interesting is 
that when I asked youth why they liked and used this brand symbol I got a range of 
answers. For the most informed, youngest and affluent, the swoosh is a symbol of a 
brand, Nike, which they had some idea about. As such it was style, it was aesthetically 
pleasing. However, many other youth provided a different answer: the swoosh means that 
‘I am always right,’ ‘Whatever I do is correct,’ ‘I know what I am doing.’ I was 
perplexed. What I learned was that this meaning comes directly from the Rajinikanth film 
Pandiyan (1992) where the Rajinikanth style of the film is to punctuate his punch 
dialogues (wherein he says that everything he does is “right”) by ripping open his shirt 
and exposing a tee-shirt with a checkmark or tick on it. Hence in the film he is “Mr. 
Right” (photo 5.3).  
Mediated by the filmic style there is an iconism between Rajini’s tick and the brand 
logo of Nike, an indexically hybrid sign which indexes fashion through a Western 
branded form because of its presence in the film as style.  
 
 
Photo 5.3 One of Rajini’s style getups (with tick) in Pandiyan (1992) 
 
More recently, in the 2004 hit film Manmathan, the hero-cum-villain’s ability to bed 
loose women (who he later kills) is punctuated with a stamp on the screen. The stamp is a 
circle where around the circumference is written “corrected machchi” (correct paNRathu 
is the slang term ‘to pick up,’ or ‘initiate a love relationship with someone of the opposite 
sex’; machchi is a slang variant of the ingroup fictive afinal kin term machchaan) with a 
Nike swoosh and the Playboy bunny in the middle of it. Photo 5.4 is taken from one such 
episode where we can see the hero’s face kissing a girl who he then goes on to kill. There 
is a triple allusion: (1) to Rajinikanth in Pandiyan and thus as a tick or checkmark (‘to be 
right, to being correct’); (2) to the Nike brand and thus as the swoosh; and (3) to Playboy 
(‘playboy’ is roughly a gloss of Manmathan, the Hindu god of love) and thus to the 
sexual prowess of the hero to correct girls. These allusions point to the status-ful hero, 
first by co-opting the status of Rajinikanth; second, through co-opting the status of the 
Western brand; and third, through co-opting female virtue.  
 241
 
Photo 5.4 “Corrected machchi” stamp from the film Manmathan (2004) 
 
In 2007 I came across this symbol re-animated by a group of students from an 
engineering college near Madurai. They had printed a status-raising tee-shirt which 
utilized the Manmathan stamp with their own caption: “Beware of the B3 - Back Bench 
Boys.”9 In this example we see how older film (Pandiyan) serves as source register for 
the status work of newer films (and younger stars)10 which in turn serves as a source 
register for youth’s own status work.11  
 
                                                 
9 “Back Bench” is a reference to students who sit in the back of the classroom and make mischief (chapter 
2, section 4.2.4). The shirt is status-raising both in its denotational and allusional content, but also because 
such shirts were all matching and meant to be worn at the same time by the students, thus creating a visual 
effect, foregrounding them from the background of other students (see chapter 3, section 2.2.6). 
10 Venkat Prabhu’s 2010 film Goa has re-animated this scenario from Manmathan in a parody scene 
starring the Manmathan hero Simbu using the same stamp. Here the reference is simply to Manmathan and 
the references to Pandiyan and Nike are subsumed to the playful re-animation of Simbu’s role in this youth 
comedy film. 
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11 Film is also a source register for brand marketing. For example, a 2007 television advertisement for a 
candy company appellates youth customers by showing a child reenacting a famous Rajnikanth style where 
he throws a candy in the air, bounces it off his body, catches it in his mouth, and says “namma style” (‘[it’s] 
our style’). The ad then cuts to Rajinikanth in a soccer and volleyball game doing even more excessive and 
impressive style with the candy (cf. the styles in Sivaji [2007]). Here film becomes the source register to 
market a particular product in other media through representations of style aimed at youth. 
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2.5 Women and film as a source register for status work  
The use of film as a source register is more common among young men than women, 
though young women do borrow from cinema heroines. Moreover, even if they don’t 
practice such aesthetics in their everyday lives, their aesthetic tastes (i.e., what they like 
and think is beautiful) are articulated through film. When they can, though, they often do 
(e.g., on tour, when on the college campus). Many hair styles, accessories (e.g., Trisha’s 
hair clips), color schemes, prints (e.g., Jyothika’s saree in Chandiramukhi [2005]), and 
ways of wearing clothing (e.g., Sonia Agrawal’s wearing of the dupatta in 7G Rainbow 
Colony [2004]), were re-animated from film.  
Women, however, borrow less comprehensively and with less frequently than men. 
This is due to the problematics of style for young women in general (see chapter 3, 
section 4). It is also due, however, to the fact that youth film favors the hero, constructing 
him as emulatable, while the heroine of the film is often relegated to a very minor role; as 
we saw in chapter 4, to the ratifier and appreciator of the hero’s style, or as eye candy, 
and not an emblem of style itself (except perhaps as a negative image of style, as in 
Neelambari, the villain of Padaiyappa [1999]).  
I asked many young women what they thought of the fact that the female characters 
in Tamil films are minimal and their dress is totally impractical to everyday life. They 
noted that while indeed this was the case, it didn’t impede their viewing experience 
because they themselves watch like boys. They also watch for the hero, who is the focus 
of their experience of the film. They are used to it, they explained. Reflecting this fact, 
women’s slang speech as far as film as source register was concerned, used many of the 
same kinds of constructions and borrowings as men’s (except, to my knowledge at least, 
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the use of sexual double entendres). And note that most of the speech that makes its way 
into youth usage comes from male characters, the heroines’ speech being much less 
replicated. (They have, after all, much less dialogue.) Again we see how ‘youth culture’ 
in Tamil Nadu is highly gender skewed, in this case with respect to mass-mediated 
representations and their re-animation. 
 
3. Received wisdom: Engaging representations of style  
3.1 Imitating favorite film heroes? 
In chapters 2 and 3 I showed how youth talk about, engage with, and negotiate style 
and status in their peer groups. In chapter 4 I analyzed the image of style in film and 
demonstrated how this image of style is iconic with that of ‘youth,’ both in the forms 
used and in the dynamics of representation/negotiation. In this chapter I have discussed 
how film provides a source register for youth performances of style, providing usable 
signs for youth in their own status and identity work.  
Why are filmic representations of style and youth modes of status and identity work 
through style iconic? What is the relationship between these two representational orders; 
between these two modes of youth activity (film viewing and film re-animation)? A 
common answer in lay and academic discourses (e.g., Rajanayakam 2002; Verma and 
Saraswathi 2003: 115; Osella and Osella 2004) is that youth imitate their favorite film 
stars, and thus youth style and film style are iconic to some significant degree. This is 
often attributed to youth’s obsession with film. Hence “fan worship” or “devotion” 
become dominant paradigms in understanding the relationship between film and its 
viewers (e.g., Rajanayakam 2002; Dickey 1993b, 2001; Srinivas 1996; Osella and Osella 
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2004; Rogers 2009, forthcoming). Through these paradigms engagement with film is 
reduced to (unreflected upon) mimesis (implicitly, then, a kind of influence or 
brainwashing), a result of film satisfying viewers’ fantasies and desires (see Dickey 
2009b for a discussion).12 While cases of youth imitating their favorite film stars can be 
demonstrated, thusly formulating youth’s relationship to film in general misses out on 
what I argue is a major part of what is going on in youth’s engagement with film. As I 
show, both the notion of imitation as well as the notion that imitation is conditioned by 
liking a film star are problematic. 
First, it isn’t clear how representative the film fan club member is of youth in general. 
Indeed, most of the youth who use film as a source register aren’t fans per se. Many are 
simply casual viewers. Second, what they use from film may not be from their favorite 
film actor, or even a film actor whom they like. For example, many Vijay styles were 
replicated (knowing they were Vijay styles) by youth who actively disliked Vijay. This 
isn’t to say that some of the time some fans do not imitate because they like the star, but 
that this isn’t sufficient to explain the relationship of youth to film in general. Third, 
viewers don’t imitate everything that their favorite film stars do. Indeed, they are highly 
selective and they react strongly when their favorite film stars do things on-screen that 
they don’t like. They will boo, boycott films, or tear up the screen or the theater seats 
with razorblades. Moreover, a fan of a star like Kamal Hassan may not imitate him 
precisely because Kamal Hassan’s image itself eschews style. Fourth, the imitation view 
 
12 For example, “The individual’s emotional and blind identification with the hero and the total loss of self-
identity make him/her effectively dysfunctional and lost in the world of simulations” (Rajanayakam 2002: 
224). “The phenomenon of hero worship is most prevalent among the youth, who are by and large 
unemployed or underemployed with a vast majority of them coming from poorer socio-economic 
backgrounds” (ibid.). 
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assumes that popularity of film is somehow linked to the amount of imitation by viewers. 
Yet even a cursory analysis shows that film popularity is no guarantee of acceptance of, 
for example, style in fashion. A flop like Vijay’s Sachin (2005) may generate a trend like 
the tee-shirt stitched on top of a button-down shirt, while a very popular film like Ghilli 
(2004) may not generate much in the way of fashion. Fifth, this view implicitly imputes a 
top-down view of film-mediated communication: fashions come from film and go to 
youth viewers.  
In short, the notions “imitation” and “favorite film star” aren’t relevant for most of 
the youth population. And even for fans such notions are insufficient to explain their 
engagement with film.  
 
3.2 Why youth use film for style 
We are presented with two questions. Why are youth interested in style in film? What 
is the relationship between style on-screen and off-screen? At a first pass we need to 
bracket the question “what about style and the hero-centered film gives pleasure to youth 
viewers?” if only because of the assumed link between pleasure as self-evident reason for 
why film is a source register for youth’s status work (cf. Thomas 1985; see Dickey 
2009b: 10).  
I argue that the link between film and youth activity is about how film can be made to 
speak to youth’s own status and identity work in their peer groups. Rather than film 
influencing youth, rather than youth imitating film, youth use film, youth re-animate film 
(cf. Pandian’s 2008 discussion of realist “nativity” films in rural Tamil Nadu). From this 
point of view, the use of film in peer groups doesn’t necessarily have anything at all to do 
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with film qua film at all. One very important reason why youth are interested in film is 
that it offers neat solutions for how to solve the problem of status-raising via style in 
contexts where status-raising is likely to breed jealousy and prompt teasing and other 
modes of status-leveling. This is so for at least two reasons.  
First, to do style requires its ratification by peers. Because youth’s status negotiation 
is fluid and ephemeral, finding a solid ground from which to project oneself as status-ful 
through style without falling prey to teasing or accusations of being boastful or arrogant 
is fraught with problems. Ratification, then, either requires the user of style to be already 
seen as status-ful (i.e., he is able to pull it off) or that the particular style-ish form in 
question is usable by all. In the latter case, it is easier to do a style which has already been 
done by someone else of higher status. Thus, using (prefigured) style from film is always 
easier, always safer, and yet still status-raises. This is precisely because it tenuously 
maintains the distance between the act as re-animation and the act qua act—that is, the 
act as performance versus as performative (Fleming n.d.)—and thus always maintains the 
possibility of citing the status of the source of the borrowing (the film star) as 
justification; or in the case of ambiguous irony, the possibility of deniability, i.e., as 
mention instead of use. The fact that style in the film conforms to style among youth is an 
indicator that film is a treasure trove of possible status-raising devices. Things which do 
style in film are easily recontextualizable within the peer group.  
And this is by design. Films present imminently reusable models of personhood to 
youth in such an idiom because they are intentionally designed by filmmakers to be 
replicable, recontextualizable, and recirculatable in media other than film. As the actor 
Sriman (the sidekick to Vijay in Pookkiri [2006]) (Sriman 2008) explains, ‘a youth film 
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needs dialogues and fashions that youth themselves can use. For example, in Pookkiri 
(2006) Vijay’s dialogue “oru vaaththi mudivu eduththaa naanee en peechchu 
keedkamaaddeen” (‘If I make a decision once, even I won’t listen to what I say’) is one 
such usable part of the film hero. From the perspective of fashion, film stylist Vasuki 
Baskar explains that the hero-star’s outfits, from the clothes to the accessories to the hair 
styles, must always be a bit “different,” but still fit within the paradigm of style and the 
overall image of the hero-star (Baskar 2008). It should be a bit out of the ordinary and 
“dramatic,” but not bizarre. The ultimate reason is that the hero’s fashion should be style 
that fans can use in their own self-presentation. Dance choreographer, film hero, and 
director Laurence Raghavendra makes the same point regarding dance steps 
(Raghavendra 2009). Dance steps are choreographed with the idea of fan replicability in 
mind.  
In short, the style of the hero (dialogues, fashion, dance, etc.) should always be 
changing, have its own unique permutation in each film so that: (a) such differences in 
style (which youth viewers look forward to seeing on the screen) act as a draw to get 
youth in the theaters; and (b) such styles recirculate fractions of the film and its hero-star. 
Such recirculation creates a kind of advertisement for the film. Such style fractions make 
the film visible, hype it, and thus contribute to the popularity of the film and thereby 
profits. They also contribute to status-raising the hero-star himself—insofar as being re-
animated by others for status-raising itself constitutes status-raising for the person being 
re-animated—and thus making him capable of further status-raising in future films.  
Second, film as a social institution, heroes’ characterization in film, ‘youth’ as an age 
set, and style as a type of status and repertoire of semiotic forms are all iconic with each 
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other. They all diagram exteriority from ‘society’ and ‘culture.’ They are all transgressive 
of norms of authority (chapter 2, section 2.2). They are all characterizable as visible, 
different (ab-normal, extra-ordinary), modern, and linked to the foreign. And because 
they share a fractionally similar diagrammaticity, diacritics from one realm are easily 
transportable to another. Just like youth, then, actors and the characters they play are seen 
as exterior to ‘society.’ They are defined by their visibility. Their status is non-traditional, 
transgressive, and modern.13 As such, film is made for youth; film is about youth; style is 
done by youth and ‘youth’ (status) is style; film style is re-animated by youth as status-ful 
among one’s peers (but not in the adult world where cinephilia is childish) and youth 
style is the grist for filmic representations of style. For all these reasons, then, youth style 
lives on and off the screen.  
 
3.3 Principles of using film for style 
If youth are selective in how they engage with filmic images, what are the principles 
upon which they select? I have already in part answered this question. Youth use images 
from film which can be status-raising in the peer group. But which images are potentially 
status-raising? I argue that the forms which are used by youth to status-raise in the peer 
group are precisely those that, on the one hand, are status-raising in the film diagesis, 
and, on the other, are performed by actors who themselves are seen as status-ful off-
screen. Thus, for example, comedians rarely provide a source register from which youth 
 
13 This is perhaps one reason why Tamil audiences, while particularly Tamil-oriented in their politics and 
protective of their “culture,” have no problem accepting non-Tamil cinema actors. MGR, Jayalalitha, and 
Rajinikanth aren’t Tamil as typically reckoned by Tamils. Moreover, rhetorical attempts to sideline such 
politically-minded actors from Tamil politics based on their non-Tamil-ness have had little traction with the 
Tamil population. This is because the whole ontology of status for such individuals is always already 
different, alternative, and exterior. 
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borrow style insofar as comedians emblematize anti-status through failed style. Youth 
will, however, re-animate comedians in their status-leveling, as we saw. Or, they will 
self-status-level by re-animating the comedian(’s dialogues) as a kind of self-deprecating 
humor (itself potentially a tropic form of status-raising, though not style per se).  
So from whom, then, does style get borrowed? Who are seen as status-ful enough to 
license their own and others’ status work? Heroes and to some extent villains are the 
most commonly re-animated figures in youth’s status work. Earlier I argued against the 
proposition that the link between youth peer group activity and film was constituted on 
the basis of simply “liking” a film star. So what is the principle? Do youth borrow 
randomly from any hero? No. Rather, hero-stars who are seen as status-ful by a critical 
mass of one’s peer group, who are seen as being able to pull off some style by virtue of 
their status serve as source registers for style re-animation by youth. Note that this is 
different from the issue of “liking” a star. Even if a Vijay fan dislikes Ajith, he will 
recognize that Ajith is status-ful (or at least that many people recognize Ajith as status-
ful) and thus to borrow from Ajith is to do style. In this sense, then, “liking” a film star is 
related to youth engagement with film, but not at an individual level. Ultimately the re-
animation of style is contingent on the perception of popularity, as manifested (or 
reanalyzed from) bodies in the theater seats, peers’ appreciation of the hero-star’s 
performed style, and widely circulating evaluations that some hero-star has the status 
necessary to pull off style. In short, the issue isn’t individual mental states (“liking”) but 
reflexive calculi of sociological facts (“popularity” qua status). 
Note how the issue of popularity, then, is as much an issue of how re-animatible and 
how re-animated certain forms linked to the hero-star are. And, of course, such forms are 
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constantly being cycled, both because of the constant arrival of new films in theaters and 
because forms which are too replicated, too re-animated begin to lose their cache as 
status-ful. The dialectic, then, is between forms whose status can’t be backed up (one will 
get teased otherwise), borrowed forms (which raise status through association with status-
ful individuals), and overused forms (which no longer raise status because of their 
ubiquity).  
If the perceived status of the hero-actor determines the probability that what he does 
on-screen can be used by others, then what counts as status for film actors? How does a 
film actor become status-ful enough to license his own style, not to mention license the 
style of others?  
 
3.4 Films stars negotiate status like youth negotiate status 
Youth apply the same logic of status negotiation in the peer group to their 
engagement with film stars. They watch a hero on-screen doing style as they might watch 
and evaluate a peer doing style. Further, youth judge the hero of hero-oriented cinema 
against his status both as a hero-character (intra-textually) and, more importantly, as an 
actor (extra-textually). They judge representations of him status-raising on-screen against 
their perceptions of his achieved status (across films and off-screen) and not just based on 
the story’s construction of the hero alone. This is because for such viewers, doing style 
on-screen is a move of status-raising of the actor. Is he an established star or a new face? 
This was explained thusly by my Madurai informants: ‘if Rajini or Vijay lights a cigarette 
by shooting it with a gun, or if they come back to life (by pure force of will) people will 
clap and appreciate it. They will take it as a serious act (of status-raising). However, if a 
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new face does the same thing, they won’t accept it. They will boo at the screen. They will 
laugh at it as ridiculous, absurd, and unrealistic. Who are such young actors to try and 
project such a status through such extreme style? They are just “chinna pasangka” (as 
compared to the periya aaLungka that established hero-stars are).’ This is also related to 
popularity. For example, as another youth explained, if the very popular Rajinikanth 
catches a bullet with his teeth and spits it back at the villain to kill him viewers will clap 
in appreciation. If Vijaykanth—a film hero who is unpopular with urban youth and who 
is seen as a kind of a joke, an emblem of the absurdity of an older kind of cinema—does 
something similar—for example, stares a bullet down so that the bullet turns around in 
fear—they will laugh.14  
Note that this is why young actors and filmmakers, as they pointed out to me, opt for 
‘realistic’ roles and films (Chantanu 2009; Kumarappa 2008). They can’t pull off such 
heroism and style in their films. Viewers will reject it, and their films will be flops 
(Selvaraghavan 2005, interview in Nakassis and Dean 2007: 89–90). As the actor Sriman 
(2008) put it regarding the extreme heroism of Tamil hero-stars like Rajinikanth and 
Vijay: “Only Superman can fly.”  
The ability to perform style is also related to the overall image that the actor has. 
Take, for example, Kamal Hassan (or Sivaji Ganeshan from his generation). He is a 
highly regarded an actor (versus Rajinikanth or MGR who are not regarded as 
particularly good actors, but as consumate heroes). Seen as the genius of Tamil cinema, 
in each film Kamal plays a different type of character from all walks of life. Each 
 
14 Obviously, this is highly perspectival. Vijaykanth fans would give different answers of course (see 
Rogers 2009).  
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character looks and sounds different.15 His films attempt to work outside of heroism 
often through notions of realism and coherency of narrative that the hero-centered cinema 
often brackets. And as youth explained, if Kamal tries to do Rajini-esque style, even 
though Kamal is a highly regarded and established actor whom many viewers like, they
won’t accept it. It will seem odd, absurd, and sti
What is interesting, then, is that for both hero-stars and youth when one’s status isn’t 
established as a perduring social fact, acts of status-raising are fraught with the possibility 
of going wrong, of being excessive, and thus being rejected by the peer group/audience. 
In such contexts, style is seen as a kind of performance and is evaluated functionally. 
Individual A did action B or used form B because it is style: individual A is trying to 
status-raise through B; (s)he is trying to show that (s)he can do that. For individuals 
whose status is sedimented—either by virtue of the history of his films (e.g., for a 
Rajinikanth, Vijay) or by some ideology of style (e.g., my roommate Stephen from 
Kodaikkanal, see chapter 3, section 3.2)—style is performative. A did B because that is 
his style, because A is style. Here style is seen as an externalization of an inner quality, a 
perduring aspect of that person (his status). 
In short, there is a double articulation of status that is held in tension through the 
screen: style on the screen can only be licensed through the ratification of status off (or 
across) the screen. Further, off-screen status isn’t reckoned independently of film. Rather, 
it is reckoned by the image of the hero projected in and across his films. This seems to be 
a paradox. How can one get status off-screen if status is only able to be built up on-
 
15 His recent Dasaavathaaram (2009) was his attempt, in fact, to establish his status as the premiere actor 
of Tamil cinema, past and present. In this film he plays ten roles (das ‘ten’ + aavathaaram ‘avatars’), thus 
breaking Sivaji Ganeshan’s previous record of nine roles in Navarathiri (1964) (lit., ‘nine nights’) 
(Rangaranjan 2007). 
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screen? And how can one do status on-screen if it can only be done if backed up by off-
screen status? How can a hero bootstrap his way into style and heroism?  
It is important to note that: (a) no actor starts off doing heroism. Rajinikanth started as 
a villainous character actor in (relatively) realist films (Abuurva RaagangkaL [1976], 
Pathinaaru Vayathile [1977]). Vijay started off as a “soft hero” in romantic films (Love 
Today [1997], Kaathalukku Mariyaathai [1997]), as did Ajith (Kaathal Kooddai [1996], 
Kaathal Mannan [1998]). Dhanush’s early films are all within a realist idiom 
(ThuLLavathoo Ilamai [2002], Kaathal KoNdeen [2003], Dreams [2004], Puthuppeeddai 
[2006]). For all these actors, it is only after a number of their depictions as non-hero 
protagonists clicked with audiences that they could even be taken seriously as hero-stars 
who can do style. Thus (b): building up such an image is never a single-film affair. 
Rather, building up a status-ful image as hero-star who can perform style in his films and 
have it ratified by audiences is something that happens over many films. And as the case 
of Kamal Hassan shows, it isn’t just being acceptable as a star that counts. One’s films 
must consistently construct an image as status-ful which is greater than any one of the 
roles one plays. That is, one’s oeuvre of films must construct a status-ful hero-star, a kind 
of “parallel text” (Mishra et. al 1989) or trans-textual image: a fusion of the actor with all 
the roles that he plays. Note that this notion of status-building over a set of films is 
precisely the same issue that confronts youth in the peer group: one has to consistently 
status-raise so as to create a perduring image or reputation as status-ful. It isn’t one single 
act of status-raising that can entail such an image. It is a cumulative effect that depends 
on image management and negotiation with those who, ultimately, must ratify such 
status-ful acts. 
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As I show below, just as the youth peer group works through the centripetal and 
centrifugal forces of status-raising and -leveling, the sedimentation of the hero-star’s 
status also works through the same dynamic. Those who are successful at building up an 
image of status, like Rajinikanth, Vijay, and Ajith, are precisely those actors who are able 
to status-raise—project style—while also status-leveling. They are enmeshed within the 
same economy of status negotiation that their viewers are. It is the multi-voiced-ness of 
actors’ status-acts—they articulate to inter-discursive histories of status-raising within an 
economy of status negotiation; they simultaneously engage in both status-raising and -
leveling (implicitly or otherwise)—that make them so useful to youth, whose own status 
negotiation also crucially depends on such multi-voicedness, as we saw in chapter 3.  
 
3.5. How film stars accrue status within, across, and outside the film text 
In this section I discuss the ways that film actors attempt to bootstrap their status 
through their image management. I differentiate three different textualities which, 
through the process of becoming a status-ful hero-star, get articulated in different ways, 
and in their apotheosis blurred completely: (1) the intra-textual image of the film hero (on 
a roll of film); (2) the trans-textual image of the hero-star (on many rolls of films and in 
non-filmic meta-discourses about that image); and (3) the extra-textual image of the actor 
qua ‘real’ life human being (not on film).16  
 
16 The trans-text is what Rogers (forthcoming, p. 22 of the manuscript) calls the “idiolect” of the hero’s 
stardom. Compare my tripartite distinction with Rajanayakam’s (2002: 253) distinction of the explicitly 
“public realm,” the publicly known side of the “private” realm, and the self-reflexive “screen realm”: “The 
public realm includes any reference that is directly political, such as icons . . . , critical comments, 
ideological statements and culturally rooted motifs and archetypes. The frequently recurring ‘politicisable’ 
references to the private life invariably consist of the past experience. . . . The self-reflexive references 
within the screen realm but laden with the potential to be politicised include repeated usage of honorifics . . 
. , certain motifs . . . , and mere titles of films by the same star” (ibid.). This set of distinctions is designed 
to deal with the particular problem of how particular texts can come to influence politics, be seen as 
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In chapter 4 we saw how Rajinikanth’s films project his intra-textual image as both 
above and part of the peer group (i.e., the community of film viewers). However, how 
does an actor like Rajinikanth connect this intra-textual image as legitimately status-ful 
individual to his extra-textual image as a status-ful actor who can play such roles? As 
noted above, it is through the construction of a trans-textual image of the hero-star. How 
is this done? Below I answer this question by focusing on the films of Rajinikanth and 
Vijay. 
 
3.5.1 Inter-discursivity 
The intra-textual image of the film hero in any particular film is made to be similar to 
all other images of him, either in other films or outside of film.17 That is, the 
sedimentation of status of the hero-star is only possible through a kind of inter-
discursivity where each film builds off of the last.18 This inter-discursivity is both 
implicit in the iconism between the roles of the characters—Vijay’s and Rajini’s heroes 
are more or less of the same type (see Rajanayakam 2002 for an indepth description of 
this iconism across all roles)—and explicit in alluding to previous characters, the 
 
political statements themselves, and translate the hero-star into a political figure. As such, it conflates 
various indexical targets which may be relevant in differing ways to the images of the hero. Do filmic signs 
index the actor, the image of the trans-textual hero-star, or another organization [e.g., a political party]? Or 
“culturally rooted motifs and archetypes”? Thus, even from the beginning (since Rajanayakam is interested 
in already fully status-ful hero-stars like MGR and Rajinikanth) Rajanayakam collapses the various kinds 
of images of the hero-star and the materiality in which they adhere (a single film, many films, the 
construction of the hero-star’s “parallel text”) into the singular image of the politicized hero-star. 
Rajanayakam also doesn’t differentiate between the internal textuality of a particular film and the 
cumulative image over many films, instead carving out the category of the “public realm” which is a 
heterogeneous set of semiotic forms which index the extra-textual political realm. 
17 Note that this tendency also applies to villains to some extent. For example, Raghuvaran was a popular 
villain who played across from Rajinikanth in many films. Similarly, Prakash Raj’s villain in Ghilli (2004) 
is rehashed in Pookkiri (2006) (e.g., through the explicit inter-discursive use of “chellam” ‘dear’ in both 
films). Hence we can also talk about the villain-star.  
18 This is what Rajanayakam (2002) calls “snow-balling.” 
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For example, the signature styles of older films are repeated in later films, thus 
creating a trans-text of style. Rajini does the same style-ish salute accompanied by th
same sound effect, the same twirling around his sunglasses, the same pushing back his 
shirt to put his hands on his hips, the same throwing of a cigar(ette) or gum into his 
mouth, and the same style-ish gait in all his films. This goes along with the repetition of 
songs (e.g., the theme song of Annamalai [1992] redeployed in Baadshaa [1995]) and 
ticular shots across films (e.g., explicitly referencing Baadshaa [1995] in Sivaji [200
through a similar shot of Rajini walking toward the camera with flames behind him).  
In general, in Rajini’s films his characters are similarly praised for having so much
“style,” thus explicitly foregrounding his trans-textual image as the king of style. Take, 
for example, the songs “Style Style” in Baadshaa (1995) and “Style” in Sivaji (2007
Similarly, the constant praising of his “style” by other characters serves to connect “Super
Star” Rajinikanth to the lexical item style. As we saw in chapter 4, the heroines in 
Annamalai (1992), Baadshaa (1995), and Padaiyappa (1999) all voice their attraction to 
Rajinikanth through their attraction to his “style.” Similarly, the fa
99), played by Sivaji Ganeshan, makes Rajini perform his signature style-ish
him, referred to explicitly as “style,” and then praises him for it.  
Rajini’s older dialogues are also re-animated in his later films. This is most 
transparent in Sivaji (2007), a retrospective inter-discursive smorgasbord of style. This is 
done both by Rajini—for example, when he says “ithu eppadi irukku?,” the dialogue
from Pathinaaru Vayathilee (1977) after flipping a firecracker into his mouth; or when h
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(parodically) reenacts his role from Chandiramukhi (2005) as the king clapping the 
thalam (“lakalakalakalaka”) for Jyothika (in Sivaji played by a male police inspector)—
or by other characters, as when Vivek references Rajini’s “thani vazhi” and “ithu eppadi 
irukku?” dialogues when giving punch d
 mimicry artists to try and crack the password of Rajini’s computer (each artist does a 
different dialogue from a Rajini film).  
In general, hero-centered films reflexively position the hero as a hero in the film text. 
For example, in Vijay’s Pookkiri (2006), a female villain addresses him as “Hey hero.” 
Often this takes the form of referencing the hero with the name of another character 
played by the actor from an older film. For example, in the song “Athirathee” in Sivaji 
(2007) R
 name and character of his 1980 film), and Baadshaa (‘king,’ the name of his 199
film).19  
More explicitly, Rajini is constantly referred to in his films by his epithet “Super 
Star.” In chapter 4 we noted this with respect to the display of the epithet of the hero-sta
at the beginning of every Rajini film (photo 4.1). This acts to suture together all his role
as “Super Star” (or, in Vijay’s case, as “Ilaiya Thalapathi Vijay” ‘Vijay, general of the 
youth’). In Sijvai (2007), the song “Style” begins “Hero Hero, You are the Hero. Staro 
Staro, nee Super Staro” ‘You are the hero! You are the Super Star!’ Later in the film the 
bad guys have assembled to bemoan Sivaji’s rise. A minister says, ‘All he wanted was to 
open a college, but [through your challenging of him] you made him into “Super Star.”’ 
 
19 Similarly, as Rajanayakam (2002: 253) points out, the song “Kaalai Kaalai” from the film Manithan 
(1987) variously refers to Rajini’s previous films Murattu Kaalai (1980), Pookkiri Raajaa (1982), Paayum 
Puli (1983), and Nallavanukku Nallavan (1984). 
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film stars. That is, the status of the hero-star is constructed by re-animating status-ful 
Alternatively, Rajini is often indirectly referred to by his name; for example, in Baadsha
(1995) Rajini’s character is referred to as th
e, referring to the ‘-kanth’ in Rajinikanth and to Rajini’s magnetic attractivenes
audiences (see Rajanayakam 2002: 295).  
Besides simply referring, older roles are actually reenacted in many films. For 
example, in Pookkiri (2006), the hero from Vijay’s previous blockbuster Ghilli (2004) 
makes an appearance (in the same exact outfit) singing the song “Appadi Poodu” from 
Ghilli. Most amazing is Annamalai (1992) where during a song sequence we are shown a
montage of scenes from different Rajinikanth films. This is diegetically framed by the 
hero and heroine looking into a moving image-finder with eye holes on either side (one 
for Rajini, the other for the heroine played by Khusbhoo). They look into it and what d
they see but various shots of Rajini doing style in as many as twelve getups from other 
films! The film characters are bizarrely watching themselves in other roles. The song
goes even further in its lyrics when it references Rajinikanth explicitly as “Rajini” and the 
heroine as “Khushboo.” Here the division between extra-, trans-, and intra-textual is 
blurred. Of course it causes no dissonance because, as I have been arguing, the immanent
film text is always already part of the la
a
Every character is a toke
3.5.2 Borrowing status 
The hero-star is also constructed based on the same relationship that youth have to 
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forms from other high-status individuals, notably other film stars. Thus, for example, in 
the film Baadshaa (1995), the name of the hero’s autostand is “MGR Auto-stand.”20 We 
can also note th
ck MGR.’  
Sivaji (2007) revolves precisely around Rajini’s co-optation of the two great actors of 
the previous generation: Sivaji Ganeshan and M. G. Ramachandiran (Sivaji and MGR for
short, respectively).21 The first incarnation of the hero is as Sivaji Arumugam, but in the
film called “Sivaji” for short. Later he comes as M. G. Ravichandiran, but call
film “MGR” for short. Here the naming co-opts Sivaji Ganeshan’s and M. G. 
Ramichandiran’s status-ful images but marks Rajinikanth (as the animator of these 
characters) as different: he is Sivaji Arumugam, M. G. Ravichandiran. In addition to 
positioning Rajinikanth within the dual lineages of Sivaji Ganeshan and MGR, the f
rife with other references, where Rajini re-animates the 1948 S. S. Vasan super-hit 
Chandralekha; his contemporary Kamal Hassan; younger generation actors like Prakash 
Raj in Ghilli (2004) and Vadiveel in Imsai Aran 23am Pulikeesi (2006); Hollywood fil
and video games: Roger Moore and James Bond, Eddie Murphy, Robert Rodriguez’s 
Desperado, The Matrix, Moral Kom
derman, and even Fidel Castro.  
On the first night of marriage with his wife Rajini asks her how they should celebra
(i.e., have sexual intercourse). Should they celebrate “soft-aa, vegetarian-aa” (‘softly, 
 
20 See Rajanayakam (2002: 259ff.) for descriptions of how Rajini used MGR’s image increasingly after his 
death; and how other actors use MGR’s image (ibid.: 307–308). 
21 Similarly, Rajini’s earlier film Raajaa Chinna Rooja (1989) explicitly connects Rajini with past greats of 
the Tamil film world. He states “I can sing like Bagavathar. I can wield sword like MGR. I can act like 
Sivaji. I can speak Thamizh like Kalaignar” (quoted in Rajanayakam 2002: 290). We can compare this with 
Simbu’s recent co-optation of Ajith and Vijay at the end of his recent film Silampaaddam (2008). 
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vegetarian-like,’ i.e., gently)—cut to a parody of the song sequence of the first nigh
Sivaji Ganeshan’s 1972 film Vasantha Maligai—or dreamy and “suRu suRu NNu” 
(‘vigorously’)—cut to a psychedelic song sequence of the first night from the 1971 MG
film Rickshawkaaran—or “romantically” (i.e., sexily, lustily)—cut to a song sequence 
from Kamal Hassan’s 1982 super-hit Sakalakkalavallavan. She then praises his st
says, ‘how would it be like that [according to your style]’? Cut to the actual song 
sequence from the film where a style-ized representation of the first night qua phallic 
fight scene is presented to the audience. 
s them, and then transcends them.22  
And just as actors of Rajinikanth’s and Vijaykanth’s generation calque their status off 
of already established artists of yesteryear like MGR, current aspirants use Rajinikanth’s
style-ish trans-text to try to ground their own status work. A survey of recent film title
shows this. Dhanush’s Pollaathavan (2007) and Padikkaathavan (2009), Laurence’s 
Raajaathi Raaja (2009), Ajith’s Billa (2007), and Sundar C.’s Thee (2009) all take 
names from past Rajinikanth hits.23 In the film Pookkiri (2006) Vijay does a style, 
twirling the gun around his finger over and over, pops the trigger, and loads it back up.
When a female character asks him in amazement how he is able to do that, he 
‘How many Rajini films I must have seen . . .’ (“naan eththane Rajini padam 
 
22 The extreme auto-referentiality of Rajini’s films (especially in Sivaji [2007]) represents the regress of 
this logic of status borrowing. Indeed, there are few who have more status than Rajinikanth, and certainly 
no one whose status is such that it can license style to the extent that it does for Rajini. As one’s status 
increases, then, the citationality of status-grounding moves turns inwards to one’s own trans-text rather 
than externally to others’.  
23 Similarly with MGR films: Marmayogi (Kamal’s recently shelved project), Aayirathil Oruvan (director 
Selvaraghavan’s 2010 film), and Raama Thediya Siithai (Cheran’s 2008 film). 
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(ironically and seriously) justify their own style, in the process constituting and ratifying 
Rajini’s trans-text as status-ful hero capable of doing style to the extreme.24  
Here, then, the hero-star is placed within a lineage of other status-ful individuals 
where, through a semiotic chain, status from one’s status-superiors licenses one’s own 
status work. And note that status works up the chain as well. Being so used itself indexes 
the status of the person being used. Hence the recirculatability of fractions of the hero-
star (e.g., of Rajini’s style in youth peer groups, of Rajini’s style by other film stars) itself 
constitutes status-raising of the hero-star (cf. voicing by another, as discussed in chapter 
4), and grounds his further status-raising in other domains (e.g., his future films).  
Note that of all the strategies discussed, borrowing as status-raising is one of the 
safest, and hence one of the most common strategies for younger, aspiring heroes and 
youth, precisely because it can equivocate between being an act of reporting (and thus 
simply a performance) and an act of performativity (as an actual raising of status). It is 
this ironical, but serious distancing which can be utilized to status-raise but maintain an 
escape hatch of deniability while still constituting an act of status-raising. This is what 
differentiates the comedian’s use of status-ful images from the hero’s. The comedian’s 
use simply attempts to perform an image of status (it is reportative, ironic, parodic) while 
the hero attempts to performatively diagram status (it constitutes status). Given humor as 
the comedian’s functional end, it is the self-reflexive distance of the performance from its 
performativity that differentiates the comedian from the villain. The villain’s style act is 
infelicitous, while the comedian brackets the illocutionary force of style within a larger 
reportative frame. The hero’s use of style attempts to minimize the gap between 
 
24 Also see Rajanayakam (2002: 302) who notes the reference to Vijay as “chinna Rajini” ‘small Rajini,’ in 
the song “Priyamudan,” as well as the actor Sarath Kumar’s use of Rajini’s image. 
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performance and performativity so that the former constitutes the latter, while the 
comedian attempts to maximize the gap so as to create a status-mismatch or -inversion, 
and thus humor. 
 
3.5.3 Summary of the hero-star’s trans-textual status work 
The total effect of such trans-textual status work is that all instances of the actor as a 
film hero are equated with each other, constantly referring to each other, collapsing one 
hero-character into the next, creating a coherent and formulaic trans-textual image, a 
crystallization of the textualized hero-star, a blurring and implosion of the intra- and 
trans-textual that is grounded not only in the intra- and trans-textual construction of the 
hero, but also in his alignment with other status-ful hero-stars (i.e., in a trans-hero trans-
text: the Tamil archetype “hero”). What is important here is that the similarity or 
equation of roles is crosscut by the sedimentation of status. With each successful film the 
hero’s style can increase, can become more magnificent, more capable of transgressing. 
There is an accumulation of status which felicitously licenses more and more style. With 
such a pattern established, viewers expect this kind of hyperbolic style from the hero-star, 
and fans are disappointed when he doesn’t deliver on it. As with youth peer group 
dynamics, status begets status.  
Further, because style is tightly regulated by the formulaic image necessary to 
generate the status essential to perform such style successfully in the first place, extremity 
of style (its intensity, the degree of its transgression) becomes another dimension of 
differentiating previous and future status-raising style. That is, the fetish of difference 
produced by the regularity of sameness increases the quantity of style as difference within 
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the same qualitative category. Indeed, in every film that a veritable hero-star like 
Rajinikanth does, his style grows in intensity while maintaining the same basic formula. 
It becomes more and more extreme, more and more developed, more and more powerful 
to the point where the hero-star is able to bend the laws of reality and society to his own 
wishes without it seeming silly or absurd to the audience. In fact, quite the opposite: it 
becomes natural and necessary.  
Such status work in films is only possible, as I have argued, because the relevant text 
being constructed and engaged with isn’t a particular film but a set of films that are seen 
as contributing to a larger trans-text. That is, the build up, to use a Tamil youth phrase, of 
an authenticated trans-textual hero-star conserves the status work done in any particular 
film, allowing it to be used as the ground zero of style for the next film. And because 
every intra-textual representation (token) is an icon of the trans-text (an emergent type 
level phenomenon), every next film doesn’t lose the momentum gained in the previous 
film. Here the history of Rajini’s films are organized around the construction of the 
Rajini trans-text: Super Star, the king of style and all their associated meanings. This kind 
of bootstrapping project of building up an image of style isn’t engaged with by actors like 
Kamal Hassan, whose characters are different in every film. His trans-textual image, 
rather, is of the consummate actor, capable of putting on any disguise and making you 
believe it isn’t him or any of his previous characters. Through non-iconism, or dis-
identification, of his roles he is seen as a great artist, but not a performer of style.  
 
3.5.4 Trans-text to extra-text 
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As I have been arguing, the hero-centered text constructs the hero as status-ful, and 
thus licensable to do style. And such texts situate themselves within lineages of 
texts/heroes to construct larger trans-textual images of status. The successes of particular 
actors to create coherent images that presuppose and entail status license the performance 
of style in later films. At the same time, such (trans-)textual images of status are 
explicitly connected to the extra-textual image of the actor, his ‘real’ life person.  
For instance, Rajini’s films often refer to his ‘real life.’25 In the fictional film 
AnbuLLa Rajinikanth (1984) he plays himself. In the more recent Kuseelan (2008) he 
plays a famous hero-star that is, in everything but name, Rajinikanth. In Sri Raghavendra 
(1985) and Muthu (1995) he plays spiritually oriented characters, which are taken by 
audiences to reflect how he is spiritual in real life. More interesting, and common in his 
films, are the references to his lowly origins; in particular, to his having been a bus 
conductor before coming to film. In Baadshaa (1995) he is pictured as a bus conductor in 
the song sequence Azhaku, accompanied by a self-reflexive moment where he stares into 
the camera and smiles a knowing smile to the audience. In Sivaji (2007), after having 
suffered a setback at the hands of the villain, his comedian sidekick Vivek asks him, 
‘What will you do? Will you become an auto-driver (his role in Baadshaa [1995]), a 
milkman (his role in Annamalai [1992]), a bus conductor (his role before coming to 
film)?’ Later in the film when he gets off a bus, Vivek says ‘You get down style-ishly 
like a conductor’ (“conductor maathiri style-aa iRangkuRe!”) doubly referencing his 
real-life past and his filmic image. Similarly, in Nallavanukku Nallavan (1984), Rajini’s 
 
25 The issue of course isn’t whether or not Rajinikanth’s life is really like this, but that the allusion in such 
films isn’t to his trans-textual or intra-textual images but to his extra-textual image, whether this be true or 
not.  
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employer asks him: “Have you heard of the one who was initially a bus conductor, but 
later turned out, because of sheer hard work, to be ‘Super Star?’” (quoted in 
Rajanayakam 2002: 288) 
In short, the trans-textual image of the hero-star is explicitly connected to, or 
anchored in, his extra-textual image.26 But why? For what purpose? As I argue below, 
this is because the ability of the trans-textual image of the status-ful hero-star only holds 
traction to the extent that the extra-textual image functions as a status-leveling alibi of the 
hero-star’s status-raising. In effect, the extra- and trans-/intra- textual images engage in a 
status division of labor that attempts to guarantee the audience’s acceptance of the hero-
star’s status-raising and allows such status-raising to become hypertrophied in successive 
films. 
  
3.5.5 Extra-text as alibi: Status-leveling 
 
26 In addition to being a feature of hero-centered films, this tacking between the inter-, trans-, and extra-
textual is itself part of spectatorship practices in Tamil Nadu. There is an assumption among many Tamil 
viewers that the role an actor plays reflects who he is as a person. This peculiar kind of realist spectatorship 
among Tamil viewers (perhaps more relevant at an earlier period of time) has been misunderstood by many 
as the ignorance of an audience that is so charmed by film that it cannot tell the difference between the 
screen and real life (see Rogers 2009; Dickey 2009b for discussion). This misapprehends the issue 
however. Many Tamil viewers assume that an actor wouldn’t agree to play a role that didn’t reflect who he 
was in real life. That is, the assumption is that one picks roles that project who one really is. For example, 
with MGR the logic was that he only played ‘good’ characters because he was a ‘good’ man. Conversely, 
on this logic women only act in films as heroines because they are actually morally corrupt in real life. For 
Rajini’s early image, there is also a confluence of his extra-textual image—as a man of vices—and his 
antihero image as deviant youth. From the get-go, then, the Tamil culture of film viewing is wont to 
connect the images of film characters with film actors through the notion of similarly constructed roles (i.e., 
that the extra-, intra-, and trans-textual images will or should align). Secondly, there is a long history of 
films diagramming extra-textual political situations. MGR’s films, and Rajini’s films to an extent, as 
Pandian (1992) and Rajanayakam (2002) have clearly shown, are supposed to be read against non-filmic 
scenarios, often quite literally. We can compare this kind of realist spectatorship with American 
assumptions about the truthfulness of documentary or news images. We accept that the news may lie to us, 
but we assume that what the news says should be evaluated by its truthfulness, or the commitment of its 
authors/animators to such truth. While we know that news images are simply images that can and often are 
false, nonetheless, the default assumption is that, by convention/genre, they are, or should be, true. 
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So far we have noted that youth viewers judge the expression of style in hero-centric 
films based on their evaluation of the hero-star as status-ful or not, following the logic of 
the peer group. One who is status-ful can express style successfully, while one who isn’t 
is ridiculed. We have linked the ability to ground status by film actors as part of the inter-
discursive construction of trans-textual images which, if ratified by audiences, license 
more and more status-ful expression in the form of style. What is interesting is that the 
grounding of such status is ultimately based on the extra-textual image of the hero-star, 
evaluated by the same logic of the peer group: the more he status-raises on-screen the 
more he must status-level in ‘real life.’ Just as someone who status-raises too much 
threatens to alienate the group, film stars who do not status-level themselves are viewed 
as immodest and arrogant. Indeed, when I talked to youth about film stars, it is this fact 
which they mention as much as the on-screen image of the hero-star. They like film stars 
such as Vijay, Ajith, and Rajinikanth because they are good people, they do social 
service, and they are humble and modest. (See Rogers forthcoming on Vijay’s extra-
textual construction as modest and ordinary).  
The common stereotype about Rajinikanth is that while on-screen his style is extreme, 
in real life he is (now) very simple and humble (also see Rajanayakam 2002: 249ff., 299). 
As it was often explained to me, ‘in contrast to other film actors and politicians who act 
in real life and on-screen, Rajini doesn’t act in real life. He is so simple. He doesn’t wear 
makeup when you see him in real life, or in television appearances. He comes as he is: 
balding, dark-skinned, unshaven, with white hair (photo 5.5). If there is a function he 
doesn’t come late and make everyone wait (a demonstration of higher status); rather he’ll 
be the first one to come (a demonstration of equal status). He never acts like he is better 
than anyone else. He acts on-screen, but not in real life.’  
 
  
Photo 5.5 Rajinikanth: On-screen and off-screen 
 
Indeed, this is part of Rajini’s self-presentation. For example, consider an interview on 
the Indian news channel NDTV (NDTV 2007) about the release of the film Sivaji (2007): 
“Interviewer: <to the camera> It’s not everyday that you get to meet and 
interview the God of Indian cinema. With me is the one and only Rajinikanth 
<turns to Rajini>. Sir, thank you very much for talking to us. We know that you 
do not give interviews normally. There’s a lot of expectation and hype around 
Sivaji. And people have been talking about the Rajinikanth style, the Rajinikanth 
style. Let’s hear it from you. What is the Rajini style? 
Rajini: <laughs embarrassedly; rubbing his neck; looking down> See, actually, 
it’s only the media who have made it so big to be frank with you. Now they are 
comparing Rajinikanth with Amitabh Bachchan.27 To be frank with you, in the 
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27 Ambitabh Bachchan was the biggest actor in Hindi cinema from the 1970s to the late 1980s, and is still a 
popular actor today. Many of Rajini’s hits were remakes of Amitabh Bachchan’s films. 
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cinema world Rajinikanth is only a king, probably a king. But Amitabh Bachchan 
is an emperor.  
I: Don’t be very modest. 
R: No, it’s a fact. So don’t compare emperor to a king, right? Ami-ji is my 
inspiration, he is my role model. Okay? And this hype, see whatever, this is 
Shanker’s [the director’s] picture, AVM’s [the producers’] (picture). Whole credit 
goes to Shankar. He’s the master, master director. Hats off to him for everything. 
We should congratulate, we should appreciate everything to Shankar. I am only 
an actor, just like a puppet.  
I: That is typical Rajini modesty. People say Rajinikanth doesn’t do stylish stuff, 
what Rajini does becomes style.  
R: Maybe, I don’t know about that <laughs embarrassedly>. I don’t know about 
that, maybe. It’s a God’s grace [sic].”  
 
Rajini’s comportment in this interview ranges from the submissive to the embarrassed: 
his nervous laughter, his swaying back and forth, his compacting posture, his nervous 
rubbing of his neck, his downward avoiding eye gaze, and his soft voice. At every move 
he status-lowers himself and praises others: saying that “Ami-ji” (+hon.) is his superior 
and role model; saying that the director Shankar is his master; attributing his success to 
“God’s grace” or the media hype. He even makes the unbelievable assertion that he is 
“only an actor, just like a puppet.” He lets the interviewer praise him, and explicitly stats-
levels himself to the point where the interviewer interrupts him by saying “That is typical 
Rajini modesty,” a dismissal of his status-avoiding manner (yet ironically itself ratifying 
Rajini’s self-status-lowering moves through interruption). Even when he self-attributes 
status he hedges: “probably a king,” “Maybe, I don’t know about that.” 
This necessity to perform modesty in proportion to one’s own on-screen style is de 
rigeur for film stars. Hence the necessity of sponsoring social functions like giving to 
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charity and celebrating one’s birthday by performing social service for the poor (e.g., 
Vijay’s 2007 celebration of his birthday with poor, sick children at the Egmore hospital 
in Chennai [Indiaglitz 2007]; cf. Rogers forthcoming). It is also de rigeur for fan clubs of 
film stars to engage primarily in acts of social service (Dickey 2001; Osella and Osella 
2004: 242)—for example, giving away food, pens, notebooks, or clothing to the poor 
during celebrations of the hero-star’s birthday or recent film releases. And this is 
encouraged directly by film stars. The idea here, as Rajini fan club members in Madurai 
explained to me, is to spread the good name, the humbleness, the “of the people”-ness 
qua patronage (i.e., status-raising through lowering, cf. the treat) of the hero-star (Osella 
and Osella 2004: 242; cf. M. Mines and Gourishankar 1990; M. Mines 1994 on the 
periya aaL).  
To not status-lower is to risk peril at the hands of audiences. Indeed, while youth 
accept stars as status-ful who project sameness with the community of viewers qua peer 
group, they explicitly dislike other stars, and often reject their status-raising moves in 
films, because of their perceived arrogance in real life. This is common discourse 
regarding actors like Simbu and, to an extent, Kamal Hassan. While everyone agrees they 
are talented, their head weight (thalai gaNam, ‘arrogance’), their banthaa, their over 
speech praising themselves as talented individuals outside of film is a turnoff, and thus a 
reason to dismiss them/their films and their attempts at status-raising.28  
What we see, then, is that while the intra-textual film hero performs unimaginable 
acts of style, projecting unmeasurable amounts of status, the extra-textual image of the 
 
28 Note that for comedians and villains the necessity to be authenticated outside of film as users of style 
doesn’t exist. Their filmic style is always already deficient in some way, and thus the necessity for their 
grounding and status-leveling in the extra-textual is moot. 
 271
                                                
film actor acts as a kind of alibi, grounding film style through extra-textual status-
leveling.29 Just as with youth peer groups, status negotiation is always twofold: one can 
perform status to the extent that one has status; one’s performances of status should never 
exceed the peer group. The most popular hero-stars are consummate humble men of the 
people, constantly status-lowering off-screen while constantly status-raising on-screen. 
Interestingly, as a hero-star like Rajinikanth’s status is ratified by audiences, he 
increasingly disavows style off-screen. This itself is an act of status-raising through 
inversion for only the man who has something to downplay can downplay it. Fans 
assume, then, that just as Rajini’s characters become normal men after the villain is 
vanquished and the film plot finishes (see chapter 4, section 3.5.9), when Rajini steps off 
of the set he is a humble, normal person, but with a caveat: just like Rajini on-screen, the 
lion within him is always there waiting to be unleashed, contained within himself as an 
act of solidarity with and deference to the ‘people.’  
Note that for any one hero-star the figures of status in play are multiple; that is, there 
are multiple embodied surrogates of the actor circulating at any one time: his actual 
physical body; images of him in particular films; and commentaries on him (as a hero or 
person) in conversation and in other media. Further, each of these images are engaging in 
status-raising or -leveling to various degrees. Precisely because of this simultaneous 
multiplicity, the hero-star’s status work can tack between these various images so as to 
 
29 When understood outside of the context of the dynamics of status negotiation in youth peer groups, this 
feature of hero-star presents itself as a contradiction or ambiguity. For example, Rogers (forthcoming: 24–
25 in manuscript) notes this ambiguity/contradiction regarding Vijay. However, because he doesn’t take 
into account the larger underpinning of the hero-star’s construction (as regulated by the logic of the peer 
group), he can only make sense of this contradiction by appealing to the essentialized Cartesian and 
Darshanic modes of seeing that are presumably at play, thereby reintroducing the mind–body dualism he 
strives to avoid in the first place. Once we realize, however, that film star images are constructed out of the 
same logic of the peer group the contradiction becomes a non-problem.  
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both project equality and difference from the peer group at the same time. Thus he can 
both voice status and deny/defer it, and each act can play off of the other, thereby 
hypertrophying the intensity of status-raising. It is precisely this representational 
disjuncture that makes it possible for the hero-star to make incredible status expressions 
in his films and have it ratified by audiences. 
And note, recalling Rajini films like Annamalai (1992) and Padaiyappa (1999), how 
the hero-star’s tacking between multiple surrogate images of himself (the extra-, the 
trans-, the intra-textual) parallels the structure of the hero-oriented text: style and status-
raising only come after a ‘building up’ of the hero (through the voices of others) coupled 
with status-leveling images of the hero both before (he is just a normal guy who avoids 
status negotiation) and after the main status work of the film (he returns to his ordinary 
status-less self). Style is liminally situated between two moments of non-status (or rather, 
hidden or deferred status). Similarly, the extra-textual image of the hero-star functions to 
buffer moments of status-raising in films, deferring the articulation of his status to others 
(e.g., his fans), by being situated outside of the film text.  
Note how this parallels youth’s ‘solving for’ the inherent tension of the peer group 
through the hybridization or negotiation of their status-raising performances (chapter 3, 
section 3). Of course, the problem is slightly more difficult for youth because: (a) in 
general they do not have such surrogates to status-raise (though images circulated in 
graffiti, on sign boards [for friends’ weddings, fan clubs, political parties], gossip, or in 
other media function in this way to this end); and relatedly (b) the feedback of status-
leveling from peers is often coterminous with their acts of status-raising, making the kind 
of tacking back and forth done by hero-stars difficult for youth. This explains why 
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youth’s status tends toward hybridity while the hero-star’s on-screen status tends toward 
hyperbolic extremity. The main task, however, of creating a perduring image of status-
ful-ness that can thus license style qua status-raising is the same. We can see, then, why 
youth status and film representations of status are so iconic: the logic of hero-stars’ 
performances of status (on- and off-screen) and that of youth’s performances of status 
and the evaluation of both kinds of performances are based on the same logic. And 
moreover, each interpenetrates the other: film images require their extra-filmic 
recirculation for popularity and profits; youth utilize filmic images to successfully 
navigate the youth peer group. 
 
4. Conclusions: From reception to re-animation 
In this chapter I have shown that film is a central source register for youth’s status 
work. Further, I argued that the engagement of youth with filmic images of style is the 
same as their engagement with images of style in their peer groups. To this extent, film 
hero-stars abide by the same logic of status negotiation that applies to the youth peer 
group. I argued that the iconism between youth peer groups and filmic representations 
holds because films are re-animated by youth to do their own status work and thus the 
same forms circulate in both representational orders. Second, they are re-animated 
because film offers a solution to the problematics of status negotiation in the peer group. 
Further, this ease of re-animation and recontextualization is part of the design of such 
films.  
In this section, based on the above discussion, I problematize the notion of reception 
in media studies. Within Indian film studies the typical framing of the commercial hero-
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oriented film has attempted to locate it within a larger dichotomy of realism versus its 
others: melodrama, escapism, and fantasy (Thomas 1985; Pandian 1992; Dickey 1993b; 
Rajadhyaksha 1993; Vasudevan 1995; Dickey 1993a; Rajanayakam 2002; Srinivas 2010; 
see Dickey 2009b for a discussion). Implicitly, then, most approaches to the hero-
oriented commercial film have attempted to read it against the question of how it relates 
to the extra-textual as representational or not (where representation is understood in the 
classical sense of mirroring, or true reference). The theoretical and methodological fallout 
of this is that the study of such film is largely textual (e.g., Prasad 1998; Niranjana and 
Dhareshwar 1996; cf. Srinivas 2010 who even while attempting to locate her analysis of 
the social life of film outside of the text inevitably falls back into this trap by “reading” 
film posters). 
More anthropologically oriented approaches to film have attempted to move from the 
text to the audience’s reception.30 However, the representational assumptions of such 
work still remain, except now, instead of the question being how do film texts relate to 
the (un-)reality of (ideological) representations, the question becomes how do film texts 
map onto the audiences that apprehend them? That is, how do viewers interpret film 
images and make meaning out of them (cf. Bordwell 1989 in the film theory literature)? 
How do viewers process filmic images, how/what do they think about particular films (cf. 
cognitive approaches in the film theory literature: Bordwell and Carroll 1996; Carroll 
1996; Currie 1996; Holland 1992; Hochenberg and Brooks 1996; Prince 1996)? What do 
 
30 For this discipline shift in anthropology see Davis 1989; Hirsh 1992; Dickey 1993a, b, 1995, 2001; 
Spitulnik 1993; Armsbrust 1996; Crawford and Hafsteinsson 1996; Barber 1997; Larkin 1997; Derne 2000; 
Liechty 2003. On the turn to reception in cultural studies (with respect to television and other media) see 
Morley 1980, 1992[1980]; Hobson 1982, 1992[1980]; Ang 1985[1982]; Radway 1984; see Ross and 
Nightingale 2003 and Straiger 2005 for discussion. 
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they learn from film images (Rajanayakam 2002: 227)? Do they reject, do they accept, or 
do they “negotiate” film images qua instances of ideology (Hall 1993[1974])? In short, 
ultimately for this approach to media the question still is, how do audiences engage with 
filmic texts as representational objects? 
In all such questions the viewer is taken as a kind of end point of communication, of 
meaning, of consumption, of ideology. The film is extinguished at the moment of being 
seen and processed by the viewer; it influences or not, just as a mirror can reflect back 
only what stands across from it. Film is always already about watching, processing, 
comprehending, thinking, and feeling at the moment of sensing the filmic image.31 This 
is the moment of its (mental/sensual) contact (cf. Benjamin 1935 and Kracauer’s 196
notion of film’s tactility).  
But why only view film from the perspective of the mental interpretants that it 
immediately produces (what Peirce 1992 referred to as the dynamical interpretant)? 
Certainly this is part of the social life of film. But is it only that? In this chapter I have 
framed film as a particular kind of semiosis that can be interrogated—and is interrogated 
on a daily basis by Tamil youth—according to its pragmatic utility. Further, I argued that 
film meta-pragmatically (pre)figures itself as re-animatable based on precisely such 
pragmatic utility (Agha 2007b). It isn’t only the case, then, that film representations of 
status abide by the norms of the youth peer group, but that this is so because film design 
explicitly links re-animatability to popularity and profits (often under the rhetoric of 
 
31 Hence the high degree of cognitivism in film theory, from Kracauer (1960) and Bazin’s (2004) 
psychologistic, Screen theory’s psychoanalytic (Baudry 1986[1970], 1986[1975]; Fargier 1980; Comolli 
1986[1971]; MacCabe 1985; see Carroll 1998a, Allen 1995 for discussion), to current cognitive 
psychological (Bordwell and Carroll 1996; Carroll 1996; Currie 1996; Holland 1992; Prince 1996) 
approaches to film. 
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giving the fans ‘what they want’). Films are designed to live on beyond being “received” 
through presupposing youth’s active modes of spectatorship and post-filmic engagement 
with and use of film (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009).  
In short, then, to understand the hero-oriented film—and to understand any film, I 
would argue—it is necessary to look at the re-animatability of filmic representations as 
pragmatically efficacious and meta-pragmatically prefigured for such efficacy (cf. Agha 
2009). To do this requires us to attend to contexts and activities often far removed from 
events of film reception (cf. Ram 2008: 56 on religious film). I demonstrated this for 
Tamil commercial cinema by situating film with respect to youth notions of status and the 
dynamics of status negotiation, and linking these realms to film production.  
The problem with the reception approach to film can be demonstrated with analogy to 
another semiotic phenomenon (see Agha n.d.: 9 on a similar line of critique regarding 
classical political economy). It is as if we reduced fashion and its consumption to the 
showroom and the moment of purchase, and ignored the fact that people actually wear 
the clothes they buy to do interactional work outside the showroom. And further that this 
is central to fashion and its social life. I think analogies of this kind aren’t often drawn 
with regards to film because of the particular biases introduced by the denotational 
transparency of film. Film has a seemingly self-contained “meaning” and can be analyzed 
solely from this point of view without any seeming residue (see Nakassis 2009 for a 
critique). Because of this robust semanticity the pragmatic and meta-pragmatic conditions 
of possibility for such meaningfulness are easily ignored in favor of textual analogies or 
analyses of audiences’ textual analyses. But ignoring such conditions is neither justified 
nor advisable, as I have argued in this chapter. 
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The ground for status work, for the work that youth make film do, is the peer group. 
And as I have argued in this dissertation, this extends far beyond the theater. From this 
perspective we can start to think about film engagement not as reception (and thus the 
question, does film influence or not?) but as re-animation (how is film used and to what 
ends?). To recall the metaphor from chapter 3, just as the carpenter isn’t influenced by his 
hammer but uses it, youth use film; they re-animate it for other purposes: to status-raise, 
to status-level others, to entertain, to time-pass. Film theory misses this to the extent that 
it thinks that films are objects whose sole or most important aim is to represent (and thus 
that its sole value is its representational and denotationally self-contained content, or 
apperception thereof), to create a world for us to be able to think and feel. It is this 
attempt to reduce film as surrogate mental object—that film is a projection of, or iconic 
with, thought or the senses—that reduces engagement with film to a mental act and that 
then projects this back on films and classifies them based on whether they abide by the 
ontological and epistemological categories presupposed by this mental act, viz. “reality” 
or “fantasy.”  
An approach to Tamil cinema which takes the story and not the hero-star, which takes 
the logic of coherence/realism and not the logic of status in the peer group, is unable to 
understand such film except as escapist, fantastical, ridiculous, unreal (cf. Ram 2008 on a 
similar take on religious films). And yet, as I have argued, such a view misapprehends 
that such films are primarily about status and not about reality or fantasy per se. They 
must be read as such. This is precisely because this is how film viewers engage with 
hero-stars. We might offer a different, albeit culturally specific, classification of films 
than the real–fantasy dualism: films which are designed to be re-animated for status 
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negotiation in peer groups and those which aren’t (cf. the hero versus the non-hero, 
discussed in section 2.3).  
This mode of reckoning film also allows us to theorize engagement with film without 
having to fall back on the psychologism inherent in the notion of identification. In 
analyses which do not place the youth peer group as the relevant model for understanding 
Tamil hero-centric cinema, the notion is that youth imitate film heroes because they 
identify with them in the fantasy created by the film (Rajanayakam 2002; cf. Osella and 
Osella 2004: 257; in Western film theory: Allen 1995; Smith 1995). While perhaps not 
untrue in some cases, this formulation mischaracterizes the issue by reductively 
psychologizing it. As I have shown, the issue of film engagement is independent of 
psychological identification by viewers insofar as it rests, in the first instance, on the 
pragmatic usability of particular forms. It doesn’t matter whether viewers identify with 
Rajinikanth or Vijay, or that they feel that they are like him, but that the images presented 
on-screen are iconic with the kinds of images that they themselves can perform for ego-
focal indexical effect. Indeed, feeling closer to the character is no guarantee that viewers 
will use such images more in their lives, as a comparison of the frequency and fidelity of 
youth’s re-animation of Rajinikanth with a new faces like Dhanush—with whom youth 
may identify with but not re-animate—shows.  
There are other issues which are still unexplained by approaches to Tamil film which 
relegate it (knowingly or unknowingly) as the opposite of realist cinema: why do viewers 
accept the ridiculous unreality of such cinema, its illogicity, its schizophrenia (as seen by 
such theorists)? The only fall back is to say that either: (a) viewers are brainwashed, 
confused, or ignorant, as per a common lay discourse; (b) that they just want some easy 
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entertainment, nothing too heavy (Dickey 1993b); or (c) that the film conforms to a larger 
moral/ideological vision of the social world (Thomas 1995; Prasad 1998). Such views, 
however, are unable to explain why some films are rejected, derided, and made fun of for 
their illogicity, their in(s)anity, and their stupidity but others aren’t. Such views also fail 
to explain why such distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable illogicity do not 
map onto fans versus non-fans (i.e., the idea that fans accept anything and non-fans can 
see through the veil). Non-fans may accept the illusion in films of an actor as status-ful, 
while fans may reject that illusion (e.g., if it contradicts their expectations). Further, they 
are unable to explain the most salient fact about Indian commercial cinema: its ubiquitous 
recirculation and re-animation by highly discriminating viewers in all domains of social 
life for multiform purposes often unrelated to pure entertainment or moral cosmologies 
(cf. Srinivas 2010).  
What I have shown in this chapter is that if we view film from the perspective of 
status negotiation in youth peer groups these issues become non-problems. For example, 
the logic of status is clear and rational in the film and thus the issue of representation and 
reality (and the masses’ illogicity) becomes irrelevant because the pragmatics of status 
negotiation work not on concepts of truth or reference but on performance and 
performative felicity.  
This interpretation of the hero-centered film also explains a number of otherwise 
curiosities about hero-oriented Tamil cinema. For example, (a) how to reconcile that the 
hero-star has unbelievable fighting ability despite not that great a physique; (b) his 
uncontrollable charisma despite average looks; (c) films whose plot lines are incoherent 
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but that aren’t evaluated negatively because of it; (d) the ability (indeed, necessity) of 
hero-stars acting as young characters well into old-age.  
A hero-star like Rajinikanth or Vijay commands so much status that he can literally 
bend screen reality to his will. Viewers accept this with relish because the hero-stars’ 
status is built up and ratified across a filmic history of status-raising and -leveling.32 
Thus, after seeing MGR or Rajini hundreds of times playing the same youth character, 
fighting off hundreds of rowdies, loving and being lusted after by young beautiful girls, 
we expect—no, we demand!—that the hero-star still play a character that age because, 
more than his actual age (which everyone knows), the age of the hero-star is fixed. 
Similarly for his physique and looks. It causes no dissonance that the hero-star is average 
looking or flabby in real life or on-screen, because the main issue is the hero’s status and 
the extent to which that can license what would otherwise be anomalies in this 
characterization. 
Yet note that no new face can do this. Indeed, the new face in Tamil cinema 
inevitably plays the role inscribed in his actuality. Thus, Dhanush’s, Bharat’s, Vijay’s, 
and Arya’s first films were as average, young men. It is also no surprise, then, why it is 
smaller aspiring stars like Vishal, Dhanush, and Suriya (rather than Ajith, Vijay, and 
Rajinikanth) whose actual physique first began to match the figurative and filmically 
constructed hyper-masculine displays that have always been part of Tamil cinema but 
never displayed on the actor’s body as they are today in toned biceps and six-pack abs. 
For new faces and less-established stars there is no other principle to ground their 
characters or their status except for their “reality” (and the coherence and realism of the 
 
32 This is what Rajanayakam (2002: 140) refers to as the hero’s “transcendental narrative status.” 
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story); for to break with reality presupposes status that they do not have enough of. It is 
this status—built up over a history of texts—that licenses such breaks from reality: from 
the reality of looks, of physique, of age, and of logic. 
In short, we have to be able to break the assumption that film should be judged from 
its representational content and audiences’ reception of such content. This is an 
understandable assumption given that the form of film motivates such a reading. Indeed, 
film is denotationally and referentially rich. Moreover, much film is made to be engaged 
with in precisely that way. And yet not all film is so constructed, and not all film is so 
used. If we hope to fully understand how film works in many different places and in 
many different ways, the concept of reception itself has to be displaced, just as the notion 
of the film image as only having (true/false) referential content. 
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Part III. Style and the Brand 
Chapter 6 – Consuming Branded Forms 
 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter I look at the consumption of branded forms by Tamil youth.1 In 
particular, I am interested in apparel and accessories that index Western brands like Nike, 
Reebok, Diesel, Armani, etc., either explicitly or implicitly. As I will argue, the 
consumption and display of such garments is understood by youth as style. This is 
because the branded form itself is understood as style. Moreover, such garments are 
understood as style at the expense of the “brand images” and “meanings” typically 
associated (in the West) with branded forms—that is, as regimented by brand meta-
discourses. As I show, youth are largely ignorant of brands qua specific brands. 
Moreover, they are willfully ignorant. I conclude with discussion about why youth are 
willfully ignorant of brands as such but invested in branded forms; how this changes how 
we theorize the brand (which I take up in chapter 8 in more detail); and what the 
implications are for how we think about globalization and doing ethnographic research. 
 
2. Consuming the branded form 
2.1 Introduction  
When I came to Tamil Nadu for the first time, of all the things that grabbed my 
attention, one which always gave me pause and brought a perplexed smile to my lips was 
the ubiquity of foreign branded forms in public space. On sign boards, the backs of cars 
 
1 I use the term “branded form” to refer to objects which have the form of branded goods, whether or not 
they are legitimate or counterfeit. This includes brands, counterfeits, and quasi- and non-brands. “Branded 
form” refers to that which has the qualia of brand tokens qua tokens of the brand type.  
 283
                                                
and auto-rickshaws, the sides of buses, the fronts of motorcycles, and especially on the 
clothes and accessories of young men, public space in Tamil Nadu was teeming with 
brands. I became increasingly interested in how and why such branded forms were so 
present, so visible in youth male fashion. Why and how were brands consumed by young 
men?2  
 
2.2 Brands in India 
While foreign brands have been present in India for a long time, their ubiquity has 
grown since the mid-1980s when the Indian economy began to be liberalized 
(Rajagopalan 1999; Mazzarella 2003: 256; Tarlo 1996: 337–341; cf. Lukose 2009). The 
liberalization of the Indian economy has contributed to the presence of brands in at least 
three ways. First, it contributed to the rise of brands in public life through making 
branded commodities more available for consumption. Second, with liberalization, 
discourses of the nation have themselves shifted from Nehruvian productivism to an 
explicit consumerist stance, thereby valorizing consumption (and thus the consuming of 
brands) as part of the nationalist project (Rajagopal 1999; Fernandes 2000a: 614, 2000b; 
Deshpande 2003; Mazzarella 2005; Lukose 2009: introduction, ch. 1). Third, with 
liberalization came increased foreign capital ready to invest in the production of branded 
goods for export to foreign markets (Chari 2000, 2004; cf. Cawthorne 1995). This 
production inevitably leaks into domestic markets, creating a supply-side reason for the 
 
2 What was just as conspicuous as the use of brands among young men was their near total absence among 
women. As discussed in chapter 3, section 4, women’s engagement with branded forms is problematic 
insofar as branded forms in Tamil Nadu are linked to the notion of style and visibility, both of which have 
moral implications for women. Because of this, it is rare to find women’s clothing with visible brand logos 
or names among the lower and middle classes. Elite women can and do use brands on their bodies, much 
like they might be used abroad. In this chapter I am mainly concerned with male fashion. 
increase in branded forms through export-surplus overruns, defects, and counterfeiting 
operations. I look at the production side of the branded form, in particular duplicate 
commodities (or dummy pieces) in chapter 7. If liberalization made the circulation of 
branded forms, authentic and counterfeit, possible on the supply side, what is the logic 
which makes such commodities objects of desire? What fuels their consumption? 
 
2.3. “Brand illa NNaa style ille”: No brand, no style 
— Zeiss brand eyeglasses advertisement; Chennai, Tamil Nadu (2008) 
 
What is the allure of the branded form for Tamil youth? In particular, what is the role 
of the branded form as part of the visible assemblage that young men construct around 
themselves? First let’s consider some examples. It’s common to find the branded form 
featured prominently on vehicles—a Bacardi logo on the trunk top, a Jaguar sticker on 
the side door, a Nike decal on the back window (photo 6.1), a Suzuki sticker on the 
motorcycle’s headlight—or on the display of one’s cell phone or computer monitor—an 
Adidas or Nike logo as the screensaver or display background.  
 
Photo 6.1 Nike swooshes on car 
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Most conspicuous and common is the presence of branded forms on the body: a 
Tommy Hilfiger tee-shirt, Ferrari button-down shirt (photo 6.2), Harley Davidson jacket, 
Diesel jeans, G Star shoes, a Nike swoosh stud earring, a Reebok ring, a Levi’s backpack, 
a Marlboro belt, or an Adidas bracelet (photo 6.3).  
 
Photo 6.2 Ferrari button-down shirt 
 
 
Photo 6.3 Marlboro belt buckle and Adidas bracelet 
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As the range of examples above shows, the branded form has its own attraction 
over and above the commodity form (cf. Halstead 2002; Hoe et al. 2003; Yurchak 2006). 
Indeed, as seen above, the branded form often is appended to commodities where the 
extension of the brand in question doesn’t apply: for example, the name and logo from 
Mercedes Benz on a pair of cargo pants (photo 6.4).  
 
Photo 6.4 Brand use (Mercedes) on novel commodities (cargo pants) 
 
In the above cases, such brand–commodity mismatches aren’t produced by the brand 
companies in question. They are counterfeits. Even if the authentic brand has its own 
“aura” (see chapter 8) and is seen as being higher quality and more trustworthy than its 
copies, the branded form is attractive beyond the question of its authenticity or its 
originality, as we will have occasion to see in this chapter and the next (cf. Halstead 
2002; Vann 2006; Yurchak 2006: ch. 5). Indeed, most if not all of the examples of 
objects youth used which have branded forms on them aren’t originals, but local 
duplicates (or dummy pieces), and this is common knowledge.  
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2.3.1 Brands as style, duplicates as style  
If brands are seen as higher quality, then why consume duplicates which are clearly 
not original items and which often bear no resemblance to the ‘real’ brand commodities 
except for the presence of brand logo or name (and even then, often in a distorted form)?3 
Why the branded form more generally?  
Besides the obvious answer that fake and export-surplus branded goods are cheap and 
easily available (a necessary condition of possibility for youth consumption), the more 
interesting and important answer is that the branded form is seen by youth as style, as 
being able to status-raise in the peer group.4 Indeed, the most common answer to the 
question of why did you buy, or why are you wearing, this piece of branded apparel was 
that the branded form was “style” or “geththu.” This explains why, as one Madurai youth 
pointed out, ‘even if some good is fake, youth will prefer the fake branded good over a 
non-branded [but authentic] good because it has style.’ As a prominent ad in Chennai put 
it circa 2008 “Brand illa NNaa, style ille” ‘If/when there is no brand, there is no style.’ 
And as far as youth are concerned, this is true of both authentic and duplicate items. 
Indeed, when I would ask youth to describe what someone who was style-ish was like, 
 
3 From my own observations it seems that the brand-as-quality discourse is also a kind of alibi, a way of 
deflecting too much status-raising. (This isn’t to say that people didn’t believe it or that it wasn’t true; 
indeed, local duplicates are of much lower quality.) That is, fetishizing the functionality of the product is a 
way of reducing the status element of its use, and thus is a kind of self-status-leveling. To claim that one 
bought a Nike shirt because it is of higher quality is to implicitly deny, or deflect, the proposition that one 
bought it in order to status-raise (see section 3.3 for more discussion).  
4 Yurchak’s (2006: ch. 5) discussion of the use of “empty” indexicals of (former) Western commodities 
(labels, empty bottles, boxes, bags) in the construction of the “Imaginary West” is a useful comparison. The 
use of such goods to construct an internal exteriority—an exterior space confined within the youth peer 
group—is similar to the Tamil case discussed in this chapter (also see Mazarella 2003: 256ff.). Different, 
however, is the Soviet fetish of “real contact” and the eschewing of the duplicate, something that isn’t the 
case among working- and middle-class young Tamil men. Without knowing the Russian case well, it is 
difficult to conclude the reason for the difference, but one possibility is the force, in the Tamil case, of peer 
pressure to status-level within the peer group, thus creating the compromise formation of Western brands in 
inauthentic forms (see section 3.3 for more discussion). The role of class is another possible difference. 
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inevitably branded clothing would figure in the description, branded clothing being an 
index of the youth status of that individual (Lukose 2009: 66–69 on Kerala; cf. Halstead 
2002 on Guyana). What makes such forms status-ful among youth? As I show below, 
branded forms are style because: (a) they foreground the individual who adorns himself 
with them because of their visibility; (b) they index exteriority; (c) they are associated 
with status-ful figures of personhood in media representations; and (d) they co-opt 
alternative schemata of value. 
 
2.3.2 Visibility and foregrounding 
Branded forms are style because they are highly visible. They attract attention. As one 
particularly style-ish Madurai youth explained to me, because style is about getting 
people to notice you, things which aren’t usually worn tend to get attention from one’s 
peers. And Western branded forms do just that; they attract attention because they are 
seen as neither ordinary nor normal (saathaaraNam). They are different.5  
But different from what? Here ‘ordinary’ non-branded clothing implicitly means, on 
the one hand, traditional ‘adult’ clothing (veeshdi, lungi, cotton shirt) and, on the other, 
tailored clothing. The latter is considered ordinary and regular largely because of the 
availability of cheap, low quality fabrics and labor. In distinction to tailored clothing are 
“ready-mades,” which is a stand-in for branded clothing. (Branded shirts are also known 
as “company shirts.”) Such clothing is generally more expensive and is connected with 
 
5 This visibility is important both for one’s peers and for the opposite sex. Young men often justified their 
use of brands because they claimed that women liked brands (cf. chapter 3, section 2.2.5). One student 
explained (obviously hyperbolically) that in Chennai meeting girls and initiating romance with them 
(correct paNRathu) was easy; you just have to have on branded clothes, like Reebok or Puma shoes, and 
just pretend that you are important person, for example, by talking in front of them on your iphone with a 
headset. Girls will instantly fall for you.  
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the market changes associated with liberalization. In this way ready-mades, and by their 
conflation branded clothing, are historically and sartorially more ‘different.’6  
As style, branded forms are caught up in the peer pressure and constant surveillance 
of youth peer groups. Youth adorn themselves with brands because such brands are 
“famous” among youth. As one Chennai student put it, ‘wherever you go you can see 
(paakka mudiyum) Reebok, so that is why I also have it.’ Another student noted that 
when he first came from Madurai to Chennai for college, he saw that everyone on 
campus had Diesel bags. He had never heard of it, but reasoned that it must be popular, 
so he picked one up himself so not to be left out, not to seem like a country bumpkin. To 
not participate in the economy of status-raising at some minimal level and be unable to 
visually monitor its associated forms is to be left out, to be invisible, and thus is 
productive of a number of anxieties and studiously avoided (cf. Dickey 2009a).  
 
2.3.3 Indexing exteriority  
The branded form is style because it indexes exteriority.7 It indexes exteriority in a 
number of ways. First, branded forms index foreignness in terms of fashion in general 
insofar as youth see brands as fashionable in foreign countries. Youth were often 
surprised that I didn’t have more branded clothing, thinking it odd that I would go out of 
my way to get tailored clothes while they were trying to get ill-fitting ready-mades (cf. 
 
6 To an American, it is ironic that: (a) tailors claim that the fashions that they have to sew today are calqued 
from ready-mades; that is, people come to ask them to make their clothes fit more like ready-mades, which 
largely means not as well fitted to their body (the index of wealth in the West); and (b) youth claim that 
tailors can’t quite get the same fit that one can get with ready-made clothes, and thus ready-mades are more 
popular. 
7 For similar indexical valences of branded commodities see Tobin 1992 and Creighton 1992 on Japan; 
Gondola 1999 on Congo; Halstead 2002 on Guyana; Vann 2005, 2006 on Vietnam; Manning and 
Uplisashvili 2007 and Manning 2009 on Georgia; and Yurchak 2006: ch. 5 on Russia. See Tarlo 1996: ch. 
2 on a similar dynamic in colonial Indian fashion in the 19th and 20th centuries.  
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Lukose 2009: 77). This spatiality is also linked to a particular temporality as well; brands 
index the ‘new’ epochal shift of post-liberalization, of a modern India that has ‘caught 
up’ with the West (cf. Manning 2009). 
Second, brands are associated with specific forms and fashions which come from 
‘outside’ of India. For example, the rage among Madurai and Chennai youth in 2007–
2009 was “anti-fit” clothing, which youth associated with American hip-hop music and 
artists like 50 Cent and Eminem.8 Further, such clothing is associated with exterior 
media. Such fashions are visually consumed via non-local television channels like MTV, 
VH1, V Music and the internet. 
Third, specific brands index exteriority because all such brands that are popular 
among youth are all “foreign” brands. Here foreign is often collapsed into “Western,” 
which itself often simply means “American,” even if the branded forms are neither (e.g., 
Honda, Suzuki are from East Asia; Puma, Pepe Jeans, Diesel, Gucci, Armani, Dolce and 
Gabanna are from Europe). Whatever their actual national origin—as we see below, 
youth don’t particularly care—what is important is that such brands are seen as coming 
from outside of India (cf. Mazzarella 2003: 256; Tarlo 1996). The irony here is that: (a) 
most branded forms are duplicates and thus locally produced; (b) even if authentic, they 
are most likely made in India under contract with a Western company for export (chapter 
7). And while branded forms which actually come from outside of India are considered 
to have an aura of style by virtue of being literally exterior,9 branded forms that aren’t 
 
8 Such artists themselves are popular because they embody a particular kind of exterior geththu that youth 
find resonant with the Tamil rowdy, himself an emblem of status-raising (cf. Weiss’ 2002 discussion of 
“thug realism” in Tanzania and their re-animation of American hip-hop artists). 
9 I found this out when going on a trip back home for a month. Before I left I was barraged by requests for 
anything foreign and branded: from liquor to tea to clothing items. 
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literally from outside still retained something of that aura because of the aesthetic quality 
that they project by indexing exteriority (see sections 2.5 and 2.6). Indeed, because the 
branded form is also an aesthetic form, even when it is clearly not foreign it can still 
index exteriority and function as style.  
This is also the reason why Tamil youth find the concept of style-ish Indian brands 
contradictory (at least as far as clothing is concerned). One Chennai youth pointed out 
that the phrase “Indian brand” is a contradiction insofar as “Indian” means local, second-
rate, and un-status-ful (with respect to Western commodities) while “brand” means 
international (and thus not Indian), quality, and style. To combine the two, then, is 
oxymoronic (see Halstead 2002 and Vann 2005 for something similar in Guyana and 
Vietnam respectively). 
This indexical value of exteriority is also the logic of the linkage of the brand with 
English.10 Beyond the brand, though crucially related to it as we will see, English on 
clothing (even if nonsense) is seen as style among youth (see chapter 7, section 2.4.4.9 
for more discussion). This link is so strong that apparel brands which are Indian almost 
always project themselves as foreign (e.g., Viking, Jansons, Viduka). As one informant 
pointed out, ‘it’s hip to have an English name on your shirt. If the brand name on your 
shirt is “Chandru Shekar” no one will see it as style, but if it’s “Charlie Nichols,” or some 
other foreign sounding name, they will.’  
Fourth, the branded form indexes exteriority because it is transgressive and non-
traditional. Insofar as the aesthetics of the branded form is a figuration of its foreign 
 
10 Of course, the exteriority of branded forms can’t be reduced to English as designs and logos also function 
in this way. More accurately, we should say Roman script, for written languages other than English (e.g., 
Spanish, German) also function in this way. For youth, however, all such languages were functionally 
equivalent, not to mention likely to be seen, in any case, as “English.” 
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origin, or its being part of foreign fashion, brands symbolically diagram exteriority not 
only from the ordinary tailored clothes of the everyday, but also from the clothing 
associated with ‘society’ and ‘culture,’ the “traditional” clothes of adults (veeshdi, 
bunyan, white cotton shirt, matching thuuNdu ‘towel,’ chappals ‘sandals’) which are 
plain and externally unbranded. In short, the branded form is a way to show one’s 
‘difference’ (viththiyaasam kaamikkiRathu), both from one’s peers and from adults. 
Branded forms as style, then, also potentially figure as a kind of challenge and 
transgression to adult authority (see chapter 3, section 2.2.4).  
 
2.3.4 Brands and mass media 
Brands are also linked to style via the mass media, as noted above. This is both 
through the linkage of brands to figures of personhood in foreign mass media—VJs on 
foreign music station like MTV and VH1; characters on syndicated television 
programming (e.g., shows like Friends) and in “English” films; athletes (e.g., the brands 
on Formula 1 racing cars and jackets; on cricket and soccer jerseys, etc.)—and in Tamil 
mass media, both television and film. In particular, since liberalization brands are de 
rigeur for Tamil film hero-stars’ style-ish dress (photo 6.5).  
  
Photo 6.5 Actor Suriya sporting Diesel brand underwear 
Here it is the link of the branded form to the film star which propagates the branded form 
among youth insofar as such branded forms are detachable and (re-)performable by youth 
in their own peer groups. As the Nike swoosh/“tick” example discussed in chapter 5, 
section 2.4.4 and in section 3.2 below interestingly shows, often it is the hero-star which 
is more important to the “meaning” or the pragmatic usability of the branded form than 
the brand qua brand.  
 
2.3.5 Co-opting wealth  
Authentic branded items perform style or geththu through their literal and 
conspicuous display of wealth. This type of usage is rare for most lower- and middle-
class youth, however, insofar as few can afford such goods. However, even cheap local 
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duplicates are able to index wealth qua style through simulating such goods. As discussed 
above, this isn’t because youth confuse such goods with the foreign originals from which 
they were calqued. Rather, such duplicates count as status-raising through their figurative 
co-opting of wealth and elite fashion (itself an exterior realm of normativity; see section 
2.3.3 above on exteriority). That is, such forms take on the aesthetics of elite fashion, and 
to this extent imagine themselves as participating in the social realms of wealth and elite 
status. This is possible because branded forms are also aesthetic objects, objects which 
diagram exteriority and status symbolically; by appropriating elite fashion in one’s own 
duplicate garments one can do style (cf. Hebdige 1979).  
 
2.3.6 Summary 
So why consume branded forms? Youth consume branded forms because branded 
forms are style; they diagram exteriority and difference through co-opting elite and 
foreign fashions via forms which index exterior places (and languages) and are associated 
with status-ful figures of mediatized personhood; as such they are transgressive of reified 
notions of (adult) ‘society’ and ‘culture’ and thus they foreground those who used them 
from the background, making them visible and status-ful.  
 
2.4 Branded forms and social class 
As mentioned above, whether an item is duplicate or real is not something most 
lower- and middle-class youth particularly worry about. Most youth don’t get teased or 
made fun of for wearing duplicates. And they certainly don’t avoid buying duplicates. As 
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I noted, one reason for this (but not the only one, as we’ll see) is that authentic branded 
commodities are priced out of most youth’s spending range.11  
For elite youth, however, authentic branded commodities (be they clothes, 
motorcycles, or cell phones) are part of the presupposed ground of participation. Not 
having brands, among other things, is a mark of poverty or rural background, and insofar 
as social class is partly predictive of peer group formation (see chapter 2, section 4.2.2), 
brand use is, to some degree, a line of social difference. As such, elite youth have a 
different experience of branded forms than other youth. Their engagement with brands (it 
is more active); their knowledge (they are brand conscious and aware largely due to their 
English mass-media consumption, trips abroad, etc.); the kinds they buy and where they 
buy them (at authorized stores; getting them from abroad from their own travels or those 
of their families) make their usage in some ways closer to that of American youth than of 
their lower-class peers. Such youth’s overall appearance and sense of style (see chapter 3, 
section 2.4) is also qualitatively different, both in terms of the quality of the clothing they 
wear and their general aesthetics. Such students look more like representations of 
Western fashion from Western media (e.g., an “authentic” hip-hop look), while their 
lower-class peers’ aesthetics conform to something closer to representations from Tamil 
cinema. For elite students, then, authenticity and brand knowledge as indexes of 
 
11 On rare occasions when one does get something authentically branded, however, it is a point of pride and 
joy. As my upwardly-mobile, middle-class Chennai roommate noted when he got his first (Adidas) branded 
pair of shoes as a gift from his father, he felt “semma jolly, romba happy” ‘extremely jolly, really happy.’ 
He explained that he had the feeling, but he didn’t know why, that he had completed or accomplished 
something important; that this moment was some sort of landmark for him. However, for most working- 
and middle-class youth, authentic branded items are a luxury and not particularly common. Moreover, 
authenticity of brands while something that individuals care about is not something that is particularly 
important at the peer group level (see section 3.3 for more discussion). This was changing as I was in the 
field, however, as companies like Nike and Reebok had priced down certain goods—hats, shirts, shorts—to 
a price range that more youth could access. It is telling, as we see below, that it is these brands that are seen 
as brands more than other brands. 
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socialization to “Western” fashion are key for fitting in, while not knowing about brands 
constitutes a sign of backwardness.  
And indeed, as one moves down the social ladder brand knowledge is less, as is 
concern with authenticity in the peer group. Even if they did know, and did have the 
money, youth wouldn’t necessarily buy authentic branded commodities. As Yuvaraj, one 
of my brand-knowledgeable Madurai hostel roommates, explained, ‘if in the college no 
one cares about brand authenticity, why would I spend 900 Rs. (about $20 at the time) on 
one “company” piece of clothing when I can get three or four (local) shirts? Among 
friends, everyone knows that no one has ‘real’ brands.’ Note that this logic also applied to 
elite youth when their peer group mainly included friends whose buying power was lower 
than theirs. In such contexts, they would dress down (see section 3.3 for more 
discussion). 
 
2.5 Brand ignorance: From brands to the aesthetics of brandedness 
While working- and middle-class young men adorn their bodies with branded forms, 
while in the field it was curious to me that they largely didn’t know or care, with a few 
exceptions, about the brands they were wearing (cf. Halstead 2002; Yurchak 2006: ch. 5). 
The exceptions included brands like Reebok, Nike, and Adidas, which youth were 
exposed to as Reebok, as Nike, as Adidas through cricket jerseys on TV, prominent 
brand meta-discourses (advertisements on television, billboards, print publications), 
authorized stores, and priced-down authorized brand products. However, these brands 
weren’t the most popular or frequently encountered among youth during my time in 
Tamil Nadu. Rather, brands like Diesel, Ferrari, and Tommy Hilfiger which didn’t have 
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priced-down products on the market, which didn’t have authorized stores, and which 
didn’t advertise in India were more popular. Diesel, the brand most ubiquitous among 
Tamil youth between 2007–2009, didn’t even have an official retail market in India at all. 
There were no authorized Diesel products in India, except those imported in ad hoc ways 
from abroad for boutiques. It was a bit of a puzzle, then, why brands like Diesel were so 
common among youth. Even more so because no youth that I met (with the exception of 
elite youth who had traveled abroad) even knew what Diesel was. My Madurai roommate 
Stephen, who owned a Diesel tee-shirt, canvas bag, and pair of jeans, asked me after my 
grilling him about Diesel and other brands, ‘is Diesel a clothing brand or is it a rock 
band?’ Similarly for Ferrari, a company that most youth didn’t know about, but readily 
adorned their bodies with. Even youth generally curious about the West weren’t 
particularly interested to know about such brands, where they were from, what kinds of 
companies they were, or what kind of a “brand image” they had.  
However, youth did have the access to information to learn about what such brands 
were about, either through the internet or by asking me. But with only a couple of 
exceptions, they didn’t. That is, non-elite youth were not simply ignorant of brands qua 
brands, they were willfully ignorant (both in the sense of ignoring brands qua brands and 
in the sense of lacking knowledge about brands).12 It didn’t matter to them. But how 
could it not? This is because, as I discuss below, brands were not construed or consumed 
 
12 Cf. Rajagopal (1999: 136) on the “pseudo-brand’s” consumption as indicating a lack of “brand literacy” 
or a sole focus of consumers on “affordable value.” 
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as brands per se. That is, the ontology of such objects wasn’t as BRAND, but as something 
else.13  
But if not as Ferrari, D & G, Diesel, etc., then as what? Such proper names were 
empty indexicals, they pointed to something, but no one knew what. Youth weren’t part 
of the brand “speech chain” (Agha 2007a); they knew of no baptismal event that linked 
this Levi’s bag to a particular company (the trademark owners of Levi Strauss), a 
particular image, or a range of spokespersons and products. But if their status as proper 
names, or even as metonyms for larger brand identities, was empty for youth, what were 
branded items indexing?  
As argued above, branded forms are style. And importantly, because of this, branded 
forms are also aesthetic objects. As one youth put it, when he shops he asks himself: 
“look-aa irukkaa? style-aa irukkaa?,” ‘does it have that look (does it look good)? Is it 
style-ish?’ Such forms are aesthetically attractive to youth: the form of the logo (e.g., the 
Nike swoosh, the Ferrari horse, the Diesel “D,” the Adidas stripes), the color 
combinations of the branded form (e.g., the red and black of Ferrari), and the English 
names, words, and letters are all seen as visually captivating and beautiful. Thus, for 
example, it wasn’t uncommon to find the use of brand names or logos in novel designs 
qua decoration.  
 
 
13 I use the small caps BRAND to designate this larger ontological category. See chapter 8, section 3.1 for 
more discussion. 
   
Photo 6.6 Nike swoosh as design element 
 
In photo 6.6 we see how one car driver used the Nike logo to create a novel design by 
inverting two Nike swooshes by flipping them vertically. When I asked him why he had 
used the Nike symbol, he indicated that it wasn’t because it was the Nike swoosh per se 
(it hadn’t even seemed to occur to him), though he was familiar with the Nike logo. He 
explained that he liked the curves of the form, that it was style, and thus he had used them 
to re-author his own design. The swoosh here isn’t a brand logo at all, but rather a design 
element, like a circle or a line, used to create a larger aesthetic design.  
In short, by virtue of their status-raising potential branded forms are aestheticized; 
they are seen as beautiful because of their connection with some (vague) notion of 
exteriority and visual attractiveness. What is interesting here, and what I discuss below, is 
that it is their status as aesthetic objects that can entail pragmatic effects (style) and not as 
brands per se that is relevant to youth’s experience and use of branded forms. 
 
2.6 Aesthetics of brandedness  
By “aesthetics of brandedness” I am referring to what Tamil youth call the “look” of 
some object as having a branded form, as seeming foreign/Western, as seeming 
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expensive even if the object isn’t branded, foreign, or expensive. This isn’t an issue of 
dissimulating or passing (off), but of conforming to, or co-opting, a set of aesthetic 
conventions and forms seen as visually attractive. (Indeed, insofar as they participate in 
this aesthetics, rather than dis-simulating brands, branded forms among youth come to 
iconize ‘youth’ instead.) We might also call this an aesthetic of exteriority, or an aesthetic 
of style. I use the phrase “aesthetics of brandedness” because—as will become clearer in 
chapter 7—the structure of all the objects that are part of this aesthetics is calqued off of, 
though not reducible to, the brand. Indeed, brands aren’t the only kinds of objects which 
are part of this aesthetics, which can be made to perform style via this aesthetics. For 
example, youth also used garments that had musicians’ or other pop culture figures’ 
names and faces on them, or the names or symbols of foreign countries (e.g., an 
American flag, the proper name “New Zealand”). Further, many forms that participated 
in this aesthetics were pseudo-, fictive-, or non-brands, though they had the look of a 
branded good (section 2.7).  
Such objects—brands, duplicates, pseudo- or non-brands—are all functionally the 
same to youth. Projecting exteriority, they are all linked to the not-here and by virtue of 
this they function as style. But this doesn’t entail any necessity of knowing positively 
what there is. This is why the duplicate in the non-elite peer group isn’t seen as a decrepit 
form of the original, the distorted form of the ‘real’: the ontology of the brand among 
Tamil youth isn’t founded on notions of authenticity, but on the aesthetics of 
brandedness. It is this aesthetics which makes even the cheapest brand duplicates able to 
perform exteriority and diagram social difference. It is this which allows the branded 
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form to be transported across commodity forms: why a Microsoft logo makes sense on a 
pair of pants, or the name 50 Cent on a belt buckle.  
It also explains to some degree which brands matter to youth: those that are 
maximally exterior and maximally visible. It is branded forms that self-reflexively point 
to themselves as exterior, as foreign, as part of this aesthetics that are taken up by youth. 
Thus, one doesn’t find shirts with Van Heusen or Peter England14—brands that make 
formal dress shirts where the brand identifier is found inconspicuously inside the shirt—
but those that are visible and eye-catching: the Nike swoosh, the Ferrari horse, etc.  
Noting that the ontology of the branded form among Tamil youth is rooted in an 
alternative organization that includes the brand, as well as many other types of 
commodity images, we can also make sense of a number of other facts about youth 
fashion: (a) the tendency toward distorting and hybridizing branded forms; (b) the 
flexibility in iconism between what we would consider the ‘original’ and its copies; and 
(c) the fetish of English in youth fashion. Below I discuss the range of objects that fall 
under this aesthetics of brandedness in order to show how this aesthetics abides to the 
form of the brand but not to the BRAND as ontological category.  
 
2.7 Hierarchy of copies  
 
14 Interestingly, if you ask youth who does care about brand authenticity, they will reply ‘older people who 
are working (white-collar jobs).’ Why? First, because unmarried people who work have money to spend on 
real brands, so it is actually a possibility for them. Hence, rich kids also care about brands. Second, because 
brands are used by young men for peer group status negotiation, which is outside of ‘society’ and fluid, 
youth have no objective status or ‘honor’ to defend or maintain in the form of gauravam (‘prestige,’ 
‘honor’) or mariyaathai (‘respect’). For working people (whom they conflated with adults), however, 
concepts of status like gauravam and mariyaathai are important, youth reasoned. Older people are 
concerned with prestige, as inherent and perduring, and thus with the brand as ‘authentic,’ as an expression 
of actual capital accumulation qua status. Plus, as such people are usually (upper-)middle-class the 
authentic brand is part of the status negotiation of their work place with its Westernized and middle-classed 
aesthetics. Young men aren’t so concerned with this at this point in their lives, and hence the authentic 
brand as such is largely irrelevant for them. 
Figure 6.1 schematizes the range of forms that are included under this aesthetics 
of brandedness. 
Figure 6.1 Hierarchy of branded forms 
 
Brand ontology 
 
Aesthetics of brandedness
 
 
(a) 
 
 “Original” branded commodity 
 
 
 
more fidelity 
(more specific 
reference) (b) Unauthorized Original from the same factory 
with the same materials 
 
 (c) Copy of an Original from the same/different  
factory with different materials 
 
 (d) Copy of the Original design with different 
materials, cut, stitching 
 
 (e) Copy of just the brand logo or name, 
but with different design 
 (f) Copy of the brand logo or name with  
alteration of their form 
 
 (g) Hybrid branded forms 
 
 
(h) Forms which don’t directly reference any  
existing brand, but have the branded form 
 
(more vague 
reference) 
less fidelity 
 
(i) 
Forms which only loosely have  
the branded form 
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“style”
 
I have organized the forms as degrees of deviation from the ‘original’ branded 
commodity, thus intersecting the two ontologies. The fit isn’t perfect, however. While 
(a)–(i) are equivalent under the aesthetics of brandedness, only (a) falls under the 
ontology of the BRAND proper (as quasi-legal category); while (b)–(g) fall under the 
“counterfeit” category (i.e., forms which pass off the intellectual property of the brand 
owner, possibly dilute or tarnish the brand, or are “grey market”); finally, (h) and (i) 
wouldn’t be considered as part of the BRAND(–COUNTERFEIT) ontology per se as they are 
unrelated to actual specific brands, though “inspired” by particular brand aesthetics. I 
have indicated these three divisions (authentic / inauthentic / seemingly un-related, 
though “inspired”) with dotted lines.  
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As we see above, the kinds of objects which function like branded forms—that is to 
say, participate in an aesthetic of brandedness—are various. From the perspective of the 
BRAND and (Western) intellectual property (IP) law, there are many deviations from the 
authentic branded good (a). The closest in form are those that are produced with the same 
materials and stitches on the same machines by the same people in the same factory (b). 
These often circulate in local markets because they are export surplus (“overruns”) or 
have slight defects. Alternatively, they may be made by an authorized factory producer 
but outside of the stipulated contract. Such items are counterfeit in the sense that they 
have not been authorized to be sold/exist, as well as because of the fact that the profits 
don’t go back to the company that owns the brand’s intellectual property. In form, 
however, they are identical to the original.  
Often to increase profits or because of a lack of materials or time, duplicates may be 
produced by the authorized factory producer with slightly different stitches or materials 
(c). These are, depending on the changes, often the same as the original to the un-
detecting eye. In a further deviation, such branded commodities may be reverse 
engineered (or the designs gotten in some other manner) and made by other producers 
with alterations, either in the materials, stitching patterns, the cut of the materials, or 
some other feature (d).  
Cases (b)–(d) are knock-offs of the branded commodity. (e) presents us with a further 
deviation. Here it is just the brand name or logo which is duplicated in what is otherwise 
a novel commodity or design.  
In photo 6.7 the logo and name of a brand, Ferrari, is attached to a wallet in a design 
the brand company doesn’t make (not to mention its misspelling). Even more extreme is 
the example of shirt with the Ferrari name and logo faithfully replicated on the back, 
while the front has the nonsense concatenation of words: “cross storm: Freedom, Athletic 
Cost, when f u scrat ur brain. blazo!”  
  
Photo 6.7 Branded form (Ferrari) in novel form 
 
Similarly, sometimes the logo survives while the brand name disappears. Photo 6.8 
shows a tee-shirt with the Ferrari logo prominently in the center. Instead of “Ferrari,” 
“Fashion” has been substituted, and the red and black color scheme has been replaced by 
blue and black/white. Here a proper name indexing exteriority (“Ferrari”) is replaced by 
an noun whose denotation indexes exteriority but isn’t a brand name per se (“Fashion”).  
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Photo 6.8 Ferrari logo with brand name substituted for 
In a further deviation (f) the brand logo or name is altered in its spelling. Hence, for 
example, Diesel becomes Diesal or Chiesel; Levi’s becomes Eevi’s, Live’s, Levie’s, or 
Livies; Dolce & Gabanna becomes Dolce & Cabana or Bglce & Gabana; Adidas 
becomes Adibas; Reebok becomes Reebek, Peekok, Reebor, or Rerock (photo 6.9); or 
Lotto becomes Lottoo (photo 6.10) (cf. Tarlo 1996: 242–243). 
 
Photo 6.9 Distorted brand names (Reebok) 
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Photo 6.10 Distorted brand names (Lotto) 
 
Alternatively the font or design of the branded form is lost and simply the lexical form is 
retained (and possibly distorted; e.g., the “Reebek” shorts in photo 6.9 above). Consider 
photo 6.11 which shows a “Levi’s” shirt devoid of logo and distinctive font; only the 
brand name remains.  
 
 
Photo 6.11 Just the brand name (Levi’s) remains 
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Related to (e)–(f) are hybrid forms which recombine different brand names and logos 
(real and imagined) in a heteroglossia of exteriority (g).15 For example, the Reebok logo 
and brand name combined with the “Ferrari” brand name and logo (photo 6.12). Or, in a 
three way hybrid, the TVS brand name and logo crossed with the Nokia brand name 
(altered with a different font) and the Nike swoosh (slightly altered in curvature) (photo 
6.13). 
 
 
Photo 6.12 Brand hybrids (Ferrari and Reebok)  
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15 Such hybrids perhaps fall into two categories: (g1) hybrids which recombine and arrange logos and brand 
names to create novel combinations; (g2) hybrids which draw from the aesthetics of the sports jersey or the 
racing car, where sponsorship of companies on the body of the athlete/his vehicle creates a pastiche of 
branded forms. I only heard this latter interpretation once however, and not in reference to clothing but to a 
motor vehicle. 
 
Photo 6.13 Brand hybrids (TVS, Nokia, Nike)  
 
The brands invoked might not even exist. For example, it wasn’t uncommon to find 
brand-hybrid shirts with a Nike swoosh on the top left breast, a Ferrari logo on the collar, 
and the word “Next” written in the middle. Or on a bag the fictive brand “Ziya” 
accompanied by a (slightly distorted) Nike swoosh (photo 6.14). 
 
Photo 6.14 Brand logo (Nike swoosh) plus fictive brand (Ziya) hybrid 
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With (h) the indexical link to actual brands is broken, and we start to find forms 
which only have the iconic diagrammaticity of branded forms: PROPER NAME + LOGO (+ 
WORDINGS/SLOGAN). Here the form is replicated without any brand content. At one store I 
saw a whole line of jeans where the back pocket had a sun design as a brand logo and the 
front leg had a proper name, some of which were brands (Suzuki, Honda, McLaren) 
while others were American pop stars (Eminem, 50 Cent), famous personalities (Che 
Guevara), and even an older Hollywood film name plus the coming year (Titanic 2010). 
Tamil films from hit stars were also often presented in the form of branded garments with 
a logo plus the film name paired together (photo 6.15).  
 
 
Photo 6.15 Film name (Villu), actor name (Vijay), and face qua branded form  
 
Items in (h) also begin to shade off into local “original” brands, quasi-brands created by 
producers (but often not backed by any kind of meta-discursive regimentation vis-à-vis 
marketing, advertising, or trademark registration) (photos 6.16, 6.17). 
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Photo 6.16 Fictive brand: “Cargo” 
 
 
Photo 6.17 Fictive brand: “Force” 
 
With (i) the aesthetics of brandedness further devolves into garments where there is 
only a vague iconism with branded forms. Such clothing shades off from the proper name 
into simple noun phrases or strings of English words as quasi-names or -logos for non-
existent brands. A pair of cargoes might have the brand-esque name “cargobluegear,” 
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both indexing a fictive brand and the type of clothing (also photo 6.16 above). Words 
which index style or fashion (i.e., index exteriority in their denotational content) often 
stand in for the brand. For example, a bag might have the word “Jeans”—an emblem of 
Western fashion—or a shirt may simply have “Fashion World” written across it with a 
logo. Photo 6.18 shows a shirt with a concatenation of phrases and numbers loosely 
related to the chronotope of urban youth fashion: City, 005, C Point, Wear, 04, Next, 
Style, Generation. 
 
Photo 6.18 Noun phrases and numbers as aesthetic design 
 
In addition to being reflexive about their pragmatics and their target audience (i.e., a 
style-ish shirt having the word “style” or “youth” printed on it), this reflexivity also 
extends to the branded form itself. For example, a shirt with the quasi-brand wording 
“LETTERING” invokes the fact that branded forms do indeed involve lettering as part of 
the aesthetics of brandedness. Consider photo 6.19 where the tee-shirt pattern is simply 
the denotational placeholder “Premium Quality”: “Name and Brand.” 
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Photo 6.19 Denotation as branded form 
 
At the end of this hierarchy—after the indexical proper name gives way to the fictive 
proper name which gives way to the fashion-indexing noun phrase—are garments which 
simply have noun phrases not particularly connected to anything related to fashion or 
youth. For example, shirts might simply have common English nouns like “Gladiator” or 
“Sports.” The wordings on such quasi-branded forms may involve nonsense as part of the 
design. For example, a shirt might combine a proper name and quasi-reference to a brand 
(“Tony Tony Chopper”) with what vaguely looks like English words (“Disquerd,” 
“Everinhu Canglong”) and finally simply a string of letters (“asiohdngy”). Consider 
photo 6.20 where the design is a series of words (“fresh,” “with,” “mine,” “so,” “BOY”), 
quasi-words (“chun,” toybar,” “de”), and strings of letters and numbers (“c,21,” “u&s, 
“cotalll”) along with the fictive brand “Us 395”: 
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Photo 6.20 Nonsense English as design 
 
From specific reference (the rigid designators of brand proper names) to abstract and 
common nouns we come to the English language/Roman script as pure aesthetic object 
devoid of any denotational or referential content. In this “nonsense” it becomes clear, in 
fact, that across all categories of this hierarchy English is always already an aesthetic 
object independent of its denotational content, even for actual brand names and slogans. 
Like the willful ignorance of the brand, youth’s aesthetic of brandedness turns the 
English language into an aesthetic object independent of its grammatico-semantic 
regularity (i.e., as capable of creating semantically meaningful content), or even its 
morphological regularity (i.e., as capable of creating word-like lexemes). Youth weren’t 
concerned with what was written on their shirts as such. It didn’t matter. English cum 
design is style via its connection to exteriority and fashion; and this is sufficient for 
youth’s purposes.16  
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16 Cf. Tarlo’s (1996: 242–243) discussion of the aestheticization of English among Gujarati women in their 
embroidery practices and the proliferation of different spellings of English words like “Welcome.” 
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Note that using English on clothing as status-raising—not as code, but as aesthetic 
design—makes it possible to get around certain problematics involved with English in the 
peer group, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Remember that using English as 
communicative code can be seen as alter-focal and thus as implicating others’ 
competency in English. As such, using English in interaction can be interpreted as a 
statement about someone else—for example, that they don’t know English—and thus 
grounds for strife within the peer group. Second, using English requires one to actually 
have some level of competence in English. On the other hand, treating English as an 
aesthetic design in another semiotic medium (clothing) avoids both of these problems: it 
is ego-focal and doesn’t implicate others’ English abilities and it doesn’t require actually 
knowing any English to appreciate or use it. I would further argue that this is also logic of 
actual English use in the peer group. As we saw in chapter 3, section 3.3.2, the tendency 
of English use within the peer group is to avoid English that has denotational content, 
preferring forms rich in interactional content. Such use of English is purely pragmatic 
(versus semantic) and, I would argue, aesthetic.  
And note that precisely because brands are part of a larger aesthetics of exteriority, 
specific brands are not the basis for social grouping or regularities in consumption or 
identity work. There was no brand identity, loyalty, or community. How could you be 
loyal to or identify with a brand when it wasn’t a brand in the first place? Rather than 
seeing the issue as ‘youth consume and use brands’ we might put it this way: youth do 
style and style includes a heterogeneous set of things, only one of which is the branded 
form. This makes sense of the apathy of most youth toward brands as particular brands, 
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but their obsessions with branded forms more generally as style.17 Rather than identity 
emblems that indicate devotion or group membership (compare, e.g., with the use of a 
picture of a politician or deity on shirt or a vehicle), brands and English letters are status-
raising signs of style and, as such, aesthetic objects empty of the denotational-referential 
content often associated with them.  
 
3. The alternative ontology of the brand in south India  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the brand qua BRAND is bracketed among 
youth in Tamil Nadu. While the BRAND is one of the competing ontologies that youth 
acknowledge in their engagement with the world of commodities around them, it isn’t the 
only one, nor often the most important one (cf. Halstead 2002; Vann 2006; Bick and 
Chiper 2007). On the surface of things (i.e., from the visibility of their displays of 
branded forms), it would seem that Tamil youth are highly brand aware. And yet, as I 
have shown, brand consciousness is highly selective among working- and middle-class 
youth. Rather than interest in brands as rigid designators regimented by brand meta-
discourses constituting branded commodities as tokens of some brand type (figure 6.2), 
for Tamil youth branded forms are regimented by a meta-discourse of exteriority and thus 
are part of a larger set of commodity tokens (figure 6.3).  
 
17 A relevant parallel is color. Youth style often involved garish and bright colors designed to attract 
attention. However, youth were uninterested in colors qua colors; one found no “fans” of red or “followers” 
of sky blue, nor were youth interested in the optics of color or the cultural histories of various colors. 
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F   igure 6.2 Brand as BRAND Figure 6.3 Branded forms as tokens of a different type 
  BRAND META-  BRAND META-             META-DISCOURSE OF EXTERIORITY -  
  DISCOURSE   DISCOURSE  youth status, aesthetics of brandedness 
                  
              // 
 
  
       
  Branded goods   Branded goods, Duplicates, Fictive brands, Popstars, English code 
  (as rigid indexes)     (as style)  
         
Under this alternative ontology the category BRAND competes with a number of other 
modes of understanding—which is to say, a number of other meta-discourses—which 
reorganize the world of objects according to different logics. For example, the ready-
made as opposed to the tailored (as a discourse of production); Western fashion as 
opposed to “traditional” clothing (as a discourse of age, alignment with ‘culture,’ and 
distance from ‘society’); youth fashion and status (style) as opposed to forms of status 
associated with the adult world of white-collar work (“formals”) (as a discourse of 
liminal suspension across age sets). In these meta-discourses the branded form is 
distributed according to a logic different from branded/unbranded, or 
authentic/inauthentic. Hence the flexibility of iconism (with respect to the BRAND) as to 
what even counts as a branded form, and the reorganization of such forms understood not 
as brands qua branded objects, but as aesthetic objects that have a particular functionality, 
that are defined by their ability to status-raise in the peer group and be typified as style.18  
 
3.2 Example: The Nike swoosh  
                                                 
18 Note that this happens in brand aware societies as well (see Craciun’s 2008 on Romania; Vann 2006 on 
Vietnam). We can note, for example, the reappropriation of branded goods for other purposes (e.g., Luvaas 
2009 on “remixing” brands in Indonesia), or simply ignoring the brand identity of some product in 
everyday use (Agha n.d.). See chapter 8, section 2.4.5.3 for more discussion. 
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Here I return to an example from chapter 5, section 2.4.4—the Nike swoosh logo—
that highlights how branded forms among youth in Tamil Nadu are imbued with value 
through alternative discourses that formulate branded forms as part of an ontology totally 
different from that of the brand qua BRAND.  
As we saw in chapter 5, of all the branded logos in Tamil Nadu, the Nike swoosh is 
perhaps the most ubiquitous. And yet what I found so confusing was that when I asked 
people why they had a Nike logo on their body, or on their vehicle, I was greeted by a 
range of answers that seemed incommensurable. Those who were in the know about 
brands and fashion would refer back to the brand, Nike, taking the logo as an index of the 
company as well as style, invoking the aesthetics of brandedness discussed above. Others 
would simply say “style,” thereby bracketing the brand identity. 
The most confusing response to the question was: ‘because I’m correct,’ ‘because 
whatever I do is right’ (cf. photo 6.21). Because I was attempting to read the branded 
form as somehow connected to brands directly or indirectly (how could it not be?) I was 
oblivious to the fact, which I eventually learned through my prodding, that for many 
individuals the swoosh isn’t the Nike swoosh, as it were, but a check mark (or “tick”) 
popularized by the style of Super Star Rajinikanth in his film Pandiyan (1992) (cf. Bick 
and Chiper 2007).  
 
Photo 6.21 Nike swoosh as the “Right” tick 
 
In this film Rajinikanth punctuates his punch dialogues, which themselves punctuate his 
victories over his adversaries, by ripping open his button-down shirt, revealing a tee-shirt 
which has a check mark (or “tick”) on it (photo 6.22).  
 
Photo 6.22 One of Rajini’s style getups (with tick) in Pandiyan (1992) 
  
His punch dialogue is ‘This Pandiyan is right in everything, everywhere, always’ 
(“intha paaNdiyan eppoovum, engkeeyum, ethilum right”). Hence being “Mr. Right” in 
the film. For these individuals, it is film as a meta-discourse which creates a usable and 
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detachable form, the tick/swoosh, which can be redeployed in various contexts as status-
raising among one’s peers and count as style. It is under this meta-pragmatic discourse 
that both the tick and the swoosh are seen as tokens of the same type, similarly imbued 
pragmatically as style.  
Of course, Nike has made serious inroads in Tamil Nadu to create brand awareness. 
And it has been, to some degree, successful. Indeed, the youngest youth (many who are 
unfamiliar with this film) make no such explicit connection of the swoosh to Pandiyan 
(1992), though they did to style. And even those who do know the film (mis)remember 
the film in two ways: (a) by misremembering that Rajini is wearing a Nike tee-shirt and 
not just a shirt with a check; and (b) by attributing their learning of what Nike was to 
watching the film, thus merging a personalized brand history with the filmic imbuing of 
the check with style. Such individuals explained that Rajini made Nike popular by 
wearing the tick/swoosh shirt. But note that even if Nike has made inroads in Tamil 
Nadu, the meaning of the swoosh as Nike symbol is still only taken as a token of the 
larger discourse of style, emblematized in the persona of Rajinikanth.  
As this example shows, the use of the branded form, its “demand,” is often governed 
not by the brand as a particular kind of brand type, but through a detachment of a branded 
form from its brand meta-discourse and its reanalysis under a different meta-discourse 
(figure 6.4). (See chapter 7, section 3.2 for more discussion.) It is this novel sign–meta-
sign relation which grounds the branded form among youth in Tamil Nadu in a different 
ontology altogether. Thus, while we can easily observe an almost compulsive use and 
circulation of the branded form among youth, it is impossible to conclude anything 
without understanding the ontology of objects under an aesthetics of brandedness.  
 
  Figure 6.4 Alternate ontologies  
 
  (1) The world of branded forms       (2) The world of branded forms under    
  under the ontology of the BRAND      ontology of STYLE (aesthetics of brandedness) 
 
  BRANDS     =     DUPLICATES     STYLE 
 
   
  brands x, y, z   duplicates x1, y1, z1      BRANDS . . . DUPLICATES 
   
       
3.3 Willful ignorance and status negotiation in the peer group 
Remember that the male peer group in Tamil Nadu is based on ‘youth’ as exterior to 
‘society.’ Thus, youth use semiotic registers that index exteriority—film representations, 
signs associated with the rowdy, English, branded forms—in order to diagram that 
difference with the aims of creating alternative islands of authority that reinscribe the 
objective statuses periya aaL–chinna paiyan (‘big man’–‘little boy’) as relative status 
designators within the peer group. Such signs are typified as style. And style is always 
played out within the economy of status-raising and -leveling of the peer group, with its 
centrifugal and centripetal pressures toward differentiation and conformity. In chapter 3 
we noted how the tension of these forces tend to lead to the negotiation and hybridization 
of status-ful youth cultural forms like English.  
It is in this context that we can similarly understand why Tamil youth are motivated 
toward a willful ignorance of brands. While branded forms are style, trying to pass off a 
duplicate as ‘real’ or consuming brands too conspicuously is over style. That is, 
evaluating branded forms under the ontology BRAND—as authentic/inauthentic—is to 
potentially convert ego-focal indexes of status-raising (as aesthetic signs) into alter-focal 
indexes of status-lowering (as class-ranking, hierarchical signs). It is to be seen as uppity 
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or showing off, as pretending that you are the periya aaL when you aren’t. It risks 
transgressing the peer group and thus inviting envy, jealousy, and possible ostracization. 
This is also why the lower- and middle-class youth that I spent my time with generally 
didn’t tease each other about having duplicate brands except if one tried to pass it off for 
real, thereby mismatching one’s status and attempts at style. Thus, in peer groups of 
lower- and middle-class youth, branded forms figuratively diagram style through 
duplicates. Literally diagramming social difference through authentic brands risks 
exceeding the boundaries of the peer group, and thus potentially calls for status-leveling 
or expulsion from the peer group (cf. Nisbett 2007). 
This isn’t to say that youth don’t want, or don’t use, authentic branded items as such. 
But rather that status-leveling within the peer group functions as a counterforce which 
reanalyzes branded forms as part of a larger aesthetics of brandedness and not as 
instances of brands qua BRAND; it thus defers the issue of ‘real’ versus ‘fake’ while still 
allowing branded forms to function as style. Hence brand indifference with respect to 
authenticity is a kind of deference to one’s peers. Analyzing branded forms under the 
aesthetic of brandedness allows one to do style without doing it too much (being over); it 
allows one to perform difference through sameness, to differentiate one’s self while still 
being part of the group.19  
 
19 We can note the same process at work in the West. Consider Hoe et al.’s (2003) discussion of attitudes of 
consumers toward counterfeit goods. They see no problem in the use of counterfeit goods per se. This is 
especially true if one doesn’t know it is a counterfeit. They also don’t see a problem with “passive” 
deception. That is, one knows it is a counterfeit, but wears it because of the connotations of the brand. 
However, one makes no commitment to it being a “real” branded good. However, respondents did feel 
strongly negative toward individuals who “actively” used fake brands to deceive; that is, who tried to pass 
off goods they knew as fake. Such individuals were themselves seen as fake, inauthentic liars or showoffs. 
Hence the tendency to admit that one’s goods are fakes (see Philips 2005 on the knowing wink of a good 
knock-off), to avoid the issue, or to feign ignorance. To do otherwise is to not show enough deference to 
the peer group, to project oneself as better than what other’s see one as, and thus to risk ostracization. In the 
 322
                                                                                                                                                
In this way, under an aesthetic of brandedness the branded form among Tamil youth 
as a diagram of exterior status (whether it be the foreign, the rich)—and thus a 
simulacrum of it—is detached from the objectivity of that simulated status and denuded 
purposively so as to convert it into a relative, and thus egalitarian, sign of status. The 
branded form qua simulacrum intentionally marks itself as such so as to voice itself 
doubly: as a sign of style but not too much style; as status-raising but not too much status-
raising.  
 
4. Conclusions 
4.1 Summary 
I have argued that the construction of youth status and its negotiation in the peer 
group motivates the use of branded forms as style. However, this functionality as style is 
not derived from particular brand meta-discourses (youth are willfully ignorant of brands 
as such), but rather to a more general aesthetics of brandedness. This aesthetics includes a 
number of objects, all of which are related to the brand in form, but not in content. I 
argued that seeing things from this point of view foregrounds that what is at issue isn’t 
brands per se at all. That is, branded forms are part of a different ontological 
configuration among Tamil youth.  
 
4.2 A note on the global and the local  
From seeing all the branded forms displayed visibly and proudly by Tamil youth, we 
might draw conclusions about the state of globalization, the erasure of cultural difference, 
 
Tamil case, because peer groups are priced out of branded goods the push isn’t toward admitting fakes, but 
toward the negation of the concept of authenticity itself.  
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the growing of cultural homogeneity, the encroachment of cultural imperialism, or the 
rise and dominance of the brand. Obviously, from my discussion in this chapter such 
conclusions would be misinformed. And yet the branded forms remain.  
On the other hand, we might note that while the branded forms circulate, the brand 
doesn’t. That is, the brand as the brand would like to be understood, the brand as 
presented in its self-reflexive meta-discourses of advertising and marketing. We might be 
tempted, then, to argue that there is a kind of localization of the form, brands are made to 
serve local interests and purposes, and their deformation in their duplication and tropic 
usage reflects that.  
I argue, however, that to frame the issue in this way equally misunderstands cultural 
globalization because it assumes that particular forms like brands are stable across 
contexts. That is, while they may have “global” or “local” meanings, they are still 
“brands” in both contexts. Such a view privileges particular forms, inevitably the forms 
with which analysts are familiar with, as stable and fixed (i.e., treating them as natural 
kinds) in their movement around the world, only to be recombined, slightly altered or 
tailored to some other “local” (read: non-natural) context (see Robertson 1995: 38, 2001: 
462, 464; Appadurai 1990: 516–517; Pieterse 1995: 53–54; Kearney 1995: 554; 
Tomlinson 1997: 181ff., Reger 1997; Watson 1997; Bauman 1998: 42–43; see Stanlaw 
1992: 73–75 on a similar argument regarding the concept of language borrowing).20  
This paradigm, then, says for any sign-vehicle X of class U with meaning Y in 
place/social domain Z we can enumerate it variants {X1, X2, . . ., Xn} and their meanings 
{Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn} in various places {Z1, Z2, . . ., Zn}. Thus, for example, in this paradigm 
 
20 This is, in fact, the same model of engagement with ideological discourses posted in British Cultural 
Studies that I critiqued in chapter 3, section 5.2 and chapter 5, section 4.  
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the word (U1) “scent” (X1) in America (Z1) means ‘a smell’ (Y1) while in Tamil Nadu 
(Z2) the word (U1) “scent(-u)” (X2) means ‘perfume’ (Y2). In this example the ontological 
forms to be compared, both words (U1), remains constant.  
Indeed, it is because this paradigm is deficient in its semiotic analysis of social forms 
that it is unable to theorize that not only forms and their meanings may differ in various 
places and for various communities, but more importantly that the semiotic configuration 
of such forms is: (a) internally complex, and thus (b) may be of a totally different 
ontology. For example, with regards to youth fashion, while English in the U.S. may be a 
code for communication of denotation and referential meanings (in addition to indexical 
ones), for Tamil youth it is simply a tool, among many, for status-raising in the peer 
group, independently of its denotational-referential capability. This is clear in how 
English is used, for example, in clothing (though also in peer group communication, see 
chapter 3, section 3.3.2): English words on Tamil youth’s clothing aren’t words (U1) at 
all, in either grammatical form or construal. Rather, they are aesthetic design elements 
(U2). In the same way, the issue isn’t that things like brands have different meanings in 
different places, but that they may not even be the same thing at all. Branded forms in 
Tamil clothing aren’t brands as the brand meta-discourses would have them to be. They 
are aesthetic objects; they are forms imbued not by brand meta-discourses, but by the 
meta-discourse of exteriority, of ‘youth,’ of style. Yet this sign–meta-sign relationship is 
un-theorizable in a flat semiotic structure whereby only forms and meanings exist, each 
stable and unitary unto itself but endlessly re-combinable.  
 
4.3 Ethnographic lesson  
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In this is an ethnographic lesson. Indeed, the branded form and the use of English in 
garments were most perplexing phenomena to me. Why so many brands? Why so much 
English? Why so little knowledge of brands? Why so little concern for meaning in 
English? Because I approached such objects as one might in the United States—Nike is a 
brand, English is a communicative code, and both of these are stable and inherently 
meaningful as such—I tried to make such forms speak to me in ways that they were being 
actively silenced by the Tamil youth users of such forms. Operating under the wrong 
ontology, such forms were (artificially) foregrounded to me, causing a kind of 
confusion.21 And yet it was only by revealing the larger meta-discursive framework 
which make such forms speak style in the peer group that I was able to silence the 
ontology of BRAND and code that were so naturalized for me. Again, it isn’t that things 
mean different things in different places. It is that they may not even be the same thing at 
all. And why that should be the case, and why this should have any kind of (social) 
regularity, are questions which can only be answered by linking moments of production 
and consumption together in a semiotically-informed, ethnographic analysis. In the next 
chapter I look at the production and circulation of such branded forms as a continuation 
of the discussion of this chapter.  
 
21 Consider Craciun’s (2008: section 2, paragraph 2) discussion of one informant’s reaction to her research 
regarding fake brands: “Nobody is going to openly admit they wear fakes if you ask bluntly. People don’t 
really use these words anyway. We just hear them on TV.” Here we see the presence of am alternate 
ontology of objects independent of their brandedness as it butts against the meta-pragmatic frame BRAND as 
put into play by the researcher and mass-media discourses.  
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Chapter 7 – Circulating and Producing (Counterfeit) Branded Forms 
 
1. Introduction 
In chapter 6 we saw how youth’s consumption and use of branded forms brackets the 
brand qua BRAND. But if consumption, and thus “demand,” is non-specific to brands, 
what is the principle of their production and circulation in Tamil Nadu? Why are certain 
brands produced and circulated, and others not? Further, why are certain brands which 
have no “authentic” presence in India (e.g., Diesel) highly circulated as duplicates and 
consumed by youth who have no idea what such brands are all about? To answer these 
questions I did research with youth-targeting shop owners in Madurai, Erode, Tiruppur, 
and Chennai who sold authentic branded garments (either as authorized brand goods or as 
export surplus); with shop owners who sold duplicate garments and/or garments that 
participated in the aesthetic of brandedness but without any direct connection to 
particular brands as such; with distributors and wholesalers of such goods in Madurai, 
Erode, Tiruppur, and Chennai; producers of such goods in Tiruppur, Erode, and Chennai; 
a second-hand buying agent in Tiruppur; and a sourcing agent of a portfolio of Western 
designer brands in Chennai (including Diesel).  
In this chapter I look at the logic of the circulation of branded forms in Tamil Nadu, 
specifically garment production and distribution with respect to lower- and middle-class 
youth. First I look at export surplus and then at brand duplicates and other variations on 
the branded form. I focus on how the aesthetics of brandedness and willful ignorance of 
youth consumers relates to production. I conclude with discussion about the concepts of 
“counterfeiting” and “demand” as highly problematic assumptions implicit in the BRAND 
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ontology. I argue that such concepts lose their meaning in the Tamil context, thereby 
canceling out a host of (Western legal) assumptions about what brands are and how they 
work. 
 
2. The circulation of branded forms in Tamil Nadu 
2.1 Introduction 
In this section I first look at the export trade of authentic branded goods as one 
circulatory path through which branded forms reach Tamil youth. I then look at the 
duplicate garment sector as another way that branded forms circulate. I argue that the 
duplicate garment sector is coordinated with respect to brands both by global trade vis-à-
vis the export-surplus sector (which is partly governed by the BRAND ontology) and by an 
aesthetics of exteriority (and its bracketing of the BRAND ontology). It is this dual link 
which organizes the supply side of branded forms with respect to Tamil youth. It is also 
the reason for the creative deviation and formulaic sameness of (counterfeit) branded 
forms within a more general aesthetic of brandedness. 
 
2.2 Retail and branded forms 
Branded forms present themselves to youth through various kinds of stores which 
segment the market by price. From platform merchants, traveling and (semi-)permanent 
bazaars, small shops, large outlet-style showrooms, and authorized brand showrooms, 
youth can peruse and purchase branded forms. In such stores, authentic branded forms 
and duplicates are intermixed to varying degrees. In an authorized showroom presumably 
all the commodities are “real,” though of course counterfeits work their way in, usually 
by the dissimulation of authentic branded items with identical counterfeits. In 
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showrooms, the forms are relatively evenly intermixed, some goods dissimulating the 
brand, others loosely borrowing from it but clearly not original. Unlike the authorized 
brand showroom, in such stores price meta-communicates the (in)authenticity of the 
branded form (Bloch et al. 1993; Phau et al. 2001). From small shops, traveling bazaars, 
and platform merchants, low quality garments which loosely borrow from the brand and 
make no pretensions to authentic brandedness dominate (here, location meta-
communicates [in-]authenticity, Brandtstädter 2009; Hansen and Moeller forthcoming), 
though authentic items in the form of export-surplus or defect items are also mixed in. 
Some shops specialize only in export surplus, some only in counterfeit or brand-inspired 
garments.1  
 
2.3 Export surplus: From factory to market 
While the increase of authentic branded garments in India is linked in the public 
imaginary to a glut of imported foreign commodities, the availability of such goods is 
still limited to a small minority. And yet liberalization has caused the increased 
circulation of Western branded forms beyond that small minority. One reason for this is 
that liberalization opened up Indian labor to increased foreign capital, and thus the 
increase of export-oriented garment factories producing Western brands (Chari 2000, 
2004; cf. Cawthorne 1995 on pre-liberalization Tiruppur; see Vann 2005; Luvaas 2009; 
Manning and Uplisashvili 2007; Thomas 2009; Phau et al. 2001 for discussion of this 
process in other contexts). It is this export sector that is ultimately linked to the expansion 
 
1 This points to another axis of difference: between goods that are imported from abroad and those locally 
produced in India. While high quality duplicates are imported on occasion from Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and China, most all duplicate garments are produced within India. Authentic items sold in 
authorized showrooms are often imported from abroad, while authentic branded items from export surplus 
are made in India. 
 329
and circulation of branded forms in India more generally through: (a) supplying local 
markets with export-surplus goods; and (b) providing materials and designs for local 
duplicate production (section 2.4; see Phillips 2005; Pang 2008; Craciun 2008, 2009 for 
discussion in other contexts).  
Different areas of India have different specialties in export-oriented production: for 
example, Ludhiana and Bombay in north India make sweat-shirt, denim, and tee-shirt 
materials, as well as do garment construction; Delhi does baseball hats; Bellari does 
jeans; Bangalore produces tee-shirts, jeans, labels, and does garment construction; in 
Tamil Nadu, Tiruppur specializes in tee-shirt materials, dyeing, and garment construction 
(Chari 2000; Cawthorne 1995); Erode specializes in cotton materials, yarn production, 
and dyeing; Sivakasi specializes in cardboard tags and boxes; Ambuur specializes in 
leather and shoe production; and Chennai specializes in producing cotton materials, 
embroidery, and garment construction.  
As each stage of the process takes place in India—knitting, dyeing, cutting, stitching, 
compacting, cleaning, embroidery, finishing, checking—there are export-surplus 
materials available at each stage of the production process. One can buy export-surplus 
tee-shirt material, shirt labels, cardboard tags, yarn, labels, or finished products (with or 
without brand logos, tags, labels). And as the industry is relatively decentralized, each of 
these export-surplus goods circulates relatively independently (Cawthorne 1995; Chari 
2000; cf. Reinach 2005: 45), thus serving as inputs into other local productions. For 
example, a producer might buy brand labels to append to shirts that he produced; or buy 
cloth which he then puts his design and tags on. 
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Importantly, export-surplus goods are sold at prices low enough to cater to markets 
that foreign brand apparel companies cannot access for significant profit. This is for a 
number of reasons. First, the export-oriented producer has already been paid for the 
overage through his contract with the brand company (or the company that contracted 
him). The brand company will typically allot for an overage of 5–10 percent, for 
example, on the assumption that the production process operates with a 3–10 percent 
error rate. Such surplus, then, is already accounted for and the sale of surplus is simply 
extra money for the producer. Further, because the amount of export surplus is relatively 
small compared to the total size of the contracts and because the opportunity costs of 
selling them are relatively high, not to mention sometimes illegal through breach of 
contract, buyers of export-surplus goods are in a position to ask for rock bottom prices 
(sometimes less than the production cost). Third, the producer may not have independent 
access to a market where he can sell such goods, or one may not exist. For example, 
trying to sell XXXL winter jackets in south India, even if branded, is exceedingly 
difficult. Even if it does exist, often the market cannot bear the full cost of the garment, 
so items are sold for whatever local distributors and wholesalers can pay. Fourth, export 
overruns often lack the sufficient quantity or “spread”2 demanded by wholesalers. Thus, 
the producer has little flexibility in dictating prices. Fifth, as the brand company has the 
right to refuse a shipment if it is late, if the brand company goes bankrupt, or if the 
quality isn’t up to standard rejected products often end up getting resold to another 
company for export (e.g., by simply attaching a new label and repackaging the good) or 
 
2 “Spread” refers to the distribution of some product by size, color, or other variation. Often the spread of 
export surplus, as it is linked to contingencies in the production process, is uneven. There may, for 
example, not be enough medium sizes for a wholesaler to be interested in buying some product.  
they are sold on the local market. In both cases the goods are sold at a heavy loss to the 
producer. Finally, producers’ contracts with brand companies often require that the 
export-surplus goods be marked as export-surplus/damaged, thus not allowing them to 
function as authenticated branded commodities in the local market (photos 7.1, 7.2).3 
This further lowers the price of export-surplus garments on the local market and 
circumscribes their circulation.  
 
Photo 7.1 Marked tag on export-surplus good 
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3 Alternatively, they are required to be burned or otherwise destroyed. Sometimes the brand company only 
excludes exporting the export surplus, and thus allows sales within India. This is especially true for 
companies who have no sizable market in India. Of course, it isn’t uncommon for such contracts to be 
broken and goods may be exported either to the intended marked (at a significant risk to the parties 
involved) or to another market. I was told by “seconds” wholesalers, for example, that Nigeria and Russia 
are popular destinations for goods produced in Tiruppur. I saw groups of Nigerian exporters combing the 
streets of Tiruppur looking for good “seconds” deals for export. 
 
Photo 7.2 Mark on export-surplus defect good 
 
Such export-surplus and defect garment sales are brokered by “seconds” agents who 
buy export-surplus and defect goods from a number of producers and then distribute them 
to wholesalers for sale as such, or to other producers who use them to create products of 
their own. From “seconds” agents finished branded forms move within India via 
distributors to showrooms, clothing shops, and traveling bazaars, either as “stock lots” 
(hodgepodges of garments which are unsorted by brand) or “fresh stock” (a single type of 
branded garment). In the stores I visited, “stock lot” was the most common way that 
garments came to them (photo 7.3). 
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Photo 7.3 Stock lot of export surplus 
 
In short, because export surplus provides (a) a large profit margin for store owners 
due to the low price of purchase (up to 100–150 percent profit, as compared to about 20 
percent profit from selling authentic brands and 30–40 percent profit from duplicates) and 
(b) often comes in unsorted “stock lots” there is a lack of selectivity about which branded 
products make it into retail. While store owners may be aware of which brands are 
popular or not (locally and sometimes abroad), because of how the products get to them 
when buying one’s stock there is no de facto principle of sorting out brands vis-à-vis 
popularity or “demand.” And because the cost of such goods is so low and youth are 
open-minded with respect to branded forms (i.e., there is little to no brand loyalty as 
such), there is little risk to indiscriminate brand retailing. The result is that most if not all 
brands produced in India for export end up on the local market. In short, as a result of the 
vagaries and contingencies of global capital’s involvement in textile production for 
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export, independently of “demand” and customer and distributor knowledge about 
brands, branded forms end up willy-nilly circulating in shops, presenting themselves to 
youth and local producers, as I discuss below.  
 
2.4. Brand duplicates and brand-inspired garments  
2.4.1 Introduction 
In addition to circulating original, though perhaps not authenticated, branded forms, 
export surplus is important to the circulation of branded forms in general because export 
surplus is the condition of possibility for the production and circulation of duplicate 
branded forms and garments which have the branded form without any clear reference to 
actual brands (what I call “brand-inspired” garments). Here I am mainly concerned with 
garments which are most popular among lower- and middle-class youth, as discussed in 
chapter 6. These are produced largely in Tiruppur (tee-shirts) and Chennai (embroidered 
cotton button-down shirts, embroidered jeans, cargo pants).  
There are a number of reasons why both duplicate branded garments and brand-
inspired garments depend upon export surplus: (a) export-surplus fabrics, tags, yarn, 
labels, and other materials provide inexpensive, but quality materials for duplicate 
production; (b) producers of duplicates share the same aesthetics of brandedness as their 
youth consumers; or, at least, they recognize consumers’ willful ignorance and produce 
accordingly. Such producers, then, also think of branded forms as style, and to that extent 
as aesthetically pleasing and economically viable/valuable. Rather than coming up with 
designs de novo, for such producers copying existing designs, which they get through 
export-surplus models, is a safer bet; and (c) the design of such garments is heavily 
influenced by what is already circulating in the market. Producers, as they put it, ‘follow 
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the market.’ That is, they copy what others are doing so as to stay competitive, just as 
consumers copy what others are wearing so as to stay current. And as the market has as a 
significant portion of export surplus and copies of it, they too copy such forms. This 
results in the further recycling and recirculation of export-oriented branded forms.4  
 
2.4.2 Producing a duplicate 
If export surplus provides the models and the materials, the form and substance, from 
which counterfeit brands are produced, why is there such a diversity of branded forms 
that circulate? Why is it not simply an endless repetition of designs identical to authentic 
branded forms? What are the principles that regulate the production and design of 
branded forms that aren’t made for export? What are the forces that regiment difference 
from and similarity to brand originals?  
In the following sections I look at the production process of brand duplicates and 
brand-inspired garments. I am particularly interested in creative deviations from export-
surplus brand models, rather than to-the-tee knock-off brand garments, both because they 
are more ubiquitous among youth and because they reveal the dynamics of the production 
and circulation of branded forms in Tamil Nadu more clearly. 
 
2.4.3 Production cycle 
In this section I briefly look at the production cycle of embroidered cotton, button-
down shirts in Chennai of either duplicate-, fictive-, or quasi- brand type. From 2007–
 
4 Indian national garment brands: (a) are largely not seen as style (and thus less likely to be duplicated for a 
youth market); (b) compete in the local market (and often at relatively closer prices) and thus have more of 
a stake in preventing counterfeits; and (c) they are in India and thus are more able to detect and prosecute 
counterfeiting. In short, duplicate production rests primarily on export surplus for designs. 
2009 such embroidery—minimally, NAME + LOGO/DESIGN—was popular among lower- 
and middle-class Tamil youth, both urban and rural (photo 7.4).  
 
 
Photo 7.4 Embroidered shirts (“Rock,” “Ranger Boys,” “Teen Terrores [sic]”) 
 
These garments were produced in relatively small-scale production units in North 
Chennai. The bigger units control each step of the production process (except for the 
production of cloth, thread, labels, and tags, which they buy either from export surplus or 
from local manufacturers), while smaller units tackle one or more parts of the production 
process.  
Local design agencies (often part of the same companies who do the embroidery) 
provide the embroidery design for the shirts. They do this either by creating designs on 
their own, which they then pitch to various producers; or they create or copy a design as 
requested or provided by the producer (often also the wholesaler) who commissions 
them. Such agencies have the roles of: copywriters (who come up with “wordings”), 
graphic designers (who come up with design elements), software operators (who translate 
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the designs into computer files that the embroidery machines can execute), and operators 
of the embroidery machines. One individual may do one or more of these jobs. 
Once the designs are ready and approved, tailors cut the pieces of fabric necessary for 
the garments. Cuts of fabric which require design are then sent for embroidery (photos 
7.5, 7.6). The embroidered pieces are then sent back to the tailors who stitch them 
together. The pieces are then finished—labels affixed, cleaned, ironed, folded, and 
packaged—and sold/sent to wholesalers who distribute them to stores. If particular items 
are successful they are ordered again.  
 
 
Photo 7.5 Embroidery machine display 
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Photo 7.6 Embroidery machine at work 
 
2.4.4. Designing the branded form 
While some duplicate producers do attempt high-fidelity knock-offs of authentic 
branded items, there are a number of reasons why garments for the local market 
systematically deviate from export-surplus models. In this section I look at the logic of 
design of such garments, and the forces that maintain difference from and similarity to 
brand originals. 
 
2.4.4.1 Exigencies of production and budget 
First, the stitches and cuts of a particular brand design may be too difficult for the 
tailors given the budget and the time frame of production. Because a majority of 
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duplicates consumed by youth tend to be low in cost, the economic margin for 
reproducing difficult and labor-intensive stitches is low. Thus, producers usually take a 
(brand) “model” and alter the stitching to the convenience and skill level of their tailors 
and their budget. Moreover, even as new models arrive, producers tend to be conservative 
in changes in the cuts and stitching of the garments. New cuts and stitching take time for 
tailors to learn, and thus there tends to be a force toward conserving forms at the level of 
garment construction. For this reason, even as the design elements, colors, and brand 
names vary across such garments, the cuts and stitching of them are relatively consistent. 
Only if elements of garment production are seen by consumers as constitutive of the 
“look” will producers go through the effort of reverse engineering a new production 
process (as some did, e.g., for the folding button-up cuffs popularized by the shirt worn 
by Vikram in the film Bheema [2008]). 
Similarly, the fabrics, threads, and other materials used for producing the original 
good may not be available, or may be too expensive for the price range of the product the 
producer is looking to make.5 The aspects of the model which are least available to 
consumer consciousness are modified: for example, minute stitching differences or subtle 
color differences. Aspects which are salient to consumer consciousness, and thus central 
to the “look” of the garment, are more likely to be maintained from the original; for 
example, the brand name and logo, the brand label, or distinctive color schemes.  
With every modification, the form changes and deviates from the original model. The 
level of flexibility in this iconism—how much can you change it until it is seen as 
different—is both dependent on producer and consumer consciousness and familiarity 
 
5 This is, note, even a principle in high quality knock-offs where shortcuts are taken in dyes, materials, 
stitches, and cutting in order to lower the production cost and thus increase profits. 
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with the original. As I discuss below, both are willfully low, and thus the degree of 
change that accrues over this production process is often great.  
Besides the material and economic exigencies of production, what are the creative 
principles that govern design? How are designs modified for reasons other than economic 
necessity? Where do new designs come from? 
 
2.4.4.2 Principles of design: Brand as template 
For producers, one primary principle of design for youth fashion is that the branded 
garment made for export is fashion. The brand for export is, by an act of faith on the part 
of producers, a guarantee that a duplicate of it can be sold for profit. This is based on a 
particular assumption about the political economy of brand consumption in India, one 
that producers often narrated to me: lower- and middle-class people emulate the rich, and 
the rich emulate the West. Thus, if you duplicate brands from the West you will make 
sales. Note that the belief that brands guarantee profits isn’t held to because there is a 
“demand” for such and such brands among young men in south India (their primary 
market); nor is it held because producers closely follow the sales of such and such brands 
in the West or among the Indian elite, because they don’t, except in the most general 
sense. Rather this belief is grounded in an aesthetic of brandedness that producers 
(believe that they) share with youth consumers. That is, the brand has that look, is style, 
and thus is capable of status-raising the wearer.  
Hence, as I noticed in my travels between Tiruppur, Erode, Chennai, and Madurai, 
any and every product that is being produced for export is being duplicated. Branded 
forms are selected for, but with no specificity for particular brands. Local producers get a 
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hold of export-surplus items and use them as the basis from which they make their own 
products (whether they be faithful to the brand or ultimately original or novel in their 
designs). Indeed, the capricious appropriation of branded forms independent of 
knowledge by producers and consumers about the brand image, target audience, and 
branded product extensions mean that any brand (and even non-brands like pop star 
names, college names, and place names) can be pulled into the cauldron of production. 
Brands are willy-nilly selected, and this is not based on any principle that has anything to 
do with the logic of particular brands as such. 
But why, then, are some brands or designs produced more than others? This is 
difficult to answer, and requires a brand-by-brand or design-by-design analysis. 
However, we can note the following:  
(A) For brands which are recognized by youth as particular brands—for example, 
Nike, Reebok, Adidas—their own brand meta-discourse is one principle which increases 
duplicate production; this is not necessarily because such brands are demanded by 
consumers and this feeds back into production (though this is certainly the case some of 
the times), but also because producers themselves lift designs from forms which they 
often see, whether it be magazine advertisements, catalogues, billboards, the internet, 
textile industry conventions where brands showcase their wares, or authorized 
showrooms of brands in high-end malls. However, many, perhaps most, of the branded 
forms consumed by youth are not of this kind.  
(B) Cinema and television provide design ideas for producers. Mass media, then, is 
both a principle of brand circulation (see chapter 6, sections 2.3.4., 3.2) and for 
introduction of new designs for production in the local market.  
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(C) Feedback from sales gives producers some idea of what designs work and what 
designs don’t work. Such feedback is extremely weak, however, and always has an after-
the-fact quality as producers do no prospective research.  
(D) In lieu of research producers ‘watch’ the market. That is, they monitor and copy 
what others are doing. At one level, then, there is an incessant repetition of the same 
based on a kind of (peer) pressure not to get left behind in the currency of (cultural) 
capital in the market. Once one brand becomes popular—as Ferrari and Diesel did in 
2007–2009—there is a frenzy of production to duplicate these brands. At the same time, 
by ‘watching the market’ producers attempt to inject (small) difference(s) into the forms 
they produced. There is a tendency, then, toward creating different (enough) forms within 
the general type of garments that are ‘moving’ in the market so as to avoid stagnation of 
sales and to diversify and maximize market saturation (cf. Lury 2002, 2008 on the same 
principle in brand “innovation”). By ‘watching the market,’ then, two forces regulate the 
production of such garments: a centrifugal force toward newness and difference and a 
centripetal force toward sameness and conformity. It is this compulsive movement 
toward difference within the formulae of sameness that both introduces and staves off 
changes in branded forms. 
 
2.4.4.3 Willful ignorance and the aesthetics of brandedness 
But because consumers are willfully ignorant of brands as such, while some brands 
are reproduced more than others the liberties that producers take with the branded form 
are many. They freely change the design of brands and their logos because, as they put it, 
‘the customer does not know the difference; and if they do, they don’t care.’ As I found, 
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producers themselves often didn’t know very much about the brands they were copying, 
except that they were brands (and sometimes not even that).  
In addition to ignorance about particular brands qua brands, producers are largely 
(willfully) ignorant of intellectual property (IP) law.6 Oftentimes producers assume that 
the brand qua protected intellectual property doesn’t include the lexical item or the logo 
but both together (cf. Reinach 2005: 48 on China). Only an exact replica would be 
breaking the law, many reasoned. As such, low-level producers of such duplicates treat 
branded logos and names as aesthetic objects, freely able to be borrowed the same way 
one might borrow a color palette or geometrical shape. As one producer put it, echoing 
the exact same discourse of consumers, ‘the question isn’t the brand per se, but whether 
the design has that “look”’ (“look-aa irukkaa?”). Branded forms are used because they 
are well designed. A design should be bright, attention grabbing, and interesting. Brand 
logos do this because of their attractive visual form and because they are associated with 
exteriority, wealth, and fashion. As producers and designers explained, it isn’t the brand 
identity that is important, but its aesthetic and functional effects as style.  
This position, of course, maintains deniability. However, for some producers at least, 
their willful ignorance (their desire not to know, perhaps to avoid the implication that 
they were intellectual pirates, or that they may become a target for legal action or other 
forms of coercion at the hands of brand companies) dislocates the branded form from any 
 
6 This ignorance may just as well been wishful thinking or feigned. It depends on the producer. Some 
seemed to have a clear idea of what is infringement and what is not, while others seemed totally clueless. 
Whatever we may believe about their mental states, producers in general act as if they are ignorant. My 
own impression given my experiences with them is that they are willfully ignorant of IP law so as to 
maintain a stance of deniability. It is important to note, as well, that dilution as a legal paradigm is not itself 
totally worked out or coherent in Europe or the West (Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008), and that dilution 
protection in statutory trademark law is itself relatively recent in India (Trademark Act of 1999, put into 
effect in 2003; see Gangjee 2008 for discussion on the differences in the concept of “dilution” between tort 
law and the statutory law, the former depending on the notion of “consumer confusion”).  
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particular brand meta-discourse which would attempt to fix the fidelity of the branded 
form.  
 
2.4.4.4 Hybrid brand forms and the aesthetics of brandedness 
Disregard for the brand qua brand identity and image (i.e., its authenticity) generates 
the kinds of brand hybridity we saw in chapter 6. One producer, for example, explained 
why he produced his shirts with one brand on the shirt, but with another brand on the 
label and another brand on the cardboard tag attached to the garment by saying that 
without the label, without the tag, it would look ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ (asingkam), the garment 
would look “cheap.” But putting a “Comfort Casuals” label on the collar of a shirt with 
“Nike” on the breast would make it look more “royal” and attractive (“look-aa irukku”). 
The logic revealed here is that it isn’t consistency of brand identity that matters—because 
largely no one cares—but that branded forms have a particular formal structure and 
aesthetics, of which the label and tag are a part. Customers expect this structure, though 
not the consistency of the subparts. 
In talking about a garment that had Adidas’ three stripes logo paired with the FILA 
name, one producer noted that he can recombine logos and wordings with no problem as 
long as the design elements are aesthetically pleasing, separately and together. And if 
consumers recognize at least one of the brand elements qua brand then this fact is simply 
a bonus and increases the chances that such an item will be bought. The same producer 
noted that such hybridization (as well as his “original” designs that utilized fictive brand 
names) always follows the LOGO/NAME + DESIGN + WORDING formula. It is this formula 
that is important, not its content as rigid designator of actual brands, he explained. As 
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producers reiterated to me, ‘we don’t care what the brands are. We make them because 
they sell (“move”) on the market. There is no need to know the brands, because 
consumers don’t even know the brands.’  
In short, using brand design elements participates in the aesthetics of brandedness, 
even if it does not conform to the coherency and consistency demanded by brand meta-
discourses, or the ontology of the brand qua BRAND. For producers, then, the brand is a 
template, a complex aesthetic design whose subparts can be disassembled and 
reassembled with other brand fractions or with other design elements (e.g., from cinema, 
from pop culture). While the value that consumers attach to such branded forms as style 
is the principle of their coherence, it is the willful ignorance of such forms as such and 
such brands that is the principle of their incoherence, which is to say, their re-
combinability.  
 
2.4.4.5 Misspellings, alterations, and the aesthetics of brandedness 
This alternative ontology of the brand common to producers and consumers of 
duplicates explains why the branded forms that circulate in Tamil Nadu tolerate a 
surprising level of deviation from their brand source material. The diversity of spellings, 
alternative designs, hybrids, and creative recontextualizations of designs described in 
chapter 6 are a direct outgrowth of producers’ not caring about the fidelity (and thus 
identity) of the brand as such (plus the fact that consumer’s apathy toward brand 
authenticity makes them economically unaccountable). And producers don’t care because 
fidelity to brand identity isn’t what makes such garments status-ful for their youth 
customers, and thus profitable for producers. Rather it’s the capacity to be style.  
For example, one producer showed me a pair of cargo shorts (photo 7.7). Having 
found the image of a basketball player on the internet, he downloaded the logo for the 
NBA and attached some loosely related sports and youth thematic wording.  
 
 
Photo 7.7 NBA-inspired cargo shorts 
 
He neither knew what the NBA was per se (just that it had something to do with 
basketball), nor what the wordings meant. They too were cut and pasted from the internet 
and then altered: indoor ? evidoor; hoop ? boop; winner hero ? winner cero. What 
was important was that the overall design fit a branded aesthetic, looked good, and was 
seen as style. For this producer, as for many others, his lack of English knowledge 
coupled with the fact that he knew that he most likely wouldn’t be held accountable for 
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English spelling meant that transcription errors or anomalies that entered the design 
weren’t likely to be corrected (see section 2.4.4.9; cf. Tarlo 1996: 242–243). 
 
2.4.4.6 Legality, the creativity of duplicates, and brand-inspired garments 
Another reason why producers systematically distort the designs of logos and the 
spellings of brand names is that such alterations are seen to help evade the illegalities of 
counterfeiting. Indeed, when I began my research in this area of Chennai there was a 
large amount of suspicion that I was an agent of a brand company out to get duplicate 
producers (cf. Craciun’s 2008 fieldwork experience). Companies which had a stake in 
retail in India—Adidas, Nike, Reebok—had apparently come down on a local Chennai 
producer. This had the effect that: (a) producers were wary of me and denied the idea that 
anyone was producing duplicates (or anything illegal), or downplayed the amount of such 
production (attributing it to unnamed others); (b) producers switched production to 
brands that didn’t have retail in India (e.g., Diesel, Timberland, Billabong); and (c) 
producers altered the logos and names of brands in order to make them different enough 
so as to not count as counterfeiting (to their mind). Thus, as one producer noted, he 
changed Reebok to Rerock and Timberland to Timber Island. Similarly, the Nike swoosh 
might be drawn with a more extreme curvature or flipped horizontally; or one of the three 
parallel Adidas triangles might be reversed in direction (see chapter 6, photos 6.10, 6.11 
for examples). 
Alternatively, producers might hybridize their designs, in effect “remixing” them (cf. 
Luvaas 2009). For example, one designer reasoned that if he took the design of a 
particular brand (which included what he thought was the simple phrase “Pepe Jeans” 
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and not a brand name) and put his own brand label on it, it meant he was not doing 
anything illegal. While this is, perhaps, a clear case of illegality, the general principle of 
deviation from the original as a mode of both creativity and legally protecting oneself 
remains.  
Here again we see the dual pressure: toward difference (in order to avoid legal 
problems) with a coercive pressure toward sameness (in order to maintain the “look” or 
aesthetic attractiveness of the copied branded form). While before we saw these 
centripetal and centrifugal forces of difference and sameness with respect to market 
competition, here we see it with respect to legal (dis-)incentivization. 
 
2.4.4.7 Example: Producing “Columbian” shorts 
Below I briefly look at how a particular branded form—the Columbia Sportswear 
Company’s brand and logo—made its way from the blustery ski slopes of Oregon, USA 
to the blistering heat of the local Chennai market.  
During one of my research trips to one of the garment production areas in Chennai, I 
struck up a conversation with a small-time producer of Bermuda shorts about his 
production process. He gets his fabrics from export-surplus factories and makes a variety 
of different kinds of Bermuda shorts utilizing different designs. While the various designs 
that he embroiders on the shorts change (e.g., brand logos, wordings, graphic designs), 
the cut and stitching of the shorts is conserved due to the time and money lost in teaching 
his tailors new designs.  
His most current model took the Columbia brand and logo as its inspiration. Fearing 
legal problems he altered the name by adding an “n,” thus changing the brand name from 
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“Columbia” to “Columbian.” He left the logo and font of the brand name the same, 
convinced that this was enough to avoid any legal problems. I inquired as to why he 
picked Columbia in the first place. Was it the brand image? Was it because it was popular 
with youth (his main target market)? Was it because it had a definite presence in India?7 
In short, was there a “demand” for Columbia? He replied that he had heard of Columbia 
and knew it was a legitimate foreign brand, though he had no idea about it beyond that.  
Rather, he chose Columbia, he explained, because he was able to acquire 500 
kilograms of original Columbia brand cardboard tags (used to affix price tags) for a very 
low cost. Therefore he decided to start producing Columbia-inspired shorts for the local 
market to which he appended the authentic, export-surplus tags. Here what is interesting 
is that the aesthetics of the brand—logo, font, name, label, tag—becomes the operating 
principle governing duplicate production only given the contingent availability of some 
export-surplus subcomponent of that brand aesthetic. Production here is totally 
independent of issues of brand image or recognition, not to mention “demand.” This 
small-time producer’s fears of legality and the exigencies of production increasingly 
distorted the original brand form, but loosely maintained its overall aesthetic 
composition. Moreover, he indicated that it was not uncommon for wholesalers to see his 
Columbia-inspired shorts but demand a different brand name, like Adidas or Fila, with 
the same design and logo, thus further distorting and hybridizing the form, causing 
mismatches between the cardboard tag, the brand name, font, and logo.  
 
2.4.4.8 Producing your own brand, novel designs 
                                                 
7 While Columbia does not have, to my knowledge, a retail presence in India it does contract manufacture 
of some of its products in Chennai. 
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As we saw, while the branded form is often replicated with some level of fidelity by 
producers, such replication isn’t governed by brand meta-discourses per se (or by the 
ontology of branded forms qua BRAND) but by a more general aesthetics of brandedness. 
This aesthetics, discussed in this chapter and the last, governs the creative design 
practices of producers whether they are copying, distorting, hybridizing, or creating their 
own brands, thereby maintaining the general structural formula of brand name, logo (or 
design), plus “wordings” (a slogan or script-based graphic design). In this section I look 
at how producers come up with novel designs that aren’t connected in any direct way to 
existing brands, but are informed by this aesthetics.  
Like duplicate producers, producers who make their own “original” garments are 
inspired by, or copy, existing designs. They get such designs in the same manner as those 
who make duplicates. And as with duplicate producers, such inspired designs are also 
altered from the source of the inspiration due to concerns with legality, exigencies of 
production, transcription errors, and the desire for the distinctiveness of their product 
(and thus competitive advantage). In distinction to duplicate producers, however, such 
producers append either their own brands (which a few had even trademarked in India) or 
noun phrases which sound like and function like brands but are not trademarked and 
command no recognition in the market. These are often accompanied by distinctive 
design elements and/or longer phrases that function as something like brand slogans.  
While a few producers I met were concerned with producing their own brands, many 
producers, especially those catering to lower middle-class youth, produced garments that 
could only be described as quasi-brands. For example, one producer took the phrase 
“Golden Eagle” (which it turns out is a company that makes flashes for cameras) and 
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attached it to an embroidered design of an eagle which he downloaded from the internet. 
He reasoned that because “Golden Eagle” sounds like a legitimate garment brand, it had a 
good chance of selling reasonably well. 
Such designs are highly modular, taking up to four or five different elements (quasi-
brand names, quasi-brand logos, quasi-brand slogans, and general images or designs) 
which are combined in various permutations, often internally incoherent. Indeed, each of 
these elements might be borrowed from a different source, altered, distorted, and then 
recontextualized in a novel pastiche (see chapter 6, section 2.7 for examples). For 
example, one producer would simply take headlines from English newspaper sports 
articles at random to generate “wordings”—“Brilliant Win,” “Difficult Struggle,” “Final 
Race”—and pair them with vaguely thematically related common nouns—“Sports,” 
“Gladiator,” “Emperor,” “Winner,” “Champion Boys,” “Cowboy.” He would then pair 
these with loosely thematically related designs (a running body, a ball and bat, a horse, 
etc.). Another producer generated his fictive brands and slogans through brainstorming 
semantically related words to clothing: “Youth Fashion,” “Fashion-21,” “Style,” “Jeans,” 
etc. (see photos 6.12, 6.19 in chapter 6, photo 7.4 in this chapter). As we can see, then, 
the logic here is that insofar as any lexical item can plausibly function as a brand name 
(i.e., are intelligible as rigid designators of possible companies), any word-like thing is 
fair game. For example “Zehewutt,” which to my knowledge is a nonsense concatenation 
of letters that loosely takes the shape of a word, is one such quasi-brand I encountered 
during my fieldwork.  
In short, the whole logic of production derives from a general aesthetic of 
brandedness but hinges on the willful ignorance or disregard for particular brands as 
such. Hence the seemingly ad hoc character of the design process. In Figure 7.1 below I 
schematize the different kinds of brand formations involved in the aesthetics of 
brandedness.  
 
 Figure 7.1 Brand formations: From quasi- to authentic brands 
 
      no brand as such authentic (but of different         authentic brands 
    product type) 
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 letters and wordings in borrowed from    crypto-  known brand 
 the form of a fictive another product   duplicate duplicate 
 brand 
   “CHAMPION FIGHTER” “GOLDEN EAGLE”  “DIESEL” “NIKE” 
 
                               
     non-duplicate / duplicate             
              ignorance / knowledge 
 
              local garments                       authentic garments 
 
 
2.4.4.9 English as aesthetic object 
The most aestheticized aspect of such branded forms—and this is true for high-
fidelity duplicates, fictive-, and quasi- brands—is the use of English, or more accurately 
the Roman script.8 From the production point of view, why are all branded forms (and 
slogans) in English (cf. Yurchak 2006: ch. 5 in Soviet Russia; Weiss 2002: 102 on 
Tanzanian shop names; Stanlaw 1992 on Japanese usage of English)? 
I first posed the question to designers and producers as, why not put Tamil words on 
shirts? Why not have Tamil language brands for youth garments? This idea was almost 
comical to producers. Writing it Tamil was highly problematic, they explained. First of 
all, it meant that your garments could only be sold in Tamil Nadu. By contrast, English is 
                                                 
8 Indeed, one producer would borrow proper names from non-English European languages like German and 
French to generate his fictive brand names. 
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a common language across India and thus transcends linguistic community and 
geographical location. More importantly, if you write things in Tamil they have to be 
semantically meaningful. This is because consumers will evaluate such writing based on 
its denotational and referential meaning (cf. Thomas 2009 on indigenous Mayan brands 
in Guatemala). By implication, then, such garments would have an addressivity (i.e., they 
would be alter-focal); their semantic content would engage the onlooker and thus present 
a danger. They would present a danger because such meaningful wordings can be more 
easily rejected as silly, trite, clichéd, offensive, etc. By contrast, English is largely 
denotationally opaque for producers and consumers. This isn’t because producers or 
consumers don’t understand what the phrases mean (though sometimes they don’t), but 
because they don’t care. Or rather, it isn’t relevant to the pragmatic functionality and 
aesthetic attractiveness of the signs used (cf. Tarlo 1996: 242–243).  
Rather than a communicative code, Roman script is an aesthetic object, and thus does 
not address per se but rather functions ego-focally as style. It is precisely because 
producers disregard branded forms qua brands and English qua denotational-referential 
code, and instead reanalyze both as aesthetic objects pragmatically capable of performing 
style, that they make shirts with strings of nonsense English letters without a second 
thought (see chapter 6, section 2.7 for examples). English is simply another element of 
design. Even if nonsensical, English, as one producer put it, ‘has that look’ (i.e., ‘looks 
good’) (“look-aa irukku”). English is used because it is style. As another producer put it, 
“English NNaa fashion” ‘If it’s (in) English (then) it’s fashion.’  
Given this, it becomes necessary to realize that (duplicate) brand names are always 
dually functioning: first, as iconic indexicals of brands; and second, as aesthetic objects, 
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as design elements (indexes of brandedness). This is one of the reasons why brand names 
are so elastic in the hands of producers. Like a line that can be curved, elongated, and 
stretched, English words and brand names can be distorted, letters replaced, dropped, 
doubled. Just as a zigzag line might enhance the design of a shirt, so too could a brand 
name or equally a string of nonsense letters (cf. Stanlaw 1992: 73–75; Tarlo 1996: 242–
243). It also explains the disregard of brands as proprietary rigid designators. As general 
design elements they are common property, not linked to any one person or company. 
 
2.5 Summary  
What I have shown in this chapter is that the production and circulation of branded 
forms in garments consumed by youth—in export surplus, literal duplication, and in 
inspired moments of copying or novel design—is largely incidental to specific brands as 
such but highly attuned to brandedness in general. It is determined by particular 
movements of global capital—the cheap labor of India making possible export surplus of 
branded forms and materials necessary to copy or be inspired by them—and the 
seemingly ad hoc logic of the local market (also see Pang 2008 for discussion of 
something similar in China; cf. Craciun 2008, Luvaas 2009). Interestingly, both the 
vagaries of global capital and local garment production are tangential and insensitive to 
the consumption of particular brands as brands in local Tamil markets. First, export-
surplus goods are calibrated to foreign tastes in foreign markets. Second, production for 
the local market is calqued off of export surplus. Third, producers for the local market 
largely assume, with a few notable exceptions, that any old brand or combination of 
English words/letters can achieve success. As such, there is an unruly proliferation of 
 355
brands, seemingly unrelated to consumer knowledge or demand, or the meta-discursive 
technologies (like marketing, advertising, consumer research) to inculcate either.  
However, the exigencies of production and the indexical value of brands as exterior 
(but not necessarily as brand X, Y, or Z) among both consumers and producers explains 
why the branded form is central to youth fashion; that is, why style in clothing operates 
under an aesthetic of brandedness and not something else. The branded form is central, 
first, because the designs and materials that make such production possible literally come 
from the debris of global capital as it produces and circulates brands. Second, brands 
provide the symbolic materials for such youth forms because the brand is diagrammatic 
of concepts of youth status (style) and ‘youth’ more generally, as I argued in chapter 6. 
As such, the brand is calqued off of and co-opted, and thus abstracted from and 
generalized into a more general aesthetic of brandedness.  
As I have shown, the production of branded forms, while seemingly ad hoc and 
schizophrenic in relationship to the consumption of particular brands qua brands, is 
totally coherent under the alternative ontology of the branded form qua style. Production 
is ad hoc and blind as to what brands are or mean because what is relevant for such 
production and consumption isn’t the brand per se, but an aesthetic of brandedness and 
its pragmatic entailments as style. Under such a meta-discourse, many otherwise 
unrelated or disparate semiotic elements (authentic brands, fictive brands, celebrity 
proper names, nouns associated with youth fashion, common noun phrases, words with 
roughly English morphological shape, strings of Roman letters) are all tokens of the same 
type: style. They all are regimented under the same meta-pragmatic discourse. It is the 
coordination of moments of production and consumption under this common meta-
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pragmatic framework that must be understood in order to make sense of branded forms 
among youth in Tamil Nadu; and as I argue in chapter 8, to make sense of the brand in 
general. 
 
3. Conclusions 
3.1 “Counterfeiting” what? 
The social life of the Western branded forms in Tamil Nadu discussed in this chapter 
cancels out a number of assumptions about brands that are taken as natural in the 
literature on brands and their counterfeits. For example, understandings of what a brand 
is and isn’t (specifically in Western trademark law) up until the late 20th century 
primarily revolved around the notion that using another’s branded form is counterfeit if 
consumers think that a product of branded form X came from someone other than its 
authorized producer (i.e., it creates “consumer confusion”) (Lury 2004: ch. 5; Wilkins 
1992, 1994; Kriegel 2004 Bently 2008; Higgins 2008; Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008). In 
the most recent incarnation, the boundary between the brand and its counterfeit 
increasingly pivots around notions of “dis-association,” “dilution,” or “tarnishment” of 
brand image (Wilkins 1992, 1994; Coombe 1996; Frow 1996, 2002; Moore 2003; Wang 
2003: ch. 2; Lury 2004: ch. 5, 2008; Arvidsson 2005; Pang 2006, 2008; Bently 2008; 
Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008; Dinwoodie 2008; Ng 2008; Griffiths 2008; Manning 2010; 
on Indian trademark law and dilution see Gangjee 2008).9 A product in this newer 
understanding is counterfeit if its self-reflexive (or at least, so construed) construction as 
such and such a branded commodity reminds customers of the trademark holder’s brand 
 
9 Note that the law, either in the West or India, is not totally coherent or consistent regarding the legal 
status of brands, and that both concepts (passing off and dilution) are relevant in contemporary legal 
understandings of brands.  
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in a way that interferes with that brand’s image, associations, or distinctiveness. Here, the 
issue isn’t confusion or dissimulation, but the extent to which someone else’s good can 
reduce brand equity as it is played out as a set of associations in consumers’ minds. In 
both cases, counterfeiting in the West depends on the mental states of consumers and 
those who apperceive branded forms qua brands of such and such a type. And yet, in a 
situation where there is willful brand ignorance, as we saw among Tamil youth, neither of 
these cases applies. Youth are not confused as to whether a duplicate is real or fake, and 
they have no associations attached to particular brands.  
To what extent are such garments counterfeit brands then, as opposed to simply 
garments? Under such an alternative ontology does the notion of “counterfeit” even make 
sense (cf. Vann 2006, Reinach 2005 on the problematics of the concept of ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘fake’ in Vietnam and China, respectively)? If we abide by the feeling that such 
garments are still indeed counterfeits, I would argue that neither view of the brand—as 
reliable source-indexical of producer or as brand equity consisting of “mind share” (see 
Holt 2004 for discussion and critique of this concept)—is of any help. What is revealed is 
simply the brute legal reality that the ontological category of BRAND is underwritten by a 
particular understanding of just profit flow: counterfeiting exists when profits aren’t 
going to the “right” person (i.e., the person who owns the intellectual property). Even 
here the core of the brand is revealed to be a particular meta-semiotic structure of the law 
governing particular brand tokens as mediators of profit flow (i.e., as tracing the 
commodity chain backwards). This is independent of consumer mental states. 
More generally, how is it possible to say that form X1 is a(n illegitimate) copy of 
form X, and not simply that we are dealing with two separate forms (cf. Kriegel 2004: 
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256–262; Johns 2009 on early debates about copyright and piracy)? I have implicitly 
argued that to understand something as a duplicate of something else—for example, a 
brand “original”—is to be able to regiment both duplicate and original according to some 
meta-semiotic principle which reckons duplicate and original as fractionally (dis)similar 
in such and such ways. That is, only with respect to a common classificatory frame can 
two such forms be seen as similar or different in the first place. And yet I have argued 
that the most relevant meta-semiotic principle for Tamil youth consumers and duplicate 
producers isn’t BRAND—which turns on the distinction between “authentic” and “fake” 
branded forms (as a truth function)—but the aesthetics of exteriority and style which 
distinguish between objects which can and cannot pragmatically entail status-raising (as a 
performative function). Under this meta-semiotic principle, then, the function COPY OF 
(BRAND TYPE) X becomes less meaningful, as do concepts of brand authenticity more 
generally (see Vann 2006). 
This isn’t to say that we cannot evaluate such goods as counterfeits. Indeed, we can. 
But it isn’t inherent in the forms involved, nor the mental states of consumers or 
producers. Rather, to view them as deficient copies is simply to align oneself with a 
particularly interested and normative position (the law, the IP owner). Indeed, a large part 
of the problem for brand companies in places like India is that many people don’t 
evaluate branded forms under the BRAND ontology that underwrites the brand in the West 
(or minimally, in Western law) (Vann 2005, 2006; Pang 2008; Manning and Uplisashvili 
2007; Manning 2009; Yurchak 2006: ch. 5). A major task for Western governments and 
brand companies, then, is the socialization (or coercion as the case many be) of 
consumers, producers, and governments to this meta-semiotic principle, to the ontology 
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of the BRAND (Bush et al. 1989: 61, 64; McDonald and Roberts 1994; Wee et al. 1995: 
41–42; Cordell et al. 1996: 51; Thomas 2009).  
To understand how branded forms work in south India, then, requires that we are able 
to explicate not simply the forms, but the regimentation of such forms into larger meta-
semiotic frameworks and how these meta-discourses inform actual events of interaction 
involving such forms. As we saw, the meta-semiotic framework relevant for Tamil youth 
involves brands, but always only as part of a more general classification of branded forms 
as instances of aestheticized exteriority (rather than as source-index or coherent brand 
image). This tangential co-opting of the brand is reflected in the input of branded forms 
into local economies as themselves tangential, integrated into production in ways ad hoc 
to brand identity.  
The problem of “counterfeit” or “piracy” as analytical concepts, then, is that they 
always already recruit such forms to a highly partial and particular (ethnocentric) meta-
semiotic framework (Western IP law10), one which may or may not actually be in play 
for the relevant social domain of individuals at hand. But to realize that such, essentia
legal, meta-semiotic frameworks are, in many important aspects, irrelevant to 
understanding the social life of branded forms in Tamil Nadu it is necessary to bring to 
bear an ethnographic investigation of both the production and consumption of such forms 
and how they are inter-articulated with respect to each other (cf. Nakassis and Dean 
2007; Nakassis 2009 on this methodological point). Moreover, it requires situating such 
moments of production and consumption with respect to larger issues unrelated to brands 
 
10 And within the law, which is itself not necessarily internally coherent, to particular views on trademarks 
that are historically more recent (i.e., the concept of “dilution”).  
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as such (e.g., the construction of ‘youth,’ its projection into concepts of youth status, and 
their negotiation in the peer group).  
 
3.2 “Demand” for what? 
A similar assumption that we take as natural under the BRAND ontology that is 
canceled out by the Tamil ontology of branded forms is that the counterfeiting of brand X 
responds to “demand” for brand X (e.g., Bush et al. 1989: 59; Bloch et al. 1993: 28, 35; 
McDonald and Roberts 1994; Wee et al. 1995: 19; Phau et al. 2001: 46; Phillips 2005). In 
this reasoning, the duplicate is insidious and illegal because it poaches the brand identity 
and image that has, through the brand company’s investment of time and capital in 
research and development, created demand. The counterfeit, thus, rides off of the demand 
of the original branded good.  
Yet, in Tamil Nadu at least, for most brands that are duplicated there is no such 
“demand.” Taking the Nike swoosh example from chapters 5 and 6, for a sizable part of 
the population the consumption of Nike swooshes isn’t driven by “Nike” at all. Rather, it 
is driven by concepts of youth status as they are embodied and articulated in 
Rajinikanth’s style. If anything, actually, it is Nike which is poaching the brand equity of 
Rajinikanth, free-riding off his hard work as an iconic actor. 
Moreover, the supply of counterfeits isn’t related to even the idea of such a demand, 
either with respect to export surplus (whose supply is totally independent of local 
demand) or duplicates (whose supply is simply an extension of whatever is being 
produced for export). In production and consumption, it isn’t this or that brand that 
people make and consume, but a branded form that conforms to a larger aesthetic of 
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brandedness. The brand becomes a pure diacritic, one among many that can index style, 
but inscrutable for any specific brand meaning. The branded form in Tamil Nadu, even if 
faithful to the brand’s “authentic” form, is empty outside the BRAND ontology as upheld 
in Western IP law. 
We can see how the concept of “demand” is highly problematic here, precisely 
because moments of production and consumption (and thus supply and demand) are so 
highly mediated: by foreign markets; by the requirements of global capital; and by Tamil 
concepts of status, exteriority, and aesthetics. In such a situation it becomes meaningless 
to argue that consumption of commodity X analyzable as a token of the brand type Y 
(either as authentic or duplicate) is a result of demand for Y precisely because what is 
informing consumption may not be Y at all (i.e., the category that the brand owner is 
attempting to discipline the consumer to) but some other principle Z (e.g., style). The 
notion of “demand” requires that brand tokens and brand types are tightly regimented and 
calibrated, such that some commodity can stand in as a token of the type. Yet such 
regimentation, as we noted, is exactly what is absent among Tamil youth consumers and 
producers. 
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Chapter 8 – Theorizing the Brand: Meta-Semiosis and Simulation 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
In this chapter I theorize the brand as a semiotic object. I do this from two 
perspectives on the limits of the brand: first, from the perspective of the aesthetics of 
brandedness discussed in chapters 6 and 7; second, from the perspective of the 
counterfeit, or brand simulacrum/simulation. First I give a brief literature review on work 
on brands to indicate lacunae that this chapter addresses. Then I look at the semiotics of 
the brand, using discussion from chapters 6 and 7 as well as work by others on the brand. 
In the last section of the chapter I look at the brand as simulacrum and simulation, based 
on my particular reading of Baudrillard. Throughout, my goal is to develop an 
ethnographically motivated theory of the brand. I do this, however, by skirting along the 
boundaries of this category, focusing as much on when a brand is not as when it is.  
 
1.2 Literature on brands  
Work on brands and trademarks spans many disciplines and audiences, from legal 
(Bentley 2008; Gangjee 2008; Higgins 2008) and economic history (Wilkins 1992, 1994; 
Kriegel 2004); legal theory (Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008; Ng 2008); the sociology of 
brands (Lury 2002, 2004; Moor 2003; Arvidsson 2005); cultural studies (Frow 1996, 
2002); anthropologists of cultural (Coombe 1996; Mazzarella 2003; Foster 2005, 2007; 
Vann 2005, 2006; Wilk 2006; Leach 2008) and linguistic varieties (Moore 2003; 
Manning 2009, 2010; Manning and Uplisashvili 2007; Agha n.d.); to the copious 
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the brand functions most distinctly from brand meta-discourses—are afforded a unique 
                                                
management and marketing literatures (Gardner and Levy 1955; Aaker 1991; Jones 1994;
Alexander and Schouten 1998; Sherry 1998, 2005; Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2000; 
2002, 2004, 2006; Calkins 2005) and polemical works addressed to a m
ience (Klein 2000[1999], Quart 2003).1  
While much empirical work has dealt with brands and some have outlined theore
accounts of brands (Moore 2003; Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2005), there appears a gulf 
between the two (Holt 2006: 30). It seems, as per the recent turn in marketing toward 
actual moments of consumption (Holt 2002; Arvidsson 2005; Frank 1997), that by and 
large the only literatures where the theorization of the brand is empirically driven from
actual instances of consumption are in the marketing and business history literatures. 
Ironically, sociologists and anthropologists interested in theorizing the brand have base
their accounts on syntheses of the marketing literature or from analysis of brand meta-
discourses such as corporation internal communication, trade journals, marketing and 
advertising campaigns, and product hermeneutics (e.g., Mazzarella 2003: ch. 6; Moore 
2003; Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2005; Foster 2007; 2008; Manning and Uplisashavili 2007;
Manning 2009) rather than focus on actual empirical work on brand consumption/use.2 
This is unfortunate because anthropologists working on brands—often in regions where 
 
1 In this chapter I focus on the notion of the brand with the implicit assumption that the brand subsumes the 
trademark. We can think of trademark as that semiotic element of the brand that is stably regimented and 
protected by legal discourses. By contrast the brand includes a host of other features, some of which fall 
under the purview of the law, and some of which do not (e.g., marketing strategies; corporate cultural 
identities linked to brand image; untrademarkable elements of brand) (Davis 2008; Gangjee 2008; Ginsburg 
2008; Manning 2010).  
2 This is doubly ironic because the business literature cites and follows the methodologies of anthropology, 
“thick description” and all (Fournier 1998: 344; see Alexander and Schouten 1998; Sherry 1998, 2005, 
2008); see Gardner and Levy (1955) for an early cry for qualitative social science research; Sherry’s (2005: 
40) “brandthropology”; and Holt’s (2004) symbolic anthropology influenced marketing theory.  
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perspective on the brand, as works by Halstead (2002), Vann (2005, 2006), Yurchak 
(2006: ch. 5), Craciun (2008, 2009), and Luvaas (2009) show.  
One result of relying on brand meta-discourses as descriptions of brands in the world 
is a particular kind of apocalyptic anxiety about a fascistic future where the world is 
overrun by brands (Casson 1994; Klein 2000[1999]; Quart 2003; see Agha n.d.: 8, 39 for 
a similar point). As we will see, this problem is symptomatic of methodological and 
epistemological problems, and not necessarily about the social life of brands in the world 
per se. In particular, it results from taking brand meta-discourses at face value, and then 
literalizing them, projecting their prescriptive meta-pragmatic discourse as descriptive of 
the world as such.  
To steer clear of these problems I offer three starting points for analysis: (1) locating 
the analysis of branded forms outside of the culture where brand meta-discourses are 
produced: in Tamil Nadu, India; (2) looking at the actual consumption of brands rather 
than brand meta-discourses as such; and (3) looking at the brand from the perspective of 
its illicit twin, the counterfeit or duplicate product.  
 
2. Semiotics of the brand 
2.1 When is a brand? 
How might we theorize the brand from the perspective of the willful ignorance of 
Tamil youth and duplicate producers discussed in chapters 6 and 7? What does such 
willful ignorance of brands coupled with an orientation to branded forms tell us about the 
semiotic composition of the brand? While the brand is a semiotically multi-form object 
and thus a heterogeneous category (vis-à-vis the type of products or services associated 
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with it, its historical context, its context of use, how it is marketed), I argue that the key 
semiotic feature of the brand is its reflexive meta-semiotic structure. Below I develop this 
argument vis-à-vis debates in social theory about the ontology of the commodity form in 
Western capitalism and its relationship to brands in late(r) capitalism. This genealogy of 
the brand in the West is complemented by discussion of contemporary on the ground 
engagement with branded forms in Tamil Nadu, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
2.2 From quality to quantity 
For those who have theorized capitalism vis-à-vis the ontological status of the object, 
the history of capitalism is the history of the increasing abstraction and rationalization of 
the object (see Mazzarella 2003: ch. 2 for discussion and critique). Marx’s (1976) 
formulation of the commodity and Benjamin’s (1935) formulation of the concept of 
“aura” are perhaps the most cited, though we may also note Simmel’s (1978[1907]) 
concern with the quantification of qualities under capitalism; early Baudrillard’s 
(2001[1968], 2001[1970], 2001[1972], 2001[1976]) work on symbolic exchange and the 
principle of equivalence; and the situationalists on commodification and spectacle 
(Debord 1967; see Best 1994). For all these authors, capitalism fundamentally changes 
the ontology of objects.  
Marx’s (1976) classic formulation of the commodity form is based on the distinction 
of use value and exchange value where the former is based on that which is self-evident, 
universal, and natural in objects: its utility and its ability to satisfy (authentic) needs. 
Exchange value, by contrast, is historically newer as it is based on particular social 
relations of capitalist and laborer. These social relations establish the object as part of a 
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set of equivalences (ultimately with money), thus abstracting exchange value from use 
value (and in the case of the universal equivalent, converting its use value as value more 
generally). In this understanding, use value is singular, unique, uncomparable; by 
contrast, exchange value is abstract, universal, and comparable.3  
In a similar vein, Simmel’s (1978[1907]) philosophy of money focuses on the 
transformation of the qualities of objects into quantities. Simmel is concerned with how, 
in modernity, objects (and subjects) increasingly are quantified, leading to a particular 
kind of cognitive orientation toward the world. For Baudrillard (2001[1968], 2001[1970], 
2001[1972], 2001[1976]), capitalism is a radical rupture wherein symbolic exchange—
exemplified in the gift, the potlatch, and ritual prestations (Mauss 1954)—forms an Ur 
ontology of the object (the substitute for use value, in fact). This ontology is radically 
changed through the reanalysis of the world of objects under the principle of commodity 
equivalence (i.e., as a pure Marxist commodity) and the structural law of equivalence 
more generally (i.e., as a pure Saussurean sign). The history of the object, then, is the 
history of abstraction, rationalization, and the emptying out, or implosion of, “authentic” 
and “genuine” “meaning”; it is the transformation of the object as that which is 
imbricated in social relations of reciprocity (Baudrillard 2001[1976]) to that which 
mediates exchange between anomic, autonomous individuals (see Frow 1996).  
Benjamin (1935) similarly takes up this issue, but shifts the focus to the reproduction 
of objects in general; in particular, how mechanical reproduction and industrialization 
 
3 While the commodity may be fetishized, reintroducing a kind of quantized quality to it (i.e., the seeming 
agency of commodities qua exchange values), this is a mystification covering both the abstract nature of 
the object and the concrete social relations that are its conditions of possibility. This fetish is not the re-
concretization of the abstract, then, but the (seeming) unmediated quality of quantified value embodied in 
things (i.e., commodities).  
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have radically altered cultural (or artistic) representations. For him it is the ability to 
produce exact copies in large quantities that fundamentally changes the object’s ontology. 
In earlier epochs (marked by earlier reproductive technologies), objects had an “aura.” 
They projected this aura through their unique history, the semiotic chain that links each 
individual with respect to the object in question and the object over time. The object is 
characterized by its sensuous materiality, indexical origin, and thus its authenticity and 
authority. (We might say, following Peirce [1992], its irreducible Secondness.) It is this 
ontology that that gives objects meaning and value (especially highly valorized ritual 
objects and art). The history of objects is the history of increasingly accurate and exact 
reproduction: from coin reproduction, terra cotta, bronze, lithography, to finally 
photography, audio recording, and film (cf. Bazin 2004; Kracauer 1960). With each step 
the object’s history, its authenticity, its authority is displaced under the (more than) 
perfect copy. This links back up with the concerns of Marx, Simmel, and Baudrillard 
regarding the quantification of objects and cognition:  
“To pry an object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception 
whose “sense of the universal equality of things” has increased to such a degree 
that it extracts even from a unique object by means of reproduction” (Benjamin 
1935: sect. 3, para. 2). 
Or as Benjamin later states: “quantity has been transmuted into quality” (ibid., sect. 15, 
para. 1).  
 
2.3 From quantity back to (simulated) quality 
If the history of the object is its increasing quantification, its increasing detachment 
from “authentic” social relations—that is, its de-indexicalization—and its conversion into 
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the abstract commodity form, what do we make of the brand? The brand is precisely that 
semiotic form which attempts to reintroduce “aura” or quality back into the commodity 
form (Lury 2004; Frow 1996; Mazzarella 2003: 192; Arvidsson 2005; Foster 2005, 2007; 
Agha n.d.; cf. Callon et al. 2002).4  
Like the author function (Frow 1996, 2002; Kriegel 2004: 250), and the parallel text 
of the movie star (Benjamin 1935), the brand attempts to provide an element of 
authenticity, authority (often provided in the last instance by the law), and meaning to the 
objects which fall under its umbrella. It figures itself as filling the vacuum of the unique, 
“real” history of the object, a history presumably liquidated by its mechanical 
reproduction, and transformed and decontextualized from its embeddedness in social 
interactions with familiar shop keepers to mere economic transaction among anonymous 
agents involving goods of relatively unknown origin and quality (except through the 
presence of the brand label) (Wilkins 1994). It is no surprise, then, that modern brands 
appear precisely when mass production and distribution emerge (Wilkins 1992; cf. Johns 
2009 on copyright).  
Through the brand and its reflexive positioning in advertising, marketing, and 
packaging, commodities in the era of consumerism are projected as more and more 
personal, singular, and unique; and more and more able to satisfy our inner needs and 
 
4 Interestingly, here “aura” is precisely a function of the sameness—the non-uniqueness—of brand tokens 
with respect to each other, insofar as this non-uniqueness is productive in instantiating a larger unity, the 
brand type. It is the fact that every brand token is the same (or similar) that makes it capable of functioning 
as part of the brand type. Rather than the “aura” adhering in the same unique object over diachronic history, 
the brand’s aura adheres over multiple tokens synchronically (as part of the brand type) and diachronically 
(the brand type over time). 
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desires, to be integrated into our individual lifestyles and into “authentic” community 
formations.5  
The ultimate aim, of course, is to reorganize a market which is otherwise presumably 
organized quantitatively by price (Aaker 1991: x, ch. 1; Jones 1994; Lury 2008) and thus 
reintroduce a principle of qualitative difference between commodities which, due to 
mechanical reproduction and technical mastery, are increasingly functionally similar 
(Rajagopal 1999; Feldwick 1999[1991]: 26; Gardner and Levy 1955; Aaker and 
Joachimsthaler 2000; Sherry 2005). It is also presumably a principle to preempt 
skepticism and resistance to consumerism as coercive, inauthentic, and instrumentally 
rational (Holt 2002, 2004; Moor 2003) and replace such skepticism with (quasi-
)reciprocal (and dependent) social relations (Fournier 1998; Mazzarella 2003: ch. 6; Holt 
2006; Agha n.d.),6 community (Muniz and O’Guinn 2001), and even brand “love” 
(Foster 2005; Arvidsson 2005). All this is, of course, in order to provide a competitive 
edge and increase profits and brand equity (Aaker 1991; Jones
The brand, then, becomes a principle whereby supply and demand can be redirected 
from functionality or price toward qualitative uniqueness (notionally in the unique 
“meanings” associated to the brand; legally as a semiotic monopoly of naming and 
product extension [Davis 2008]), and thus how the market can be both segmented 
internally and maximized overall (Lury 2008). The brand, then, attempts to direct the 
tendency of commodities to maximize their circulation, by linking a set of commodified 
 
5 For discussion of this aspect of brands see: Baudrillard 2001[1968]; Sawchuck 1994; Frow 1996, 2002; 
Callon et al. 2002; Lury 2002, 2004; Moore 2003; Arvidsson 2005; Foster 2005, 2007; Agha n.d.: 10–26; 
in the marketing literature see: Fournier 1998; Cowley 1999[1991]; Feldwick 1999[1991]; Holt 2002, 
2004; McGracken 2005. On community formations see: Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; Klein 2000[1999]; 
Coombe 1996. 
6 See Leach (2008: 341), Lury (2004), Arvidsson (2005), and Mazzarella (2003: 195) for a critique of the 
notion of brand–consumer reciprocity and its asymmetries. 
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objects/services under the umbrella of a brand, as a principle of scarcity, in order to 
generate profits (Frow 1996).  
In this section I have argued that the brand figures itself as reinjecting quality—aura, 
authenticity, authority, and meaning—into quantified commodity forms. What is the 
semiotic organization of the brand that allows it breathe life into the empty forms of 
capitalism from which it is necessarily built up? In section 2.4 I take up the semiotic 
organization of the brand qua BRAND, looking at it as a Peircean sign of a particularly 
reflexive type.7  
 
2.4. Semiotic organization of the brand 
2.4.1 Introduction 
One of the major problems with work on brands is the tendency to focus on the brand 
as something mysteriously (im)material (e.g., Lury 2004; Shields 2003: 177; Arvidsson 
2005; see Feldwick 1999[1991]: 19, 21 on this tendency within marketing discourse). 
Indeed, what is interesting about brands is that they are composite semiotic objects. This 
complexity has prompted many a writer on brands to reflect in wonderment—reminiscent 
of medieval scholastics’ debates on universals and particulars—at how a brand can be 
both physically material (an “object”) and metaphysically immaterial (a set of 
associations, concepts, mental states) (see Moore 2003; Manning 2010 for a similar 
critique). As I will argue, while brands—like other symbolic signs (including the lexical 
item “brand”)—often designate discrete material objects, the semiotic complexity of 
 
7 In my discussion I will be using the Peircean (1992) terms with his technical meanings: qualisign, 
token/sinsign; type/legisign in discussing types of sign-vehicles or representamena; icon, index, symbol in 
discussing the ground of signs; rheme/rhematic sign and dicent signs as constituents of more complex signs 
like propositions; and interpretant for the more developed sign (to a mind). For discussion of Peirce’s 
semiotic see Parmentier (1994) and Lee (1997). 
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brands has led to a dual tendency by theorists to naturalize and concretize the brand when 
it should not be (e.g., Lury’s [2004] “object-ifying” of the brand8) and abstracting from it 
too much when it should not be (elevating the brand to a mystical metaphysics). 
However, if we are clear on the semiotic organization of the brand, the mystification of 
the brand as material/immaterial and the false problems that follow from it can be 
avoided. 
We need to ask the simple epistemological question: how do we know when we are in 
the presence of a brand? At first glance, there are at least two obvious ways: (1) we come 
in space–time contiguity with some material thing (e.g., a logo, label, unique form/color 
combination) which indexes the presence of the brand; (2) the brand is invoked virtually 
through discourse about the brand or other semiotic activity that typifies the brand. In the 
first case we are presented with an instance of the brand sensorially. In the second, we are 
presented with the brand through a representation of it. Both may happen at the same 
time as well. 
The point here is that the presumably immaterial thing called “brand” is only ever 
knowable and experiencable (and hence has an empirical existence that can be studied) 
through instances of it, either as tokens of the brand type or as virtual representations of 
either. What are the semiotic features of brands that make it possible to be experiencable 
in this way? 
 
 
8 Indeed, despite her claims otherwise Lury (2004: 16) is guilty of misplaced concreteness. This is revealed 
by her treatment of the brand as concretized projection off of virtual descriptions of it by brand meta-
discourses. It is noteworthy, then, that all her hedges—of not assuming the brand to be a natural unity, a 
single thing, etc.—are located in the “Coda” sections of each chapter. They are literally afterthoughts, 
addenda. Moreover, such auto-critiques and qualifications are never taken up in later discussion. They do 
not change how she theorizes the brand. They are alibis, deniability clauses.  
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2.4.2 As type  
The brand is a type (or legisign). Brands are classificatory principles which categorize 
some range of signs (objects, services, spaces, experiences, etc.) as tokens (or sinsigns) of 
the brand type (what Pang 2008: 128 calls “metonymic displacement”). That is, brands 
introduce a principle of differentiation between similar things (which may be organized 
by some other classificatory principle; e.g., functionality) while grouping otherwise 
distinct things as the same (by the criterion of brand membership), with the hopes of 
creating competitively advantageous classes of commodities. (Note that there is nothing 
special about the brand in being a type-level sign. We may ask the same question about 
any kind of classificatory object: e.g., words in a language, literary genres, or 
cultural/functional types of objects.)  
To this extent, the brand as type is a regulator of similarity, or iconism, between 
objects, regimenting the range of objects which can be seen to be similar (i.e., members 
of the type) and excluding others. As we discuss below, it is this regimentation (or [non-
]flexibility) of iconism which attempts to: (a) differentiate brands from each other; and 
(b) ground the authority of the brand through classifications of “authentic” versus 
“inauthentic” (as fetishized in the form itself). It is this control of iconism that allows 
tokens of the brand to function as instances of particular brand types, and thus exclude 
counterfeits and competing brands as not part of the brand type. But how is this 
classificatory relationship possible? 
 
2.4.3 As index 
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Branded tokens are indexes of the brand type. In addition, the brand type—embodied 
most saliently in the trademark—is itself an index, in particular a rigid designator (Kripke 
1980), that points to a presumed origin of production or “good will.” This functions 
analogously to proper names whereby the brand type and its tokens index its source (or 
indexical target) by virtue of the apperceiver of the brand token being acquainted with the 
semiotic chain that radiates from some (presumed) “baptismal event” (Durant 2008). To 
this extent, any part of the brand type which can be instantiated in tokens of it (e.g., the 
brand name or logo; a branded event [Moor 2003, Alexander and Schouten 1998] or 
space [Sherry 1998]; or distinctive and recognizable color combinations [Davis 2008; 
Ginsburg 2008]) can be indexical of this (presumed) origin.9 In this way, then, brands 
(and more specifically, trademarks) are distinctive diacritics of source/origin (Coombe 
1996; Bently 2008; Ginsburg 2008; Durant 2008). 
What is important to note here is that brands are particular kinds of indexes, rigid 
designators, whose indexicality is a function of socialization to them as such. (This is 
because their contiguity is highly mediated by temporally and spatially dispersed “speech 
chains” [Agha 2007a].) This is in at least two ways. First, we come to know of particular 
brands qua indexes of such and such an origin through socialization to the ontology of 
BRAND more generally; that is, the idea that brands exist and have such and such a being 
(see section 2.4.5). Second, we are socialized to specific brands in particular: Nike is a 
brand, Reebok is a brand, etc. Such socialization may occur via multiple media: everyday 
conversation and word of mouth; or experience of brand tokens themselves, though to 
 
9 See Gandelman (1985); Frow (1996: 176ff., 2002: 62–63); Coombe (1996); Manning (2010) on the 
signature as parallel to trademark; as indexical sinsign “I was here”; indexical legisign—the proper name; 
and as indexical symbol, the figure associated with the proper name, the author/brand; in sum, as a dicent 
symbolic legisign. 
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even know these to be tokens (e.g., as a logo) and not as something else (e.g., a simple 
design) requires some meta-discourse that informs us of this connection, such as 
advertising or the law. It is such socialization which makes the type-level functionality of 
brands possible, and thus their rigid designation as well. 
It has been noted by many that the trademark as index of producer—earlier, a mark of 
liability or quality assurance—is a historically earlier function of brands (Wilkins 1994; 
Bently 2008; Higgins 2008), and is less central to the kinds of work that brands do today 
(Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008; Lury 2008; Ng 2008; Griffiths 2008; Manning 2010).10 
Indeed, it is the slippage between producers and products that has over time resulted in 
the shift from brands being attached to producers (as principle of the brand type) to being 
attached to products (as tokens of the brand type) (Leach 2008) and, through meta-
discourses of the brand, to the abstracted “meanings” attached to the brand type (and by 
extension its tokens), what are called “image” or “personality” in the marketing literature 
(Gardner and Levy 1955; Aaker 1991; Feldwick 1999[1991]; Aaker and Joachimsthaler 
2000; Mazzarella 2003: 187–192). This slippage is inherent in trademark law. In 
trademark law the assumption is that if rigid designating signs that index producer are 
protected, this will allow consumers (through their experience with trademarked 
products) to induce the reputation of the producer (as a set of associated symbolic 
meanings). It is this good will which is ultimately protected and thus what makes the 
trademark/brand—if successful in the market—valuable unto itself. This is an example of 
 
10 Indeed, consumers often do not know or care who the actual producer is (Wilkins 1994: 35; Dinwoodie 
2008; Ng 2008: 227; Manning 2010) and the brand owner may not even be the producer, or the producers 
may be multiple (Klein 1999[1991]; Lury 2008). 
 375
                                                
the more general process where the diacritic of difference that stands in for something of 
value becomes something of value in and of itself (see Dean 2009, 2010).  
Note that this additional layer of indexical meaning—the capacity of the brand 
token/type to index a host of symbolic meanings—is sedimented on top of the capacity of 
brands to function as rigid designators (perhaps more accurately, signifiers of pure 
difference, or diacritics) of the brand type, even if the presumed origin is irrelevant or 
unknown (see section 2.3.2 below). That is, to the extent that they are rigid designators 
(which itself hinges on them being type-level signs) they can be reanalyzed and 
enregistered (Agha 2007a, n.d.) as indexical of a whole set of other (symbolic) values. 
But how are these values linked to the brand qua rigid designating legisign? 
 
2.4.4 As symbol 
The brand is not simply an index. It does not just designate some company or 
person—the presumed author (in Goffman’s [1981: 226] sense) of the brand—but 
invokes a set of “associations” or meanings, often focused or emblematized in a 
particular figure of personhood, literal or fictive.11 To this extent a branded token can 
function as an index of such a persona and the qualities (s)he (and by association, the 
brand) embodies. What is the basis, or ground, of this indexicality? The connection is 
symbolic: the brand is connected to a set of associations or meanings by virtue of a 
convention, or law to use Peirce’s (1992) terminology.  
Interestingly, to the extent that such symbolism is ratified and naturalized, brand 
tokens are seen to be iconic with the brand type, the figure of personhood invoked by the 
 
11 For example, Nike’s “image” is linked to the general social persona of the athlete and specifically in the 
figure of Michael Jordan. 
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brand, and even the consumer him/herself or who (s)he wishes to be (Baudrillard 
2001[1968]; Jones 1994; Sawchuck 1994; Frow 2002; Lury 2002, 2004: ch. 4; Moore 
2003; Arvidsson 2005; Foster 1995; in the marketing literature see Feldwick 1999[1991], 
Gordon 1999[1991]: 33; Agha n.d.: 21). This is what Parmentier (1994: 18) calls semiotic 
“downshifting.”  
The brand, however, is never purely symbolic, but always maintains a degree of 
(rigid) indexicality, or at least is seen to do so. Indeed, the “erosion” of the brand (qua 
rigid designator) into a common noun (i.e., a simple symbol) is the negation of the brand 
itself, as denoted by the term genericide (Moore 2003: 344–346; also see Klein 
2000[1999]: 180ff., Manning 2010). Thus, brands are designed so as to minimally 
describe denotationally the tokens (products, services, spaces, experiences) which fall 
under their classification (the brand type) (Coombe 1996). Note, then, that the brand type 
is never isomorphic with other cultural classifications—for if it is, then it risks becoming 
a generic term—and thus is always a sub-, super-, or overlapping-set of other 
classifications. 
 
2.4.5. As meta-semiotic 
But how are such symbolic connections and their related iconic downshiftings made 
possible? This brings us back to the question, how are some set of perceivable signs 
regimented to act as tokens of a brand type? In this section I show that it is the meta-
semiotic regimentation of the brand that serves as the ground for the hierarchically nested 
semiotic aspects of the brand discussed above (as token/type < index < [iconically 
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downshifted] symbol). This meta-semiotic and reflexive aspect of the brand is itself 
complex and multiple. 
 
2.4.5.1 Brand meta-discourses 
First, such symbolism is possible through different genres of meta-semiotic discourse 
produced by the brand company or proxies of it (e.g., public relations firms, advertising 
firms, street teams). In one kind of marketing practice, for example, marketers attempt to 
abstract adjectives and phrases which capture the “core” of the “brand essence.”12 This is 
an organizational principle to shape marketing strategy which then attempts to fix such 
rhematic values to the brand so that tokens of the brand can function as pragmatically 
efficacious signs for consumers.13 This is accomplished through the meta-pragmatic 
discourses of advertising, marketing, packaging (Gardner and Levy 1955; Duckworth 
1999[1991]; Lewis 1999[1991]), product placement (from strategic insertion in everyday 
conversation to media placement), and event or experience sponsorship (Moor 2003; 
Alexander and Schouten 1998). Such brand meta-discourses attempt to prefigure 
consumer usage (often in the form itself) as a way to project/entail the presumed desires 
of the consumer onto the branded commodity/brand (Callon et al. 2002; Frow 2002; Lury 
2002, 2004: ch. 2; Arvidsson 2005: ch. 2–4; Foster 2007; Agha n.d.: 21). The goal is to 
alter the experience of branded tokens in particular ways, thus increasing dependency or 
 
12 Compare such meta-rhematic practices with Callon et al. (2002) on qualification. See Holt (2004) on a 
critique of this marketing practice and an alternative mode of brand meta-discourse in “myth” building. 
13 Thus combining a dicent sign [the brand type] to a rhematic sign [the brand “meaning,” associations] to 
form a proposition that functions as a proxy for the consumer’s own status or identity work, itself a kind of 
meta-proposition. 
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recurrence of brand engagement (Agha n.d.: 23ff.) and thereby profits/brand equity.14 In 
short, brand meta-discourses attempt to regiment the kinds of symbolic meanings that 
brand tokens can invoke as socially useful indexes of the brand type.15 
 
2.4.5.2 Consumer meta-discourses 
Of course, brand companies are not the only ones who produce meta-pragmatic 
discourses about brands. Consumer advocacy literature, newspapers and trade journals, 
online internet forums, and word of mouth are all meta-pragmatic discourses that typify 
brands and attempt to affix particular meanings and associations to them, strategically 
altering their pragmatic values.  
Consumers themselves are interested parties that produce meta-discourses about the 
brand through the reanalysis of their own use and experience of brand tokens. What the 
marketing literature (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2002, 2004a, b; Vargo and Lusch 
2004; see Agha n.d.: 27 on this point) has recently attempted to spell out is the idea that 
consumer interactions with brands (as a meta-semiotic principle of brand meaning/value) 
can be exploited and converted into (human) capital via research (Gordon 1999[1991]), 
feedback (Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2005), trend hunting (Quart 2003), and event 
sponsorship (Moor 2003; Alexander and Schouten 1998), and thereby increase brand 
equity.  
 
14 In the marketing literature (Feldwick 1999[1991]: 24, 25; Calkins 2005) this is demonstrated by “blind” 
comparison tests of various products versus tests where the brand identity is shown. The latter often has the 
effect of skewing experience of the brand token toward brand meta-discourses. For example, consumers 
describe their experience of the same drink placed in various bottle designs in ways that resonate with the 
packaging of the bottle, or associations with that packaging (Lewis 1999[1991]: 163).  
15 The existence of brands amongst other brands in larger classifications (e.g. “cola”) also lends a principle 
of value, akin to Saussure’s notion of the value of the sign (Lury 2004; Frow 2002). Thus, being brands of a 
comparable class (e.g., Pepsi versus Coke) means that the fates of such brands and their pragmatic values 
are intertwined.  
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If consumer interactions with brands were prescribed by brand meta-discourses, and 
thus identical with them, consumers’ consumptive labor would be of no value. But they 
never are. They are not because like all signs, brands’ contextualized usage entails 
pragmatic meanings that are, by degrees, different from (or trope on) the norm of their 
usage (see Agha 2007a: 24–27; 295–298 on norm and trope). It is only also at this 
interface—actual use in specific contexts—that we can ever broach the question of the 
“effects” of brands on, or their articulation with, social life. Moreover, it is in actual use 
in context that the BRAND as an ontological form is itself ratified (and branded forms not 
constituted as some other type of semiotic object). We noted such radically tropic usages 
of branded forms among Tamil youth in chapter 6.  
Much theoretical work on brands stops precisely at the norm of the brand (e.g., 
Baudrillard 2001[1968], 2001[1970]; Lury 2002, 2004). This is precisely because such 
work is highly product(ion) centric (e.g., Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2005; Wilkins 1994). 
Indeed, even if there is a nominal lip service to the consumption of brands, the 
boundaries of such discussion again fall back on brand meta-discourses. This is because 
works are often only concerned with how brands co-opt consumers’ tropic co-optation of 
brands (Arvidsson 2005: ch. 2; Foster 2005, 2007: 718; Zwick et al. 2008; in the 
marketing literature, see Fournier 1998; Feldwick 1999[1991]: 21; Holt 2002; Moor 
2003).16 Such work does no empirical work with actual users of brands, and thus is 
 
16 Presumably, this turn to the customer as source register of brand meaning is indicative of an increased 
reflexivity in marketers’ own understandings of how consumption works (Arvidsson 2005). Compare this 
with earlier source registers of brands which, for example, drew on imagery of alterity and exteriority, such 
as the savage and the frontier; that is, all that the consumer was not or could not access (Coombe 1996; 
Manning and Uplisashvili 2007).  
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unable to theorize the brand from the perspective of its actual use.17 And yet the question 
of consumption cannot be reduced to brand meta-discourses, as noted above.  
This point is even more important because brand meta-discourses always presuppose 
the BRAND as an ontological form. It is telling, then, that in all discussions of brands and 
resistance to them, the issue of willful ignorance is never taken as a possibility except in 
work that involves real consumers in acts of actual consumption (Vann 2006; Yurchak 
2006).18 Not doing actual work with consumers, then, literalizes and projects a particular 
meta-discourse about a form as a reality in the world. Analytically this is problematic 
because it systematically misunderstands how brands as signs work. Indeed, while it may 
be true that signs have norms of use it is by no means true that such norms or tropes on 
them are derived solely, or even ultimately, from authorized discourses (as Foster 2005: 
10 notes).19 Relying on brand meta-discourses, then, runs the risk of naturalizing them, as 
well as their presuppositions about brand meaning and ontology (cf. Miller’s [2002] 
critique of Callon’s “economy of qualities”).  
Ironically, recognition of the fact that the brand must be situated in the moment of 
consumption is the sine qua non of contemporary brand marketing. Marketing today is 
largely about folding consumers’ unique, personalized, and idiosyncratic tropic uses in 
particular contexts back into the brand. This is ironic because while market research as 
central to the brand is something many theorists repeatedly come back to, such theorists 
 
17 For example, Frow (2002: 66ff.) asks why is it that brands have a “non-rational hold” (citing Haigh 1998: 
12) on consumer behavior. His next move is revealing: to explain this hold he gives an analysis of brand 
advertising and marketing. 
18 Thus, even Foster (2007) who looks at how “voicy customers” can disrupt brand value assumes 
implicitly that the limits of consumption are contained within the BRAND as a stable ontology (also Klein 
2000[1999]). 
19 This would be like holding that the meaning of the word is what is in the dictionary; note, an approach 
Lury (2004) begins her book on brands with. 
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of the brand are unable to appreciate its real significance. Even more ironic because those 
involved in brand production and marketing seem to have a better understanding of the 
importance of actual empirical consumption practices and their necessity to the 
functioning of brands than theorists (see Agha n.d.: 26 on this point). While marketers 
constitute their particular brands with respect to market research, theorists like 
Baudrillard (2001[1980]), Lury (2002, 2004) and Arvidsson (2005) are content to 
theorize the brand based on analysis of brand meta-discourses, deducing consumption 
from brand meta-discourses’ figurement of consumption, and thus abdicating actual 
empirical research to brand marketers. Such work mistakes another’s highly prescriptive 
map for the territory. It is in (bad) faith, then, that Lury (2004: 149) writes that “objects 
(co-)produce the social,” because her analysis never actually broaches the social. It is 
content to stay within the self-reflexive universe of the brand. This is triply ironic 
because this is presumably the dream of every brand: to create a branded social universe 
so inclusive one would never have to leave. 
 
2.4.5.3 As meta-semiotic in ontological form 
So far I have discussed the meta-semiotic principles that govern how particular brand 
tokens come to be seen as tokens of a brand type with various symbolically indexical 
values. There is another more fundamental way that the brand is a meta-semiotic object 
which undergirds and acts as a condition of possibility on particular brand types acting in 
the world. Just as brand tokens are always reflexively figured, implicitly or explicitly, as 
members of some brand type, brand types are always reflexively figured as part of the 
larger ontological category BRAND. Uses like “Lego brand products” explicit point to this 
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meta-level membership, differentiating between Lego as a member of the ontological 
category BRAND and lego as a generic class of objects (Moore 2003: 245; Manning 2010). 
The legal apparatus of intellectual property (IP) is a meta-discourse whose function is 
to ground BRAND as an ontological category (vis-à-vis trademark regulation) distinct from 
other ontologies (even if the legal concept of what a brand isn’t totally clear, Davis 
2008): generic objects (i.e., those part of the “commons”) and inauthentic and counterfeit 
objects. It does so by making (aspects of) branded forms a kind of property of the 
company who owns the brand type, thus allowing the brand both to function as guarantee 
of quality and origin (i.e., to fix brand identifiers as rigid designators), as well as its 
unique sets of meanings (to protect brands from dilution) (Wilkins 1992, 1994; Coombe 
1996; Frow 1996, 2002; Moore 2003; Wang 2003: ch. 2; Lury 2004: ch. 5; Arvidsson 
2005; Pang 2006, 2008; Bently 2008; Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008).  
This legal apparatus itself presupposes another order of meta-discourses that work to 
legitimize the ontological category BRAND: for example, discourses about the individual 
whose primary right is the (dis-)possession of property; and discourses that ground 
ideational objects as property and creativity as the source of their value (Lury 2004; 
Arvidsson 2005: ch. 3; Pang 2008; Scott et al. 2008).  
What is important to note, here, is that brands are not ontologically independent or 
natural entities which are then positioned, marketed, imbued with meanings by 
consumers, marketers, and other interested parties. Historical work (Wilkins 1992, 1994) 
shows that brands emerge precisely from meta-discourses which presuppose their 
existence (i.e., performatively bring them into being). Thus the historical coincidence of 
advertising, packaging, trademark law, and brands: advertising presupposes something to 
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be advertised, which itself requires a label such that purchase can be directed.20 In short, 
brands are semiotic objects which are brought into being precisely through their 
typification in meta-discourses which presuppose their ontological existence. It is in this 
more fundamental, though seemingly trivial, sense that the brand is a semiotic form 
whose internal structure is meta-semiotic.  
To return to our genealogy of the commodity and brand in sections 2.2 and 2.3, the 
notion of “aura” is the notion that objects before mechanical reproduction are somehow 
unique. But this is still true after mechanical reproduction. Indeed, each copy is always 
unique in its spatial and temporal dislocation. But why is it, then, that we do not see such 
objects as unique (even if we often treat them as such, cf. Kopytoff’s 1986 discussion of  
“singularization”; Agha n.d.: 4), instead seeing them as part of an endless series?  
Note that any so-construed “unique” object can be reanalyzed as part of a series with 
variable classificatory specificity: THE RIVER (1868) < WORK BY MONET < PAINTING < ART 
< OBJECT, etc. If it is that case that any object is always already under a particular meta-
sign of identity as of such and such a type, the notion of the Real or aura, then, is that 
special meta-sign that typifies some object as the singular member of a set across all 
temporal instances. However, it is a type all the same for there is still the need for a 
 
20 As Wilkins writes: “Advertising did not make sense if there were not differentiated products—goods 
with trade names. If the consumer was to buy the advertised product, the consumer had to be able to 
distinguish that good. The brand—the trade mark—performed that service. Just as advertising carried 
information, so did the trademark itself. It was what directed the purchaser to a designated product” 
(Wilkins 1994: 19). Packaging emerges when products are produced from increasingly non-local locations 
by unknown agents. Packaging removes the product from sensory proximity and it is at this moment that 
the mark or brand is created to mediate, and functionally replace both the qualisigns of the object and the 
meta-discursive guarantee of the shop-keeper. Finally, the legal protection of trademarks is required 
precisely because brands emerge at the time when older guarantees of origin and quality—the local shop, 
locally produced commodities (and earlier trade guilds)—are increasingly replaced by market anonymity 
and non-local production. The brand as “mark of liability” (Wilkins 1992, 1994) emerges to guarantee 
quality and origin. But this is impossible if such products and their marks are not systematically 
differentiated from counterfeits and other brands.  
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classificatory principle to reckon the differences of the “same” token at different points in 
time. By this argument, any object intelligible to us (even as purely singular) must be 
reckoned by this sign–meta-sign relation if only to unite all temporal instances of the 
object as the “same” thing.21  
If the Real object that can accrue aura is simply a special instance of a sign–meta-sign 
relationship reflexively figured as unique and authentic, the question becomes what are 
the other possible meta-semiotic relations where the “same” objects can be seen as 
meaningful in the full sense of being historically unique and authentic? One important 
such meta-semiotic relation is the BRAND.22 The BRAND is an ontological form which 
attempts to reinvigorate the mechanically reproduced commodity through a synchronic 
classification of (copies of) objects as instances of a larger type which itself is 
(potentially experienced as) unique and personal. While “aura” in the Benjaminian 
formulation is a quality of singular objects (where token = type), the brand reorganizes 
aura to be a property of many tokens of a unique type (i.e., the “aura” of the type). And it 
is through its self-reflexive construction (through marketing and advertising, through the 
“authorized” dealer, through the logo and brand name stamped onto the product) that it 
attempts to project itself as unique, personal, authentic, trustworthy, etc. Each token of 
the type, then, invokes the unique, or as Baudrillard might have put it, the simulacrum of 
 
21 Frow (2002) discusses this as the paradox of the mark (citing Derrida): for any mark (e.g., a signature) to 
be seen as the diacritic of some singularity, it must be part of a larger type level, and thus, in principle, 
repeatable and part of a (virtual) series. 
22 We can note other similar relations. For example, some types of commodities are organized in 
functionally similar ways to brands but with different participant frameworks (with respect to producer): 
the quality grade of cloth, meats, eggs, precious stones; or the use of locations to qualify commodities 
(Vann 2005). In both these cases, like the brand, a range of objects are classified under a particular meta-
sign—quality grade, location—but unlike the brand, not linked to a singular producer. These may partially 
overlap, as in the quality-grading of counterfeit brands in Chinese counterfeit markets (Hansen and Moeller 
forthcoming). See Jamieson (1999) for a fascinating discussion of different “regimes of value” vis-à-vis 
record collecting and its counterfeits that explicates how the same objects can, under various meta-signs, be 
differently regimented with respect to auratic originals. 
the aura of the authentic object. I diagram this in figure 8.1, comparing it with the notion 
of the auratic object as a type which only has one token at any moment in time (figure 
8.2). 
  Figure 8.1 Meta-semiotics of brand 
   BRAND (grounded in IP law, discourses of creativity and property, etc.) (meta-type) 
Self-typifying as having qualities {X, Y, Z . . .} and as a member of BRAND   
via meta-discourses of advertising, marketing, packaging, etc 
 
 
  Brand typex  . . . Brand typey . . . Brand typen (as meta-token [type]) 
  (token-to-type  
  feedback: market  
  research, etc.)      * where “token” includes any embodied 
        instance of the brand (e.g., proper name:  
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‘Nike’; logo: Nike swoosh; slogan: 
  token typifying       ‘Just do it!’; spaces: Nike Town23,  
 Brand token1 ~  token2 ~ token3 ~ . . . ~ tokenn http://www.nike.com; etc.) 24 
 (as tokens of the brand type*)  
     
    
  Figure 8.2 Singular “unique” object25 
  Type: the auratic, authentic object The River 
      [vs. On the Bank of the Seine, etc.] 
  =   
     
  Token  The River (t0 =1868) = The River (t1) = . . . =  The River (tn) 
               time 
 
One issue, of course, is that such meta-semiotic configurations are always relative to 
some context of use and social domain, as we also argued for particular brand types in 
section 2.4.5.2. While it happens to be that we often refer back to the brand type (e.g., 
Nike) as the relevant classification of some object (and thus as an instance of the BRAND), 
                                                 
23 See Sherry (1998) on Nike Town. 
24 We can see that even here there is another embedded type–token relation as the Nike swoosh, the Nike 
proper name, the slogan “Just do it!,” etc. are type-level signs. 
25 And, indeed, presumably there may be many drafts of any one painting (even on the same canvas), 
complicating this type–token conflation. I thank Magda Nakassis for pointing this out to me.  
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we just as often do not, instead employing alternative schemes depending on the context 
(e.g., like sneaker, leather good, or weapon of capitalist oppression). In the same way, 
while we often treat objects as instances of the singular “unique” object type, we just as 
often do not (Agha n.d.: 7). We may, for example, classify The River just as easily as a 
painting, as a Monet, as an instance of the impressionist style, or a commodity. We are 
prone to treat such singular objects as such because they seem to project their own aura 
(their essential, Real, historicity) from within. But, if indeed it is the case that the meta-
semiotic organization of the “singular” object and the brand are as I have described them, 
then it becomes clear that the aura of objects (branded or not) is never internal to them 
but is supplied externally by meta-discourses which ground this object as a token of this 
type and this ontology in this context for this social domain (cf. Notar 2006: 90). In the 
next section I take up the issue of the BRAND having various social domains; that is, the 
issue of alternate ontologies. 
 
2.5 Alternate ontologies 
The literature theorizing the brand has specified its multiple facets (partially as a 
result of the wide definition of what constitutes a brand, Davis 2008; Manning 2010).26 
 
26 For example: as a mode/means of production (via prefiguring consumption); a medium of 
communication; a frame or interface between producers and customers (and exploitation of consumption to 
create surplus value); a context for the emergence of the social activities, relations, identities, emotional 
attachment, communities/(counter-)publics (Rajagopal 1999; Lury 2002, 2004; Arvidsson 2005; Foster 
2005, 2007; Coombe 1996; Mazzarella 2003: ch. 6; Holt 2004); a set of conventions of form (brand name, 
logo, slogan, etc.) (Moore 2003); a guarantee of origin/quality; the reputation or public face of a 
corporation (or set of products) (Wilkins 1992; Coombe 1996); proprietary property (as trademark; and 
thus as monetary value, i.e., brand equity) (Wilkins 1992, 1994; Coombe 1996; Aaker 1991; Pang 2008; 
Bently 2008; Higgins 2008; Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008); the focal point for marketing practices; an 
organizational identity for employees and non-employees (Klein 2000[1999]; Manning 2010); an organizer 
of producer markets (Lury 2008); a set of associations, images, figures of personhood (Baudrillard 
2001[1968], 2001[1970]; Gardner and Levy 1955; Cowley 1999[1991]; Feldwick 1999[1991]; Gordon 
1999[1991]); an emblem for a wider social imaginary (Berlant 1993; Coombe 1996; Halstead 2002; 
Manning and Uplisashvili 2007; Manning 2009, 2010; Vann 2005, 2006). 
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However, among all these facets it is the sign–meta-sign relation that is central to the 
brand, if only because it is at this level that brands can be undone.27 This is the 
fundamental semiotic lynchpin of the brand, both for particular brand types (i.e., the 
ability of a brand type to regiment tokens of it) and for the more general ontological 
category BRAND (i.e., the ability of brand types to be construed as such). Of course, this is 
not apparent to most theorists of the brand because they take the brand as a natural kind, 
something pre-given in its form.28  
What I have been arguing—through the ethnographic materials in chapters 6 and 7 
and theoretically in this chapter—is that the brand is not pre-given in any sense (either as 
particular brand type, or as ontological form), but can be defeased, as we saw in the case 
of Tamil youth’s use of branded forms. If branded forms only function to the extent that 
they are classified as tokens of the brand type, what are the other meta-signs that can 
stand in for the BRAND?29 As we saw with Tamil consumers and producers it is precisely 
 
27 Moore (2003) breaks the brand down into a brand name and the product, service, and experience. Even if 
we take “brand name” to be more general and include things like logos, slogans, or any other set of 
qualities that index the brand type, this formulation is still problematic if only because it fails to note that 
the brand name/logo and its most immediate object sign (the product, service, experience) are relevantly 
part of the brand only to extent that such objects signs are regimented qua tokens of the brand type and the 
brand type qua BRAND. It is this missing piece, the meta-sign under which particular branded tokens/types 
stand that is crucial.  
28 Not making this the central axis for analysis runs the risk of incorporating elements as parts of brands 
which perhaps ought not to be. Indeed, Lury (2004), whose analysis is heavily production-centric, ends up 
incorporating all sorts of elements into the brand (e.g., market research) which, while central to its 
constitution, are logically exterior to it. If the brand is simply a list of its related aspects, it becomes 
analytically unwieldy and ultimately mystifying. There are other problems. For example, Lury (2004: 1) 
begins her approach to brands with the definition that the brand is a “set of relations between products or 
services.” But what is the principle that relates such products? How do they form a unity? What is the 
condition of possibility for the brand to function as such? Precisely because the brand is theorized one-
dimensionally there is no coherent answer to this question. The brand is naturalized as a fixed ontological 
form. This flattening of the brand’s semiotic complexity thus leads Lury to mystify the brand, as I argued in 
section 2.4.1, because of the inability to reconcile the recursively embedded type–token (i.e., sign–meta-
sign) composition of the brand. 
29 We might state this reflexive relation in Lee and LiPuma’s (2002) terminology as a difference in 
“cultures of circulation.” And indeed, part of what is at issue is the overlapping, though distinct cultures of 
circulation that link particular branded forms to multiple communities in different ways. However, I prefer 
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the notions of style and exteriority—in short, the aesthetic of brandedness—that stand in 
for the BRAND. It is not that these are additional meanings attached to particular brand 
types, but that they substitute in for the BRAND qua meta-semiotic regimentation of 
branded forms. Branded forms in the hands of Tamil youth are not tokens of brand types, 
but part of a different and more general classificatory scheme (cf. Halstead 2002; Vann 
2005, 2006; Bick and Chiper 2007; Sylavnus 2007; Manning and Uplisashvili 2007; 
Manning 2009).  
This alternative meta-semiotic configuration reorganizes objects which are treated as 
different under the BRAND ontology (e.g., authentic, duplicate, fictive brands, and non-
branded items) as similar. The brand type is bracketed and the branded form re-signified 
under this alternate ontology. Branded forms are stripped of their rigid designation and 
their invocation of brand images (their symbolicity). Instead, branded forms invoke the 
discourse of style as embodied in different images: the film hero-star, urban hip youth, 
the TV VJ, the foreign return/NRI, the foreigner. Within this classification, then, there is 
a different flexibility of iconism, a different principle of what is the same and what is 
different: hence the distortion, hybridization, and recontextualization of branded forms 
with respect to the BRAND ontology.  
In this context we can take up Lury’s (2002, 2004; also see Pang 2008: 127ff.) idea 
that the brand is performative: that is, that the brand performatively entails a mode of 
consumption and being (personal relationship with the brand, loyalty, community, etc.) 
 
to state the issue in terms of the sign–meta-sign relations that make such particular cultures of circulation 
different. As they state: “The circulation of such forms . . . always presupposes the existence of their 
respective interpretive communities, with their own forms of interpretation and evaluation (Lee and 
LiPuma 2002: 192). But the core of this interpretive difference is the alternative meta-discursive reanalysis 
of the forms in question to some particular social domain. While Lee and LiPuma are concerned with the 
performative foundations of such interpretive communities, I am more interested in how such communities 
operate via the ontological foundations of the objects to which they mutually orient themselves.  
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by virtue of its composition (via marketing, advertising, the form itself). But as Austin 
(1986[1962]) himself realized at the outset, we can only talk of performativity with 
respect to conditions of defeasibility and felicity. It is never the case that the performative 
does anything necessarily, even if it often seems that way. It is only under particular 
conditions—institutional (for a marriage, the priest is authorized by the Church), form 
internal (the present-tense, first person, simple aspect of “I do”), and textually (e.g., the 
groom says “I do” only after repeating his vows)—that the effect is entailed. Moreover, 
as has been pointed out (Agha 2007a; Lee 1997), to understand performativity requires 
theorizing how (a) the performative self-reflexively figures itself as an act of such and 
such a pragmatic type and (b) how it is taken up and ratified by others. That is, to make 
the claim that the brand is performative requires one to locate its socio-cultural 
embeddedness in particular instances of contextualized interaction among consumers 
(Moore 2003: 335; Agha n.d.: 7).  
Yet we are totally unequipped to do this if the assumption is that the brand is 
inherently performative. This assumption imputes a magical essentialism to the form 
(hence the wonderment about the brand). Few would consciously subscribe to this 
assumption. Yet it is part of much work on brands, precisely because such analysis is 
product(ion) centric. Such analysis takes the figurement of branded products as 
performative in brand meta-discourses as evidence that brands are performative in actual 
contextualized usages. Yet taking brand meta-discourse at face value literalizes and 
projects the brand as ontologically necessary in the world, and thus leads to essentialism.  
It also leads to the assumption that brands are inherently meaningful (or meaningful 
in the way that brand meta-discourses project them to be). Remember from our 
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discussion in section 2.3 that the brand emerges historically as a reaction to the seeming 
meaningless and empty commodity form, the object which only has value because of its 
exchange value, because of its same-ness, the object purely defined by supply and 
demand (i.e., price). It is this emptiness that the brand attempts to fill through its meta-
semiosis. In the business literature this is manifested as the anxiety that consumers will 
construe commodities by their materiality (utility, functionality) and price (i.e., that 
brands will return to simply being “faceless, lifeless” commodities, Aaker 1991: 15; see 
Mazzarella 2003: 194), and not as the essence or aura bestowed upon them by brand 
meta-discourses (Frow 1996; Klein 2000[1999]: 12–13; Foster 2007: 716; Wilkins 1994: 
16). The anxiety of being seen under a different meta-sign than the BRAND is inherent in 
the organization of the BRAND itself, both in general—as the 1993 Malboro Friday crisis 
and the fear of consumers’ “brand blindness” showed (Klein’s 2000[1999]: 12–13; Jones 
1994)—and for particular brand types—as Callon et al.’s (2002: 205–207) discussion of 
managing consumer “attachment” and “reattachment” to products and as Moore’s (2003) 
discussion of genericide show (also Manning 2010). 
To simply assume, then, that brands are meaningful is to assume that the brand meta-
discourse is always successful in socializing consumers to it. But as we saw with Tamil 
youth there can be no assumption that brand meta-discourses are successful or even 
present. Thus to assume the meaningfulness of the brand is to miss the semiotic and 
political work necessary such that brands can even be talked of and thus imputed 
meaning to. Unfortunately, this fact is lost when one’s methodological approach avoids 
actual instances of the use of branded forms. Thus, for example, Lury (2004) is unable to 
account for the condition of possibility on the meaningfulness of brands except by falling 
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back on brand meta-discourses; or by arguing that brands are auto-poetically organized 
into a system that produces their meaning/value. Lury, however, has no analysis of how 
such a cybernetic system might work, or any demonstration that brands in fact work in 
this way. Because she has eschewed actual empirical work with consumers and because 
her theorization of the brand is semiotically flat, she is pushed to align (unwillingly) with 
brand meta-discourses’ own reflexive understanding of what they do. The only out 
(besides just simple complicity) is to posit the self-organization of brands into a system, 
as a set of self-regulating relations between tokens of the brand:  
“the activities of marketers…does not adequately describe the brand. Nor indeed 
would an account of the practices of designers, or a description of the activities of 
consumers…They privilege purposive actions, and do not acknowledge the 
significance of the self-organizing elements of the brand as a complex 
indeterminate or open object.” (Lury 2004: 51; my emphasis) 
Yet clearly the auto-poetic organization of brands is a remainder hypothesis. When all 
forms of external control fail to account for some phenomenon, its internal structure is 
appealed to. To simply jump to this conclusion as Lury does is suspect, especially as she 
never looks at the actual “activities of consumers” (ibid.).  
As I have shown, whether or not the brand is performative, whether or not the brand 
is meaningful is relative to the extent that brand meta-discourses can self-reflexively 
ground themselves. That is, to the extent that they can guarantee their uptake by 
consumers as brands. And as we have seen, the willful ignorance of Tamil youth toward 
the brand qua BRAND pries apart this meta-semiotic organization so as to reattach branded 
forms as tokens of a different type, and thus stand under a different ontology altogether.  
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This implies that the BRANDed-ness of any object is only one among many possible 
ontologies, dependent on place (Halstead 2002; Vann 2005, 2006; Bick and Chiper 2007; 
Manning and Uplisashvili 2007; Manning 2009; Yurchak 2006: ch. 5) and time (see 
Kriegel 2004 on the emergence of IP in Britain as a debate over the ontological 
distinctiveness of original and copy); that is, on the social domain of the ontology. This 
speaks to our common sense notion that a branded object may be seen from many angles: 
a unique object (of nostalgia or sentimentality), a functional object (a pair of shoes), a 
cultural object (part of modern Western dress), etc. In fact, there are as many angles as 
there are meta-discursive classifications of the object. Objects can move in and out of 
their status as branded, as commodities even, depending on their user and contexts of use 
and evaluation (Appadurai 1986a; Kopytoff 1986; Frow 1996; Agha n.d.). That is, 
depending on for whom and under what meta-sign they stand under.30  
Note that the issue here is not just that some brand meta-discourses are successful in 
regimenting some set of forms as tokens of a brand type and others are not. Rather, what 
is problematic in much of the literature is the assumption that brands can be defined 
independently of their use. Again, what I have been arguing is that to fully theorize the 
brand it is necessary to start from actual contexts of consumption (cf. Miller 1990: 50, 
2002). Moreover, the assumption that the ontology of the brand is fixed and stable is 
highly problematic. It is not enough to say that particular brand types are not fixed, 
 
30 A corollary to this is the brand’s heterogeneity: there are many different types of brands (product brands, 
corporate brands, event brands, community brands, national brands, online brands, experience brands, etc.) 
and functionalities of branded phenomena (as lifestyle accoutrement, as functional objects, as experiences, 
services, spaces, etc.) as there are meta-discourses which typify particular objects as some kind of brand or 
another. This is precisely why the brand as a semiotic form is applicable (with more or less success/fit) to 
numerous non-(traditional-)commodities: for example, self or persona (celebrities, politicians) (Hearn 
2008); organizations (NGOs, governmental organizations) (Arvidsson 2005: ch. 4; Klein 2000[1999]: ch. 2; 
Cowley 1991[1991]: 12); universities, countries, or places (Foster 2005: 8; Arnholt 2004); ethnic groups 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2009); and events or experiences (Moor 2003; Alexander and Schouten 1998). 
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discrete, or unitary, but that the BRAND itself is not a natural category. It is contingent on 
particular (meta-)semiotic arrangements. In the success–failure paradigm, the assumption 
is that the form is stable across all contexts. It fails to see that the ontology of the object is 
itself a site of negotiation, one backed by (the violence of) the law and thus in no way 
certain. This is why it is crucial to look at cases where the brand is negated, defeased, and 
erased because it is in such scenarios that the presumed natural link of sign–meta-sign 
that is central to the brand is taken apart and reattached, as we saw in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
2.6 The irony of fashion in India 
Once we realize that branded forms are semiotically complex we can make sense of 
one of the ironies of fashion in India: while branded forms in India are contemporary 
with fashion in the West (because they are produced in India before they hit the shelves 
in the West), the meta-discourses of brand and fashion are not. Thus, while the 
contingencies of global capital and the willful ignorance of local markets guarantee that 
branded forms circulate ubiquitously, meta-discourses of brand identity and “meaning”—
advertising, brand events, authorized showrooms, etc.—circulate to a lesser extent. In 
some cases, they may be totally absent.31  
This disjuncture of branded form and brand meta-discourse creates a distortion of 
supply and demand of brands qua particular brands, as we saw in chapters 6 and 7. For 
example, while Diesel may be in low demand as Diesel, objects that index Diesel may 
still be in high supply. One irony here is that fashion in India among lower- and middle-
 
31 This disproves one of Lury’s (2004: ch. 4) claims that the repetition of logo itself guarantees brand 
recognition for indeed, in Tamil Nadu the repetition of brand names and logos does not guarantee brand 
recognition precisely because the ontology of brand qua BRAND may not be relevant in the first instance. 
One may treat the noun phrase “Diesel” as simply a word or graphic design, not a brand per se. For 
repetition to entail brand recognition requires that the BRAND ontology is in play. 
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class youth is directly linked to brands but ignorant of them precisely because brand 
meta-discourses and the branded forms circulate according to different logics. The brand 
company, of course, tries to ensure their fusing so as to coordinate consumption with 
production, but there is no necessary guarantee that these two moments can be sutured 
together. Thus, at the same time that branded forms are in India before the West, Indian 
fashion is ironically behind Western fashion.32  
Further, the branded form and its meta-discourse circulate in different temporalities. 
Thus, branded forms in Tamil Nadu are cycled with incredible speed. A branded form 
may appear as export surplus or duplicate only to disappear within months, production 
having moved on. This cycling is so fast that the possibility for the creation of brand 
awareness through the forms themselves is relatively low.  
A corollary to this is that while it is tempting to think that fashion in India simply 
moves from the West to Indian elites to the middle classes and finally to the poor, the 
production of authentic branded products (as export surplus) cycling faster than brand 
meta-discourses of fashion (as consumed by elites and the upper-middle classes) means 
that while urban elites may consume Diesel because they have seen the ads abroad (i.e., 
based on its brand identity), the rural poor consume it because it is style and it is cheap 
and available, and thus consume it independently of elite fashion. While it may seem, 
then, that both poor and rich are coordinated in their fashion (evidenced by the same 
forms in both social domains), this is complicated by the fact that the same form is linked 
 
32 With regards to the production of duplicates there is also a delay linked to the production process. For 
example, for duplicate producers to make duplicates they must get a model of the piece, reverse engineer it, 
get their tailors to learn the cuts and tailoring, and get the relevant materials. They also wait to see if certain 
forms click in other markets (e.g., producers in Chennai wait to see what gets popular in Bombay). Once a 
sample is produced it hits the market, but only in small amounts at first. If it catches on then it increases. 
Hence there is delay. 
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to different meta-discourses (brand meta-discourses in the case of the elites; style and 
simple availability in the case of lower classes). We can only realize these ironies if we 
theorize the brand as meta-semiotically organized of de-coupleable parts.  
 
3. Brand and simulation: Theorizing the brand from its duplicate 
3.1 Introduction 
While above I looked at the semiotics of the brand and the conditions under which the 
brand is defeasible, in this section I theorize the brand from the perspective of the 
duplicate or counterfeit branded item. I argue that the counterfeit brand can be understood 
as a particular kind of Baudrillardian simulacrum, and Tamil youth usage of branded 
forms as a kind of simulation, but only if we understand simulation and simulacra as 
particular cases of the reflexive sign–meta-sign structure that is central to the brand in 
general, as discussed above.33 
 
3.2 Literature on brand counterfeits 
The category counterfeit is highly heterogeneous.34 I will be focusing on duplicate 
Western branded garments and related accessories, of the kinds discussed in chapters 6 
and 7. Most of the literature on counterfeiting focuses on the impact of counterfeiting on 
the economy and “society” (Kays 1990; Wee et al. 1995; Wilke and Zaichkowsky 1996; 
 
33 Few have made this move. Pang’s (2008) consideration of Chinese counterfeiting, Craciun’s (2008, 
2009) comments on fake brands, and Sylavnus’ (2007) discussion of “African” wax prints as simulations 
are exceptions, though neither consider the sign–meta-sign structure of the brand or of simulation as such.  
34 By counterfeiting I mean goods which are illicit because of their transgression of intellectual property 
law or because their selling is in breach of the rights of the producer/brand company by contract (e.g., 
illegitimately reselling overruns). Duplicates are goods which are illegal because they misuse proprietary 
brand designs (e.g., trademarks), and thus are a subset of counterfeits. See Bamossy and Scammon 1985; 
Kay 1990; Bloch et al. 1993; McDonald and Roberts 1994; Wilke and Zaichkowsky 1999; Astous and 
Gargouri 2001; Phau et al. 2001; Hoe et al. 2003; Wang 2003; Phillips 2005; Pang 2006; Vann 2006; 
Craciun 2008; Chaudhry and Zimmerman 2009 on different kinds of counterfeit, imitation, and “grey” 
goods, and various terminological distinctions. 
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Phillips 2005; Rutter and Bryce 2008; Chaudhry and Zimmerman 2009) and on ways to 
combat counterfeiting in light of that impact (Grossman and Shapiro 1988; Bush et al. 
1989; Bloch et al. 1993; Tom et al. 1998; Nia and Zaichkowsky 2000; Phau et al. 2001). 
While much of the literature is on the supply side of counterfeiting (Bush et al. 1989; 
Chaudhry and Zimmerman 2009), there is also a large literature on the demand side 
(Bamossy and Scammon 1985; Grossman and Shapiro 1988; Bloch et al. 1993; Wee et al. 
1995; Cordell et al. 1996; Tom et al. 1998; Nia and Zaichkowsky 2000; Astous and 
Gargouri 2001; Phau et al. 2001; Hoe et al. 2003; Rutter and Joyce 2008). Unfortunately, 
this work employs a naïve psychological idiom to understand counterfeit consumption, 
eschewing the larger contexts of consumption outside of the moment of purchase. Such 
work is also highly normative (one exception is McDonald and Roberts 1994). There are, 
however, a growing number of anthropologists and sociologists (Halstead 2002; Reinach 
2005; Vann 2005, 2006; Bick and Chiper 2007; Pang 2008; Craciun 2008, 2009; 
Brandtstädter 2009; Thomas 2009; Hansen and Moeller forthcoming) working on brand 
counterfeits, as well as on digital piracy (Wang 2003; Pang 2006) and other kinds of 
fakes (Jamieson 1999 on vinyl records; Notar 2006 on souvenirs).  
With a few exceptions (Pang 2008; Vann 2006), little work has been done to theorize 
the brand from its duplicate, or to theorize the duplicate itself. This is ironic because the 
historical condition of possibility of BRAND (and earlier the trademark) is its legal 
differentiation from its duplicate (Bently 2008; Higgins 2008; see Kriegel 2004; Johns 
2009 on piracy and copyright). Brand and counterfeit are always already co-eval and co-
definitional. Below I look at the leaky boundaries of the duplicate and its relationship to 
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its authentic other, the brand. I approach this via Baudrillard’s notions of simulation and 
simulacrum, treating the brand and its duplicates as species of them.  
 
3.3. Simulation and simulacrum 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In this section I give a particular reading of Baudrillard’s concepts of simulacrum and 
simulation and apply them to the case of brands and brand duplicates. Through the 
discussion of the empirical materials in chapters 6 and 7, and the semiotic discussion of 
the brand in this chapter, I argue that simulation is a variant on the meta-semiotic 
organization of BRAND more generally.  
For Baudrillard the simulacrum is the “alibi,” or ideological underpinning, for some 
system—more often than not, capitalism understood as a Saussurean sign system. 
Simulation is the abstraction of some (older) sign system; thus it is of a higher order type 
than that which it abstracts from. The notion of abstraction here is the idea that the 
indexical grounding of the simulated sign system is minimized, and thus appears more 
disconnected from the “real.” These two concepts play off of each other in Baudrillard’s 
periodization of capitalism.  
 
3.3.2 Capitalism as the history of simulation 
For Baudrillard, the history of capitalism is the increasing de-indexicalification of 
objects and the social relations they mediate as they are increasingly made to function as 
arbitrary Saussurean signs in a larger system of value or “code.”35  
 
35 Of course, Baudrillard has no theory of indexicality, hence his anxiety surrounding capitalism and 
simulation. 
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The first epochal break comes with the commodity form and its abstraction from the 
contextually grounded and maximally indexical Symbolic Exchange (understood as 
primitive society’s reciprocal exchange relations) into de-contextualized exchange (and 
sign) values. The functioning of this commodity system (i.e., early capitalism) was based 
on the simulacrum of the “real” object under symbolic exchange: that is, the 
naturalization of use value as an ideological construct that acts as the “alibi” of exchange 
value. This is what Baudrillard calls the simulacrum of Natural Law (Baudrillard 
2001[1972], [1976]). Thus, Baudrillard argues that early political economy operated on 
the myth that exchange value was a function of utility as the really “real” of how 
economies and societies worked. As such, use value’s status as simulacrum (or “alibi”) 
grounded the economy to work as a capitalist market driven by circulating exchange 
values. It is the system of exchange value, Baudrillard argues, that is actually running 
society, unbeknownst to those at its mercy. Use value as simulacrum makes possible, 
then, the simulation of symbolic exchange in the new capitalist order of commodity 
exchange. 
The next historical rupture comes in the current era where the functioning of the 
system is detached from even the concept of the Real. This is the era of simulation 
(Baudrillard 2001[1976], 1994[1981]). Here the differentiation between the real and the 
unreal is transcended in objects whose ontology blurs copy and original (the era of 
mechanical reproduction, media implosion). At the same time that the “finalities” of the 
older order (capitalist productivism, exchange value) are liquidated as functional 
principles driving the previous system, such finalities are resurrected in the form of 
simulacra like “production,” “history,” “labor.” Here the previous engines of capitalism 
 399
                                                
(which were ideologically covered by the simulacrum of use value and functionality) 
have themselves been turned in simulacra, or “alibis,” for the current system of digital 
finance capital and computer networks. The role of such simulacra, similarly to the 
earlier historical period, is to cover the functioning of the current system. Thus, even as 
our lives are run by databases and statistical calculations we believe in the truisms of 
production, labor, and work, the previous engines of capitalism and objects of 
contestation and struggle. 
While simulacra previously functioned to cover the artifice of exchange value and to 
discipline production (i.e., the system of that era) through images of the Real, today 
simulacra function to hide that the Real no longer exists, that simulation has gone to a 
higher order of functionality by typifying themselves as unreal.36 The “hyper real”—like 
Disneyland, which caricatures or transcends the “real” by its hyper-/un-reality—simply 
serves to guarantee the reality of everything else (which is increasingly governed by “the 
simulation machine” of equivalence). This functions to hide that simulation today is 
totally detached from the Real altogether (i.e., that it has zero indexical content) 
(Baudrillard 1994[1981]: 12). While it used to be exchange value that governed the 
economy, today it is the abstract code of finance capital and the media: capital is freed 
from “the finalities of content” into an “escape in indefinite speculation, beyond any 
reference to the real” (Baudrillard 2001[1976]: 129). We still think, however, in terms of 
political economy, though it is no longer the engine of history but a simulacrum of it. 
Thus concepts like revolution are bound to fail, Baudrillard argues.  
 
36 Baudrillard (2001[1976]: 124) writes: “Each configuration of value is resumed by the following in a 
higher order of simulation. And each phase integrates its own apparatus, the anterior apparatus as a 
phantom reference, a puppet of simulation reference.” 
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I summarize Baudrillard’s periodization of simulation in Table 8.1 below. 
Table 8.1 Baudrillard’s periodization of simulation 
 
 
Symbolic Exchange37 
 
(Production) Capitalism 
 
Era of Simulation 
Principle of 
semiosis 
Natural law of meaning 
(meaning is produced by 
reference to Nature/the 
Divine) 
Commodity law of value 
(value is produced by the 
exchangeability of objects by 
reference to the simulacrum of 
Nature) 
Structural law of value 
(value is the pure play 
of signs) 
The Gift (Object) The Commodity (System) The Pure Sign (Code) 
Quality (analogic) Quantity (unitized) Information (digital) 
Emblematic 
object 
Maximally indexical 
(Real) 
Symbolic but grounded in the 
“alibi” of the indexical (the 
Real), downshifted as icons 
Symbolic, not grounded 
in any Real, but 
typifications of the 
“unreal” 
Relation to the 
Real 
Nature/the Real  Simulacrum of the Real (to 
ground exchange value) 
Hyper-real (to conceal 
the volatilization of 
reality) 
Reciprocal exchange (no 
production/consumption 
per se) 
Political Economy 
(production/exchange value) 
via simulating authentic 
objects (qua utility) 
Digital finance capital, 
digital media, computer 
networks via simulating 
political economy (qua 
labor, work, etc.) 
Engine of 
society  
 
 
 
 Gift exchange Production (mode of 
production) 
Consumption (code of 
production) 
Types of 
simulacra 
Counterfeit (dissimulates 
the object) 
Mechanical copy (produced as 
part of a series)  
Model (copies without 
originals) 
Metaphysics  Metaphysics of 
appearance (reality exists) 
Metaphysics of energy and 
determination (reality is 
distorted) 
Metaphysics of 
indeterminacy (there is 
no reality) 
Forms of 
control 
Divine/Sovereign power Discipline and surveillance Participation and 
solicitation 
 
3.3.3 Simulation, simulacrum, and logical types 
While simulation is a process of producing value through pure difference of signifiers 
(the logic of capital modeled on the pure Saussurean sign), simulacra “dissimulate the 
fact that there is nothing behind them” (Baudrillard 1994[1981]: 5), and serve as an 
ideological screen for the actual workings of capital (the system of signifiers). There is a 
functional fit between the two: simulacra (the resurrected corpses of the earlier 
                                                 
37 He also substitutes the “Classical Era” as a transition phase from Symbolic Exchange to Capitalism in 
Europe that has some of the relevant features of societies of pure Symbolic Exchange (i.e., of “primitive 
societies”) (Baudrillard 2001[1976]).  
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simulations) prop up simulation as a system (the abstraction from earlier simulations) by 
mystification.  
For Baudrillard, what is of interest is what happens when simulation operates through 
signs where the metaphysics of true–false cease to apply. What happens when the 
original and copy are no longer distinct? This applies, Baudrillard argues, in the current 
era of simulation where mechanical reproduction, the mass media (and new media like 
the internet, databases, and computer programs), and the binary code of finance capital 
operate through copies without originals. What is the ontological status of such signs? As 
Baudrillard argues, their basic form is as codes that produce models immanent in every 
instance of them. That is, they are always already tokens qua types. There is no original 
computer program, for example, only identical copies of the same binary code. In this 
sense they are tautologically performative and self-reflexive: the model is its own 
referent; it is a representation of itself in its totality (cf. the auratic object).38  
By this reckoning, then, simulation operates at a higher logical type than the 
simulated, it is a system (or meta-discursive principle of meaning/value imbuement) that 
typifies particular (object) signs as tokens of a type. Thus, for example, the concept of 
exchange value requires for its intelligibility that two objects be taken as equivalent in 
some respect. In that case, then a third thing of a higher logical type, the exchange value, 
is brought into existence. Even though Baudrillard doesn’t, we can note that this 
abstraction is dependent on its uptake and ratification as social facts; that is, as Marx 
 
38 Of course, though Baudrillard does not discuss this (he takes such simulation as a natural kind), this 
performativity (of map that creates the territory) only holds to the extent that this re-ontologizing of objects 
and representations as simulation is regimented—for example, by the law, the violence of the state, banks, 
etc.—and ratified by those who construe such signs as of such an ontology (or not). I come back to this 
point in section 3.3.5. 
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(1976: 139) put it, it is “purely social.” The power of simulation, then, is to act as a 
higher order legisign principle that classifies increasing numbers of things as the “same,” 
as indistinct39 tokens of the same type and thus inputs to some kind of calculus or social 
process, whether it be as exchange value, sign value, or as binary ones and zeros. 
By contrast, simulacra (e.g., use value as natural utility satisfying universal desire) are 
at the same logical type as their object signs (e.g., actual objects imputed some utility). 
They are symbols that represent themselves as icons of that which they are a simulacrum 
of. As such, they can be compared with what they purport to be. In this sense they are 
ideological distortions. As such they differ from simulation which is neither true nor 
false, but rather, if felicitous, performative. While simulation is a condition of possibility 
of iconism in general, the simulacrum represents itself under the meta-discourse of (dis-) 
identity (i.e., iconism). But because it is at the same logical type as that which it is a 
simulacrum of, it can be logically falsified.  
 
3.3.4 As sign–meta-sign 
The main problem with Baudrillard is that pure Saussurean signs do not exist.40 No 
one to my knowledge has found any signs that function without indexicality. Leaving 
aside Baudrillard’s hypostacized and apocalyptic vision of semiosis gone awry, there are 
at least two analytical problems: (a) he is fixated on the Saussurean sign as the model of 
 
39 The issue is distinctiveness, and not being identical. Baudrillard often confuses the criterial factor of 
indistinguishability—a concept relative to some legisign principle—from identity—a concept fetishized in 
the thing-in-itself. This is a common mistake by Baudrillard to project epistemological issues as ontological 
differences. It is also one reason why (along with a tradition from Kant onwards) particular anxieties about 
the possibility of grounding oneself securely in knowledge are felt acutely by him.  
40 Moreover, even if Saussurean signs worked to describe language, which they were designed to do, the 
analogies he proposes, for example, between exchange value:use value::signifier:signified [Baudrillard 
2001(1972)] are disanalogous in that differences in exchange value do not produce analogous differences in 
signifieds, as the Saussure ratio proposes. 
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the world and as his analytical toolkit (thus always already confounding object- and 
meta-sign); and (b) he is forced himself to simulate the symbolic exchange of so-called 
primitive societies as a position from which to launch his normative critique of capitalism 
and thus does not subject it to any analytical investigation vis-à-vis the question of 
indexicality. Instead he fetishizes symbolic exchange as the “real” and “authentic.”41 As 
such, he has neither a theory of indexicality nor of meta-semiosis.  
While there are many ways to criticize Baudrillard (see Chen 1987; Huyssen 1989; 
Gane 1991; Kellner 1994 and chapters within), the question is, how can we reformulate 
simulation and simulacra to our use? I propose the following distinctions to steer us clear 
from some of Baudrillard’s problems. Simulation and simulacra both have at their core 
the sign–meta-sign relationship. Simulation is meta-semiotic in that it involves the 
regimentation of type–token relationships. Rather than seeing simulation as a Saussurean 
sign system—which Baudrillard never demonstrates in any convincing detail anyway (he 
even gives up trying after 1968 with The System of Objects)—let us see simulation as the 
case where objects are regimented by a larger meta-discursive principle which figures 
them as tokens of a type and, to this extent, the same. Such tokens are members of a 
paradigmatic or classificatory set which can be acted upon, for example in a computer 
algorithm, or exchanged for each other, for example in economic transactions. Further, in 
simulation, the type is historically continuous in some way with the tokens it regulates; 
for example, the same forms (exchanged objects) are abstracted into a higher order type 
(exchange value). This captures Baudrillard’s observation that through the historic 
 
41 For Baudrillard, primitive “symbols” (not in the Peircean sense) must function as irreducible, because 
they must be authentic by definition. Thus they are mystified. As he writes, “Of what is outside the sign, of 
what is other than the sign [i.e., Symbolic Exchange], we can say nothing, really except that it is 
ambivalent” (Baudrillard 2001[1972]: 94). This is Baudrillard’s thing-in-itself. 
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escalation of logical types (from singular object exchanged in reciprocal gift relations to 
commodities universally comparable through their exchangeability to operators in a 
computer equation) objects are increasingly abstracted (their indexical value is 
elsewhere/negated), rationalized, and made comparable. Thus, through continuities of 
forms (i.e., that abstraction in simulation is recursively embedded: THINGS < EXCHANGED 
THINGS/GIFTS < EXCHANGE VALUES/COMMODITIES < FINANCE CAPITAL) the social world is 
ontologically transformed through simulation.  
Simulacra, on the other hand, are objects which are explicitly typified—either by 
exterior meta-discourses or reflexively by themselves—in some particular way—more 
often than not, as the really “real”—so as to naturalize the type level phenomena, the 
simulations, of which they are also tokens (hence motivating the ideological confusion 
between types and tokens). Use values, for example, under conditions of capitalism are 
always already regimented under the type exchange value; but they are (falsely) typified 
as the “real” essence of commodities (e.g., by political economists), and thus function to 
naturalize or mystify the social relations that underwrite commodity exchange and the 
reality that exchange value runs society.  
 
3.3.5 Where does the indexicality go? 
What we can see from this reformulation of Baudrillard is that the central issue is 
what happens to the indexical component of the object (an nth order sign) under 
conditions of simulation (an n+1th order abstraction). What happens to the component of 
the sign’s meaning that is irreducibly linked to its contextual embeddedness, and that 
seems to be lost via simulation?  
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As one moves up the logical types of simulation, indexicality is both interiorized and 
exteriorized. Simulation internalizes indexicality by hypertrophying one aspect of 
(otherwise contextually situated) objects—for example, their utility qua satisfiers of 
needs; their measurability and exchangability as unitizable objects; their digitizability as 
information qua binary values—and semanticizing (symbolicizing) it, making it the core 
default value, or dominant meaning, as specified by the type. Thus, for example, while 
commodified objects may have the same form of objects under reciprocal exchange (e.g., 
a hammer is a hammer before and after capitalism), ultimately the commodity is more 
mediated, asymmetrical, and one-sided because its “value” is increasingly 
overdetermined by its exchange value (and not its use/utility). Under capitalism, 
exchange value becomes the object’s core attribute. The regress of this is the fantasy of 
context-free objects where meanings otherwise indexically grounded in context are 
interiorized into the logical form of the object qua “value.” 
At the same time, indexicality is exteriorized in meta-discourses which regiment 
objects so that they may serve as tokens of the type. Thus, for example, in Baudrillard’s 
discussion meta-discourses of the individual as property owner and of Human Nature 
more generally (in philosophy, the law, popular literature, and psychology) naturalize the 
concept of use value so that it in turn naturalizes economic exchange value and capitalism 
(Baudrillard 2001[1972]). Here external meta-discourse makes possible the increased 
semanticization of objects under simulation. 
Moreover, simulacra and simulation are indexical in their ability to bring to bear on 
their own intelligibility a meta-discourse of identity. They point to themselves as being of 
such and such a type, often in ways radically different than their actual form and 
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function. Thus, as Baudrillard discusses, “work” rather than being part of the struggle of 
industrial capitalism (as it was at an earlier era) is increasingly (self-)typified in 
contemporary capitalism as part of one’s “lifestyle,” as a commodity, marketed and 
designed as such, to be integrated into the self, thereby satisfying needs for creativity and 
individuality. Thus, labor “enters the general lifestyle; in other words it is encompassed 
by signs” (Baudrillard 2001[1976]: 133). As a simulacrum of “actual” production/work, 
then, it functions differently, its ontology is fundamentally different—no longer a violent 
struggle, work is simply another part of the consuming self—but it points to itself as of 
an older order/ontology. This meta-discourse of identity—the self-typifying “I am 
Real!”—is made to seem increasingly natural as the iconism between 
simulation/simulacra and their tokens/what they copy is increasingly accurate (more 
precisely, the difference is less and less distinct). (This indistinctiveness, of course, must 
also be regimented by particular meta-semiotic legisigns.)  
The point is that the abstraction and reorganization of some set of signs as tokens of a 
functionally distinct type while at the same time obscuring their newfound functionality 
by confounding this type–token distinction is only possible given the meta-discourses 
which are able to regiment that token–type relationship in the first place so that such 
signs can be put to use in concrete contexts. Thus, the social convention of money 
(exchange value); the institutional backing of finance (finance capital); the semiotic 
division of mass-mediated labor (the imploded media) all must be socially ratified so as 
to be pragmatically efficacious for buyers, bankers, and audiences in the various kinds of 
contextually embedded activities that they are engaged in. Thus, every simulation 
involves not only abstraction and reclassification, but the creation of new indexical 
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possibilities, pragmatic values, and contexts of use. Baudrillard cannot see this, of course, 
because he has no theory of indexicality or reflexive sign use. Thus, to him it seems as if 
signs are simply increasingly abstract, empty, and floating away into an eschatological 
teleology even while, inexplicably for him, they are (re)imbricated in social life (i.e., 
have “effects”), troped upon, used, re-animated and recycled.  
 
3.3.6. Simulation and the brand 
How can we bring this reformulation of Baudrillard to bear on our analysis of brands 
and their duplicates? I argue the following propositions below: (1) the brand is part of the 
escalation of logical types under capitalism, and thus is a simulation of the commodity 
form (section 3.3.6.1); (2) the duplicate forms both a challenge to the brand as a 
counterfeit, but also acts as a kind of simulacrum reinvesting the brand with the “real” 
through its typification as “fake” (section 3.3.6.2); (3) the bracketing of the BRAND 
ontology by Tamil youth points to a higher order simulation of brands for that particular 
social domain; branded forms are abstracted from, and reorganized under an aesthetic of 
brandedness (a higher order type) and thus invested with a different ontology and 
functionality (style) (section 3.3.6.3).42 In making these arguments, however, I am 
 
42 We can see something similar in Craciun’s (2009) discussion of the role of fake brands in the self-
narrativization of one of her informants, a Turkish producer/distributor of fake brands. Here too the 
question of the brand (or its fake) is always relative to some larger meta-discursive frame which figures 
such objects in such and such a way (i.e., with such and such an ontology). For this informant—who saw 
himself as one who lives dangerously, on the margins of normativity and legality—the duplicate branded 
object is a “legitimate object,” “another version of a conventional form” insofar as it functions as his 
“assertion of individuality.” Similarly, Vann’s (2006) discussion of Vietnamese concepts of status, 
mimicry, and brand duplication indicates that the ontological category of the brand as we know it in the 
contemporary West—and its concomitant notion of “authenticity”—is not present in Vietnam, or certainly 
not in the same way (also see Halstead 2002; Notar 2006; Bick and Chiper 2007; cf. Jamieson 1999). 
Sylvanus’ (2007) discussion of “African” wax prints similarly shows how the same form is variously 
“requalified” depending on its insertion in various contexts of production and consumption; that is, 
depending on the meta-sign under which it stands (e.g., “Africanity” in the U.S.; or through association 
breaking with Baudrillard’s larger narrative of capitalism. I don’t see this as a new phase 
in capitalism. I also don’t see the simulation of brands into an aesthetic of brandedness 
necessarily ideologically propped up by fetishized simulacra (i.e., counterfeits as 
simulacra), except from the perspective of the BRAND ontology (which in any case Tamil 
youth don’t necessarily abide by). 
In his periodization of types of simulacra Baudrillard notes three kinds: the 
counterfeit, the object of a series (mechanical reproduction), and the model (where copy 
and model which produce it are one and the same). The counterfeit dissimulates the real. 
It presents itself as the authentic and authorized, but it is not. In this way, it assumes that 
the “real” in order to pass itself off as it. The mechanically reproduced object is the 
multiplication of the concept of the counterfeit into an infinite series where all members 
are identical in form (see Chen 1987: 74ff.; Tseëlon 1994; Shoomaher 1994 for 
discussion). Here the issue is not dissimulation, but the displacement of original and 
copy. The commodity is the exemplar, the object whose materiality is subsumed by 
exchangeability. Finally there is the model, as we discussed above, a further 
transcendence of the ontology of the object to a higher logical type, a purification of the 
series into the model or code which makes no reference to the “real.” I schematize this in 
Figure 8.3 below.  
 Figure 8.3 Baudrillard’s orders of simulacra 
 
 ‘Natural’ object    counterfeit    the series   the model 
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  is dissimulated    is multiplied                   is generalized 
 
        1st order simulacrum 2nd order simulacrum                 3rd order simulacrum 
        Symbolic Exchange Industrial Capitalism         Era of Simulation 
                                                                                                                                                 
with American soaps like Dallas in Togo). Kriegel’s (2004: 259) discussion of design pirates’ discourse 
also shows that this logic was also at play in 19th century Britain as well (also see Johns 2009). 
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3.3.6.1 Brand as simulation of commodity 
Here I want to recount Benjamin’s narrative about the commodity as reinterpreted 
through my reading of Baudrillard: the commodity is an abstraction of, a simulation of, 
the singular auratic object whose meaningfulness is grounded in the contextualization 
inherent in reciprocal exchange, in its unique historicity, its embeddedness is historicized 
social relations. Through this, meaning is converted into value—i.e., reorganized into a 
higher logical type of equivalence—and the relationship of the original to the copy is 
radically altered. The aura of the object (which the counterfeit dissimulates) is 
extinguished.  
As I argued in section 2.3, the brand organizes a set of commodified forms into a 
higher logical type of brand origin and image, and as such is itself a simulacrum of that 
lost aura through the immanent replicability of brand tokens. While the brand does not 
project itself as any single unique object, it reformulates itself as the personalization of a 
set of objects (the series of identical commodity brand tokens) iconic with the consumer 
(as set of desires, needs, lifestyle choices over time). The brand attempts to restore the 
meaningfulness of objects, their authority and authenticity, as imbricated in social 
relations through its simulacrum of sociality. At an earlier historical moment this is 
through the simulacrum of the guarantor of product quality—the shopkeeper—via the 
trademark. The brand and its packaging substitute for the face-to-face interaction with the 
local merchant. More contemporarily, it is the simulacrum of sociality more generally: 
buying a branded good is purchase to a community, a lifestyle, or a kind of self.  
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Ironically, it is through the simulacrum of the brand token’s singular history or origin 
that capital circulation is reanalyzed as authenticity. That is, the authentic branded good 
is that good whose unique commodity path is an inverse icon of (an equally unique) 
profit flow from point of purchase to the trademark owner. Here the discourse of origin or 
quality (the “good will” of the brand) acts as a simulacrum, setting the conditions which 
make branded goods “authentic.” Authorized copies of the brand are backed by the law 
and construed as legitimate because they supposedly have the same origin, and this sets 
the conditions on how consumers experience branded goods (e.g., as status-ful, as “real,” 
as desirable). In doing so it excludes other goods like counterfeits as “inauthentic.” 
Through such simulacra the brand is an abstraction from (the mere exchange value 
of) commodity forms into a higher order type, reorganizing and reclassifying the world of 
commodities as instances of brands. BRAND, then, is a simulation of the commodity, and 
does its work through a set of simulacra. And as many have shown, this has entailed a 
reformulation of how engagement with objects and exchange in and out of the market 
work. This is the most recent phase in extraction of profit under capitalism: 
commodification of the right to access types of commodities (Frow 1996, 2002) and the 
effects of the consumption of tokens of such types (Arvidsson 2005; Foster 2007). 
 
3.3.6.2 Duplicate as simulacrum 
What are we to make, then, of the duplicate under the BRAND ontology? The duplicate 
garment is a counterfeit in Baudrillard’s sense. The duplicate is inauthentic. It is not 
authorized by the social order (i.e., IP law) in an analogous way that the counterfeit of the 
Classical Era was a simulacrum of the natural, divine order. The duplicate falsely 
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attributes origin. It is a parasite on brand image and identity, siphoning off profits from 
the rightful IP owners (Wilkins 1992; Wilke and Zaichkowsky 1999; Vann 2006; Pang 
2008). The duplicate is a simulacrum of a meta-discursive mapping of brand types-to-
tokens, falsely including itself under a type to which it doesn’t belong.  
And again, the problem with the duplicate (from the point of view of particular brand 
types) is not with falsity of form or material. In fact, a piece of clothing is counterfeit 
even if it is the exact same design, with the same cut, materials, stitching, made in the 
same factory by the same people as the authentic item, sold to the customer in an 
authorized store by employees on the company payroll. Rather the problem is with 
profits. If profits do not go to the brand owners it is counterfeit. In this way, then, the 
duplicate does not disrupt the law of exchange as made possible by brands, but short 
circuits it. That is, it is a challenge to particular brands, but not to the larger ontology of 
the BRAND.  
Indeed, it is precisely through legal discourse’s labeling as “fake” and “inauthentic” 
that the duplicate reinvests the branded form with reality and authenticity. Functioning 
like the hyper-real Disneyland, the duplicate serves to legitimate the reality of the brand, 
covering the fact that BRAND itself is not a natural category, but one achieved through 
various brand related meta-discourses which regiment an order of iconism and 
indexicality so that otherwise similar objects are forced into the categories “authentic” 
and “inauthentic.”  
 
3.3.6.3 Aesthetics of brandedness as simulation of the brand 
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What are we to make of the aesthetic of brandedness discussed in chapters 6 and 7? 
What exactly is the implicit challenge of the duplicate in the hands of Tamil youth (i.e., 
under the ontology of style)? Remember that the brand is founded on its ability to 
differentiate signs—i.e., regiment iconicity—out of an otherwise homogeneous range of 
so-construed indistinct objects. The duplicate as used by Tamil youth offers an implicit 
challenge to that because it blurs the boundaries that brands attempt to regiment. The 
duplicate threatens to extinguish the simulacrum of aura and authenticity that brands 
instantiate, and thereby reveal their artificiality (cf. Pang 2008).  
This is a challenge, though, only to the extent that branded forms are treated 
indifferently with respect to their authenticity, that is, to their BRAND ontology. When the 
duplicate is accepted as just as good, just as functional, as the authentic brand token, the 
ontology of the BRAND is, to use a Baudrillardian turn of phrase, liquidated. But why is 
this so? It is precisely because the meta-semiotic basis of the brand as a type that 
regiments a set of tokens is scrambled when the duplicate (known to be a duplicate) is 
treated indiscriminately with authentic brand tokens (cf. the process of genericide).  
This is precisely what happens among young men in Tamil Nadu in their use of 
branded forms not as tokens of a brand type, but as part of an aesthetics of brandedness. 
In this alternative ontology, the brand is simulated at a higher logical type. As such 
brands become abstracted into a larger classification, and their aura of identity and origin 
(their “brand image”) is bracketed. Under this new ontology, tokens of the type are able 
to perform a different kind of functionality, imbued with new indexical connections and 
entailments: performing style in the peer group. Here, under an aesthetic of brandedness 
the duplicate makes the BRAND (as a set of brand types) irrelevant. It denaturalizes it by 
swapping out the brand meta-discourse, its figures of personhood, and its associated 
meanings with an alternative meta-discourse, figures of personhood, and associated 
meanings.  
Among young Tamil men doing style, then, brands are simulated. The indexical 
connections and images otherwise associated with particular brands are replaced with the 
idea of the brand (or as Baudrillard would put it, the “sign” of the brand). Branded forms 
are disconnected from questions of authenticity/inauthenticity and true/false and 
reconnected to questions of social function (status-raising) and aesthetics (i.e., not the 
aura of brand identity, but the aura of exteriority). The surface form remains but it is re-
ontologized within a new functionality and principle of equivalence: can it perform style? 
With respect to the BRAND ontology, the branded form becomes a decontextualized shell 
of itself, a trope of its older meaning, reinfused with new meaning and recontextualized 
by an alternate set of meta-discourses. I chart out the recursion of simulation in Figure 
8.4 below. 
 Figure 8.4 Recursion of simulation 
     simulation of com-    
 simulacrum of simulation of   modity/simula-  simulacrum of simulation of  
   natural order   object as utility   crum of “aura”    brand identity    BRANDedness 
 
  Object   Counterfeit Commodity    Brand   Duplicate        Style-ish branded  
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                          form 
 
  Real unto itself  Copy as real Copy unto itself    Real as copy Copy as real   Alternative ontology  
    Counterfeit Abstraction    Simulation Counterfeit        that liquidates the  
            copy/real dialectic                
            through simulation 
  Singular object   Mechanical reproduction  
    
 Classical era  Industrial capitalism    Consumer capitalism 
 
ONTOLOGY OF THE “REAL”  (ONTOLOGY OF BRAND)                    AESTHETICS OF                             
                BRANDEDNESS 
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Keeping in mind the conditions of possibility for this alternative ontology—the 
disconnect of brand meta-discourse from branded form, willful ignorance of brands, the 
contingencies of global capital and export surplus, the meta-discourses of the film hero 
and style, the peer group dynamic of status-raising as diagrammatic of the experience of 
‘youth’ and thus the motivation of the use of brands (among other signs) as style—wh
want to point out is that this simulation is motivated from the ground up and not by any 
abstract notion of “system,” or cybernetic, auto-poetic logos of capital or brand (see 
Sylavnus’ [2007] for another such example of bottom-up simulation). Simulation, even
a decontextualization of an older norm/system, is always contextually grounded both in 
its genesis and its next turn recontextualization. It is this indexicality that Baudrillard 
misses as he only focuses on the process of abstraction. But as I have shown, this is only 
part of a larger semiotic process in w
ulation, while necessarily involving abstraction, always creates new sets of index
presuppositions and entailments.43  
One inductive proof that indeed we are dealing with different ontologies (one of 
which is the simulation of the other) is to look at the range of forms that are included 
within the notion of “authentic” goods, on the one hand, and within the categories of
“inauthentic” duplicates on the other across the two ontologies. When the distinction o
true/false brands is relevant, where the duplicate is a simulacrum, there is a cat-an
mouse game between counterfeiters and the brand company where the production of 
counterfeits and originals are increasingly similar and the diacritics of difference 
 
43 Another way to put this is that “abstraction” is itself an indexical shifter. It is always “abstraction with 
respect to” some semiotic aspect of a form. The de-indexicalification of one aspect of a form opens up new 
indexical horizons vis-à-vis other aspects.   
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increasingly minute (see Phillips 2005 for some nice examples; see Bush et al. 1989 on 
other methods of introducing authentic differences, e.g., bar codes). This is the economy 
of exact duplicates, but where ironically such duplicates do not offer a real challen
the brand as BRAND, just as to the question of where the profits of particular brand 
go. When there is no distinction between the true/false brand, where the brand is 
simulated, we find that counterfeits have very low fidelity. Indeed, there is a push 
(insofar as differentiation increases market saturation) toward distortion, hybridization, 
and differentiation from the model, but contained within a more general a
ndedness. This aesthetics expands the flexibility of brand iconism proportionally 
the discerning powers, or lack thereof, of the consumer and producer.44  
To uncover that Tamil uses of branded forms function as simulations of BRAN
however is to move away from the forms themselves to the meta-semiotic condition
possibility of such forms as they make such forms intelligible and pragmatically 
efficacious in actual moments of use. In this context it is telling that the economics 
literature on counterfeits (which is highly production-centric) is fixated on the fidelity of 
copies rather than on the indexical and meta-indexical aspects of the uses of copies. We 
can also critique Baudrillard on this point: he is obsessed with the fidelity of copies.
is because he privileges and fetishizes the real and the authentic without any sensitivity to
 
44  We can compare this situation with the various “regimes of value” that Jamieson (1999) discusses 
regarding collector cultures of vinyl records. He distinguishes between two ontological organizations of 
counterfeit records, those which fetishize the original object (the records) and those that fetishize access to 
the recordings (i.e., the songs on the records) as part of DJ performances of exclusive knowledge. This 
parallels our discussion of the ontologies of BRAND and STYLE, whereby in the first “regime” it is fidelity 
and authenticity that confer authority while in the second it is performance in the peer group that generates 
authenticity. In this second regime, copies do not extinguish aura but increase it (cf. Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2009: 20). In the second regime, the duplicate brackets the question of the object per se and 
reanalyzes it as part of a different ontology. As Jamieson notes, the difference between the first and second 
regime is that the first is based on the “axiomatic knowledge of the primordial character of particular 
categories of object” (Jamieson 1999: 9) while the second is not.  
 416
e dependent on particular meta-semiotic discourses 
ut into play in particular contexts of social action. That is, they are not the inherent 
 objects in question.  
 
g of 
rgued that a semiotic account of 
sim  
er, I 
lly 
 
requires an appeal to the indexicality of the sign and its imbrication in meta-discursive 
the fact that concepts like “fidelity to _____,” “copy of _____,” and “simulation of 
_____” are indexical concepts that ar
p
qualities of the
3.4 Summary 
In this section I have shown how the Baudrillardian concepts of simulation and 
simulacrum can be applied to the study of duplicate branded goods. Further, I have 
shown how theorizing the duplicate as a kind of simulation is crucial to our theorizin
the brand more generally. This, however, requires us to abstract from Baudrillard’s 
concepts (to make a simulation of them, in fact). I a
ulation and simulacrum as the play between meta-semiosis and indexicality allows us
to rescue Baudrillard from a number of problems.  
As our discussion shows, the semiotic structure of simulation is not one necessarily 
linked to an apocalyptic vision of capitalism as an uncontrollable cybernetic or 
Saussurean system of signs tyrannically and invisibly ruling from the top down. Rath
argued that simulation (even in the cases discussed by Baudrillard) is always indexica
grounded and dependent on particular meta-semiotic discourses, and thus ultimately 
defeasible or tropically reformulatable from the bottom up. The case of Tamil youth 
fashion shows how the BRAND ontology is simulatable, and how this principle of value
(style qua exteriority qua youth status) is of a totally different form than the 
Saussurean/Baudrillardean system/code of pure equivalences. But to make this move 
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orld of the brand and simulation as the creeping shadows of capitalism.  
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er which the brand relationship holds in general. It shows us 
when a brand is and is not. 
frameworks. It also requires empirical work with actual consumers and users of branded
forms in their cultural contexts of use. Otherwise we risk being drawn into the illuso
w
 
onclusions  
In this chapter I have shown that: (a) The brand is a meta-semiotically organized
whereby a set of tokens are taken as instances of a brand type which is indexical of 
source/producer and symbolic of a brand image. Further, the condition of possibility of 
brand types is the larger meta-semiotic configuration which grounds and is grounded by 
the ontological category BRAND. We saw how this ontology can be defeased in the Ta
case of youth fashion and style. (b) Simulation and simulacra are also meta-semiotic 
forms of the same configuration. There are as many kinds/orders of simulation/simulacra
as there are meta-discourses which reanalyze and recontextualize some set of forms at a 
higher logical type vis-à-vis different functionalities and principles of classification. The 
brand is a further development of simulation within capitalism. (c) The duplicate in Tamil
Nadu under the aesthetics of brandedness foregrounds this meta-semiotic component and 
shows us the conditions und
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